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ABSTRACT
The research presented in this thesis examines the changing nature of environmental 
decision-making processes and their implications for scientists. The fundamental 
issue is how can we get the right science, in an appropriate social context, to support 
environmental decision-making? This question is considered by examining the issues 
surrounding the management of radioactive wastes. Specifically, the research looks 
at the qualities and culture of the geosciences in fostering participatory risk analyses.
The primary aim of the work is to identify vehicles for debate in order to build a 
knowledge platform shared by a range of stakeholders. Social science theory is 
used to guide scientific practice in risk assessment. The thesis has been structured 
into three sections;
• A literature review examining modern trends in the social framing of 
decisions and the management of risk;
• An analysis of the specific case of radioactive waste management;
• New studies exploring the implications of increased stakeholder engagement 
in evaluating the risks from the deep geological disposal of radioactive 
wastes.
Overall, it is concluded that opportunities for developing and sharing knowledge 
between scientists, stakeholders and the public can and should be created. Because 
of the highly quantitative nature of risk analyses, this sharing is best addressed at a 
conceptual, qualitative level. Important considerations are that the knowledge 
building process is iterative and reflexive and that dialogue between participants 
begins early in the process. If an appropriate process is adopted, conceptual 
understanding can be used to support both social learning and quantitative analysis 
for expert regulation. A methodology for a participatory risk assessment for deep 
geological disposal is advanced. The research concludes that conceptual models can 
provide vehicles for debate, but the construction of a shared knowledge platform is 
more elusive.
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EARTH SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND DECISION MAKING:
THE ROLE O F CONCEPTUAL GEOSCIENCE IN  PARTICIPATORY RISK  
ASSESSMENTS FOR DEEP GEOLOGICAL D ISPO SAL
1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to good practice in environmental decision-making. 
The research examines how to increase opportunities for broad interaction and knowledge 
building about the cause and effect of environmental processes. These issues are 
examined in the context of assessing the risks from the disposal of radioactive wastes deep 
underground. The developments proposed in this thesis centre around encouraging debate 
to build a knowledge platform that is shared by both scientific and non-scientific participants 
in the decision-making process.
Environmental policy-making is becoming increasingly complex. The notion of sustainability 
places a responsibility on today’s societies to consider economic, social and environmental 
issues alongside each other. Decision-makers -  often representing the UK Government -  
are now seeking to make decisions about projects presenting a risk to the environment 
based on a measure of public consensus. They are adopting stakeholder dialogue and 
consultation as part of the decision-making process. Traditional practices for bringing 
scientific knowledge into decision-making are called into question by this new way of 
working, which challenges the long-established, technocratic approach of judging the 
acceptability of environmental risk against a set of regulatory criteria established by a 
limited set of stakeholders.
These new processes for environmental decision-making call for various stakeholders1 and 
public constituents2 to come together and share issues, concerns and values about the 
decision in hand. The premise is that all these individuals and groups have knowledge 
relevant to the decision. The hope is that by sharing this knowledge, the resulting decision 
will have solid social, environmental and economic foundations. However, such knowledge 
sharing modifies the demands on scientists holding expert knowledge about environmental 
processes. Meeting these demands requires some careful and reflective consideration 
about how different forms of knowledge are prepared, presented and debated during the 
decision process.
1 A stakeholder is an individual or group of individuals who are directly or indirectly affected by the 
decision and therefore can be viewed as having a stake in its outcome.
2 The term public constituents is used here to describe the wide range of different individuals and 
groups who together constitute the society in which the decision is being made.
1
1.1 Aims
My objective is to examine the changing nature of environmental decision-making 
processes in order to identify ways of evolving the knowledge building processes that 
support these decisions. The fundamental issue is how can we get the right science in an 
appropriate social context to build an effective knowledge base for decision-making?
The primary aim of this thesis is to identify vehicles for shared knowledge building that take 
into account modern trends in the social framing of decisions and acknowledge the value of 
other (less expert) forms of knowledge about environmental processes. I have used social 
science theory to guide the development of scientific practice in the field of environmental 
risk assessment. My main focus has been to find new ways of building analytic-deliberative 
decision-making into the specific decision-problem of radioactive waste disposal. My 
hypothesis is that qualitative descriptions, captured in conceptual models offer potential as 
a vehicle for debate. Such debate is necessary in order to build a platform of shared 
knowledge that can be used to inform risk analysis in environmental decision making.
1.2 Audiences
Shared knowledge building raises issues for social and physical scientists since they will 
both be challenged to think outside traditional comfort zones. However, the thesis is 
primarily aimed at physical scientists who may be involved in providing expert knowledge 
into consultative environmental decision-making. In particular, I hope to make a 
contribution to the literature supporting good practice in the nuclear industry.
The work presented in this document sits on the boundaries between scientific practice and 
social science theory. Both areas of work have their own language and informal codes of 
conduct. One of the difficulties of presenting work that sits on such interfaces is that there 
are two distinct bodies of academic research to reflect, and two distinct sets of language 
and mindset. Therefore, the contents of this thesis cover a very broad range of topics from 
a range of different academic disciplines. The scope of the thesis is therefore broad and 
has been structured to reflect a line of integrated thought, rather than any conventional 
topical arrangement according to discipline..
1.3 Context
This thesis originates from the experience of working with Nirex (the company charged with 
developing proposals for the safe long-term management of the UK radioactive wastes) in 
the 1990’s. During that time, the national policy for the management of certain types of
2
radioactive waste was to dispose of them deep underground. The development of 
proposals to meet that policy were based on assessments of the potential risks to humans 
from radioactivity returning to the surface environment for very long times into the future. 
An important component of research was to understand how the geology and hydrogeology 
at the site of the repository would affect its evolution and the consequential migration of 
radionuclides. To inform this research, one of the major site investigation and geoscience 
programmes in the UK at the time was undertaken in West Cumbria by Nirex.
A major focus of this site investigation programme was the integration of various aspects of 
geoscientific information into a conceptual understanding of the repository site, and the 
integration of this understanding into models capable of calculating risks from the 
repository. Having developed an understanding of the site, Nirex applied for planning 
permission to undertake further research from a mined underground facility, a “Rock 
Characterisation Facility or RCF. However, Nirex was not successful in gaining planning 
permission. The research leading to this thesis was initiated by a personal view that this 
failure partially stemmed from a naive approach to the use of scientific knowledge in a 
decision making process for a project of such social significance.
The viewpoint from which this thesis is written has been developed from experience as a 
practising scientist working on the long-term management of radioactive waste - a difficult 
and dynamic area of environmental policy. I have worked, directly and indirectly, for Nirex, 
for 15 years. Over these years, I have experienced much satisfaction and much frustration 
over the use of “my” scientific information in public and corporate decision-making. These 
highs and lows have been partly determined by the quality of interaction between 
scientists, other stakeholders and public constituents. In consequence, although it remains 
a prerequisite that the cognitive content of scientific information is of high quality, it is no 
longer sufficient to ensure that the information is used effectively in decision-making. Since 
I believe that scientific information has a fundamental role to play in the decision-making 
process, this thesis explores new ways of ensuring that the value of science is maintained 
in decision-making processes where scientists are not the only source of knowledge.
1.4 Methodological approach
The approach taken for this research is outlined below. As with any research undertaken 
over a prolonged period of time, the ideas evolved during the process.
1.4.1 Literature R eview - Framing the problem (Section 1)
My starting point for the research is the assumption that scientific knowledge in general, 
and geoscientific knowledge in particular is important to evolving forms of environmental
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decision-making. Initially, this assumption is explored against the background of literature 
that discusses:
• the changing context for environmental decision-making (chapter 2);
• participation and its role in decision-making (chapter 3);
• risk analysis and the treatment of uncertainty (chapter 4)
This literature review suggests that the manner in which this knowledge has been used in 
the past has inhibited opportunities for stakeholders to engage with science during the 
decision-making process (chapter 5). Traditionally in many industries, scientific knowledge 
has been bought into decisions about the environment in the form of an assessment of 
environmental risk. Such risk assessments use scientific knowledge and mathematical 
models to make calculations of potential harm to the environment arising from a proposed 
course of action. I suggest that the highly quantitative nature of these risk evaluations can, 
in isolation, mask the value of the scientific contribution to environmental decision making. 
In essence, shared knowledge building is constrained by the highly technical nature of the 
risk analysis.
1.4.2 Case Study Analysis -  The specific case of radioactive waste management
(Section 2)
The validity of my conclusions from the literature review is tested against case study 
material drawn from the radioactive waste management industry (Chapters 6,7 and 8). 
This topic is controversial and requires an assessment of potential environmental risks 
about which there is a large amount of uncertainty. My experience has been in this area, 
having worked for Nirex, an organisation charged with developing options for the safe 
management of certain radioactive wastes in the United Kingdom. Nirex’s experiences 
give rise to empirical information available from the eighties and nineties about how 
scientific knowledge has been used in making decisions on behalf of society. Specifically, 
the difficulties of using “performance assessments” (the term used for assessments that 
examine the long term risks from disposing of radioactive waste deep underground) are 
considered. The relationships between values and knowledge in the performance 
assessment is explored, together with the cultural difficulties of using such a highly expert 
process to encourage debate with those holding different expertise.
As a result, I argue for greater use of conceptual presentations of the physical and 
chemical processes giving rise to environmental risk as a common platform for knowledge 
building. This argument is tested in a series of linked empirical studies (Section 3). The 
linking between these studies is shown in Figure 0.
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Figure 0: Linking between the studies presented in Section 3
Dialogue 
W hat are the areas of concern  
with deep geological disposal?
Risk communication  
Can we present risk 
results in a more 
meaningful way?
Visual Language 
Can we encourage  
debate about the 
underpinning  
concepts?
Participatory risk assessm ent 
Can we integrate dialogue and analysis?
1.4.3 A dialogue about issues and concerns with deep geological disposal of 
radioactive wastes. (Chapter 9)
A series of public focus groups were commissioned to talk about public concerns about the 
deep geological disposal of radioactive waste. The aim was to identify areas of common 
interest that could form a focus for the development of visual representations of important 
concepts relevant to the risk analysis.
Eight focus group were established across the UK. Each focus group met for a two hour 
session on two consecutive weeks. The groups were selected to reflect different 
demographics and were arranged and managed by an independent facilitator.
As well as analysing the results of the dialogue, reflective practice was applied to the 
design and development of the dialogue process since it involved extensive discussions 
between analysts from Nirex and a facilitator with no prior knowledge of radioactive waste 
management.
The study identified many areas of interest. Concerns about long timescales and worries 
about contamination underground were taken forward into the next study. These concerns 
go right to the heart of the risks associated with deep geological disposal.
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1.4.4 Presenting the outcomes of long-term risk results for deep geological 
disposal (Chapter 10)
An analytical study was undertaken to look at ways of improving the output of risk analyses 
for deep geological disposal. The study worked from the assumption that the long 
timescales involved are problematical for people wanting to engage with the issue of 
radioactive waste disposal. The study focussed on the outputs of Nirex “performance 
assessments”. Attention was payed to the manner in which the long timescales involved 
are conveyed. This issue emerged as a difficult communication area from the dialogue 
work described above. The study applied communication theory to the results of the most 
recent Nirex performance assessment and assessed the effectiveness of the revised 
presentations through individual discussions with non-technical staff within Nirex.
Whilst this study has potential value for the communication of risks, it did not address the 
central hypothesis, that qualitative descriptions of concepts can be used as vehicles for 
debate. A parallel study was undertaken to develop these descriptions.
1.4.5 Presenting deep geological disposal in visual language (Chapter 11)
Participatory research was used to develop visual representations of the key concepts 
about the role of rocks in deep geological disposal. Visual Language is a novel 
communication technique. The assumption behind this study was that a visual
representation could encourage debate and deliberation about the science of deep 
geological disposal. Iterative review and development was used to develop the visual 
language.
Initially, a set of visual representations were developed. Contextual representations were 
developed to address some of the issues identified from the dialogue work, more detailed 
representations were developed from knowledge of the important processes captured in 
the risk assessments.
The first pass representations were subject to focus group discussions within Nirex, using 
groups of individuals designed to reflect different levels of familiarity with the scientific 
concepts of deep geological disposal. Comments from these groups were used to develop 
a second version. This second version was subjected to an independently facilitated 
workshop involving 10 participants from the social science academic community. A review 
report was produced from this workshop. This review report was used to assess the 
potential for visual language to act as a vehicle for dialogue.
1.4.6 Integrating dialogue into risk analysis (Chapter 12)
Both the previous studies were essentially about communication and dialogue. A key issue 
for the research was to determine whether the outcomes of this dialogue could be included 
as an integral component of the risk analysis process. The risk assessment processes
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used by Nirex were revisited to look at how the assessment process could incorporate the 
findings of the preceding studies. The aim of this was to propose a new approach to risk 
assessment where analysis and deliberation were integrated into a single process.
1.5 Limitations of the research
Given the above context, it will be apparent that the research outlined above was 
undertaken whilst I was an employee of Nirex. Hence I was a participant-observer, not an 
objective researcher. This has several consequences for the research:
• whilst I have sought to preserve an impartial view through the research, there will be 
some embedded values that arise from having worked in a radioactive waste 
management implementation organisation for a long time. For example, I have not 
seriously questioned whether or not radioactive wastes should be managed by 
deep geological disposal, except peripherally when exploring value judgements in 
Nirex’s performance assessment.
• Essentially, any dialogue presented in this thesis was undertaken under Nirex 
sponsorship and with a Nirex brand associated with it. One way of minimising the 
consequences of this has been to use independent facilitators for the major 
dialogue components. However, ultimately Nirex funded all of this external work 
which may have influenced the participants views and the way they responded to 
the dialogue.
• Nirex’s stated mission over this period was to “develop safe, environmentally sound 
and socially acceptable options for the long term management of radioactive 
wastes”. Whilst there is no conflict between Nirex’ mission, the goals of this 
research and my own personal values, I had to adapt some of the research 
programme to address broader needs than those of the research alone. This 
means that the integration and resolution of the various empirical studies is not as 
strong as it might have been. Specifically, a logical conclusion to the research 
would be a testing of the participatory performance assessment method developed 
at the end of this research. This would have involved dialogue work which, due to 
changing policy contexts, Nirex did not feel able to undertake at the time.
• And finally, Nirex is a very focussed organisation, whose mandate relates solely to 
the management of radioactive wastes. This focus is shared by Nirex’s employees. 
Therefore the research is similarly very focussed on radioactive waste 
management. My employment within a particular industry, whilst providing an 
extremely valuable source of experience and information during the research
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process, may have limited the extent to which I was able to identify and see 
connections into other research fields and industry applications.
It is also worth noting that the research has focussed on the visual representation of 
information into dialogue and debate. This will undoubtedly reflect my own preferences for 
visual forms of information. The research could equally have considered the contribution 
that could be made from other forms of information. However, the goal of the research is 
not about information provision, it is about engaging interest and capturing the 
consequence of dialogue. Therefore, it seemed appropriate for me to have chosen to try 
and capture the dialogue in the information form with which I am most comfortable.
And finally, with the emphasis of the research being on the radioactive waste management 
industry, it is necessary to consider its applicability outside the field. Decisions about the 
management of radioactive waste are affected by a number of issues. These issues reflect 
the growing body of academic literature on decision analysis, risk perception, deliberative 
democracy, trust, credibility and transparency. Decision-makers have to deal with a great 
many different views on:
• the long term environmental significance of the wastes
• the dread of radiation,
• connotations with nuclear weapons
• the historical legacy of the nuclear industry in general
• inevitable links with the future of the nuclear industry
Many other environmental projects have to face a similar mixed bag of issues, some of 
which derive from the scientific evaluation of a project, others which derive from social 
values and past history. Therefore, although this thesis has been generated on the basis 
of experiences with radioactive waste management in the 1990’s it has a more general 
applicability to other projects that pose a long-term risk to the environment. Nevertheless, 
this more general applicability is not explored thoroughly within this thesis.
1.6 Structure of this thesis.
This thesis has been structured into three sections. Section 1 analyses existing literature 
relevant to the research. Section 2 analyses the specific case study of radioactive waste 
management. Section 3 presents the empirical work undertaken to address the research 
questions arising from the first two stages. The next Chapter is the start of the literature 
review and presents an overview of the issues arising in the emerging field of 
environmental decision-making.
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Section 1
The role of science in environmental
decision-making:
Framing the Problem
2 ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEBATE
The context for environmental decisions is changing at local, national and international 
levels. In consequence, both the process for, and the content of environmental decision­
making need to be rethought. This raises questions about the knowledge that is 
required to support new, socially inclusive processes and the processes that affect those 
holding such knowledge. This chapter explores these questions to establish the context 
for the research in this thesis.
2.1 Environmental decision-making -  a definition
The environment is a shared resource. It responds to any action that we take. We are 
learning about our relationships with the environment all the time, and realising that for 
any action, there are many possible futures that could reasonably be considered, often 
with widely diverging consequences. Environmental decision-making is about 
determining an appropriate course of action, despite the associated uncertainty.
Environmental decision-making needs to consider whether our actions could threaten 
the ability of the environment to sustain our societal norms. Changes to the environment 
are becoming more significant as we become increasingly aware of the long-term 
impacts of our past actions. Over the last few decades the concept of environmental 
decision-making has grown, culminating in the ratification of the principles of sustainable 
development at the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 [WCED, 1987]
2.2 The influence of sustainable development
It is impossible to separate economic development from its impact on the environment. 
Raw materials and energy are provided by the environment in which we live and 
economic growth generates waste products that require disposal. In consequence, the 
environmental resources on which economic development is based are eroded [WCED, 
1987]. Societies are therefore challenged to find ways of pursuing economic 
development that are sustainable and will limit degradation of the environment on which 
they are reliant. In consequence, since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, sustainable 
development and sustainability have become key elements of environmental policy.
Sustainable development provides a framework for weighing up the potential benefits of 
economic developments against the risk of detrimental impact on the environment. This
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concept now dominates the national and international environmental policy arena. Its 
intentions are captured in a commonly used definition proposed by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development. This states that “sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.
Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment recommends that the widest 
possible participation should be encouraged. Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development states that “ environmental issues are best handled with 
the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level...” (WCED 1987). In 
response, successive governments in the United Kingdom have been seeking to 
describe how sustainable development will be put into practice [DETR, 1999b; DoE, 
1994]. Increasingly, governmental organisations are seeking to integrate economy, 
society and the environment in setting environmental policy at both national and local 
government levels. Internationally, a convention on “Access to Information, Public 
participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters” (the 
Aarhus convention) [UN, 1998] was developed through the United Nations in 1998 to 
provide a global framework for addressing these issues.
Consequently, decision-makers are seeking to consult prior to, and during the 
determination of a course of action that will impact the environment [Munton and Collins, 
1998, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2000]. The decision analysis 
and operational research literature reflects the major effect that such “deliberative 
democracy” is having on decision-making processes [Bell et al, 1988]. Essentially, this 
work implies the need for new relationships between all those interested in, and affected 
by, the decision. [Petts and Leach, 2000]. An aim of deliberative democracy is to 
empower “society at large” to influence decisions about what constitutes an acceptable 
development [Bohman and Rehg, 1997]. Under the framework of sustainable 
development, “society at large” includes both current generations, who are able to speak 
for themselves, and future generations whose needs have to be anticipated.
A common position adopted in many genuine attempts to respond to the principles of 
sustainable development is the idea of “balancing” between:
• Environmental issues, often informed by researchers and practitioners in science,
engineering and technology;
• Economic issues, such as those that determine productivity, viability and maintain
a healthy economy;
• Social Issues, that determine individual and collective quality of life.
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The idea is that by considering these three pillars of sustainable development, the 
perceived benefits of a decision can be weighed against possible detriment. However, 
the benefits of economic development are not distributed equally across society or 
across the globe [Giddens, 1999]. In addition, the “environment” means different things 
to different people, and different people may have different opinions as to what 
constitutes an “adverse consequence”. The art of balancing the benefits of economic 
development against potential environmental risk requires consideration of what will be 
gained from the development and what could be harmed by the development [DETR, 
1999b]. However, there are no simple answers to these questions. For different people, 
the answer will differ depending on their personal values and by value judgements3. 
These differences have fuelled debates on underlying ethical questions such as:
• how much value should we place on future generations?
• what value do we place on economic development?
• to what extent do we need to minimise consequences?
Answers to these questions vary significantly between the international, national and 
local scales and depending on whether individual benefits or collective benefits are of 
concern. Additionally, anticipation of the needs of future generations in these three areas 
is extremely difficult since the future is, by definition, uncertain. This has led to an often 
observed problem in interpreting the principles of sustainable development. It is very 
difficult to move from fairly general statements of principle towards ideas of best practice 
and measurement criteria that are acceptable to all players.
These questions about how to interpret the principles of sustainable development may 
mask a deeper issue. Some workers express a concern that this difficulty in interpreting 
the “balance” model of sustainable development has obscured the underpinning 
ideology -  that technical, economic and social factors all need to be healthy if 
sustainability is to be achieved. This is the concept of “deep sustainability” [UNESA, 
2002, Lovins et al, 2001].
Deep sustainability highlights the importance of the social processes surrounding an 
environmental decision. Whereas in the balance model, it is possible to separate 
knowledge about environmental, social and economic factors on the assumption that 
these factors will be “weighed” against each other at some point, deep sustainability 
calls for them all to be interwoven together. The balance model is therefore more 
comfortable for specialists with a particular form of expertise since it allows them to
a A value judgement is a subjective judgement informed by a specific set of moral and ethical 
standpoints.
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remain within their discipline on the assumption that “someone else” will do the 
balancing act. The model of deep sustainability challenges those involved to think 
outside the boundaries of their own particular expertise and experience. In 
consequence, it is redefining the boundaries of knowledge pertinent to environmental 
decision-making.
Since the eighties, there has been a lot of thinking and analysis of the role of different 
kinds of knowledge in environmental policy making. Research [Giddens, 1990, Beck, 
1992a] suggests that we are undergoing a change so that anxiety, uncertainty, radical 
doubt and reflexivity are replacing past “truths” such as trust in experts and belief in 
Government. Giddens identifies that this “reflexive modernisation” undermines 
knowledge and erodes levels of trust in those in authority. This includes the authority 
that scientists once enjoyed as the purveyors of knowledge.
This contemporary thinking does not seek to downgrade science -  rather to place it 
effectively within its social context. Both Beck and Giddens identify that risks to the 
environment are a major preoccupation and Beck cites Immanuel Kant’s conclusion from 
“A critique of pure reason (published in the 18th Century) that “scientific rationality 
without social rationality is empty, but social rationality without scientific rationality is 
blind' [Beck, 1986]. The question thus becomes how can we get the right science in an 
appropriate social context to build an effective knowledge base for decision-making?
2.3 Knowledge and environmental decision-making
Environmental decision-making responds to demands for new approaches to managing 
our relationships with the environment. Scientists have always been part of the decision­
making process thanks to the knowledge that they bring to the decision. However, 
mounting evidence of failures to adequately assess the consequences of our action is 
leading towards lack of confidence in this traditional knowledge base. The power of 
scientific knowledge used in isolation is waning (Beck 1992b).
Knowledge can be defined in several, equally legitimate ways. For example, in one 
dictionary [OED] it is defined both as “the facts or experiences known by a person or a 
group of people” and “consciousness or familiarity gained by experience or learning”. In 
this thesis, I have adopted the second definition and in so doing I am suggesting that 
knowledge extends beyond facts. The rationale for this claim arises from the need to 
inform environmental decisions by knowledge arising from:
• science and technology, which provides an understanding of processes affecting 
the environment;
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• the social landscape in operation, which is a way of describing the important values 
and concerns held by those individuals, groups and cultures (stakeholders) that will 
be affected by the development, now and in the future; and
• the results of consultation, which enables the decision-maker to develop a view on 
the general acceptability of the risk and the perceived benefits of the project at the 
time of consultation.
Not all of this information will be factual, but under sustainable development all will be 
pertinent to the decision. Box 1 clarifies further definitions of terms used in this chapter 
of the thesis.
Simplistically, a linear relationship between knowledge and decision making can be 
considered. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1
Figure 1. A  sim plistic view  of knowledge and decision-m aking
Goal or 
aspiration
Pertinent 
knowledge  
and levels
Potential
consequences
Social I
Learning Action
This linear model implies that the acquisition of knowledge for decision-making is 
relatively straightforward -  a collation exercise that is undertaken as a precursor to the 
decision-making process. It is easy to see how scientific knowledge fits into this linear 
approach. For example, the Earth Sciences would provide knowledge bases such as 
mineral reserve estimations, aquifer potential assessments or site characteristics to 
inform cost-benefit analyses for resource development decisions.
14
Box 1: Definitions of terms relating to “knowledge”
Knowledge: consciousness or familiarity gained by experience or learning 
Facts: a truth verifiable from experience or observation 
Information: knowledge acquired through experience or study
Expert: a person who has extensive skill or knowledge in a particular field. This could be in a 
particular scientific discipline, or in the fields of economics or social science. Their knowledge 
(expert knowledge) is necessary, but not sufficient for the decision.
Expert Knowledge: tends to be structured and organised according to specific cultural guidelines 
dictated by the profession and its history.
Lay knowledge: This knowledge is also relevant to the decision but is likely to be experiential and 
can be very unstructured. It tends to be quite context specific. Within that context, the layperson 
could be an expert (as defined above). However, the context can be quite narrow. In this 
definition of the term lay knowledge would not necessarily be held by the experts since they are 
more likely to deal with generalities and principles.
Social Learning: The development of a collective knowledge and understanding that can be used 
to inform policy development. This can include developing the individual understanding of 
the participants and also improving the availability of information to society in general. 
Social learning is generally achieved when all partners modify their behaviours.
Uncertainty: something that is not accurately known or predictable. There are many different 
types of uncertainty including issues that are known to be uncertain (known unknowns) and also 
uncertainties that are not yet appreciated (unknown unknowns).
Values: the things that held to be of importance. These are most often discussed in terms of an 
individuals values. However, societies operate on the basis of collective value systems as well. 
Values can vary dramatically from individual to individual and from collective to collective.
Beliefs: a conviction or opinion, generally not proven that tends to be based on values.
Risk Analysis; a process through with the available knowledge is used to examine the 
consequences of a course of action in terms of future behaviour, impact or potential.
Stakeholder: An individual or group of individuals who are directly or indirectly affected by the 
decision and therefore can be viewed as having a stake in its outcome.
However, this initial information requires further evaluation to consider what may happen 
in the future -  potential consequences. This requires the incorporation of a new set of 
information, much of which is uncertain and which draws on expertise from both inside 
and outside the scientific arena. This enables:
• the evaluation of mineral reserves to evolve into an assessment of economic
potential;
• aquifer vulnerability plans to be developed from aquifer potential studies; and
• site specific risk assessments to be developed from the information provided from
site characterisation.
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These transformations are typically achieved using some form of “risk analysis” [DETR, 
2000], which is a calculation of potential consequences. Traditionally, it has been the risk 
analysis that has formed the knowledge platform on which environmental decisions have 
been based [Royal Society, 1992].
The National Research Council of the United States identifies risk analysis as “an activity 
that applies analytical techniques to the understanding of risks [National Research 
Council, 1996]. It involves estimating the likelihood of occurrence and possible severity 
of particular kinds of harm”. Risk analysis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
The point to be made here is that the validity of risk analysis as the main vehicle of 
knowledge for environmental policy-making is now under challenge. Whilst it fits well into 
the linear approach shown in Figure 1, it does not easily accommodate knowledge from 
outside the natural and physical sciences -  either social, economic or lay knowledge. 
New processes that integrate social, economic and technical issues imply a need for 
both expert knowledge provided by the scientific, social and economics professionals 
and also lay knowledge provided by the community at large
The integration of new forms of knowledge into the decision-making process challenges 
previously adopted cultural attitudes. True integration is unlikely to be best achieved 
with a linear model of knowledge development. Iteration and recursion between 
stakeholders with different forms of knowledge is likely to be required, so that one body 
of understanding can develop and evolve from another, and then feed back. Such 
iterations will enable the different forms of knowledge to work together and generate new 
ideas and values.
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of this new relationship between lay knowledge, 
professional/academic expertise and policy development. There is little new in the 
figure, except perhaps the idea of more closely linking unstructured lay views about 
impacts, with structured expertise and analysis. This goes in all areas of expertise -  
linking worries about the “pounds in my pocket” with a cost benefit analysis, linking 
concerns about environmental impacts with risk analysis.
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Figure 2. Iterative and recursive knowledge development
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2.4 Uncertainty, knowledge and values
Because we are still learning about our relationships with the environment, there will be 
uncertainty about the potential consequences of an action whatever the knowledge base 
bought into the decision-making process. The benefits of a project could vary widely 
within these possible futures, as could the potential harm. Finding a way through this 
minefield of potential futures requires a level of subjective judgement [Beck, 1992b], 
Judgement is strongly influenced by the values held by the individual (person or 
organisation) making the judgement [Keeney, 1998]. Therefore, the conclusions of 
different individuals in the face of such large uncertainty can be markedly different, even 
directly opposing. However, both conclusions can be valid for the state of knowledge.
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution address this issue in their 21st report 
on the Setting of Environmental Standards [RCEP, 1998]. They identify the very close 
linkages between knowledge, uncertainty and values.
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Values are what we care about [Keeney, 1998] and are thus inherently personalistic. 
They guide our actions and influence our decisions. They are subjective and colour our 
view of the world. Whilst I do not wish to major on a discussion of values, they are 
important in the context of setting environmental policy since they inevitably affect views 
about what should happen in the future.
In the past, values and knowledge have tended to be considered as distinct entities -  
“axiology” and “epistemology”. Hence science -  perceived to be about knowledge has 
been considered to be “value-free” -  i.e. a pursuit of knowledge that is not influenced by 
subjectivity. This distinction and separation is now being questioned. Whilst there are still 
undeniably areas of knowledge which are totally grounded in observation and hence can 
claim to be objective, there are also other areas -  those where uncertainty is high - 
where claims of objectivity are often questioned. Modelling the future is one of those 
areas.
One way of looking at the relationship between values and knowledge is that values 
provide the framework within which knowledge sits (Figure 3). Where knowledge is fairly 
certain, this framework is of little significance. However, where uncertainty is high, the 
framework becomes more significant since it provides the window through which each 
individual makes sense of the uncertainty and considers its significance. Since the value 
framework varies, the way people make sense of uncertainty will vary, and these 
variations need to be juggled by the decision-maker to determine an appropriate way 
forward. Very often, these variations can lead to significant debate about the wisdom of 
a particular course of action.
Figure 3. General relationship between knowledge, values and
uncertainty (see Box 1 for definitions)
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2.5 Environmental debates -  why do they happen?
To help evaluate the consequences of a decision, the decision maker often seeks 
knowledge about the potential risks of a project. The definition of “risk” is difficult [Royal 
Society, 1992]. Several distinct classes of risk can be identified and are discussed in 
Chapter 4. Historically, risk was an intuition -  a general good or bad feeling [Giddens,
1999]. As the insurance industry grew up it became a much more quantitative measure, 
based on the frequency and consequences of particular events determined from 
historical records [Adams, 1995]. The quantitative approach to risk has been carried into 
the environmental sector [RCEP, 1998, DETR, 2000], where risk is defined in terms of 
some measureable quantity or set threshold [DEFRA, 2002a, EA, 2000, EA, 1997], Risk 
assessment or risk analysis is the art of determining how close to that measurable 
quantity one will get [DETR, 2000]. Many industries have used this approach to 
environmental management based on linking together environmental standards, risk 
assessment, evaluation and characterisation in a logical process that could lead towards 
deciding on a course of action [Tran et al, 2000].
However, we are now realising that:
• we do not always know what hazard is posed by the set threshold [Coveney and 
Highfield, 1995]
• risk is a perceived thing and is conditioned by culture and by the type of person 
you are. - one persons risk may be another persons thrill [Wildavsky and Dake, 
1990].
• The acceptability of a risk is very individualistic [Slovic, 1987].
• The risk may change once a risk is understood -  we affect the world around us and 
are not separate from it [Adams, 1995].
Consideration of these issues generates robust debate that can challenge the adequacy 
of risk thresholds, targets or the measurable quantities established by the scientific 
community [Shrader-Frechette, 1990b; DETR, 2000]. Increasingly, calls are being made 
for decision-making processes that have a very clear role for public participation [Stern 
and Fineberg, 1998, Fischoff, 1995]. This is sometimes called the analytic-deliberative 
model of decision-making. As participation and consultation increase in profile as an 
essential component of environmental decision making, more intuitive factors are once 
again fundamental influences on any risk management strategy. These factors are risk 
acceptability and perception (Box 2), which are generally not included in a risk 
assessment. They are also both factors that will vary with different values.
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Box 2: Terms in common use for risk management
Term Definition used in this 
thesis
Examples Comment
Risk assessment 
Or
Risk analysis
the quantitative 
evaluation of the risk 
associated with an 
action, event or 
development
The risk of a bridge 
failure .
typically the domain of 
scientists and engineers. Much 
work has gone into method 
development
Risk evaluation a judgement about the 
significance of the risk
Informs a decision 
such as:
• I will/will not 
cross the road;
• the risks are 
significant because 
the threshold is 
exceeded
Risk management Typically what is done 
by the decision maker, 
and in the context of 
environmental projects 
(s)he is having to act in 
the interests of a wide 
range of stakeholders
Determines a course
of action such as:
• Speed Limits to 
reduce the risk of 
road accidents
• Welfare state to 
reduce the risk of 
extreme poverty
• Comprehensive 
education to 
ensure a certain 
level of education 
for all
Risk
characterisation
Risk characterisation has 
been termed the way in 
which the risk analysis is 
translated to the risk 
manager
Statements such as 
“this is not a problem”
Dealt with by triarge 
nurses in Accident and 
Emergency units
Can be difficult for projects 
involving many stakeholders 
with different characteristics and 
cultural backgrounds because 
“perception” and “ 
acceptability” of risk will vary
Risk perception The appreciation of the 
significance of the risk
Smokers vs non- 
smokers
Will vary dramatically 
according to personal 
characteristics and values, 
organisational culture and 
business and relevance to the 
individual or organisation
Risk acceptability the level to which the 
benefits outweigh the 
detriments
Accepting the 
Newbury bypass 
because it reduces 
congestion in the town 
centre.
Will vary dramatically 
according to personal 
characteristics and values, 
organisational culture and 
business and relevance to the 
individual or group
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Sociological and anthropological studies indicate that perception and acceptance of risk 
have their roots in social and cultural factors. Some workers [Short, 1984] argue that 
response to hazards is based on the influences transmitted by friends, family, fellow 
workers and respected public officials. Other workers [Wildavsky and Douglas, 1982] 
suggest that people, acting within social groups downplay certain risks and emphasize 
others as a means of maintaining and controlling the group. Risk acceptability and risk 
perception are therefore strongly influenced by personal and subjective judgements.
Descriptive research has indicated that there are some identifiable factors that affect the 
perception of risk. Early work by Starr [Starr, 1969] was based on seeking to explain 
historical evidence of societal response to risk. This identified that the level to which the 
exposure to risk was considered to be voluntary was critical in risk perception. Starr 
concluded that:
• The acceptability of risk from an activity is roughly proportional to the third power of 
the benefits for that activity
•  The public will accept risks from voluntary activities (such as skiing) that are 
roughly 1000 times as great as it would tolerate from involuntary hazards (such as 
food preservatives) that provide the same level of benefit.
Starr’s work is limited because it implies that a universal measure of benefit could be 
established. In view of the inhomogeneity of values held by different individuals and 
groups, such a measure would never be acceptable to all stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
Starr’s work does imply that, because long term risks to the environment generally 
expose people to risks that are deemed to be involuntary and unlooked for, they will be 
perceived in a worse light than voluntary risks. Hence the apparent inconsistency 
between the acceptability of environmental risk and the acceptability of much higher 
levels of voluntary risk (e.g. smoking).
Further work sought to measure individual risk perceptions in relation to different risk 
problems more directly, rather than relying on historical evidence [Renn, 1991]. This 
research identified the importance of contextual factors such as perceived controllability, 
catastrophic potential and dread. This research [Covello et al, 1988] also suggested that 
perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable for different groups with different relationships 
to the risk problem. This pattern of perception is termed the “psychometric paradigm”. 
Table 1 is taken from a discussion of the psychometric paradigm and illustrates peoples 
quantitative judgements about the riskiness of diverse hazards [Slovic, 1987].
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Table 1: Ordering of perceived risks for 30 activities and technologies
(after [Covello at al 1988 )
G F
Nuclear Power i 1 i 8 20
Motor vehicles 1 2 5 3 1
Handguns ) 3 2 1 4
Smoking 4 3 4 2
Motorcycles 1 5 6 2 6
Alcoholic beverages 6 7 5 3
General(private)
aviation
j  7 15 11 12
Police work ! 8 8 7 17
Pesticides 9 4 15 8
Surgery 10 11 9 5
Fire fighting i  11 10 6 18
Large construction 1 12 14 13 13
Hunting i  13 18 10 23
Spray Cans 14 13 23 26
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29
Bicycles 16 24 14 15
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16
Electric power (non­
nuclear)
18 19 19 9
Swimming 19 30 17 10
Contraceptives 20 9 22 11
Skiing 21 25 16 30
X-rays 22 17 24 7
High school and 
college football
1 23 26 21 27
Railroads 24 23 29 19
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14
Food colouring 26 20 30 21
Power mowers 27 28 25 28
Prescription
antibiotics
28 21 26 24
Home appliances 29 27 27 22
Vaccinations 30 29 29 25
2.5.1 How do you enable a debate about risk?
Differences in risk perception and risk acceptance are the key factors that fuel 
environmental debates. It is these highly cultural factors that motivate people to adopt 
different positions when considering courses of action that have widespread and 
distributed impacts on the environment. The legitimacy of these different and 
personalistic views about risk have not always been appreciated. Those involved in risk 
analysis have often tried to convey the “real” meaning of risks to others - efforts that 
have been frustrated and frustrating for both the audience and the communicator. So
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although the desire for a debate is there, it can be difficult to make the debate happen. 
Much of this comes down to the difficulties of risk communication.
In an analysis of the history of risk perception and communication, Fischhoff has 
described the evolution in risk communication research [Fischoff, 1995]. He identifies a 
number of stages and concludes that although each stage makes progress, it also 
identifies additional, more complicated problems to solve”.
Table 2 reproduces Fishhoffs evolutional stages in risk communication research. Each 
stage is characterised by a focal communication strategy, which the communicater 
hopes will “do the trick”.
Table 2: Stages in risk communication research
Stage 1 All we have to do is get the numbers right
Stage 2 All we have to do is tell them the numbers
Stage 3 All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers
Stage 4 All we have to do is show them they have accepted similar risks in the 
past
Stage 5 All we have to do is show them that it is a good deal for them
Stage 6 All we have to do is treat them nice
Stage 7 All we have to do is make them partners
Stage 8 All of the above
A common theme in these risk communication strategies is the hope that they will 
influence the audience -  presumably by persuading them that the development they are 
proposing or opposing is a good or a bad thing. Therefore, all these risk communication 
strategies are examples of strategic action, as defined by Habermass [1971]. It is not 
surprising that a feeling of “us and them” can easily develop, particularly given the 
complexity of environmental risk.
Enabling debate about environmental risks requires that all sides be bought into a 
dialogue about the benefits, detriments and uncertainty surrounding a project. Chapter 3 
discusses the nature of dialogue in more detail, but a desired outcome of dialogue is the 
development of new meanings and understanding on the part of all participants. Ideally, 
communicating risks into the debate needs to be done as a form of communicative
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action [Habermass, 1971]. However, because of different values, something that starts 
as a genuine attempt to communicate risk in an unbiased manner may be interpreted as 
a one sided attempt to stifle debate and discussion.
Historically, institutions have adopted an analytically dominated (technocratic) approach 
to decision-making. This institutional approach has been based on genuine attempts to 
quantify risks based on scientific, technical and mathematical analyses. However, the 
attitudes of the public to the risks will be more intuitive and will be much more strongly 
influenced by feelings and individual experiences. It is not surprising that this can lead 
to a fundamental disjoint between the two approaches. Recognising this helps explain 
some of the difficulties in enabling true dialogue about environmental issues.
2.5.2 Environmental risk, trust and legitimacy
The general public is often sceptical of the industrial claims regarding safety and risk 
[Slovic, 1999]. In the nuclear industry, factors such as potential harm to future 
generations, possible catastrophic consequences and undefined environmental effects 
are often cited [Covello et al, 1988] Industry has tended to respond that the public has 
an irrational perception of radiation risks -  particularly those from man made (as 
opposed to natural risks) [Cohen, 1983]. This tends to underplay what might be called 
morally relevant factors influencing public perception of risk and highlights a 
fundamentally different approach to considering the term “ risk”.
Debates about risk assessments often come down to a question of not only who we are 
going to protect from harm and at what cost, but also who we are going to allow to be 
harmed and by how much. Such decisions represent a fundamental problem of moral 
philosophy, and therefore decision-makers are often faced with conflicts and dilemmas 
that are grounded in matters of values and ethics.
In general terms, past decisions have been founded in “utilitarian” ethics [Benn, 2000]. 
Utilitarianism is an ethical approach based on ideas expounded by Bentham of achieving 
the “ greatest happiness of the greatest numbers”. It is society based, focussed on 
overall outcomes and therefore readily lends its support to economic risk/cost benefit 
actions. The distribution of harm or benefits (who pays and who gains) within society is 
not relevant within utilitarian ethics.
However, environmental risks are distributed -  both in time and space. Moreover, to the 
public, who pays and who benefits is a highly relevant question. An alternative ethical 
approach [Benn, 2000] is to treat the individual as an end in themselves -  not a means 
to an end. The focus of such a “deontological” approach is on human rights, autonomy
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and freedom. Clearly there is tension between the two different approaches, both of 
which seek to describe moral behaviour.
It is therefore not surprising that there is a public mistrust of the traditional institutional 
approach to dealing with environmental risk. Numerous recent studies point to lack of 
trust as a critical factor underlying environmental debates and the management of 
technological hazard [see Slovic, 1999]. If trust is the problem then it is unlikely that the 
solution is simply one of risk communication: If you trust the risk manager, 
communication is relatively easy. If trust is lacking then no form or process of 
communication will be satisfactory.
Many models have been put forward for building trust between participants in 
environmental debates [e.g. Renn and Levine, 1991]. Many common themes come out 
of these ideas, some of which are outlined below.
Trusted sources are perceived to be both knowledgeable and concerned with public 
welfare, whereas distrusted sources are perceived to distort information and to provide 
biased information [Slovic, 1999] The “elaboration likelihood model (ELM)” [Renn and 
Levine, 1991] is an influential social psychological theory of communication that 
proposes both a “central route” and a “peripheral route” to the way an individual 
processes information. The central route involves the receiver of information processing 
the incoming information. The peripheral route is influenced by external, often subliminal 
factors surrounding the information, and the receiver may make up his mind about the 
accuracy of the information without undertaking any central processing at all. Most 
often, this will result in the information being discounted. High credibility (honesty, 
competence, consistency etc) will encourage central processing and low credibility will 
act to encourage peripheral processing.
The Aarhus convention, with its focus on “Access to Information and to Justice”, 
considers trust to be a critical aspect of any societal process. The nature of trust is 
taken up by the European Commission in their Guidelines on the collection and use of 
expertise [CEC, 2002] and trust in scientists and experts is an issue often taken up in the 
media and in documents seeking to deal with the relationships between science and 
society [House of Lords, 2000].
Trust relies on competence and credibility. Renn and Levine [1991] identify five 
contributing factors that all tend to be judged based on historical experience. An 
individual will judge an institution depending on how it has behaved in the past with 
respect to:
• competence;
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• objectivity;
• fairness;
• consistency;
• faith.
So the way an individual trusts information cannot be divorced from the information 
source and from the past history of the source.
A recent trend in building credibility for organisations is to adopt the principle of 
transparency. Transparency initially meant better/clearer/more detailed/less 
detailed/different explanations of technical solutions to other stakeholders. It was about 
packaging technical information. This was called the “deficit model” [House of Lords, 
2000]. However, as research and reality have moved on, it has been increasingly 
realised that transparency needs to encompass both technical issues and judgements 
grounded in ethics, morality and values. Transparency also needs to address the 
relationship between them, and the roles and relationships of different groups involved in 
the debate.
So modern trends in decision-making encourage deliberation and discussion between a 
wide cross section of society through the transparent presentation of information, values 
and relationships. Transparency is not a route to trust [O'Neill, 2002]. Indeed, if trust 
existed then there would be no need for transparency. However, transparency can help 
with legitimacy, which may eventually provide a route to trust.
In accordance with the principles of sustainable development, a legitimate decision- 
making process must be managed so as to provide fairness and equity in terms of
• the risks and burdens placed on future generations (inter-generational equity), and
• resource allocation and decision-making within contemporary generations (intra-
generational equity).
The Aarhus Convention seeks to tackle this by identifying Access to Information and 
Access to Justice as key elements of a legitimate process.
2.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, there are large uncertainties surrounding decisions about the 
environment. Such decisions require a knowledge platform that considers the potential 
risks to the environment. However, environmental risk is a culturally understood factor 
and its significance is very subjective. Values therefore influence decisions involving
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environmental risk to a very large extent. The legitimacy of decisions made using 
processes that do not easily accommodate social values is therefore compromised.
An important aspect of evolving decision-making processes is the ability to integrate 
values and knowledge so that they can sit alongside each other. In such a way, it may 
be possible to build dialogue between different groups, and ensure a broad range of 
opinion is built into environmental decisions. Therefore environmental debate becomes 
an intrinsic part of the decision-making process and decisions become more 
participatory.
These ideas have informed the development of processes for environmental decision­
making. In the next chapter, current trends in these processes are explored with a view 
to identifying their ability to incorporate both social values and technical knowledge.
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3 THE PARTICIPATORY TREND IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION 
MAKING
To understand something of the knowledge requirements for environmental decision­
making, it is necessary to explore the nature of the processes that they are to inform. 
Participatory processes for decision-making are subject to much academic scrutiny at 
the moment. Many researchers are working to describe “analytic deliberative” models of 
contemporary environmental decision-making. Key issues to consider are:
• The stakeholders involved in the decision;
• Ways of encouraging deliberation between the stakeholders;
• The process by which the decision is made
This chapter examines trends in these issues.
3.1 Environmental decision making -  past practice
As discussed in Chapter 2, environmental decisions in the past - whether to proceed 
with a project, and how to manage the risks it presents - have been based on a technical 
analysis of risks, and a view as to whether or not those risks comply with regulations. 
The philosophy has been that there should be no restriction per se to any development 
providing that the developer meets the regulations. However, it is acknowledged that 
developers responding purely to market forces may place a relatively low value on 
protecting the environment. Therefore, environmental standards are established, often in 
legislation to ensure protection of the environment [DEFRA, 2002a, EA, 2000, EA,
1997]. These standards are typically based on scientific analysis and on judgements 
about environmental limits and carrying capacity. Monitoring organisations (regulators) 
such as the Environment Agency are in place to ensure compliance with regulations and 
contravention is pursued through the law courts. The key factors in this traditional form 
of environmental risk management are:
• The establishment of policy in the form of regulatory requirements
• The technical assessment of environmental risk based on “rational” evaluation of
impacts against the concept of societal good;
• A review of levels of compliance with regulatory requirements;
• The application of “scientific” evaluations of environmental risk in dialogue between 
the regulator and the developer;
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• A few major “stakeholders”6 -  who are generally institutions of some sort or other.
The stakeholders identified in this form of environmental decision-making are the 
developer, the monitoring organisation and the courts, all of which use scientific 
reasoning and logic to justify their positions. Policy and regulation provide the decision­
making framework within which the stakeholders operate. Figure 4 seeks to capture this 
process
Figure 4. The stakeholders involved in traditional form s of dec is ion­
making
Risk analysis
Proponents Courts
▲
Other stakeholders
(Whilst the icons used in this diagram are stereotypical caricatures, they do reflect some 
of the perceptions that have arisen from traditional forms of environmental decision­
making. The use of such highly value-laden images is intended to reinforce the 
polarisation that can arise between the key actors).
b A “stakeholder” has an interest in the project at hand or its consequences. They can be 
individuals, groups or institutions. A distinction is now generally made between “stakeholders” and 
the “public”.
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Public values play little part in this traditional form of environmental decision making, 
except where they are implicitly taken into account in determining environmental 
standards or where the courts choose to make them a priority. In addition, there is little 
opportunity for input from other stakeholders except during the development of 
legislation (generally before a specific issue or project is on the table) and during any 
legislative procedure taken through the courts (generally once proposals have been 
extensively developed). In both instances, the views of other stakeholders can only be 
taken into account via secondary representation: in the first case through parliamentary 
procedure and in the second case through the courts. If the court action is one of 
prosecution due to contravention of regulatory requirements, it is often “after the event” 
and environmental damage has already occurred.
Sometimes called the “decide-announce-defend” approach to decision making 
[Environment Council, 1995], this model is essentially focussed on the different 
participants in the decision-making process. The role of risk analysis in this model is 
relatively clear -  it provides the main knowledge platform for expert discussion about 
environmental risks between the regulator and the proponent.
This form of decision-making has developed in response to the ideal of representative 
democracy - the basis on which successive governments receive a mandate to make 
decisions on behalf of society. However, as technology and communication have 
developed over the past 100 years, people have become more aware of the limitations 
of an elected representative taking decisions “for the good of society”. The limited 
number of actors involved in traditional forms of decision-making can identify options 
and make decisions without the involvement of others. As society and technology has 
moved on, the electorate increasingly voice concerns about being excluded from the 
creation of the alternatives and their evaluation, leaving them with a solution that they 
felt they had had no input into.
A possible response to this is deliberative democracy [Bohman and Rehg, 1997], which 
adopts the idea of the “common good” as an ideal. It encourages forums for discussion. 
Instead of assuming that opinions are in some way fixed and even measurable (on 
which representative democracy is based), it encourages the development (and change) 
of positions and even values through debate between equal partners. For deliberative 
democracy to work, there must be public participation -  i.e. the involvement of members 
of the public, in particular those that have a stake in the decision in hand.
These ideas have generated an evolution in decision-making to one in which both 
analysis and deliberation are key parts of the decision process.
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3.2 Analytic-deliberative approaches -  m odern trends in environm ental 
decision-m aking
Chapter 2 has highlighted the limitations of basing decisions too strongly on a technical 
analysis of environmental risk. Social factors are not explicitly brought into the decision­
making process; highly variable (cultural) factors such as risk perception, risk 
acceptability and the implications of uncertainty are not tackled and the perception of the 
analysis often comes down to a question of trust and credibility. Inevitably, 
environmental decision-making has been evolving to meet these challenges.
Since policy and regulation are central pillars of a democratic society, they will always 
play an important part in setting the framework for environmental decision making 
[DETR, 1999b]. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that analytical science and 
technical knowledge will continue to play an important part in informing judgements 
about environmental risk, be it via a quantitative risk analysis or by some other means. 
However, under deliberative democracy, an additional dimension is called for -  social 
interaction. The way these three processes interact will determine the ability of the 
decision-maker to adopt an “acceptable” course of action. This represents a much more 
process-oriented approach to environmental decision-making than those used 
traditionally. The key components of such an approach (sometimes called an analytic- 
deliberative approach) are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. The com ponents o f an analytic-deliberative approach to  
environm ental decision-m aking
Consultation
nnm
i t t h
Analysis Governance
31
In this model the term “analysis” includes any form of expert knowledge or specific 
analytical input to the decision process. This includes risk analysis as well as other 
specific analytical studies such as cost-benefit analyses or social impact studies. 
“Governance” refers to the way in which we organise ourselves as a society and 
includes regulations and legislation as well as the Government and Parliament. 
“Consultation” highlights the need to create opportunities for a wide spectrum of 
stakeholders to influence all aspects of the decision-process.
3.3 Public participation and dialogue
Central to the development of new participatory decision-making will be processes that 
enable dialogue between a wide range of interested parties and organisations. 
Dialogue is one of a suite of terms which include consultation, participation and 
deliberation (see Box 3). These practices share a commitment to discussion between 
stakeholders as part of determining a course of action.
There is a history of such participation in the UK. Public participation arose primarily out 
of land-use planning, regeneration initiatives, sustainable development initiatives, the 
ethos of “customer facing” service delivery, and the democratic deficit (Petts and Leach,
2000). More recently, Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA) and Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) are active areas in which dialogue and consultation is central 
to the assessment process [Jamison, 1998].
Processes that are seen to be legitimate vary but have in common the necessity for 
public and stakeholder involvement. Dialogue processes may vary but they share the 
ability to explore what other parties think, and to engage in some way with taking 
account of these views in policy development. Theoretically, a policy based on the 
views of the public will be acceptable to that public. Although it is unlikely to be quite as 
straightforward as that, the principle of entering into dialogue as a means of engendering 
mutual understanding and more acceptable outcomes remains valid.
Dialogue and consultation therefore support deliberative democracy and should enable 
better decisions. However, what counts as good dialogue, why, and for whom, remain 
questions with many different answers.
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Box 3: Distinctions and definitions relating to participation
The terms used to describe various aspects of consultation and dialogue are often used more or 
less interchangeably. Behind each term there is nevertheless a depth of theory and social and 
philosophical analysis. There is also a vast range of practice. Relatively simple definitions are 
provided below:
Dialogue
Dialogue can be defined as interaction and mutual learning - a ‘conversation with a centre, not 
sides’. Stakeholders are brought together for the purpose of finding common ground, redefining 
the terms in which they operate, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement, and, crucially, 
developing enhanced understanding of each other and of potential ways forward. A key outcome 
of dialogue is the development of new meanings and understanding on the part of all 
stakeholders.
Consultation
Consultation is the provision of opportunity for stakeholders to comment upon issues and 
proposals during the course of their development. Crucially, consultation implies that the power 
to make decisions, and the extent to which comments are taken into account, remains at the 
discretion of the institution that instigates the consultation.
Deliberation
Deliberation is a form of discourse or debate. Theoretically and ideologically, deliberation requires 
those involved to be equals, both in terms of access to information and justification of arguments. 
Deliberation involves reasoned debate between relevant stakeholders.
Participation
Broadly, participation describes the act of taking part in a process. Although participation can take 
place solely through taking account of a wider range of views, there is a sense in which 
participation implies proactivity on the part of the stakeholder. Participation in taking decisions, as 
opposed to being consulted on those decisions assumes that a measure of accountability for that 
participation is accepted by the participant. However, the degree of public participation in 
decision-making depends on the amount of power transferred from the decision-maker to the 
participant.
Social Intelligence
Social intelligence is information about the public/society, such as that gathered in survey data on 
public values or opinions. Social intelligence can be gathered purely to serve the interests of the 
sponsoring organisation, or can be used in an attempt to reflect public preferences. Dialogue, 
consultation and deliberation can all offer means to gather social intelligence.
Stakeholders and the Public
The terms ‘stakeholder’ and ‘public’ need attention if not definition. ‘Stakeholder’ is used widely, 
and variously, to mean everyone who has an interest in an issue, or those directly affected, or the 
institutional parties involved. There is no over-riding definition. In practice, “stakeholder 
dialogue” often includes only institutional representatives, sometimes using bodies such as the 
National Consumers’ Council or environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to 
‘represent’ the public interest.
‘Public’, too, can be a complex term. There are multiple groups within the ‘public’, individual 
members of whom may also be members of other groups. In terms of consultation and dialogue 
practices, it is crucial to consider who the relevant publics are, and how they might best be 
represented within a process.
Social Learning: The development of a collective knowledge and understanding that can be 
used to inform policy development. This can include developing the individual 
understanding of the participants and also improving the availability of information to 
society in general
33
3.3.1 Public Participation Processes and their application
A host of consultation and dialogue techniques have been developed. These have been 
adequately described in a number of reports [New Economics Foundation, 2001; DETR, 
1998; LGA and LGMB, 1998; Audit Commission, 1999; Petts and Leach, 2000]. Table 3 
presents a simple classification of dialogue processes and highlights key differences. 
These differences tend to reflect the different purposes for which dialogue can be 
undertaken. Indeed a key factor in developing participatory approaches to societal 
decisions is to select participatory processes that are fit for the topic and the audience 
[Petts and Leach, 2000].
Over the last few years extensive experience in processes involving consultation and 
dialogue has been gained. Much of this has been within local government, driven by the 
government programme to build on and develop Local Agenda 21 initiatives [LGA and 
LGMB, 1998] in conjunction with a desire amongst many government officers to 
introduce more participatory practices [Summers and McKeown, 1996]. Much, too, has 
been done in the Health Authorities, where service users are increasingly being included 
in decision-making procedures [Ling, 1999; NHS, 1998]. The Environment Agency, and 
the National Radiological Protection Board, are both exploring different mechanisms of 
public consultation and stakeholder dialogue. Additionally, technology assessment (TA) 
practices are in development. Recently, the Cabinet Office issued a Code of Practice in 
written consultation (www.cabinet-office.qov.uk/servicefirst/index/consultation.htm).
In the commercial world, a driver for participation has been the recognition by large 
businesses that they are out of touch with their key stakeholders. Dialogue is being 
increasingly adopted to rectify this situation, most famously between Greenpeace and 
Shell after the Brent Spar occupation by Greenpeace activists [Murphy and Bendell,
1997].
However, in the light of this experience, some shortcomings in current consultation 
practices are now being observed. A key issue is that ways of integrating the outcomes 
of public participation into decision making are ill-defined in practice. Partly, this could 
be explained as a result of consultation occurring too late in the decision-making 
process. The decision-maker “knows” what the issues are and what options are 
realistic, but the participants wish to discuss the broader issues. Often the decision­
maker may already have rationalised these broader issues in his/her own mind 
according to his or her set of values and priorities. It can be frustrating to have to “take a 
step back”, but this step is necessary to ensure that the range of perspectives about the 
problem are aired and discussed. This is the issue of “framing”.
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Table 3: Differences and distinctions between stakeholder dialogue, public consultation and public deliberation.
Stakeholder dialogue Public consultation Public Deliberation
Who is involved? Generally involves representatives of interested 
organisations meeting together for discussion of 
identified issue
Can include members of public, but to date has 
done so only rarely
Organisations who do not usually 
meet/communicate brought together
Involves members of the ordinary public, self­
selected and/or selected as demographically 
representative or representative of relevant 
groups
Usually interpreted as involving members of the public, 
but can be interpreted as deliberation by elites taking 
place in the public eye.
Issue characteristic Issue is often contentious, and opposing parties 
are brought toqether
Issue may not be contentious, but involves some 
development or appraisal
Not necessarily bound to a particular issue, and in any 
case allows related issues to be considered
Purpose To share knowledge
To identify areas of agreement and disagreement 
To develop possible ways forward
To elicit public views on issue To develop, through engaging in debate, considered 
responses and reasoned decicions
Interaction between 
agency and public
Very limited unless public included as 
stakeholders
May be distant, usually mediated by convenor of 
consultation process.
Dependent on way in which deliberation is organised
Relationship with 
decision making
Often provides useful input but is open to 
manipulation or misunderstanding by decision 
maker
Theoretically provides authority for decisions, but 
in practice dependent on interpretation of 
outcomes by decision maker
May have no relationships with decisions, but in 
principle provides the basis for making the best 
decision
Examples Any form of meeting between stakeholders where 
interaction and discussion takes place
Range from traditional forms of consultation 
(consultation papers, questionnaires) to more 
innovative forms (local forums, citizens’ panels)
Few if any examples of deliberation under ideal 
conditions, but citizens' juries and other debating 
forums with full access to information partially fulfil 
requirements, and many processes have deliberative 
elements.
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3.3.2 Framing
A key issue in the analysis of environmental (and other) controversy is that of “framing” 
or problem definition [RCEP, 1998, Stern and Fineberg, 1996]. Framing is sometimes 
thought of as the lens through which an issue is seen -  different lenses provide different 
ways of seeing. Another commonly used explanation of framing is that paying attention 
to the way a problem is framed is paying attention to the question of “what is this issue 
about?” For example, decisions about toxic wastes, in particular radioactive wastes can 
be about broad issues such as:
• whether or not society should be producing such wastes at all.
• how can future generations and non-humans be represented
• who has the right to make decisions
• the dominance of scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge 
or it can be about narrower technical issues such as
• migration of contaminants in ground water,
• issues of the certainties and uncertainties of hydrogeological modelling.
Framings affect all types of public participation. A good dialogue process is one which 
enables all framings to be articulated and considered with equal relevance. In the UK, a 
classical public inquiry process will include a number of framings, such as traditional 
planning concerns (traffic, disruption), pollution, and, under the Environmental Impact 
Assessment process, evaluation of alternatives. However, concerns that fall outside the 
framework of the subject under discussion are generally excluded.
Some different framings become associated with particular social groups and are a 
representation of their values and priorities (sometimes called “worldview”). For 
example, scientific experts working within nuclear institutions commonly frame the 
problem as being one of ‘controllable risks’ amenable to technical and regulatory 
management. The public, by contrast, may see the problem as to do with issues of 
responsibility for the risks and the ethical questions of where waste is placed and how 
associated risks are distributed. Some environmental NGOs disengage from discussing 
what to do with radioactive wastes because entering in to such a dialogue could be seen 
as legitimising continued nuclear power production.
This provides an insight into the reasons why there is widespread public antipathy 
towards radioactive waste repositories. Institutional framing and public framing are at 
odds [Hunt and Wynne, 2000]. The public are concerned about issues that are left out of
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traditional decision-making processes and institutional thinking. As stated above, a good 
dialogue process is one which recognises the different frames of different groups. Thus, 
to develop legitimate decisions and hence effective management strategies, institutions 
need to find out what other views exist, to accept the legitimacy of these, and to 
integrate them into management proposals. The range, nature and sequencing of 
opportunities for interaction are determined by the decision-making process adopted.
3.4 The importance of the decision-making process:
It is all very well to identify:
• who the key stakeholders are;
• what elements need to go into making a decision about the environment ( for 
example, analysis, governance and consultation); and
• how to create opportunities for deliberation and dialogue.
However, these factors need to be linked together if they are to be effectively applied 
towards a common purpose. It is the decision-making process that links these factors 
together. It is therefore critical to be clear about this process. There is much discussion 
of decision - making processes in the academic literature -  in particular the operational 
research journals. Generally speaking, workers identify models of decision-making in 
three categories.
“Normative models” describe an ‘ideal’ approach where stakeholders apply a purely 
logical process to the decision problem. “Descriptive models” claim to describe how 
individuals make decisions in their everyday lives (Bell et al 1988). These descriptive 
models are based on ‘real’ human behaviour. These two types of model distinguish 
between perceived rationality (normative) and actual behaviour (descriptive). In fact, 
actual behaviour may well be rational, if a much wider set of values and complex social 
interactions are recognised than in normative models. Therefore, “prescriptive models” 
are identified, which combine the elements of the descriptive approach that recognise 
social interactions, with the logic applied in the normative approach. The intention is that 
these models describe workable decision making techniques that are defensible against 
critical analysis and acceptable to a wide range of stakeholders.
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3.4.1 Components of an analytic-deliberative decision process
The US National Research Council have considered these prescriptive issues in 
proposing a new approach for informing decisions in a democratic society [Stern and 
Fineberg, 1996]. Figure 6 is a schematic diagram reproducing key elements of their 
representation of the decision-process.
Figure 6. Elem ents of an analytic-deliberative decision-m aking process  
[redrawn from Stern and Fineberg, 1996]
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Central to this approach is the idea that opportunities for learning and feedback between 
all stakeholders need to be established at all steps in the decision making process. The 
process should not be seen to be linear and mechanistic: rather it is a series of steps 
that all need to be reviewed at each stage in the process.
A key question for this thesis is how do analysis and deliberation respectively contribute 
to this decision-process? This is considered in detail by the NRC [Stern and Fineberg, 
1996] who identify several criteria that are necessary, but not sufficient for the effective 
implementation of an analytic deliberative approach to decision making. These criteria 
are identified in Box 4.
Box 4. Criteria identified by the Stern and Fineberg [1996] for effective  
application of an analytic deliberative approach to decision m aking
• Getting the science right
• Getting the right science
• Getting the right participation
• Getting the participation right
• Developing an accurate, balanced and informative synthesis
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The criteria of “getting the science right” and “getting the right science” are fundamental 
to the information gathering and knowledge building stage. They are about the content 
of the decision. These criteria reflect the call for the application of sound science within 
the principles of sustainable development. Much has been written about “sound 
science” and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution wrote extensively in 
their 21st report on Setting Environmental Standards about best practice for scientific 
assessment and technological options appraisal [Office of Science and Technology, 
2000, RCEP, 1998]. However, how to “get the right science” is another matter entirely. 
Under deliberative democracy and the application of an analytic-deliberative approach, 
the information that is required at this stage, and the way it will be analysed are no 
longer solely defined by scientific practice and engineering precedence. How to 
determine these things is the subject of subsequent chapters of this thesis.
The criteria of “getting the participation right” and “getting the right participation” go to the 
heart of the decision-making process. The NRC identify difficulties in identifying who are 
the interested and affected parties and how to ensure fairness in the process. They 
consider the diagnosis required to determine the characteristics of the hazard, and the 
characteristics and knowledge about risks. They state that the effort involved in this 
diagnosis may be extended or very brief, depending on the decision situation. However, 
the decision-maker is still left with the problem of deciding who will be involved in this 
diagnosis. Whatever his or her choice, it will remain vulnerable to challenges of 
preconception.
So if both process and content are important, who is it that determines when the process 
and the content are legitimate? Who says that the right science has been used and the 
right participation has been achieved? This is a common omission in the participatory- 
decision literature. Additionally, whilst there are many participatory decision-making 
techniques available for decisions involving multiple stakeholders [Hunt and Wynne, 
2000, Armour, 1996], these mainly present the decision situation to the stakeholders in 
terms of selecting a course of action from at least two alternatives. Essentially, the 
problem formulation stage has been completed for them, and often they are invited to 
join in a defined decision-process. This implies a priori knowledge of the objectives of 
the decision and the best way of making it. It also requires those involved in the 
decision to accept that the alternatives are:
• mutually exclusive ( the alternatives cannot exist at the same time);
• independent (one option is not dependent on the other);and
• cover the full range of uncertainty.
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Recent developments in decision theory challenge these assumptions. Keeney [Keeney,
1998] states that values should be the driving force of our decision making and the focus 
of the time and effort we spend thinking about decisions.
Objectives are based on values -  the reason for taking a course of action is the desire to 
avoid undesirable consequences and achieve desirable ones, which are value 
judgements and therefore subjective. There is therefore an increasing demand for early 
participation in establishing decision objectives and identifying potential alternative 
courses of action as part of the problem formulation and process design.
3.4.2 The importance of the “front end" of decision-making
Research has indicated that focusing people’s attention first on their values or objectives 
helps those involved in the decision making to create more inventive alternatives, which 
match their requirements more accurately [Heerboth et al, 1980; Ho and Keller, 1988]. 
This suggests that the stage of problem formulation is multifaceted and involves 
understanding:
• who are the stakeholders ( or interested and affected parties)?
• what are their values?
• What are the objectives of the decision being made?
• How will the decision be made?
Where there are different values, priorities and framings, this can be extremely difficult to 
manage. Hence widening stakeholder involvement in environmental decision-making
increases the difficulties of establishing objectives and criteria for the decision that is
being considered. Nevertheless, practical experience in managing hazardous wastes 
[Hunt and Wynne, 2000, USEPA, 1995; Ferguson and Malina, 1999] has shown that this 
is a fundamental step, enabling the principles and framework for guiding the whole 
process to be shared and allowing stakeholders to influence the whole of the decision­
making process.
This has led to the idea of “front end consultation” [Hunt and Simmons, 2001] -  dialogue 
with the stakeholders at the time of establishing the objectives of the decision -  as part 
of the decision-making process. The ‘front end’ encompasses the early stages of any 
process. It focuses on identifying stakeholders’ issues and concerns and integrating 
these into the decision making process. Throughout each of the phases of the decision 
making process it is essential that there is involvement of stakeholders, including the 
public, so that the varied perspectives on the issue can be identified and taken into 
account.
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Early stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process has several advantages:
• Defining the problem -  asking stakeholders to develop and express their values 
allows them to define the problem and hence gives them...
• Increased influence -  allows stakeholders to influence the process
• Increased understanding -  helps stakeholders to understand more about their 
differences and the situation and identifies common ground. Helps responsible 
institutions to better understand stakeholder concerns.
• Increased involvement -  in social decisions, values are what are important to the 
public. If debate focuses on the technical issues of a decision or options this can 
exclude the public. Focusing on values involves the public.
• Wider ownership -  involving stakeholders in the process increases their 
ownership of the outcomes. This in turn should lead to more robust and 
acceptable decisions.
• Developing relationships -  the processes of engagement can assist in 
developing positive relationships between parties with conflicting views.
• Less adversarial -  focusing on values makes it easier for stakeholders to 
understand their differences and identify common ground [French et al, 1992].
• Guide information collection, option development and option evaluation -  early 
involvement can help identify appropriate information requirements and valuable 
research. It can also help identify the criteria against which options for a decision 
can be evaluated.
So although a front-end consultation incurs an increased initial spend, it can significantly 
reduce the total costs and time incurred in finding a long-term implementable solution. 
This is because early involvement helps to ensure the work undertaken addresses the 
issues people are concerned about, it also helps to reduce the chance of litigation and 
lack of public support for the outcomes because people are involved throughout the 
process.
3.4.3 Not forgetting the “back-end”
There needs to be some means of monitoring and evaluating the outcome of a decision. 
This is particularly important for environmental decisions since the outcome of decisions 
can be uncertain. This area is often neglected, because it can be taken to imply a poor 
decision, which generally reflects badly on those accountable. However, this is a short­
sighted view in the context of sustainable development and given the uncertainties in
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assessing environmental impact. Environmental monitoring systems, performance 
targets and environmental auditing can be used to test the outcome of a decision in 
terms of protection of the environment. It should be accepted that it may be necessary 
to revisit decisions if they do not ultimately achieve the identified objectives. This 
requires that the evaluation process is fed back into the decision making process.
This linkage between monitoring and the decision-process is often overlooked. 
However, it is an important part of ensuring social learning and improving both the 
processes and the content of decisions in the future.
As an ideal, analytic-deliberative decision-making reflects that fact that experience has 
taught us the benefits of a better integration of different forms of knowledge, the 
acknowledgement of values and a greater level of dialogue between stakeholders. 
These principles sound self-evident. However, the question of whether it can be done in 
practice needs to be considered.
3.5 Challenges raised by a participatory approach to environmental 
decision-making
3.5.1 Collective Choice and social negotiation
There are some intrinsically human factors that make the delivery of a legitimate and 
truly participatory decision extremely difficult. In ancient times philosophers and 
reflective thinkers identified that there is no uniquely rational way of resolving 
contradictory perspectives. In translation [Waddell, 1929], a poem by Boethius (a fourth 
century Roman philosopher) opens with the lines
“ This discord in the pact of things, this endless war betwixt truth and truth which singly 
hold and yet together give the lie to him who seeks to yoke them both”
Stirling argues that the many different aspects of environmental decisions are 
incommensurable and therefore the assessment approach of resolving all these conflicts 
analytically in an objective manner needs to be rethought [Stirling, 2002], Making 
choices on behalf of a pluralistic society cannot be done using the rules governing 
individual choice.
“Expected utility theory” is a generally accepted model of rational choice [Cayford, 2001] 
and has been widely applied to describe economic behaviour. Until recently, utility theory 
has predominated in expert literature describing decision-making [Savage, 1990]. By 
accepting utility theory as a model for decision-making, it is assumed that all rational 
people would wish to adopt the basic principles of the theory and will make rational 
choices when faced with a decision problem. However, the theory is based on individual
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choices (either of the institution or of a person) and on the idea that the decision-maker 
knows what is good or best. These ideas break down when applied to collective choices, 
and when the decision-maker has to take into account a wide range of needs and 
values. Environmental decisions are generally matters of public policy, which are 
collectively decided. Therefore, the applicability of utility theory to environmental 
decisions can be challenged. This can be illustrated by considering two decisions -  one 
based on individual choice and one on collective choice.
If I need a kettle. I will need to choose which kettle to buy. In making that choice, I will 
need to take into account a few things -  like how large it needs to be, whether it should 
be gas or electric, jug or round, fused or not. I will make a rational choice, based on my 
preferences and some consideration of practicalities.
However, consider three individuals (Amy, Alice and Andrew) making a collective choice 
about ice cream. The potential choices are vanilla, chocolate and raspberry. Their 
individual preferences are given in Table 4. Individually, their choices would be 
rationally based on these preferences. However, an analysis of the group preferences 
indicates that two of them prefer vanilla to chocolate, two of them prefer chocolate to 
raspberry and two of them prefer raspberry to vanilla. As a group, they do not have a 
rational set of preferences on which to make the selection. There is no possibility of a 
process producing the “preferred” outcome, because, as a group, there are no clearly 
defined preferences.
Table 4: The problem  of collective choice
Amy Chocolate Raspberry Vanilla
Alice Vanilla Chocolate Raspberry
Andrew Raspberry Vanilla Chocolate
This does not mean that they won’t make a collective choice -  other things will come into 
play. Alice may detest raspberry, whereas Andrew is reasonably happy with any of the 
choices and Amy ate chocolate yesterday. So they choose vanilla. There may be a 
number of other sensible choices. However, those other choices will be based on a 
process of “social negotiation” between the three of them. Making the decision requires 
a deeper consideration of values and weightings.
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The above illustration seeks to draw out some of the limitations of “rational” or 
prescriptive decision making processes. In a democratic society, environmental 
decisions, especially when viewed through the framework of sustainable development, 
should be collective decisions.
In an attempt to identify practices for developing such collective decisions legitimately, 
international frameworks are being set up to provide guidelines and codify what it means 
to be sustainable. The Rio declaration and the Aarhus convention are examples on a 
global and international scale and participatory assessment techniques describe specific 
processes that help to achieve legitimacy (Hunt and Wynne 2000, Petts and 
Leach,2000). However it is possible that these frameworks may mask the underlying 
issue and essentially human problem of whether a legitimate collective choice is 
possible, given the multifaceted and cultural consideration of environmental risk.
3.5.2 Developing a shared knowledge platform
In any decision-process, knowledge is accumulated throughout the process. This places 
a requirement for an iterative and recursive process. Information may be gained at a 
later stage that will suggest a need to revisit the knowledge on which an earlier stage 
was based. This notion was also developed by Stern and Fineberg [Stern and Fineberg,
1998] who also identify that the development of knowledge through the decision-process 
should:
• involve more than scientific expertise, and
• be iterative so that at each stage, the option of reverting to an earlier one should be 
possible.
Figure 7 identifies schematically the sorts of knowledge relevant to making decisions 
involving environmental risk. The six stages of Stern and Fineberg are used. The 
traditional emphasis of decision-makers has been on the development and evaluation of 
options -  the right hand side of Figure 7. Science and engineering have therefore had a 
dominant role in knowledge development for environmental issues since they provide an 
unrivalled source of expertise on the causes, effects and likelihood of environmental 
harm. There is a lot of emphasis in the environmental science literature on best 
practice for determining environmental options. Principles such as: best practicable 
environmental option studies (BPEO); best available technology not entailing excessive 
cost (BATNEEC); and, in the world of potential exposure to ionising radiation, as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA); and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) are 
adopted by experts and are often written into regulations and environmental standards .
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Figure 7. Knowledge requirem ents for environm ental decision-m aking.
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Despite the best of intentions, it is quite common to provide a risk analysis and a social 
impact assessment as separate chapters within an EIA submission. The process is 
integrated but the content is not. This still leaves the decision-maker in the position 
where (s)he has to determine the relative ascendancy of social and technical issues. 
Ideally, the decision maker would benefit from social negotiation to bring together all the 
issues and establish common ground and understandings. This social negotiation 
needs to occur between representatives of very different cultures.
This is where the analogy with three people choosing ice-cream (three individuals with a 
common background and language) breaks down and leads to a number of practical 
issues for those seeking to inform the decision-making process. Not least these include 
the need for those providing knowledge to work with a much broader range of 
stakeholders and to acknowledge their own cultural framings of a particular problem. To 
scientists, these issues are challenging enough without the added complications of 
seeking to integrate values and lay knowledge into the knowledge platform for the 
decision.
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In the next chapter the role of analysis in decision-making is considered. The discussion 
is largely focussed on the understanding and calculation of risk, and the treatment of the 
uncertainty that is inherent in the concept of risk.
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4 RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND ANALYSIS
As discussed in the preceding chapters, environmental decisions are often based on an 
evaluation of risk, which is predominantly informed by scientific knowledge. This chapter 
looks generally at the relationships between risk, uncertainty and analysis and reviews 
contemporary thinking about their role in decision-making.
4.1 Hazard, risk and chance.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “the chance or possibility of danger, loss, 
injury or other adverse consequences”. The original use of the term risk in the 16th and 
17th century appears to refer to sailing in uncharted waters in an era of global exploration 
by western voyagers [Giddens, 1999]. Subsequently, the term became used by the 
great merchants and bankers of the middle ages as they sought to come to terms with 
the possibility of a less than favourable return on their investments. Risk therefore 
became associated with the idea of events that may or may not happen -  an uncertain 
(uncharted) future. It cannot now be divorced from ideas about what the future may 
bring.
Hazard, danger and risk are terms that are often used interchangeably. Whilst there is 
general agreement in the literature that they are not synonymous [Adams, 1995], most 
workers adopt their own definitions of the terms. There is a general consensus that a 
hazard is an object or situation that could give rise to harm and a danger is a situation 
where there is a real possibility of harm [OED]. Risk is the likelihood of circumstances 
arising that result in harm occurring. Implicit in all these discussions is the idea that 
danger should be minimised, and hazards avoided.
In very general terms, risks to the environment from economic developments arise in a 
number of ways:
• by extracting and/or depleting natural, mineral or biological resources
• by affecting ecological resources due to physical disturbance
• by affecting ecological resources due to direct contamination or indirect contamination 
via contaminant migration
•  by creating a range of waste products which need management
4.1.1 Characterising risk
In a Reith lecture in 1999 [Giddens, 1999], Giddens identified two types of risk:
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• External (or natural) risk: the risk of adverse consequences arising because of a 
natural event (e.g. bad harvest, floods, plagues, earthquakes, and famine).
• Manufactured risk: the risk to the environment created by the actions of developing 
societies.
There are historical records of the consequences of natural events. It is therefore 
possible to make a calculation of external risk on the basis of these past records. The 
insurance industry is therefore able to offer to take on external risks in return for 
premiums. For example, they will generally insure houses against subsidence and 
natural disasters. Lloyds of London have been insuring against external risks for 
centuries.
However, manufactured risk is often less tangible. The consequences of our activities 
on the environment are not always obvious and may well not be understood. 
Manufactured risks are increasingly the subject of high profile debates as environmental 
conditions are experienced that do not appear to be solely the result of natural events. 
Examples would be the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming and the BSE scare 
[Hoffman and Wynne, 2002],
Over the last century, awareness of risk has shifted from an almost exclusive 
consideration of external risk (landslip, flooding, and meteor impact) to debates that are 
dominated by consideration of manufactured risks [Giddens, 1994]. However, for 
manufactured risks with a long-term impact on the environment, there is little history. 
Therefore, calculations of risk are difficult and it is impossible to insure against 
manufactured risks. In this thesis, the term “environmental risk” is used synonymously 
with manufactured risk.
In 1994, the Royal Society referred to three types of risk [Royal Society, 1994]:
• risks for which statistics of identified casualties are available ( e.g. the failure of 
buildings due to seismic events, the chance of flooding under different 
circumstances)
• risks for which there may be some evidence, but where the connection between 
suspected cause and injury to any one individual cannot be traced ( e.g. the BSE 
scare, pollution effects from traffic schemes, pollution effects from landfill, the . 
continued depletion of natural energy resources)
• experts’ best estimates of the likelihood of events that have not yet happened (e.g. 
risks from a radioactive waste disposal facility, the greenhouse effect)
The first type correlates well with the idea of external risk, and the last two give 
examples of manufactured risks. The distinction made between risks for which there is
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some evidence and best estimates of potential risk indicates some layering of 
environmental risks. In both cases, high levels of uncertainty about cause and effect 
would dominate any calculation of risk. Even so, both types of risk are grounded in 
some idea of what might happen in the future and its associated uncertainty (the “known 
unknown”).
Researchers considering the nature of science within society will also identify the 
possibility of “unknown unknowns” -  risks that may happen in the future for which there 
is no current conception [Hoffman and Wynne, 2002]. The occurrence of BSE arising 
from a change in stock feeding practice is an example where consequences were 
unknown at the time of action. It is difficult to know how to approach the issue of 
unknown unknowns, other than to recognise their existence.
The use of insurance to spread risk is discussed above. However, environmental risk is 
inevitably one where the risks are distributed, both in time and in space. Because the 
environment is a shared resource any change to it can result in impacts that are widely 
distributed. This raises questions about how the risk should be shared between those 
who engage in a project voluntarily or who benefit directly, and those who are affected
with no direct benefit. An example of this would be the consequences of passive
smoking, where someone who does not smoke is at risk from the habit of one who does.
Sometimes, the timescales over which environmental risk can be distributed may be 
very long indeed. For example, people are at risk from the coal tar linings which were 
used to line lead water mains at the turn of the century. As these linings degrade, 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons can be released into drinking water, some of which are 
carcinogenous. The risk from these coal tar linings (which may have been unknown or 
unappreciated at the time of installation) are distributed in time because they are a 
consequence of deterioration. In this case, the risks have been passed on two or three 
generations.
So environmental risk is characterised by very high levels of uncertainty about:
• cause and effect on the environment
• likelihood of occurrence
• impact on society(s)
•  spatial and temporal distribution of impact.
This inevitably makes environmental risk an inherently multidimensional issue. When 
this is coupled with the fact that our notions of what constitutes the environment tend to 
be socially constructed, the it is inevitable that there will be high level of debate and 
discussion over environmental issues.
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4.1.2 Risk and the future
Risk is therefore a concept that is only relevant in a society that wishes to control the 
future in someway. For risk to matter, society has to be bothered about consequences. 
Hazards have always existed. Under certain circumstances they could lead to “adverse 
consequences”. They become risks when an attempt is made to calculate the likelihood 
and potential benefits and/or detriments of those circumstances occurring. Risk is 
therefore a calculation of the future, which is why it cannot be separated from ideas of 
probability and uncertainty.
The Royal Society [Royal Society, 1992] illustrate this by reference to Nelson’s column. 
Nelson’s column is the hazard. It may be damaged (by wind, rain, vandalism), in which 
case it becomes a danger (a thing likely to cause harm [OED] due to pieces falling off 
causing harm to people in Trafalgar Square. The risk is a measure of the probability of 
this harm occurring in a given period (i.e. 10 years). Determining the risk requires:
• consideration of the susceptibility of Nelsons Column to damage by different 
events;
• the likelihood of those events occurring over the time period of interest;
• the likelihood that as a result of this damage, pieces could fall off; and
• the possibility that it could land on people below. In short, it requires a prediction of 
a possible future.
This can also be illustrated by reference to the investments market. Financial markets 
fluctuate in strength. This is a hazard. If I invest £1000, I want it to increase in the 
future. There is a danger that my money will diminish due to the fluctuation of the 
markets. I will therefore make a prediction about what the markets will do over the period 
of investment and evaluate the consequences in terms of my £1000. Certain markets will 
show a greater potential increase than others will. However, those that could show the 
greatest potential increase are likely to fluctuate more dramatically and there will be a 
higher level of uncertainty about my prediction. The risk associated with investing in that 
market is therefore greater than the risk associated with investing in a less volatile 
commodity.
4.1.3 The cultural understanding of risk
Alternatively, one can view the investments market as the “chance” to get a great return 
on a financial input. Used in this way, “chance” implies a more positive approach to 
future uncertainty. Therefore, for gamblers, the “chance” that ones number may come 
up is a cause for optimism. Like “risk”, “chance” arises because of the essential
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unknowability or indeterminability of the future. However, unlike risk, the concept of 
chance suggests that future uncertainty is an opportunity to be exploited.
The fact that two such similar concepts co-exist with such different connotations tells us 
quite a lot about the markedly different ways in which individuals can react to future 
uncertainty. It implies that the understanding of risk is essentially cultural - a 
characteristic which is well researched and documented in the literature [Beck, 1992b , 
Thompson et al, 1990 ] - and raises many questions when considering how to generate 
a common platform of knowledge about environmental risk.
4.1.4 Risk sharing
The notion of insurance has arisen in tandem with the concept of risk and offers the 
potential for risks (and rewards) to be shared. The insurance industry calculates risks 
and offers to take on the risk in return for payment. For the insured, it is a way of 
managing or controlling risk. For the insurer, it is a “chance” to exploit uncertainty and 
probability theory for potentially large financial rewards (i.e. a gamble). Sound ethical 
principles underlie this concept of risk sharing -  helping ensure the greatest happiness 
of the greatest numbers -  the concept of utilitarianism [Benn, 2000],
However, workers considering societal trends and the increasing move away from 
fundamental beliefs to a more questioning and value-driven society identify that the 
traditional concept of insurance may struggle to deal with long term and global risks to 
the environment [Beck, 1992a]. This is partly because of the lack of information on 
which to base the risk sharing. What is the risk that is being shared? It may be that the 
hazard to the environment has not even been recognised yet. Or the quantification of 
the risk may not be possible since there has been no evidence of it as yet. In such a 
climate of uncertainty, ensuring the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers is no 
longer a simple question of paying to reduce exposure to risk. Contemporary society is 
seeking to get to grips with the very specific set of issues raised by long term and global 
risks to the environment [Adams, 1995] and the very significant level of associated 
uncertainty. Traditionally, a risk analysis is undertaken to help understand these issues 
and deal with the associated uncertainty. Traditionally, a risk analysis is undertaken to 
help understand these issues and deal with the associated uncertainty.
4.2 Risk analysis and its role in decision making
The scientific analysis of risks, essentially using models to calculate what might happen in 
the future, has played a central role in the decision-making process [Stern and Fineberg, 
1996; Royal Society, 1992]. Methods for the scientific analysis of risk have been
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developed over the past forty years in order to provide objective assessment of 
environmental impact and safety. The origins of risk assessment related to well structured 
mechanical and engineering processes [Wynne, 1995]. Methods have since been adapted 
to the less well structured problems of environmental risk management. Whilst there are 
differences of approach in different industries [Power and McCarty, 1998, Stirling, 1999] 
they generally have in common the idea of either:
• determining compliance with regulations using some agreed way of dealing with 
uncertainty (e.g. for land contamination, flood defence, aerosols, landfill or radioactive 
waste disposal); or
• predicting potential future impact -  sometimes on a global scale (for example, in terms 
of global climate change and strategic hydrocarbon predictions, or human health 
implications from dose-effect relationships).
The choice of approach tends to be determined by disciplinary precedence rather than any 
intrinsic distinction from other approaches [Power and McCarty, 1998]. Risk analysis uses 
modelling to represent a course of action and the processes that may occur as a 
consequence of the project. Figure 8 shows the general relationship between the scientific 
understanding underpinning the risk analysis and the calculation of risk itself.
Figure 8. The risk analysis process
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A good environmental risk analysis is an exercise in gathering observational data, adapting 
it to novel cases about what might happen in the environment using expert judgement and 
integrating the pieces with some model. It is an application of many scientific principles, 
rather than a scientific pursuit in its own right.
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Many methods of risk analysis have developed. For many issues, it is possible to draw 
fairly tight boundaries around the problem and a risk analysis is a fairly straightforward 
exercise. However, in the environmental arena, risk analyses have become increasingly 
sophisticated and complex in order to handle the inherently multidimensional nature of the 
problem. Boundaries are diffuse and it can be difficult to constrain the issues because:
• there will be ambiguity over the level of regulatory compliance because many possible 
futures need to be taken into account;
• it is not possible to test the environmental consequences;
•  precedent projects may have given rise to unforeseen consequences and may have 
exposed limitations in the regulatory framework.
In consequence, the results of a risk analysis are challengeable. Stern and Fineberg’s call 
for “getting the science right” is partly relevant here. The decision-makers need the 
assessment to be as robust and credible as possible. Good quantitative analysis has 
several characteristic features [Stern and Fineberg, 1996].
• It is consistent with state-of-the-art scientific knowledge;
• Any assumptions used are clearly explained, used consistently and tested for 
reasonableness;
• The analysis is checked for accuracy ( e.g. of calculations);
• Unnecessary assumptions are removed before the final analysis is reported, after 
checking to ensure that the removed assumptions do no affect the results;
• Any models used for calculation are well defined and, ideally, validated by testing 
against experimental results and observational data;
• Data sources are identified in such a way that the data can be obtained by anyone 
interested in checking them;
• Calculations are presented in such a form that they can be checked by others interested 
in verifying the results;
• Uncertainties are indicated, including those in data, models, parameters and 
calculations;
• Results are discussed clearly, indicating what conclusions they can support.
However, this is only part of the story in understanding the robustness of the risk analysis. 
Adopting a good analytical approach to the risk analysis is necessary, but not sufficient for 
a robust risk assessment.
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Where there is a large amount of uncertainty in the physical and chemical processes that 
could arise as a consequence of the project, fairly complex modelling techniques are often 
employed -  to ensure that a wide range of different scenarios about the future are 
adequately captured.
Much work has been done to develop participatory assessment techniques. These have 
been reviewed in the academic literature [Petts and Leach, 2000]. There are a number of 
common assumptions to these techniques which have been discussed elsewhere [Stirling, 
2001] but include:
• The assumption that there exists a rational chain of inference from any single set of 
proposals;
• The assumption that the consequences of any action can be predicted given sufficient 
understanding of the initial and boundary conditions
• That an “optimum” solution can be identified;
• That standards and performance measures can be defined
Participatory assessment offer a potential way forward in developing shared knowledge 
about risks based on inclusive determination of what the right science is (and hence what 
the scope of the assessment should be). Nevertheless, even the most inclusive approach 
to a risk analysis will not be able to provide risk calculations that can be used with complete 
confidence.
4.3 Factors affecting confidence in risk results
Philosophical and reflective thinking about the role and application of natural science in 
society has raised a number of issues that pose direct challenges to the risk analysis as a 
source of knowledge. To fully understand the confidence with which an analysis can be 
used, the decision-maker must consider issues such as:
• Who did the analysis?
• What information went into it? what conceptual assumptions were made? How do the 
models calculate risks?
• How reliable are the models?
They are even being challenged with the question
• But is it science?
And underlying all these questions is the issue of how to handle uncertainty.
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4.3.1 Uncertainty and science
Uncertainty is intrinsic to science and also cannot be divorced from risk. For a long time, 
the premise has been that the scientific method should be well equipped to provide tools 
and strategies for dealing with uncertainty and risk.
Generally speaking, the scientific method involves developing hypotheses to explain the 
way the world works based on observation and measurement. This is illustrated in 
Figure 9.
Figure 9. A schem atic representation of the scientific m ethod
However, there is much interest at the moment in what constitutes “good science” 
particularly in areas where uncertainty is high and systems are complex. Guidelines are 
being produced in many policy areas for improving the knowledge base on which policy 
is founded [RCEP, 1998; Office of Science and Technology, 2000; CEC, 2002], A 
common theme in these guidelines is the importance of quality in scientific advice and 
the Commission of the European Communities suggests that quality is based on:
• The excellence of the scientists, as endorsed by the judgement of peers, but 
ensuring that the breadth of expertise is appropriate for the task
• The extent to which experts act in an independent manner (i.e to minimise vested 
interests); and
• Pluralism (the assemblage of a diversity of viewpoints)
The Royal Society, in their report on Science and Society [House of Lords, 2000] 
identified that scientists may lose their objectivity when providing knowledge about the 
application of scientific information. In such situations, choices are being made about 
the significance of any remaining uncertainty. Where this uncertainty is high (for 
example if the system under consideration is complex or has many interdependencies)
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vested interests based on personal value systems may (consciously or subliminally) 
come into play. In such situations, even more weight on pluralism and breadth is 
required if scientific advice is to be of high quality. Hence peer review and a 
multidisciplinary approach become central aspects of providing scientific advice to the 
decision-making process.
The process of peer review -  the practice of subjecting the derived theory or concept, 
and its basis in observation to scrutiny by other experts -  has always been central to the 
scientific method. Other scientists may develop concepts further by additional 
exploration and eventually theories become more or less accepted based on how well 
they pass through the peer review process and how well supported they are by 
observation. Thus the theory that the world is round is now “proven” -  we can see that it 
is so from outer space. However, when first conjectured, the theory was uncertain, but 
gradually gained in acceptability to the point where Christopher Columbus was prepared 
to sail in the “other direction” to India. In the Earth Sciences, the theorems of sea floor 
spreading and continental drift [Press et al, 2003] gave way to an integrated theory of 
plate tectonics as further observational evidence was analysed and interpreted [Press et 
al, 2003]. Plate tectonics is now accepted as a general theory explaining global 
distributions of geological evidence. Uncertainty has been reduced to minimal levels. 
However, it is not “proven” and it is possible that evolved theories may be developed in 
the future. Therefore, peer review is a way of achieving some form of scientific 
consensus in lieu of fact.
4.3.2 Uncertainty and credibility
As discussed earlier, risk is a concept that is concerned with the future, which is uncertain. 
Therefore, any risk analysis is going to have to deal with uncertainty. There are numerous 
different classifications of uncertainty. Some workers classify it in terms of its nature. For 
example, Wynne [Wynne, 1994, Hoffman-Reim and Wynne, 2002] identifies uncertainty in 
the categories;
• Risk -  where cause, effect and likelihood are known
• Uncertainty -  which is where the causal factor is known but the likelihood of its 
occurrence is not -  there is incomplete knowledge;
• Ignorance -  where causal factors are not known
• Indeterminacy -  which are things which cannot be known because they depend in part 
on unchecked behaviours
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In this classification system, “risk” is a form of quantified “uncertainty". In both cases the 
causal factor is known -  the distinction is whether or not there is sufficient information to 
quantify cause, effect and likelihood. Since these could be said to be subjective 
judgements in their own right, the following discussion will group “risk” in with uncertainty.
Taking Wynne’s classification system, risk analysis seeks to deal with “risks” and 
“uncertainty" but cannot be expected to deal with “ignorance” and “indeterminacy”. 
Therefore, many workers argue that these analyses do not completely handle uncertainty. 
Wynne argues for at least an acknowledgement of the limitations of the analysis in order to 
place the knowledge it provides appropriately within a social and moral framework. From 
Wynne’s work, it is apparent that there is a very real credibility problem for the process of 
risk analysis, which has, in the past, claimed to be a comprehensive vehicle for capturing 
and managing uncertainty.
The nature of the uncertainty, and the manner in which it is handled will influence the 
credibility of the risk results. Funtowicz and Ravetz discuss this issue extensively 
[Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992]. As uncertainty increases, it becomes more difficult to 
establish acceptance and precedent practice becomes less relevant. Funtowicz and 
Ravetz identify that as uncertainty increases, shifts in peer acceptance, colleague 
consensus, available observations and theoretical structure occur. Table 5 reproduces 
their ideas about “research pedigree”, a concept that can be closely related to analytical 
credibility.
Table 5: Factors influencing analytical credibility -  after [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
1992]
4 Established theory Experimental data Total All but cranks
3 Theoretically-based
model
Historic/field data High All but rebels
2 Computational model Calculated data Medium Competing schools
1 Statistical processing Educated guesses Low Embryonic field
0 Definitions Uneducated guesses None No opinion
A quick look at Table 5 identifies that environmental risk assessment is up against some 
tough challenges in terms of establishing a high pedigree or level of credibility. Firstly, we 
have identified that we do not know what will happen in the future. As the timescales for 
which we want to understand risk get longer and longer, it gets less and less easy to test 
the assumptions we make against experimental observations. Hence analysts are relying
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on theory, calculation and expert judgement. This puts the pedigree of risk analyses 
generally in the area of 0 - 2. Nevertheless, thanks to the interpretative practices of the 
natural sciences, we are not completely in the dark. In particular the earth sciences give 
the analyst the chance to build models and understanding based on at least “educated 
guesses”, if not historical and field data. (Rank 3).
An alternative and more typically technocratic approach is to classify uncertainty in terms of 
its source:
• Uncertainty about the future
• Uncertainty in data
• Uncertainty about models
Risk analysis sits most comfortably with an uncertainty classification system based on the 
source of the uncertainty. This is unsurprising since they both stem from the technical 
arena. In very general terms, the risk analysis deals with future uncertainty by postulating 
ideas about the future (scenarios) and considering consequences. This is true whether the 
analysis is a comprehensive performance assessment for radioactive waste disposal or a 
HAZOP study for a construction project although the terminology may be different. The 
concepts captured in a scenario tend to be represented using theoretically based models 
(suggesting a ranking of 3 on Table 5). However, parameterising these models can be very 
difficult since there may be little or no prior experience of them (implying a very low rank). 
This leads to high data uncertainty.
Ideally, data uncertainty is handled by seeking more information. However, when analysing 
risks into the future this may not be possible since it may not be possible to predict all the 
possible combinations of conditions that affect a specific parameter. Additionally, the 
inherent variability of natural environmental systems means that heterogeneity may also 
add to uncertainty. Whilst it is theoretically possible to envisage complete knowledge about 
variability on all scales, when dealing with the environment this is impractical and it is not 
possible to predict with complete confidence how this variability may evolve. So data 
uncertainty tends to encompass both uncertainty and variability in specific parameters.
Commonly the analyst takes recourse in probability theory to help handle data uncertainty. 
This enables the analyst to capture uncertainty in a particular parameter by describing the 
possible range of values of the parameter and its likelihood of being that value. Essentially 
a probability distribution function is generated.
Expert judgement is often used to generate these probability distribution functions. The 
level of empirical observation and experience available to guide this judgement makes the
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difference between the loose terminology of educated and uneducated guesses used in 
Table 5. This would suggest a ranking of 0 -  1 on Table 5. However, whatever the level of 
observation available to guide the development of probability distribution functions, 
probability theory assumes total knowledge of the range of possible values the parameter 
may take on. Ignorance and indeterminacy are not allowed for within probability theory. 
Without acknowledging this, any method of treating data uncertainty remains vulnerable to 
challenge.
An example of how this challenges risk analysis for hazardous waste disposal is given in 
Schrader-Frechettes book on Burying Uncertainty [Schrader-Frechette, 1990b]. She 
identifies a distinct difference between “two point logic” and “three point logic based on the 
idea that it is not sufficient to adopt a “closed-world” approach to data uncertainty. The 
chances of a parameter being less than x is not necessarily one minus the chance of it 
being more than x since there is not complete knowledge about the system in the first 
place. In other words, in some situations, it should not be claimed that the area under a 
probability distribution curve is equal to 100%.
Some workers are now moving to develop new approaches to capturing knowledge about 
parameters, which do not assume complete knowledge. Workers considering risks from 
natural hazards with fairly long-term implications (i.e. earthquakes) have developed a 
classification system based on [Blockley and Godfrey, 2000]:
• fuzziness;
• incompleteness; and
• randomness
Methods are being developed to enable this classification system (FIR) to be incorporated 
into a system for modelling processes and consequences in the oil and engineering 
industries.
Model uncertainty is uncertainty that arises from the theoretical and computational 
processes used to turn information into calculations. Verification and validation are 
processes that are available to build confidence in models. Verification ensures that the 
model does numerically what it is supposed to do -  i.e. that if it says it is going to add two 
and two and make four, it does. Validation is a way of testing whether a theoretically based 
model reproduces key aspects of the system it is describing. However, where the model is 
predicting into the future, complete validation is not possible until the 
implementation/evaluation stage of the decision-making process, which may last for many 
generations into the future and which is, in any case, after the event. At best it may be
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possible to validate parts of the model and build confidence by peer review and (hopefully) 
peer acceptance and colleague consensus. However, where validation is not possible it is 
difficult to conceive of achieving consensus outside competing schools (Rank 2 on Table
5).
So there is unlikely to be a single rank on Table 5 that applies to all the uncertainties 
accommodated within the risk analysis. This suggests limitations to the applicability of the 
research pedigree ranking system to the multifaceted nature of a risk analysis. The 
NUSAP system” offers another classification as shown in Table 6 [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
2001].
Table 6: The NUSAP system  of uncertainty classification
Technical Where the complexity of 
the system being 
considered can be dealt 
with using the traditional 
tools of applied science
Numerical uncertainty 
Unit uncertainty
Spread
Determining what is the 
right number to use for a 
specific,defined problem
Determining an 
appropriate measure for 
a specific, defined 
problem
Determining the inherent 
variability of the system
Methodological Where more complex 
aspects of knowledge 
must be dealt with such 
as reliability, 
extrapolation and 
subjectivity. Here 
personal judgements are 
required and have an 
impact on how 
uncertainty is handled
Assessment Determining an 
appropriate way of 
representing the system
Epistemological Where there are often 
conflicting stakes 
because ignorance and 
indeterminacy are at the 
core of the issue and 
values become very 
significant
Pedigree Determining the origin 
and trustworthiness of 
knowledge based in 
some measure by who 
has it, how it was derived 
and what went into its 
derivation (Table 2.1).
The focus of the traditional risk analysis is on technical and methodological uncertainties -  
numbers, units, spread and assessment methods. However, epistemological uncertainties 
exert a significant influence over the risk analysis process.
There is no doubt that a range of different types of uncertainty are addressed within the risk 
analysis. Hence experience and expert judgement play a large part in the construction and
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credibility of the risk analysis. Since expert judgement plays such an important role, the 
credibility of the risk analysis becomes intimately linked with the credibility of those 
undertaking it -  the experts.
4.3.3 Experts and values
Unsurprisingly, risk analysis is seen as an expert activity. This is both a strength and a 
weakness. The strength is in its sophistication and pedigree, and its amenability to good 
analytical method and scientific peer review. Its weakness centres around the fact that 
there are many knowledge’s (both within the term “science”0 and external to it) that are 
relevant to establishing environmental risks and these are not all captured in a technical 
risk assessment. Indeed, concerns have been expressed that that the experts in industry, 
consultants and contractors and the regulator operate as a very closed community 
[Rothstein and Irwin, 1998]. This inevitably raises questions about impartiality, vested 
interests and open mindedness.
The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology recognised this in 2000 
in their third report on Science and Society (Summary, Chapter 2) when they identified that 
“Science is conducted by individuals; as individuals and as a collection of professions, 
scientists must have morality and values and must be allowed, indeed expected, to apply 
them to their work”. The problem is that this individuality on the part of scientists is not 
always recognised outside the profession. Since this individuality reflects the moral 
priorities of the scientist (which are also presumably reflected in his/her choice of 
professional affiliation) there will always be some scepticism about the motivating factors 
behind a risk analysis.
Another difficulty in making sense of expert information and knowledge is that, where there 
is significant uncertainty, experts with similar training and background can come up with 
different understandings and concepts. Often these different understandings can have 
equal validity because they call on different research and the actual truth is not known. 
This difference of view can induce a sense of conflict amongst experts that further 
undermines any expert authority which they hold.
Environmental decision -making often comes down to discussion of who you are going to 
allow to be at risk and by how much. These are subjective, value driven judgements. In 
the face of high uncertainties, these value judgements will affect all choices about how to 
handle uncertainty within a model. Taking Wynne’s classification system, only 
incompleteness (reduceable uncertainty) is likely to be amenable to value-free judgements
c Science covers a range of very different disciplines, knowledge and cultures. As with the term 
“public”, there is more than one science.
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since it does have the potential to be addressed by the acquisition of more information -  
i.e. by observation. “Ignorance” may be reduced as more information becomes available, 
although Wynne identifies that the reduction of ignorance will inevitably lead to an increase 
in uncertainty since new causal factors will come into play. “Risk” is culturally understood 
and therefore different people will make different choices about the significance of the risk. 
“Indeterminacy” is, by definition, irreduceable and so any attempt to deal with these will be 
educated guesses and will be influenced by personal experience.
The fact that risk is culturally understood means that subjectivity inevitably comes into 
judgements made at all stages of the risk analysis process. This includes the definition of 
environmental standards. Value-free information can guide these judgements to a greater 
or lesser extent (Figure 10).
Figure 10. Risk analysis and values
So if values are influencing the risk analysis process and the process sits in the domain of 
experts, are the value judgements being made by the experts appropriate? Generally 
speaking, the expert should apply his/her knowledge in a manner that is as impartial and 
objective as possible. This is the essence of the scientific method described in Figure 9 and 
is encapsulated by the notion that scientists are “seekers after the truth”. Given this cultural 
background, the analyst is seeking to be as objective as possible in making a calculation of 
risk. However, as uncertainty increases, the influence of values becomes stronger and 
stronger (Figure 3). Whilst the experience and training of the expert gives him/her a certain 
authority in terms of knowledge, it does not provide him/her with any significant ascendancy 
in terms of values. So where values become significant, should it be up to any one 
epistemological group to determine what those values should be? The issue here is 
whether any group of experts can claim to have objectively considered an uncertain 
problem.
Risk Calculation Regulatory
Targets
Models
Understanding
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It is naive for any group to claim complete objectivity. Research into the didactic use of 
information and discourse analysis demonstrates that experts use information differently in 
their dialogue. Lawyers will tend to cover over weak points and emphasis strong ones, 
even when it is the weak ones that are important -  scientists emphasise detail -  
communicators select key points and evidence therefore exercising control over the 
debate. So inevitably, cultural training will affect the way information is used and discussed. 
An example of the significance of cultural differences was given by Edward Tufte in his 
analysis of the 24 hours leading to the Challenger disaster in 1983. [Tufte, 1997]. In this 
work, Tufte analysed the way scientists presented information on the risk of O-ring failure in 
cold weather to NASA officials gearing up to authorising a Challenger take off in January. 
The information was presented with all the detail that a scientist would be expected to 
provide to demonstrate the rigour of his/her analysis and the message was entirely lost on 
the NASA officials. Take off was authorised, an O-ring failed and twelve people died. 
Knowledge and information was sent and received in very different ways due to a 
difference in culture and mindset.
Another challenge to the objectivity of the risk analysis comes from the consideration of 
expert bias. Psychological research on risk perception [Edwards, 1961] has indicated that 
people apply a set of mental strategies to make sense in an uncertain world. Although the 
mental strategies that they apply may be valid under certain circumstances, in others they 
can lead to large and persistent biases. These biases have serious implications for risk 
assessment. In particular, laboratory research on basic perceptions shows that difficulties 
in understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, misleading personal 
experiences and the anxieties generated by life’s gambles cause the denial of uncertainty 
and the misjudgement of risks. Expert judgements appear to the prone to many of the 
same biases, particularly when experts are forced to go beyond the limits of available data 
and rely on intuition -  as is the case for long term environmental risks that may arise in the 
future.
There has been a lot of work exploring the biases of experts [Kahneman et al, 1982; 
Schrader-Frechette, 1990a] especially when faced with uncertainty. This work supports the 
claim that, in the absence of an algorithm completely guaranteeing scientific rationality, 
experts do not necessarily or always make more correct judgements about the acceptability 
of technological risk than do lay persons. Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman et al, 1982] 
illustrated a number of characteristic biases to which most people fall prey:
• Representativeness: which is when samples are believed to be very similar to one 
another and to the population from which they are drawn. This ignores the kind of 
factors often discussed in basic probability and statistical theory (prior probability of
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outcomes, sample size, predictability, correlated variables and regression towards the 
mean). Therefore, the bias of representativeness can be reduced by sound training.
• Availability: which is where the frequency of something, or its probability is influenced 
by the ease with which it can be bought to mind
• Anchoring: which is where estimates are made on the basis of adjusting values to an 
initial variable. This ignores the likelihood of different starting points yielding different 
results and that insufficient adjustments can skew the results. Typically, for a complex 
system, this results in an underestimation of failure.
Where there is a level of complexity about the system being analysed, all these biases may 
come into play in risk analysis. The concern expressed by many risk commentators is that 
those undertaking risk analysis may be vulnerable to bias due to their personal perception 
of the risks they are analysing. This is particularly the case when there is limited information 
on which to base the risk analysis.
As awareness of these potential bias increases, methods are gradually being introduced to 
minimise their impact. Nirex’s approach of previewing scientific work prior to its 
undertaking it is one such example. Participatory assessment techniques have been 
developing rapidly over the past decade (Petts and Leach, 2000). Nevertheless, it is still the 
expert community that largely determines what ideas about environmental evolution go into 
a risk analysis. It is also experts who develop the models used to make the risk 
calculations.
4.3.4 Abstraction and Calculation
The risk analysis itself is done using models of many kinds. Problem definition is developed 
from the available knowledge (which includes knowledge about uncertainty) to represent 
the “important” aspects of the system and how it may evolve into the future. Mathematical 
models are created from these concepts using a series of assumptions about the repository 
system. Therefore, the development of a risk analysis requires the expert to make an 
intellectual translation of information into a modelling methodology (Table 7). Since the 
assumptions are approximated by a numerical representation within the models, this 
means that the intellectual translation needs to convert essentially descriptive information 
about system behaviour and uncertainty into numeric and quantitative model input 
parameters.
Model input is often represented as conceptual assumptions and supporting information. 
This generally includes a description of the features and processes to be modelled and
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data on key properties. Sometimes these are called conceptual modelsd[ Nirex, 1997], 
especially in the field of hydrogeology which is of great relevance to environmental 
modelling. Since the information going in to the model determines the robustness of what 
comes out, these conceptual models and their origin are tremendously important to the risk 
analysis process.
Table 7: The translation of information into a modelling methodology
What standards need to be met 
(generally defined in regulations)
Identification of model output ( what the 
model is to calculate)
How the proposed course of action 
hopes to meet these standards (the 
project design)
Model representation
What is known now about environmental 
conditions, processes and evolution ( 
environmental knowledge)
Conceptual models and algorithms for 
representing key processes and couplings 
between processes, input parameters
What potentially could happen in the Scenarios of the future
future Groups at risk and their representation in 
the model
What are the risks? Ways of judging risk
The conceptual model is a very important component of the modelling process. It captures 
what is encompassed within the risk models. However, conceptual models are not 
quantitative. They are descriptive in nature and in the arena of risk analysis have tended to 
take a subordinate role to the numerical models used for the quantitative treatment of 
uncertainty to deliver a risk result. This result can be compared with environmental 
standards and regulations (Figure 10). The level of compliance with regulations informs the 
decision-making process.
So the derivation of risk results is based on the use of mathematical models used to 
represent conceptual assumptions and knowledge (both what is known and what is not 
known). The risks analysis process is therefore only as good as the models used to 
calculate the results and the models are only as good as the information used in the first 
place [Ravetz, 1998].
There are a number of problems that arise from this:
d The definition of conceptual model used here is “a brief, clear, simple and unambiguous description 
of the system. It defines the processes acting within the system, the parameters required to model 
those processes and the conditions on the boundaries of the system”.
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• A quantitative definition of risk, derived from regulatory science and captured in an 
environmental standard may not necessarily represent the concerns and values held by 
all stakeholders. In particular, the quantitative definition of risk derived from the physical 
sciences is not in accord with that of social scientists whose definition is inherently 
multidimensional and personalistic [Covello et al, 1988]. Thus results can appear to 
have little relevance to immediate concerns held by non-experts.
• Probability theory is often used to handle uncertainty within the model. However, 
probability is not intuitive, data will need to be augmented by expert judgements and the 
numerical representation of all this can be complex. This tends to focus discussion on 
the modelling process itself, rather than the underlying scientific assumptions.
• The quantitative presentation of results from a risk analysis is rarely in a form aimed at 
engaging non-regulatory stakeholders.
These problems arise from the fact that mathematical models approximate reality to a 
greater or lesser extent. The accuracy of the approximation depends on a great many 
issues including:
• the degree of realism or conservatism required;
• the quality and comprehensiveness of data used to populate the models and the 
way in which they are used within the model;
• uncertainty about the conceptual model which the mathematical model is seeking to 
represent;
• the way in which the mathematical model simplifies and abstracts physical and 
chemical processes so that they can be represented in equations;
• uncertainty about the future evolution of the system being modelled.
Additionally, the model development process can be involved. This is particularly the case 
for the assessment of a radioactive waste repository where, for example:
• the wide range of features and processes considered requires that a range of 
different models needs to be used in a hierarchical manner;
• data processing may be required to develop model input parameters. This data 
processing often requires the application of expert judgement;
• sophisticated programs are used;
• the models need to handle the changes that may occur over long timescales into 
the future;
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• the system under consideration is heterogeneous, manifested in a high degree of 
spatial variability. This is particularly the case where the variability is not simple, as 
is the case with many geological systems.
Because of the emphasis on quantitative output and the sophisticated nature of the models 
involved there is a temptation to present the models in great detail. They are the key to 
turning understanding into results. However, a high level of detail about the models may 
not be of interest to the majority of stakeholders. It is obviously important to establish the 
validity of information that has gone into the models (data and assumptions) and the 
confidence with which model output can be used (their strengths and limitations and their 
ability to reproduce independent data). However, these are generally seen to be one role 
for expert regulation and peer review to play on behalf of society. Stakeholders may not 
consider they have the competence to pass comment in these areas. However, that does 
not mean that they are not interested in the ideas and concepts behind the models -  
concepts that describe expectations about the causes and effects of environmental 
processes.
A key argument in this thesis is that, out of context, an emphasis on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the mathematical models may act as a barrier for discussion and dialogue 
about the causes and effects of environmental processes. Whilst expert regulators may be 
able to engage with the models, the discussion is kept within an expert (some would say 
closed) community. The risk models and the results they produce are unlikely to serve as a 
platform for shared knowledge building since, by their very nature they exclude the non­
expert community.
In using the term expert here, I am referring to those with an intimate understanding of the 
mathematical modelling of risk and uncertainty. There are many examples of (expert) 
natural scientists, working to provide conceptual models to input to risk models and 
remaining sceptical about the model output because of the “numerical hoops” through 
which their input is put. Many instances of this are documented by Nirex in a detailed 
investigation into allegations of misconduct in the mid-nineties [Nirex 2001b].
Risk workers do not call the output of their models predictions. This is common to many 
fields of investigation that have to rely heavily on probability theory to deal with long term 
environmental risks -  e.g.climate change, radioactive waste disposal. The models used in 
these areas of work, which involve considering risks for very long times into the future are 
highly sophisticated. They are also based on uncertain input information. When faced with 
such uncertainties the analyst may adopt the principal of “conservatism” -  using a model 
parameter that will tend to increase the risks calculated by the model. Additionally, when
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faced with multiple futures, the analyst may choose to use a probabilistic approach to the 
analysis -  whereby the model handles the many possible futures and uncertain information 
by allowing them all to be possible and calculating risks from randomly selected 
combinations of parameters. If this is done a sufficient number of times, an “expectation 
value of risk” can be derived which is some average value of risk allowing for all identified 
future and data uncertainty that is included within the model. However, it is not a prediction 
of risk. Most analysts would claim that a “prediction” of risk would be lower than an 
“expectation value” of risk.
The apparent numerical complexity required to handle data uncertainty quantitatively is not 
easy to assimilate, even by those intimately involved in providing model input information. 
This raises the question of how to understand the output of the risk calculation. Where 
models need to place such emphasis on treating uncertainty and where there is such 
difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the model output, can the risk results be used 
with any confidence?
4.3.5 Reliability
There is no single answer to the question “how reliable are the models” since the answer is 
a value judgement in its own right and will be influenced by epistemological uncertainties. 
There will also be a significant level of debate about what is meant by the term model. 
Computer codes may be very reliable in some situations and completely unreliable if used 
inappropriately. Conceptual models may be very robust but their translation into a 
mathematical model capable of calculating quantitative results may be inappropriate. So 
despite the rigour going into the calculation of risk, confidence in the results will be 
determined by other factors.
A fundamental challenge to the application of any risk assessment is that there may be 
causal relationships that have not yet been experienced. This is particular problem in the 
environmental arena and has been discussed extensively by Wynne [Wynne, 1996]. So 
how should a risk analysis dealing with future uncertainty be viewed? In part, this comes 
down to the level of confidence the stakeholder has in models.
However, given that it will never be possible to test the output of the models, it is not 
possible to rely on scientific methods to wholly “verify” or “validate” the models in the face 
of continuing future uncertainty. Therefore, confidence in the models that provide an 
assessment of risk cannot be divorced from the level of trust placed in the institution or 
individual developing the models. This will lead to questions about the motives and values 
of those developing the models, and the level of transparency about the assumptions that 
are used within the models.
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In the past, where the risk assessment was used to facilitate discussion between the 
proponent and the regulator, confidence in the models was established through expert peer 
review and debate about specialist knowledge and uncertainty. In participatory forms of 
decision-making, this may not be sufficient. Whilst expert review and comment will remain a 
significant factor in determining confidence in the risk models, the use of other forms of 
knowledge may be required for a risk assessment that is robust to review by a wider cross- 
section of stakeholders. Deciding whether to respond to this wider audience is one of the 
key challenges for analysts arising from new forms of environmental decision making.
So although there is a general consensus that risk assessment is an essential component 
of developing a risk management strategy, its limitations need to be appreciated, by both 
the analysts undertaking the assessment and the decision-maker.
4.3.6 But is it science ?
Where there is sparse data, or lack of precedent for a project, some researchers claim that 
risk analysis (in particular the development of conceptual models and providing the 
numbers to model it) is an exercise in “disciplined guesswork” [Fischoff, 1995]. This could 
be reconciled with scientific practice since expert judgement is the basis on which 
observations are turned into hypotheses (Figure 9) and also the bedrock of peer review. 
However, other workers have referred to risk analysis as “ the technological application of 
science”, which is clearly challenging whether it is science or not [Schrader-Frechette, 
1990b]. Aside from some bruised egos, it does not really matter in practice whether risk 
analysis is or isn’t science. However, it is important that the balance of fact, knowledge and 
judgement going into risk analysis is seen clearly, especially where the analysis is 
informing a decision-making process. This is a major theme in the work of Wynne -  that 
risk workers should not claim authority and objectivity (and hence executive power) without 
acknowledging limitations. The reason why this is of such concern is that risk analyses are 
used in standard setting and policy formulation. These are currently highly dynamic fields 
and it is surely important that old technology and ideas are not applied inappropriately to 
new problems.
Funtowicz & Ravetz explore the relationship between science and policy in their work 
“Uncertainty and Quality in science for policy [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2001]. They identify 
the emergence of a new form of ‘post-normal’ science. The term, ‘post-normal’ is relative to 
the idea of ‘normal science’ which assumes that it is possible to identify a framework for 
the systematic handling of knowldege. Within such a framework, values tend to be 
unspoken and assumptions are often implicit rather than explicit. Hence socio-political 
problems tend to be converted into analytical puzzles [Kuhn, 1962]. In contrast, Funtowizc
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and Ravetz claim that post-normal science responds to a decision-making climate where 
‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decision urgent’ [Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1992]. They suggest that “normal science” struggles to deal with these issues 
owing to factors such as data inadequacies and poor understanding of complex 
phenomena. They propose “post normal science” as a new culture or epistemology, 
developing in response to changes in the decision-making climate in which experts find 
themselves.
The relationship between post-normal science and normal science is shown in Figure 11, 
reproduced from Funtowicz and Ravetz’s original work [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992]. The 
term “decision stakes” refers to the complexity of the decision - some multiple of cost, 
benefit, impact and the number of interested and affected parties. Where both uncertainty 
and the decision stake is low, the model claims we are in the realm of applied science, 
where uncertainties can be dealt with at the technical level using standard (‘normal’) 
techniques. Where decision stakes or uncertainties are ‘higher’, uncertainties exist 
involving more complex aspects of information such as reliability or values. Here, 
judgements are required, and the practice in question is termed a professional consultancy, 
a ‘learned art’ like medicine or engineering [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2001]”.
According to Funtowicz and Ravetz, the realm of post-normal science exists when either 
stakes, uncertainties, or both are high (see Figure 11). Uncertainties involving 
indeterminacy and ignorance become significant and decision stakes reflect conflicting 
purposes among stakeholders. Uncertainties therefore become “epistemological” (using the 
NUSAP system) and incorporate issues associated with morals and ethics. As discussed 
in chapter 2, these are the very issues that fuel environmental debate and make 
contemporary environmental decision-making so tricky.
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Figure 11. Three types of problem-solving strategies (redrawn from 
Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992)
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The idea behind post-normal science is that the quality of the information being used in the 
decision can no longer be determined solely by expert peer review. This is because there 
is an extended set of legitimate participants in post-normal science and hence “extended 
facts” which need to be incorporated into the knowledge base for the decision. These 
extended facts derive from those with local knowledge and are complementary to 
knowledge derived from “abstract, generalised conceptions of the genuineness of the 
problems and the relevance of information”.
Whilst the rationale behind the identification of post-normal science is sound -  it identifies a 
realm of understanding where knowledge and values are linked and decision-stakes and 
uncertainty are high -  the concept can be challenged on two counts:
• The notion that science itself is limited by its ability to deal with uncertainty and 
extended facts;
• The notion that different types of uncertainty can be represented on a linear scale.
If the discipline of science is taken to be the “pursuit of knowledge” [OED], then all types of 
uncertainty -  incompleteness, ignorance, indeterminacy, technical, epistemological, 
methodological, data, model, future -  and all types of knowledge are entirely within its
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boundaries. However, a particular application of science, or a specific method of dealing 
with a scientific problem may well be unable to cope with certain types of knowledge or 
uncertainty. For example, the inability of a risk analysis to deal with ignorance and 
indeterminacy is discussed above. Post-normal science is a response to the increasingly 
rigorous quantitative nature of scientific analysis -  good for dealing with technical 
uncertainty. However, this is only a method. In a way, post-normal science appears to be 
taking methodological uncertainty and using it to define the boundaries of normal science. 
An alternative view is that an open-minded scientific practitioner thinks beyond the 
boundaries of any particular method. A good scientist should be able to acknowledge the 
existence of all types of knowledge and his/her role is to pursue ways of incorporating this 
knowledge and reducing these uncertainties via systematic structuring of knowledge. This 
scientific practice remains valid for any position on the diagram reproduced in Figure 11.
One of the reasons for identifying the realm of post-normal science is that it enables values 
and knowledge to be more firmly linked together than is done in the traditional (“value- 
free”?) pursuit of science. Deficiencies in recognising the significance of values could be 
more of a methodological uncertainty (a limitation in past scientific attitudes and 
applications) than a fundamental boundary to science per se. This suggests that there is no 
need to define a new epistemology outside science (as is done with the definition of post­
normal science). Rather there is a need to rethink the role and pursuit of science and its 
social context within difficult policy areas, and to understand the limitations of the scientific 
applications currently used.
A related issue is that post-normal science identifies technical, methodological and 
epistemological uncertainty as a spectrum. Wynne offers comment in this area and 
identifies that “risk, uncertainty and indeterminacy are overlaid one on the other, being 
expressed depending on the scale of social commitments which are bet on the knowledge 
being correct” [Wynne, 1994], If different types of uncertainty are overlaid one on the 
other, then it may be better to conceive of different epistemic knowledges as onion skins 
around a central issue. In this way, Wynne’s view that more precise scientific knowledge 
can narrow down uncertainty but will increase ignorance and misrepresent indeterminacy 
identifies a limit to science. Wynne’s challenge is that science expands to fill the void where 
indeterminacy and ignorance exist, whereas this should more usefully be filled by a 
discussion of the limitations of science. In my view, it should be a discussion of the 
limitations of the scientific method being used to deal with uncertainty. I believe we are all 
in danger of defining and limiting science by the methods used in general scientific practice.
Nevertheless, the upshot of this highly philosophical discussion is that risk analysis is 
limited in its potential to act as a knowledge base for environmental decision-making. Risk
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analysis is an analytical method derived for the quantitative and systematic treatment of 
uncertainty. Funtowizc and Ravetz would probably identify that risk analysis sits in the 
realm of “normal” science -  it is methodological and has been developed in the belief that 
values and knowledge can be separated and uncertainty can be objectively handled. An 
ideal vehicle for shared knowledge building for environmental decisions would sit in the 
realm of postnormal science and acknowledge the interaction between knowledge and 
values that was discussed earlier.
A quick look at Table 7 shows that the translation of information through the three key 
stages of risk analysis (understanding, model building and calculation) acts as a focus for 
both:
• The application of expert knowledge and judgement; and
• Values - influencing choices about what to model and how to model it.
Knowledge and values are therefore intimately intertwined within the risk analysis. 
Therefore, it may be possible for risk analysis to evolve and hence continue to be a central 
part of the knowledge platform for environmental decision-making.
4.4 Risk analysis as a vehicle for knowledge building -  a summary of 
issues
There is little argument that science, and in particular scientific knowledge about physical 
and chemical processes and their effect on the environment is, and will continue to be, a 
very important source of information for environmental decision-making. Additionally, whilst 
there is a lot of discussion and debate about understanding and acknowledging the 
limitations of mathematical treatments of uncertainty in a risk analysis, it seems generally 
agreed that risk analysis will continue to have a role.
Since risk analysis has been developed as a way of modelling environmental 
consequences within a regulatory framework, it is reasonable to consider that it provides a 
means of meeting the requirements of expert regulation. However, it has rarely been used 
to facilitate social inclusion. Partly this is because of the very systematic nature of the 
analytical process and the complexity of the models that are used when dealing with 
environmental risks. This has led to an increase in the development of participatory 
assessment practices outlined in (for example) Petts and Leach (2000). Undeniably, within 
these participatory frameworks, the risk analysis is an important input to knowledge building 
since it provides a means of considering what might happen in the future. However, the 
work described above suggests a number of limitations in using risk analysis as the 
platform for shared knowledge building. Essentially these ideas challenge:
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• Whether uncertainty is captured comprehensively
• The objectivity of the expert judgements used in the development of a risk analysis
The implication is that a risk analysis undertaken by experts working within their own 
epistemological community is not a sufficiently broad-based vehicle on which to base a 
discussion. Hence the results of a risk analysis should not be used without reflection and 
discussion of who did it, what definition of risk was used, what went in it and what was left 
out. These issues actually have a very large impact on the analytical process itself and on 
the people who undertake the analysis. If risk analysis is to be used more effectively in 
participation, it will be important to understand the practical implications of opening up 
these issues to scrutiny and debate, both on the practice of risk analysis and on the 
practitioners.
One practical implication is that the involvement of stakeholders in dialogue about 
environmental risk should start earlier in the analytical process. Rather than the risk 
analysis informing the dialogue, there should be opportunities for dialogue to inform the risk 
analysis. The question is, how can these opportunities be created and how will they affect 
the analytical process.
At the very least risk analysts will need to reconsider the extent to which their work is value- 
free and objective. In general terms, it could be claimed that the risk analysis does go some 
way to integrating knowledge and values via expert judgements, although the analysts are 
not always aware of this. Hence the values that are incorporated are solely those of a 
closed and expert community. Going back to Stern and Finebergs criteria for a good 
analytic deliberative approach, this essentially means that the determination of “the right 
science” has been left to the analysts.
Many workers are now advocating a new paradigm for risk analyses in support of 
radioactive waste disposal [Andersson, 2001]. In this new paradigm, values drive the 
analytical process and are determined in a consultative manner. Inevitably, this proposal 
leads to the concept of a consultative risk analysis. But is this vision really compatible with 
the scientific method and with the behaviour and practice of scientists and risk analysts?
This question is very broad and may have a different answer depending on the nature of 
the environmental-decision being made. In the following chapters, the question is 
considered by looking generally at the role of science in general and earth science in 
particular in environmental decision-making.
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5 SCIENCE AND EARTH SCIENCE: HOW CAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING?
5.1 The challenges of analytic-deliberative decision-making
There is not much doubt in the literature that science and scientists have a significant 
and ongoing role to play in environmental decision-making. Three key challenges for 
scientists arise out of the preceding discussion:
• Scientists no longer have the executive power they enjoyed in the decide- 
announce-defend model of decision-making, where the risk analysis provided a 
common platform for discussion and debate between the proponents and the 
regulators experts. The scientific experts no longer have complete autonomy to 
determine what is “the right science” to be addressing;
• The significance of value judgements within science has been highlighted -  
challenging the notion that science is “value free”;
• The scientist needs to engage with new audiences without the training and 
mindset of the scientific peer community. The expert nature of science is not 
helpful in this respect and demonstration of scientific rigour itself may be a barrier 
to communication.
Scientists remain important sources of knowledge about:
• the physical and chemical processes and their impact on the environment,
• the management of uncertainty and
• the assessment of risk
I would put it more strongly. Scientists are in a unique position to facilitate knowledge 
building, provided that the necessary receptiveness to alternative (scientific or lay) 
opinions can be adopted. What would the implications of this be?
There is a lot of debate about this in the literature. Adams [Adams, 1995], captures 
views expressed strongly by Beck (a sociologist) and Wildavsky (a political scientist) and 
concludes that they agree on the significance of culture and society in influencing 
perspectives on risk perception, and disagree about the magnitude and seriousness of 
those risks, Nevertheless, they have similar ideas about how to deal with these issues.
The way ahead shared by Beck and Wildavsky is one that sits very comfortably with 
scientific culture and practice. Beck argues that when scientist is pitted against scientist
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then arguments become intelligible and self-criticism can act to identify errors and 
limitations before they become entrenched in action. Wildavsky implies that some 
perspectives will be more in line with knowledge than others -  and hence some people’s 
views should take priority over others [Wildavsky and Dake 1992]. The notion is that 
good science can provide the necessary knowledge. This idea is mirrored in the Royal 
Society’s discussion of risk [Royal Society, 1992].
Adams [1995] challenges these proposals on the basis that this would only be possible 
where everything is controllable. He states that, as evidenced by the ideas of Einstein, 
Heisenberg, reflexive modernisation and chaos theory, everything is far from 
controllable. This prescriptive theme that science cannot provide all the answers is 
picked up by many recent workers and has been discussed elsewhere (Wynne1996). It 
is also apparent in Stern and Fineberg’s work [1996]. This leads to an important 
question for this thesis - how is a practising scientist to contribute to the management of 
risk? How can the individual be:
• authoritative without being authoritarian or arrogant?;
• responsive without abrogating the responsibilities of a specialist knowledge?
• open without being apologetic for his/her expertise?
These questions need to be answered practically rather than philosophically. Douglas 
and Wildavsky [1982] suggest that the selection/identification of risk is a matter of social 
organisation and the management of risk is an organisational problem. So the scientist 
needs to keep in mind the organisational structure and context within which (s)he is 
working as well as the social values to which (s)he is responding
A number of tools and techniques have been developed in recent years to aid this 
integration and enable individuals and individual groups to be included in the 
development of knowledge (social learning). In such participatory processes ideas about 
risk communication, participatory analysis and the concept of citizen science have their 
place.
However, there is also a need for consideration of societal issues in a generic or 
collective sense based on social and behavioural research. Often ideas of collective 
benefits are wrapped up into regulations and governance. Ideas of group values are 
therefore important to consider as part of expert regulation, along with the provision of 
appropriate checks and balances and qualified peer review. The notion of addressing 
two distinct axes is illustrated in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Axes for the discussion of scientific knowledge in the analytic- 
deliberative approach to decision-making
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Figure 12 identifies that the scientist (analyst) needs to engage in dialogue with those 
providing expert regulation of their work and also with those seeking a less expert 
involvement in response to social inclusion. Past institutional expectation has been that 
risk analysis should rationally form the basis for discussions and knowledge 
development about environmental risk (i.e. it should sit in the centre of the triangle in 
Figure 12). In traditional forms of decision-making this was appropriate and checks and 
balances to ascertain the quality of the science encompassed in the risk analysis have 
been set up through legislation, regulation and monitoring organisation (regulators). 
Because dialogue about environmental risk has been mainly limited to the developer and 
the regulator, it has been possible for the dialogue to adopt the expert culture and 
scientific language of risk assessment. The risk analysis has therefore served well in 
enabling discussion and knowledge building with expert regulators.
However, experience in many sectors is giving rise to questions about whether the risk 
analysis continues to be an effective vehicle for dialogue and discussion with a broader 
representation of society. If not, the scientists therefore need to rethink whether or not 
traditionally structured risk analyses continue to be an appropriate vehicle for discussion 
and debate if they are to continue with a central role in environmental decision-making.
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5.2 Vehicles for debate
Stern and Fineberg [1996] identify the development of an accurate and balanced 
synthesis as important for an effective analytic deliberative process. In essence, the 
synthesis is a key goal of the knowledge building process (Figure 5). Taking their work 
further, this synthesis needs to be informed by “the right science” and “the right 
participation” so that the decision maker can form a view about the significance of 
environmental consequences, based on a balanced discussion of the cause and effect 
of environmental consequences.
This seems to have the makings of something that could act as a vehicle for discussion 
between both expert and lay communities since it is important to all. Generally speaking, 
a knowledge platform needs to consider what is known (observational evidence), what is 
generally accepted (basic principles) and what is not known (conjecture). However, 
uncertainty is handled differently within different scientific disciplines. Geoscientists deal 
with uncertainty by seeking to explain it (explanatory rather than reductionist), and this 
should be a real asset in encouraging a debate about environmental uncertainty [Allaby 
and Allaby 2003].
Essentially, wider stakeholder participation (deliberation) will be captured in a linguistic 
form -  ideas, comments, arguments developed in writing and rhetoric. The 
determination of risks (analysis) will be undertaken in a numerical fashion based on 
mathematically rigorous treatments of uncertainty. Between these two endpoints of the 
analytic-deliberative approach to decision making, something needs to occur that 
translates linguistic inputs into numeric information.
This is where an interpretative and heuristic approach to science comes into its own. 
Earth Science is a descriptive (i.e.linguistically oriented) discipline in which the subject 
matter is essentially environmental -  so much so that in the past the Earth Sciences 
have been considered a derivative science, based on the application of primary sciences 
(chemistry and physics) to understanding the environment around us. The central theme 
of this thesis is therefore to look at the potential for geoscientific knowledge about the 
physical and chemical processes affecting the environment to focus social negotiation 
and develop shared knowledge about the significance of environmental consequences.
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5.3 The value of Earth Science
“Earth Science” is acquiring currency as an all-embracing term for geology, geography, 
geodetics, climatology and meteorology, oceanography and the astronomical aspects of 
the earth-moon system. Encompassed within Earth Science is the term geology which is 
defined as “the study of the earth as a whole, its origins, structure, composition and 
history and the nature of the processes that have given rise to its present state” [OED]. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the geological context of the Earth Sciences 
which has provided the biophysical background for my work with Nirex and my 
involvement in long term risk analyses.
The Earth Sciences, with their emphasis on considering the earth as a natural system 
and exploring the chemical and physical processes that determine the earth’s dynamic 
evolution help in understanding the cause and effect of environmental change. Earth 
scientists therefore have a central role to play in environmental policy-making. 
Historically, the discipline of Earth Science has been descriptive and interpretive. 
However today, it also includes experimental modelling so that it can be a predictive, as 
well as interpretive discipline. The work of a geoscientist is to offer explanatory 
hypotheses in the face of sparse evidence and large uncertainties [Oreskes, 2001]. It is, 
by nature, an heuristic discipline, which seeks to explain evidence in the present by 
considering evolutionary history. Time and evolution are constant points of reference for 
the Earth Sciences. In consequence, it is fundamentally bound up with the consideration 
of environmental change and, as such, provides a good basis on which to discuss 
environmental impact.
Whilst the practice of Earth Science uses models to recreate history, test hypotheses 
and make predictions, it is essentially conceptual, based on the observation of naturally 
occurring features and processes. So when an oil geologist makes predictions about the 
extent of oil reserves, (s)he uses a model based on observations from field tests, a 
hypothesis about the evolution of the site and the disposition of the rocks and an 
understanding of the physical and chemical processes of hydrocarbon generation 
(derived from experimentation and observation). A volcanologist will analyse and model 
the cause and effects of an eruption to make predictions about future hazards from an 
active volcano.
Additionally, the evidence which the Earth scientist uses are provided by nature -  and 
exhibited as part of the environment in which we live. Earth Science therefore has the 
potential to be tangible to others, since we are all part of the environment and will see 
examples of geoscientific evidence as part of our everyday lives -  the upwelling of a 
spring, the drying up of a river, the red brown colour of the soil in Devon.
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So, theoretically, there are some key opportunities for the Earth Science community to 
contribute to environmental decision making. Earth scientists can provide:
• a major contribution to establishing, describing and reviewing the processes that 
could affect the environment, both now and in the future, and hence give rise to 
environmental risk [OUP, ];
• inputs to the risk analysis process [Stern and Fineberg, 1996];
However, if Earth Science is to contribute to evolving methods of environmental 
decision-making by facilitating the linkage between expert and lay knowledge, then a key 
question has to be whether it provides a medium for dialogue, for example by 
enabling/encouraging other stakeholders to engage in dialogue about the cause and 
effect of environmental risk.
Although there is little documented evidence for Earth Science acting as a vehicle for 
dialogue, this may be due to the nature of past practice where the focus for most Earth 
Science contributions to environmental decision making has been via the risk analysis. 
This focus has emphasised the skills of comprehensiveness, scientific rigour, precision 
and auditability, all of which are important attributes of any good scientific practice. 
However, this emphasis has inhibited the application of Earth Science in the other areas, 
which require a greater level of audience focus and therefore demand clarity of 
presentation and an ability to engage in dialogue.
The emphasis on the quantitative presentation of information also encourages a view 
that science provides an impartial, factual answer (however uncertain). Recent work 
challenges this idea by exploring the scientific practice and the motivational behaviour of 
scientists working in the face of significant uncertainty [Wynne and Irwin, 1996]. Hutton 
said that the present is the key to the past. As evidenced by the increasingly predictive 
nature of Earth Science, contemporary practice is to make the past the key to the future. 
This is where geoscience has an opportunity to contribute to environmental decision­
making.
5.4 Geoscience and prediction
With environmental decision-making, society is still learning about the consequences of 
actions taken fairly recently and so new information is coming to light all the time. Hence 
the uncertainty and complexity associated with environmental systems is increasing and 
it is becoming much more difficult to achieve scientific consensus. This is partly because 
of the important scientific quality factor of pluralism. As more scientists with different 
perspectives and fields of expertise become involved, the number of factors to be
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integrated into a hypothesis about system behaviour increases, and hence the range of 
viable hypotheses available to explain the uncertain information expands exponentially.
Geologists have been dealing with uncertainty for more than 200 years. It is the 
essence of the geoscience subjects to take partial information about the disposition of 
materials and chemicals within the earth and its atmosphere, and speculate about:
• the processes and features that gave rise to them (for example, palaeontology,
mineral genesis);
• their current disposition ( as exploited by the oil and minerals industry); and
• what they might tell us about the future (for example in volcanology and natural 
hazard prediction).
These strands of geology all have one thing in common: uncertainty. Uncertainty in 
what happened in the past, uncertainty about what could happen in the future and also 
uncertainty arising from incomplete information. However, these uncertainties are 
essentially different.
What happened in the past is unknowable for sure, but hypotheses about past history 
can be tested against data and observations made now. This type of uncertainty is 
amenable to reduction via the scientific method. It is typically explored by physical 
scientists to develop theories of how the world works, and a general consensus may be 
achieved after a long process of such testing and peer review. The development of the 
idea of plate tectonics, and its ascendancy over the concept of continental drift is an 
example of this type of uncertainty reduction [Press et al, 2003].
Uncertainty due to incomplete information can, in theory, be eliminated by completing 
the dataset. In practice, this would not be possible. However, with the application of 
suitable resources, it may be possible to reduce uncertainty to a point where it is not 
significant. This approach to handling uncertainty is adopted by the engineering 
sciences, who test materials in order to provide a more complete dataset about their 
performance. Oil geologists face daily decisions about how much uncertainty they can 
live with when committing resources to exploration and oil production.
Finally, what may happen in the future will only be known with hindsight. Again, referring 
to the oil industry, geologists cannot know exactly how long hydrocarbon resources will 
remain available for exploitation. Power consumption may change, the balance of 
different energy sources may change, new technologies may make currently unusable 
hydrocarbon sources viable, new sources may be found. So to handle future uncertainty,
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analysts turn to models, in which assumptions are made to enable future impacts to be 
evaluated.
Because geologists have a long history of handling uncertainty, many methods exist for 
dealing with it. However, these methods have really been developed for application in 
mineral exploration and oil industry. In a recent submission to a Government review of 
energy and security of supply [Oil Depletion Analysis Centre, 2001], a range of 
predictions about “almost certain” near-term hydrocarbon shortages are identified. 
These predictions are based on models of future hydrocarbon production rates in which 
assumptions are made to deal with future uncertainty. The claim is that these models 
are assessed as “adequately accurate and robust”. In essence, this type of claim means 
that model validation processes and peer review have been applied to the issue to build 
confidence that rigour and good science have been applied in the development of the 
models. However, as the time horizon being considered extends further into the future, it 
becomes more and more difficult to answer the question “ how good are the models?”
With enough knowledge, and after the event, the models can also be tested by 
“postdiction”. This approach has been adopted in the global climate change arena and 
the medical health arena. It is also used all the time for business analysis models. 
However, the business analyst is typically concerned with timescales altogether shorter 
than the “future generations” identified under the umbrella of sustainable development. 
Postdiction is not an option for the long term management of environmental impact.
5.5 Summary
The traditional scientific method of hypothesis testing against empirical observation 
followed by peer review has, in the past, led to a general consensus of scientific opinion 
about physical theories, this method can only be applied historically. The very nature of 
the scientific method is about explaining observations -  i.e. something that was 
observed or measured in the past. Which leaves policy-makers and stakeholders 
concerned about the environment with a problem: “how can I make decisions about what 
may or may not happen in an uncertain future?”.
The previous chapter considered the challenges associated with evolving risk analyses 
to contribute a broader perspective into the decision-making process by becoming more 
participatory. The aim would be to encourage greater levels of debate and dialogue over 
the knowledge and values included in the analysis. The compatibility of dialogue with 
scientific practice has been considered in this chapter. There are many different 
scientific cultures. In this chapter, the culture of geoscience has been examined and
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offered as a potential vehicle for debate since it has strongly descriptive and predictive 
elements which could be shared with non-experts. In the next section, the robustness of 
these ideas is explored by looking at the specific case of the deep geological disposal of 
radioactive wastes.
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Section 2
The specific case of radioactive waste
management
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6 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AS A CONTEMPORARY 
EXAMPLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
6.1 Introduction
Radioactive waste management is an exemplar of contemporary environmental issues. 
The solid radioactive wastes produced by the nuclear industry (and others) act as a 
focus for a wide range of societal debates and economic issues. They are the by-product 
of an industry which has been, and is, violently opposed by some on ethical and 
environmental grounds. In many countries, there is a long history of attempts to develop 
a sustainable means of managing radioactive wastes over the very long timescales for 
which they pose a hazard. More recently, those involved in the management of 
radioactive wastes have been seeking to find ways forward that command a measure of 
public support. Hence, as an industry, there is a lot of valuable case-study material to 
consider in terms of using deliberation and analysis to find a way forward on behalf of 
society.
6.2 Background
Radioactive wastes are waste products that contain radionuclides and hence emit 
radiation in some form or another. Some wastes will remain hazardous for many 
thousands of years, both by virtue of the radioactivity associated with them and the 
chemical form of the wastes. Radioactive wastes are generally produced as a by-product 
of processes involving the use of radioactive sources and nuclear technology, primarily 
within the nuclear industry but also within the health and education sectors. From 1950 
to 2000 there was a world-wide increase in the exploration and the exploitation of 
nuclear technology. Primarily, nuclear technology was developed for electricity 
production, but it has also been used for military purposes to develop strategic 
deterrents. All these activities have created radioactive wastes,
Both solid and liquid radioactive waste can be produced. This thesis is concerned with 
considering solid radioactive wastes. Different countries classify the waste in different 
ways according to their characteristics -  primarily based on the nature and amount of 
radioactivity they emit. The UK classification system is presented in Box 5.
85
Box 5: Categories of solid waste in the UK
UK solid radioactive wastes are categorised into four groups 
High-level Waste (HLW)
HLW has the greatest concentration of radioactivity, and generates significant quantities of 
heat. It occurs in relatively small volumes from the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel 
and contains about 95% of the radioactivity in all wastes from UK nuclear power 
generation. It is produced as a solution in nitric acid which, for the most part, is converted 
into glass and stored in a specially designed facility at Sellafield. In April 1998 there were 
1,800 cubic metres of HLW in storage.
Intermediate-level Waste (ILW)
Waste is classified as ILW if its radioactive content exceeds the upper limit for LLW, but its 
heat output is not so high that special cooling is necessary (as is the case for HLW). Much 
of the waste comes from materials that have previously been in nuclear reactors e.g. fuel 
cladding. Many of the wastes are stabilised by mixing them with cement inside a stainless 
steel drum. In April 1998 there were about 71,000 cubic metres of ILW in storage.
Low-level Waste (LLW)
LLW is waste with a radioactive content which does not exceed 4,000 Bq/g (Becquerels1 
per gram) of alpha or 12,000 Bq/g of beta/gamma activity. Most solid LLW in the UK is 
disposed of at Drigg after supercompaction and placed into containers that are infilled with 
a cement grout. The containers are then buried in engineered trenches. Between 1959 
and 1998 about one million cubic metres of LLW were disposed of, mostly to Drigg.
Very Low-level Waste (VLLW)
VLLW has a radioactive content that is less than 0.4 Bq/g of alpha or less than 0.4 Bq/g of 
beta/gamma activity. VLLW may be disposed of without special treatment at landfill sites 
licensed for domestic and other wastes.
I -  a becquerel is the SI unit for radioactivity and equates to one disintegration per 
second
Whatever the classification, the perception of hazards from radioactive wastes is 
generally high, principally due to a dread factor (see Chapter 3). Radioactivity is silent, 
unseen and can cause cancer. To compound the issues, radioactive wastes have 
connotations with the nuclear weapons industry. Another problem is the extraordinarily 
long-term health risks arising from the wastes. Society is therefore challenged with 
finding a way of managing these wastes both now and in the very long-term future
It can be difficult to divorce the issue of radioactive waste management from the 
processes that produce radioactive wastes. Inevitably there is a link between these 
wastes and the nuclear industry (and strategic deterrents). Hence the topic of 
radioactive wastes is rarely discussed in isolation from consideration of the future of 
nuclear power and the legacy arising from strategic deterrents. Therefore, decisions 
about what to do with radioactive wastes encompass most of the complex factors that 
make environmental decision-making such a multifaceted problem.
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Ongoing environmental debates focus on issues such as whether the development of a 
long-term management proposal for radioactive wastes means that the continued 
production of these wastes is being condoned -  therefore assuring the continued 
survival of the nuclear power industry. Alternatively, it is argued that there is an ethical 
obligation on this generation to deal with an existing, and hazardous legacy, regardless 
of decisions about the future of nuclear power production. Either way, it is difficult to 
decide what is the best way of handling these wastes, now and in a future which is 
essentially unknowable
Broadly speaking, the development of radioactive waste management policy requires the 
integration of:
• scientific research (into the environmental behaviour and health impacts of 
radioactivity);
• technology (to design and build facilities for the containment of the wastes);
• social research ( to understand the behavioural, political, ethical and cultural factors 
that require consideration during the decision-making process; and
• consultation (to establish the key issues of concern and the values to be adopted in 
developing a management policy).
There are a number of possible options for managing solid radioactive wastes that are 
under active consideration. Some are considered more viable than others [DEFRA, 
2001]. In the eighties and nineties, the options tended to be grouped into one of two 
broad categories:
• Dilute and disperse
• Concentrate and contain
However, this classification is simplistic when the timescales of concern (millions of 
years) are taken into account. No containment system can be guaranteed for such 
timescales and so an idea that has received much international support is the concept of 
multibarrier containment. In such a system, the wastes are indeed concentrated and 
contained into a central disposal facility, often conceived of being deep underground. 
However, the concept assumes that eventually the engineered containment will 
deteriorate to a point where it no longer serves a containment function. At this point, the 
natural system in which the disposal facility was built will begin to serve a containment 
function by retarding, diluting and dispersing the radionuclides within the natural 
environment.
Radioactive waste management is a problem being faced by many of the developed 
nations. Approaches vary between nations due to the different national cultures and
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backgrounds. Within the EC, many countries focus on the idea of building geological 
disposal facilities to manage their radioactive wastes. However, the details of such 
repositories can vary markedly. In most countries, there is a history of successful, 
partially successful and failed attempts to develop and implement different policies for 
the long-term management of the wastes. There is a lot of scope for comparing these 
attempts to identify strengths and weaknesses of the decision-making processes 
adopted
6.3 International Policy Considerations
The amount of waste held by any one country depends upon the history of nuclear 
exploitation within that country. Some of the oldest wastes relate to extraction of radium 
from uranium for medical purposes. Early electricity-producing nuclear reactors 
produced much more waste (per unit of electricity generated) than more recent ones. 
The volume and the diversity of the wastes in a country's possession therefore depends 
on past and present policy decisions for energy and defence. Examples of such 
decisions are the extent to which nuclear power is to be used for electricity production, 
whether uranium mineral reserves are to be exploited, and whether spent nuclear fuel is 
to be treated as a vyaste or as a resource to be exploited through reprocessing. For 
reasons such as these, different countries face quite different challenges in terms of the 
quantity and the range of waste types that need to be managed. A summary of 
management approaches is given in Appendix A.
In accordance with the principles of sustainable development, there is widespread 
international agreement that, in addition to protecting the current population, these 
wastes must be managed so as to provide fairness and equity in terms of:
• the risks and burdens placed on future generations (inter-generational equity), and
• resource allocation and decision-making within contemporary generations (intra- 
generational equity).
With current technology, the storage of these wastes to protect current generations 
(short-term management) is relatively straightforward. Many waste storage plants 
already exist. However, they have not been designed as a permanent solution for the 
management of radioactive wastes. Providing adequate protection to future generations 
(long-term management) is therefore a different matter.
For some wastes this entails isolation of the wastes and containment of long-lived 
radionuclides for many thousands of years. On these timescales it cannot be assumed 
that the infrastructure, resources and technology that are required for storage will
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continue to be available. Long-term management therefore requires other approaches 
and different countries are addressing this in different ways.
Broadly speaking, much of the policy-debate about the long-term management of 
radioactive wastes tends to be focussed on those options which do not contravene 
international treaties: long term storage and disposal. Ethical arguments citing the 
principle of intergenerational equity can be advanced for both.
Long term storage involves active management, monitoring and maintenance of a 
storage facility for hundred of generations. The idea is that this active process extends 
choice to future generations and gives them the option of applying new technologies in 
the future. However, in the light of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on 
September 11th 2001, some advocates of long term storage (sometimes called 
guardianship) are including the notion of below-ground storage into their thinking.
Disposal involves the construction of a facility which does not rely on active maintenance 
to achieve the necessary containment of radioactive wastes -  i.e. it relies on the idea of 
“passive safety”. Multibarrier containment is a concept that has been developed to 
deliver this passive safety and a way of achieving multibarrier containment is to 
construct a repository for radioactive wastes deep underground -  deep geological 
disposal. However, in view of concerns regarding the performance of such facilities, 
many advocates of deep geological disposal are now including periods of storage in the 
repository during which the wastes can be monitored and retrieved into their proposals, 
prior to final closure.
Given these trends in thinking, the policy issues that separate the ideas of storage and 
disposal come down to question s such as “how deep?”, “how retrievable?” and “for how 
long?” -  once again that type of value-laden ethical questions for which it is very difficult 
to establish any measure of consensus.
Meanwhile, as the policy debates continue, existing wastes are stored in interim storage 
facilities which are vulnerable to surface processes and which require increasing levels 
of active maintenance. Therefore, internationally there is pressure to formulate policies 
for the long-term management of radioactive wastes [Oxburgh, 2002]. Different countries 
are developing different approaches [Lidskog and Andersson, 2002], A comparative 
study is presented in Appendix A. Countries included in the study are Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Czech 
Republic, United Kingdom and the United States. Given the wealth of detail associated 
with various radioactive waste management programmes internationally, this analysis 
focuses on particular sites and aspects of waste management programmes that provide
89
the most useful lessons with respect to stakeholder dialogue and consultation. The 
analysis was undertaken in 2001.
6.4 Radioactive waste management in the United Kingdom
As in other countries, the UK has a long history of solid radioactive waste management, 
and more importantly, a history of persistent attempts to develop a solution for the long­
term management of radioactive wastes. Appendix B outlines the history of radioactive 
waste management in the United Kingdom, leading to the present Government 
consultation about Managing Radioactive Waste Safely [DEFRA, 2001] and the setting 
up of an advisory committee on radioactive waste management (CoRWM).
6.4.1 Wastes and disposal options
The UK already has significant quantities of long-lived radioactive wastes. Most of these 
have arisen in the last 50 years as a result of UK Government decisions on nuclear 
power production and nuclear defence. Smaller quantities of radioactive waste also arise 
from medical and industrial uses of radioactive materials. The categories of waste 
existing in the United Kingdom are given in Box 5. The UK Inventory of Radioactive 
Wastes [DETR, 1999a] provides a more detailed description.
In the UK, the management of these wastes is being increasingly viewed as an ethical 
issue relating to inter-generational equity. It is the present generation that has benefited 
from the technology that produced these wastes. It would be wrong to leave the finding 
of a solution to future generations, which may have neither the industrial infrastructure 
nor the resources to do so.
Nevertheless, determining a management strategy for these materials has proved to be 
a major challenge in the UK, despite 30 years of research. A range of different options 
for the management of radioactive waste have been discussed. These are illustrated in 
Figure 13 and have been discussed in more detail in a recent review by Nirex [Nirex, 
2002b]. However, only a small subset of these have been actively considered in the 
past as representing viable options for the management of radioactive waste. These are:
• Sea disposal
• Shallow disposal
• Deep disposal
• storage
These options are discussed in more detail in Box 6 and are illustrated on Figure 13
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Box 6: Options for the disposal of radioactive wastes (see Figure13)
Long term surface storage
Long-term surface storage involves specially constructed facilities at the earth’s surface. 
The waste could be monitored and retrieval at any time. Ideas include:
• Conventional stores of the type currently used for interim storage, which would 
require replacement and repackaging of waste every two hundred years or so:
• Permanent stores that would be expected to remain intact for tens of thousands of 
years. These structures are often referred to as ‘Monolith’ stores or ‘Mausoleums’.
Both suggestions would require information to be passed on to future generations, leading 
to the suggestions of whether the stability of future societies could be ensured
Below surface storage
This type of facility usually takes the form of engineered (concrete) vaults constructed at 
ground level.
Waste containers are placed within the vaults and when full are backfilled. They will 
eventually be covered and capped with an impermeable membrane and topsoil. These 
facilities may incorporate some form of drainage and possibly gas venting system. Facilities 
of this type already exist.
Shallow Disposal
Unlike near surface disposal where the excavations are conducted from the surface, 
shallow disposal requires underground excavation of caverns but the facility is at a depth of 
several 10’s of metres and accessed through a tunnel (drift). This type of facility is typically 
used for operational arisings of LLW and short-lived ILW as with the near-surface type. 
This type of facility already exists.
Deep geological disposal
A deep geological repository usually comprises of a mined tunnels or caverns into which 
packaged waste is placed. In some cases the waste packages are then surrounded by a 
material such as cement or clay (i.e. bentonite) to provide another barrier (termed buffer 
and/or backfill). The choice of waste package materials and design and buffer/backfill 
material varies depending on the type of waste to be contained and the host geology 
available.
Disposal in deep boreholes
In a deep borehole concept solid packaged wastes are placed in deep boreholes drilled to 
depths of several kilometres with diameters of typically less than 1 metre. The waste 
packages could be separated from each other by a layer of bentonite or cement. The 
borehole would vertically not be completely filled with wastes. The top 2 kilometres would 
be sealed with materials such as bentonite, asphalt or concrete
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Box 6 (cont)
Rock Melting
The concept of deep rock-melting involves the melting of wastes in the adjacent rock in 
order to produce a stable immobilised mass encapsulating the waste or incorporating the 
waste in a diluted form that cannot be leached and transported back to the surface. This 
technique has been mainly suggested for heat generating wastes such as HLW and host 
rocks with suitable characteristics to reduce heat dissipation. The HLW in liquid or solid 
form could be placed in an excavated cavity or a deep borehole. The heat generated by the 
wastes would then accumulate resulting in temperatures great enough to melt the 
surrounding rock and dissolve the radionuclides in a growing sphere of molten material. As 
the rock cools it will crystallise and immobilise the radionuclides in the rock matrix. After 
complete crystallisation and cooling, it is estimated that the waste would be strongly 
“diluted” (i.e. dispersed through out a large volume of rock).
Injection into deep rocks
This concept involves the injection of liquid radioactive waste directly into a layer of rock 
deep underground chosen to have suitable characteristics to trap the waste (i.e. minimise 
any further movement following injection).
Disposal at Sea
Disposal at sea involves radioactive waste being shipped out to sea, and either released 
into the water in appropriate packaging, to sink to the seabed, or released directly to the 
seawater volume, to be dispersed and diluted. Sea disposal was undertaken by the UK and 
other countries over the period 1946 to 1982 to dispose of low and intermediate level 
radioactive wastes. It had not been implemented for HLW. The application of the sea 
disposal of radioactive waste has evolved over time from being a disposal method that was 
actually undertaken by a number of other countries, to a disposal method that is now 
banned by international law.
Sub-seabed disposal
The concept of sub seabed disposal differs from disposal at sea in that radioactive waste 
would be buried in suitable geological media beneath the deep ocean floor. It has been
suggested for LLW, ILW and HLW This could be performed by:
• A repository located beneath the seabed. This could be accessed from land or from 
an offshore structure, and would be a variation on the concept of a repository
located under land. Included in these suggestions has been the use of small
uninhabited islands
• Burial of waste material in deep ocean sediments. This could be made by two 
different techniques: penetrators or drilling placement.
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Box 6 (cont) 
Disposal in subduction zones
Subduction zones form at convergent plate boundaries, where one section of the Earth's 
crust is moving towards and underneath another lighter section. In principle, wastes 
disposed in such places would be drawn deep into the Earth As shown in the figure, the 
movement of one section of the earth crust below another is marked by an offshore trench, 
and earthquakes occur adjacent to the inclined contact between the two plates. The edge 
of the overriding plate is crumpled and uplifted to form a mountain chain parallel to the 
trench. Deep sea sediments may be scraped off the descending slab and incorporated into 
the adjacent mountains. As the oceanic plate descends into the hot mantle parts of it may 
begin to melt. The magma thus formed migrates upwards, some of it reaching the surface 
as lava erupting from volcanic vents.
Disposal in iced sheets
Canisters of heat-generating waste could be placed in stable ice sheets such as those 
found in Greenland and Antartica. The containers would melt the surrounding ice and be 
drawn deep into the ice sheet, where the ice would refreeze above the wastes creating a 
thick barrier.
Although disposal in ice sheets could be technically considered for all types of radioactive 
wastes, it has only been seriously investigated for HLW, where the heat generated by the 
wastes could be used to advantage to self-bury the wastes within the ice by melting.
Disposal in space
The objective of this option is to remove the radioactive waste from the biosphere 
permanently, for all time, by ejecting it into outer space. The basic idea would first involve 
packaging the waste in such a way as to be likely to remain intact under most conceivable 
accident scenarios. A rocket or space shuttle would be used to launch the packaged waste 
into space. Placing the waste in space near earth would not be sufficient due to the 
possibility of waste returning to earth. There are several possible ultimate destinations for 
the waste in space which have been considered including shooting it into the Sun, leaving it 
in an orbit around the Sun between Earth and Venus and ejecting it from the solar system 
altogether.
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Table 8 reproduces key dates in the history of radioactive waste management in the UK 
based on a review undertaken by earth scientists who were members of the Radioactive 
Waste Management Advisory Committee [Kelling and Knill, 1997],
Table 8 shows us that there has been a history of policy changes and failures relating to 
the management of radioactive waste. The sequence of events, decade after decade, 
suggests something fundamentally wrong in the way the nuclear waste management 
system has been approaching the issue of radioactive waste.
Table 8: Key points in the history of radioactive waste management in the
United Kingdom
1976 Flowers report - a UK strategy for solid radioactive waste management
1978 Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee established
1981 HLW drilling stopped
1982 Nirex established
1983 Sea dumping stopped
1985 Billingham study stopped
1987 Shallow sites stopped
1989 Sellafield/Dounreay selected
1991 Sellafield chosen for detailed studies
1995-6 Rock Characterisation Facility Planning Inquiry
1997 Rock Characterisation Facility stopped
1997 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology report on radioactive 
waste management
1998 House of Lords report - the future management of radioactive materials
2001 DEFRA consultation into Managing Radioactive Waste Safely launched
This thesis will focus on only one of these decision points in detail. Context will be drawn 
from other experiences and from the international context.
6.4.2 The Nirex Rock Characterisation Facility Public Inquiry -  a defining moment 
in radioactive waste management in the United Kingdom
In the nineties, Nirex focussed an extensive programme of geological investigations on 
the Sellafield site. Twenty-nine deep boreholes were drilled to investigate the properties 
of the geology around the site, and considerable modelling work carried out to assess 
the suitability of the site for a repository based on the concept of deep geological 
disposal. In 1992, a need for a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF), an underground 
laboratory was identified. The purpose of the RCF was to investigate further the detailed 
properties of the potential host rock. Nirex applied for planning permission to build the 
RCF in June 1994. Cumbria County Council rejected the application in December 1994.
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Nirex appealed against the decision and this resulted in a public inquiry that took place 
between October 1995 and February 1996.
The result of the public inquiry was that the rejection of planning permission for the RCF 
was upheld. The Secretary of State for the Environment announced on 17th March 1997 
that he supported the decision not to allow the construction of the RCF and 
consequently Nirex terminated its work at Sellafield.
The RCF decision ended serious pursuit of any specific long-term management option 
for solid ILW radioactive wastes. In a report summarising the national situation with 
regard to radioactive waste management [Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology, 2000], the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology identified that:
“While site characteristics and the way in which Nirex was perceived to operate no doubt 
contributed to the particular problems, the experience does throw up many serious 
questions over the mechanism for determining the appropriate approach to what would 
have to be a unique and national facility. ”
The report was the first in a series of comments about the future of radioactive waste 
management in the United Kingdom from influential organisations. Following the RCF 
Public Inquiry decision and the election of a new party into government in May 1997, the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and Technology launched an enquiry into 
the management of nuclear waste, inviting evidence from a wide range of experts and 
stakeholders. Their report, The Management of Nuclear Waste [HoL, 1999] was 
published in March 1999. They concluded that the future policy for nuclear waste 
management would require public acceptance based on widespread public consultation 
before a policy is settled by Government and presented to Parliament for endorsement.
6.4.3 Current situation
The Government has responded to this situation on a number of fronts. Radioactive 
wastes exist now and will continue to arise over the foreseeable future. Those who 
produce them at many different locations around the United Kingdom currently look after 
these wastes (Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Current locations of radioactive wastes
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The existing wastes, their current storage and the ageing facilities that produced them 
are commonly termed the UK’s “nuclear liabilities”. For many years the responsibility for 
these liabilities has rested with the nuclear operators -  BNFL, UKAEA and British 
Energy. Recently the Government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), who 
effectively sponsors these nuclear operators has announced the inception of a single 
“Liabilities Management Authority” to take over and unify the currently fragmented 
management arrangements [HM Government, 2002].
To address the issue of how to manage the wastes for generations of generations, the 
Government’s Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
together with the devolved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland published a 
consultation document entitled “Managing Radioactive Waste Safely” [DEFRA, 2001]. 
This consultation process has led to the formation of a Committee on Radioactive Waste 
management (CORWM) whose remit is to develop and coordinate a process that will
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lead towards new government policy on managing radioactive wastes within the next 5 
years.
So DEFRA and the devolved administrations are embarked on a process of developing 
future policy for long-term radioactive waste management and DTI is working towards 
the establishment of a centralised authority for the present-day management of nuclear 
liabilities. These two initiatives, and the relationship between them will shape the future 
of all stakeholders involved in the management of the UK’s solid radioactive wastes.
The DEFRA policy development process will take many years to complete, not least 
because the Government is sensitive to the fact that non-inclusive approaches to 
radioactive waste management were adopted in the past which has left a legacy of 
disaffected stakeholders. However, concerns have been expressed that the time 
required to develop a legitimately inclusive policy consultation process is too long, given 
the present hazards associated with leaving radioactive wastes in current storage 
facilities. The concern is that the wastes present a very immediate risk to society and if a 
long term management strategy for these risks is not quickly forthcoming then an interim 
solution may be required [Oxburgh, 2002].
Meanwhile, the wastes need to be packaged and stored safely, until such time as a long­
term management solution has been developed. In partnership with the Department of 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Nirex (an organisation with a long 
history of experience in the management of radioactive wastes) produces an inventory of 
radioactive wastes in the United Kingdom [DETR, 1999a]. This inventory is updated 
periodically and contains information on the volumes and characteristics of all the 
wastes produced by organisations such as BNFL, UKAEA, the Ministry of Defence and 
British Energy. Based on this knowledge, expert advice on the packaging of the wastes 
-  the immobilisation of raw waste into an appropriate form and container - is provided by 
Nirex to the waste producers. This advice needs to be given against a background of 
generalised and specific knowledge about options for the long-term management of 
radioactive wastes in order to ensure that the packages are safe for both interim storage 
and for subsequent management in the long-term.
Currently, Nirex give their advice about packaging against a long-term management 
concept based on multibarrier containment in a deep geological repository for which 
there is a protracted (100s of years) period of monitoring and retrievability prior to final 
closure. This concept (the Nirex Phased Disposal Concept) is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 10.
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6.5 Analysis - what lessons does history teach us?
Both International and UK history of Radioactive Waste Management demonstrate the 
complex characteristics of environmental decision making described in the earlier chapters. 
Generally speaking, management strategies in all nuclear countries have evolved towards 
new, more consultative framework for radioactive waste management. This provides the 
opportunity to juxtapose technocratic and deliberative approaches and consider their 
implications for organisational and individual behaviour, and in particular, for the role of 
scientific knowledge in the decision-making process.
Because of cultural differences and differences in the nature of the radioactive wastes in 
different countries, there are limitations to any analysis of past and current approaches 
to radioactive waste management in different countries. Nevertheless, generalised 
comments can be made about the importance of a few key factors.
6.5.1 The role of consultation
There is increasing international consensus that consultation and dialogue have to form 
part of the process of making decision about radioactive waste. This is clearly 
manifested in the international approaches studied in Appendix A. Clearly this is in line 
with the general trends in the risk management research arena, as described earlier. 
With regard to radioactive waste management, this trend is reflected in the exponentially 
increasing literature on public participation, consultation and stakeholder engagement 
arising from organisations involved in making decisions about radioactive waste 
management.
Appendix A provides an empirical summary analysis (by this author) of information about 
how various countries have consulted about radioactive waste management by the year 
2001. Consideration of the Appendix indicates that there is no explicit international 
consensus regarding which consultation principles and processes are the most effective. 
This is to be expected given the cultural differences between the countries tackling the 
issue of radioactive waste management. Nevertheless, some common trends are 
identifiable:
• There is evidence of continuing innovation in the methods of dialogue and 
engagement with stakeholders on radioactive waste management. On the basis of 
meetings such as the Forum for Stakeholder Confidence organised by the NEA, and 
European funded projects such as RISCOM and COWAM, there is evidence that 
these innovations are welcomed by politicians and public alike.
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• Public and stakeholder involvement in determining the guiding principles for 
radioactive waste management policy is increasingly identified as essential for 
establishing the legitimacy of the overall management process since it provides the 
opportunity to identify the societal values that need to lie behind radioactive waste 
management solutions. Hence the idea of front end consultation is gaining ground in 
organisations involved in radioactive waste management organisations.
• Longer timescales for public discussion and debate are now accepted as both 
inevitable and important, reflecting increased social awareness and concern for 
issues of intergenerational equity and environmental sustainability.
• The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure (and potentially Strategic 
Environmental Assessment [SEA]) are playing increasingly significant roles in site 
selection processes. However, the effectiveness of EIA is determined by country 
specific guidelines for EIA design and implementation. Countries that have drawn 
societal values into the process through forms of dialogue and community 
involvement, such as Finland and Sweden, appear to have made more consistent 
progress, although in the US significant progress has been made at WIPP and at 
Yucca Mountain with a very technocratic and legislative approach. Nevertheless, the 
adoption of inclusive processes does not mean that the project will be accepted, as 
evidenced by experiences in Canada.
• Site selection processes need to be specifically tailored to meet the socio-political 
history, culture, and needs and expectations of the communities involved. Volunteer 
processes and the use of a local veto seem to contribute to having an effective siting 
process, but they must be seen to be part of a wider package addressing the 
national need.
• Stakeholders, including the public, have brought valuable information, opinions and 
guidance to the dialogue. They are capable of tackling complex technical issues. 
Important methods have been developed to increase the transparency and 
accessibility of technical reports and other material so that it can be fully tested and 
“stretched” in this way.
In the United Kingdom, Nirex have recently published a report on the role that
stakeholder consultation plays in their current programme (Nirex, 2004).
6.5.2 Science is no longer sufficient
Internationally scientific argument alone is no longer regarded as sufficient to justify a
democratic decision, particularly where objective scientific proof may be impossible and
effective risk management involves managing the doubts caused by uncertainty. A
100
wider interpretation of risk is required, as risks will be perceived differently by different 
individuals and also for different projects. For risk management decisions to be 
supported by society, societal debate is needed in the early stages and throughout the 
decision-making process. Although agencies in the US have been successful in 
developing an implementing a disposal facility for military wastes in New Mexico ( the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant or WIPP) using a fairly technocratic approach, this has 
generated a lot of discontent in local communities and is unlikely to offer a practicable 
model for more densely populated countries in Europe.
In the United Kingdom, past approaches have been very technocratic, with experts and 
decision- makers working together to determine and distinguish options. Generally 
speaking, these options are developed with the best of intentions, by committed 
scientists seeking to address the technical problem (what to do with the wastes) with a 
technically viable solution. However, time after time, these technically developed 
options have been rejected on behalf of society in general.
6.5.3 Sustainable development
Many of the principles of sustainable development are directly applicable to radioactive 
waste management. However, there is a lot of ambiguity over the interpretation of 
sustainable development and what it might mean in practice. Therefore, although some 
countries have carefully considered the principles of sustainable development and how 
they influence proposals for radioactive waste management, the impact has not been 
significant. Much of what has been done in the name of sustainable development would 
have been done anyway in the interests of legitimate and inclusive decision-making.
In the United Kingdom, most options considered in the past have been looking at providing a 
final solution based on the concept of passive safety, whether considering deep or 
shallow systems. This does not extend choice to future generations. However, it is very 
consistent with an interpretation of the precautionary principle that we should not burden 
future generations with the consequences of the current generation’s activities. 
Nevertheless, until now there has been no significant dialogue about whether it is more 
appropriate to extend choice (long-term storage/guardianship) or to adopt a final solution 
(disposal).
6.5.4 Regulations
The nature of the regulations governing the management of radioactive wastes has a 
fundamental impact on the development of options. For example, in Finland, regulations 
place a requirement to contain radioactive for the first few thousand years. This has led 
to a design that uses barriers around the wastes that are designed to remain intact for
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very long timescales. In Finland (as in Sweden) wastes are to be encased in copper 
canisters which will be protected by a bentonite clay surround. In the United Kingdom, 
regulations place a quantitative requirement that the risks to an individual should not 
exceed 1 in a million at any point in the future. Since no man-made material can be 
guaranteed for that length of time, greater emphasis is placed on selecting a natural 
environment around the waste that will limit the chances of releases to the accessible 
environment.
In the United Kingdom, regulations under the Radioactive Waste Management Act [EA, 
1997] would govern the final authorisation of a facility to dispose of radioactive wastes. 
Hence, these regulations have governed all past approaches to radioactive waste 
management in the UK. However, in the early stages of development, proposals to 
research particular sites is generally legislated under the Town and Country Planning 
act. In consequence, the environmental regulator has had no official role in option 
proposals and planning. As pointed out by the House of Lords [HoL, 1999] and others, 
the regulatory environment for the development of proposals has been fragmented.
6.5.5 Trust in the nuclear waste management system
In Sweden, there seems to be a measure of trust that the nuclear waste management 
system has an appropriate level of in-built checks and balances. Both the regulator(s) 
Ski/SSi and the government advisory group KASAM are active within the nuclear 
debate. Early siting studies in the north of Sweden, undertaken by SKB, the waste 
disposal agency, met with strong local opposition. At that time, Ski was not actively 
involved in monitoring the siting activities of SKB and so there was no obvious "public 
champion"- a phrase that has been used about Ski during later siting studies. Although 
Ski work closely with SKB to develop appropriate processes for moving the debate 
forward, they are careful to maintain distance from SKB [Andersson et al, 1998] -  even 
to the point of setting up public hearings independent of SKB during the recent siting 
process in Sweden. In Sweden they also have the special adviser on radioactive waste 
management issues who provides a further source of independent expertise - expertise 
that is made available to the local communities (municipalities) who may be considered 
for hosting radioactive waste.
Culture is an important factor here. In Finland, the culture is much more consensual 
than in the UK, and hence there is less tendency to challenge. In Sweden, the long 
history of transparent government similarly tends towards a less hostile decision-making 
environment.
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Trust in the United Kingdom is generally low following the Windscale fire, Chernobyl and 
more recent allegations of inappropriate behaviour on behalf of BNFL. The close 
association of the nuclear industry with the UK’s nuclear weapons programme and a 
legacy of low levels of information about nuclear power does not helping this regard. 
More recently, the economic failure of British Energy has not helped engender an 
environment where the major organisations identified with radioactive wastes are 
trusted.
6.5.6 Involvement of local communities
Once again, looking to Sweden and Finland there are strong indications that a close and 
early involvement of local communities can enhance progress towards a common 
understanding of issues and hence an improved knowledge base for decisions. In 
Sweden, the local municipal councillors are allocated funds -  to be used at the 
Municipality’s discretion for commissioning independent studies of any sort. The 
Municipality can (and does) choose to use some of the fund to support local opposition 
groups. In Finland, arguably further down the decision-making process than other 
European countries, the radioactive waste management agency POSIVA Oy has 
relocated its offices to the community of Olkiluoto. Posiva have just received a decision- 
in-principle to construct a facility at Olkiluoto subject to a successful ten year programme 
of underground research. This follows an extensive and very transparent programme of 
site investigation, selection and the production of a detailed Environmental Impact 
Assessment for the Olkiluoto site. By moving base to Olkiluoto, Posiva are publicly 
declaring support for the local community in a very practical manner -  one that makes a 
big difference in sparsely populated rural Finand.
By contrast, the local communities of New Mexico (which hosts the Waste Incapsulation 
Pilot Plant for military wastes) and Nevada (which plays hosts to an extensive site 
investigation programme investigating the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a host for 
high level wastes are very antagonistic towards the authorities developing and operating 
the facilities at these sites -  even to the point that Nevada is bringing a court case 
against President Bush for endorsing a recommendation that investigations at Yucca 
Mountain proceed. In both cases, the sites were chosen for their strategic locations, 
coupled with suitable geology.
Until recently, local communities have not been involved in any form of site selection 
process in the United Kingdom. Generally they have only been consulted by the 
authorities and institutions once a site has been identified. There has been little national 
debate about the siting of radioactive waste management facilities and the conditions
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and provisions that should go with it. In the UK, the distinction between planning gain 
and bribery is a very fine line and hence organisations have shied away from any open 
discussion of what is owed to a community who takes on the burden of a national facility. 
Although public relations programmes have been considerable, they have been typified 
by information provision and one-way communication.
6.5.7 Relationship between legislation and decision-making
There needs to be an obvious link between the decision-making processes for nuclear 
waste and any legislation governing its long-term management. In Finland, this has 
recently been quite successfully achieved by adopting an Environmental Impact 
Assessment approach to siting decisions, and then adopting a decision-in-principle 
approach to proceeding with detailed investigations at the preferred site. This decision- 
in-principle is made by the Finnish Government against legislation covering all nuclear 
activities and then ratified by Parliament.
As evidenced by the discussion of regulations given above, these relationships are very 
unclear in the United Kingdom.
6.5.8 The importance of siting
The process of siting appears to be crucial to the management of radioactive wastes. It 
is the point at which a national (and dispersed) problem, becomes a local (and 
concentrated) issue with direct and tangible impacts on the local population. The 
manner in which decisions about what is owed to the local community for taking on 
board a national problem is critical. It is also nation-dependent.
In France, dependency on nuclear power production is high, as are the planning benefits 
provided by the Government for communities hosting a nuclear facility. In Sweden, 
discussions with potential host communities have been extensive and ongoing. This has 
led to a considerable degree of engagement with nuclear waste issue on the part of the 
local municipalities -  typified by the “Oskarshamn model” of decision-making [Andresson 
et al, 1999]. The Oskarshamn model is also interesting since it suggests that the 
amount of control on the decision-making process devolved to the local community has 
a significant impact on their willingness to engage.
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse engagement in decision-making with 
acceptance. In Canada, an EIA approach to siting was adopted which ended in a 
rejection of proposals to site a facility at Deep River.
In the United Kingdom, siting has been undertaken “behind closed doors” and only a 
very small number of people know the names of sites which have been on shortlists in
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the past. Indeed, the selection of a site has been a matter for the implementing agency 
alone, with no overseeing framework and little in the form of checks and balances.
6.5.9 Sites before options or options before sites?
A key issue appears to be how far a technical option for the long-term management of 
radioactive wastes should be worked up before identifying a site. In Belgium, for low 
level waste disposal, the concept of partnerships with the local community has been 
developed and implemented. In this model, the local community is involved in 
developing a technically feasible option for the particular locality. In this way, the local 
community can be engaged with the technical work before it has developed too far, and 
site specific criteria can be adopted in the technical design. This way of working is one 
response to the fact that the identification of a site for the management of radioactive 
wastes is one of the most difficult and critical steps in the process and that the technical 
work can follow. It is a far cry from developing a national policy for waste management 
and then finding somewhere to implement that policy.
In the UK, the option for radioactive waste management has been inscribed in policy 
before any siting work has been undertaken. Whilst this makes sense in terms of being 
able to identify option-specific criteria for siting, it can reduce the ability of development 
proposals to respond to the concerns of the local community.
6.5.10 Demonstration of feasibility
Many countries identify demonstration of feasibility as a central part of building public 
confidence in a proposed management option. Hence there are a number of 
underground research facilities that combine meeting scientific research needs with 
demonstrating technology. The Aspo facility in Sweden, Grimsel in Switzerland, Mont 
Teri and Mol in Belgium are visited by both researchers and interested decision-makers 
and opinion-formers from all over Europe.
There has been no significant attempt to demonstrate feasibility in the UK although 
influential stakeholders are sometimes taken to overseas facilities.
6.5.11 Conclusions
Those countries which have had most success in progressing a radioactive waste 
management solution have sought to apply legitimate procedures to policy development 
rather than legitimising procedures for consultation purposes. Those that have 
recognised the importance of ‘social values’ are now beginning to shift dialogue about 
radioactive waste management away from discussion about what should (not) have
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been done in the past, to a more constructive debate about what could happen in the 
future.
As with many other environmental problems for which there is little past precedent and 
long term future risks (hazards associated with adopting genetically modified organisms, 
human health hazards from food processing), the problems seem to turn on the clarity, 
transparency and inclusiveness of decision making processes. Hence, developing and 
implementing inclusive and transparent decision-making processes is now a major goal 
of those organisations most closely associated with radioactive waste management over 
the past few years.
6.6 The move towards step-wise decision making
In pursuit of transparency and inclusion, there is currently a major change occurring in 
the way that issues associated with radioactive wastes are being discussed and 
debated. Those organisations most affected are radically changing their approach and 
the relationships between those organisations are being redefined.
For example, since the late 1990’s, Nirex has been working to re-establish itself as a 
credible and knowledgeable organisation, accountable to the public for the long-term 
management of radioactive materials. As well as the continued retention of its technical 
expertise and competence, Nirex has identified a number of practical ways for instilling a 
culture within the organisation that will enable it to operate in the inclusive and 
democratic climate of participatory decision-making. This has a required some radical 
rethinking, both by the organisation and by the individuals working within the 
organisation. Nirex is actively pursuing independence from the Nuclear Industry so that it 
can provide expertise on long-term waste management that is not linked to the 
economics of nuclear power production.
Similarly, the work of DEFRA [DEFRA, 2001] and the DTI [HM Government, 2002], and 
the response to DEFRAs consultation document [DEFRA, 2002b] reflect ideas about 
new and radical ways of working to develop solutions for radioactive waste 
management. Most of these ideas are based on the notion of a stepwise and inclusive 
process of decision-making. Such a process should enable the issues and concerns of 
society to be articulated early, and confidence in each step to be generated before a 
subsequent step is taken.
Figure 15 reproduces the Nirex view of what such a stepwise process should look like 
[Atherton and Poole, 2002]. Clearly, having such a long personal association with Nirex 
makes it impossible for me to comment objectively on the value of the process.
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However, the intention has been to develop a process that provides the opportunity for a 
number of the lessons learned from history to be addressed. Table 9 shows my view of 
how the key factors identified above could be addressed within the framework of a 
stepwise process.
Table 9: How could a stepwise process help address some of the issues
identified from international and UK history?
Sustainable development Provides the opportunity to debate principles and ethics 
early on, prior to identification of options
Regulations Front end consultation could help identify what an 
integrated regulatory framework would look like and 
how the organisations involved would relate to each 
other and to legislation
Trust in nuclear waste 
management system
Provides time and opportunity for relationships to 
develop between stakeholders and the public
Involvement of local 
communities
A range of opportunities for local communities to 
express views, both before and after sites are identified
Relationship between 
decision-making and 
legislation
Can be discussed as part of a front end consultation
The importance of siting Enables a national debate about siting, and about what 
is owed to a local community should they accept a 
national burden “on their doorstep”
Sites before options or 
options before sites
Early involvement of local communities extends some 
level of influence over options
Whilst Table 9 highlights the manner in which a stepwise process can theoretically 
encourage transparency and inclusion, there are a number of practical issues that 
require consideration before a truly stepwise process can be delivered for a specific 
project.
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Figure 15: The Nirex Stepwise Process.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
In a particular context, participatory decision-m aking has very real and practical 
implications on the work o f organisations involved in contem porary environmental issues 
and on the work of individuals within those organisations. In the radioactive waste
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management arena, there are many lessons to be learned from history and from other 
countries. The effectiveness of the changes that Nirex has made over the last five years 
-  in its culture, its views and its relationships with stakeholders -  will begin to emerge as 
the Government consultation process continues. However, the notion of a reversible 
stepwise process is now embedded in the thinking about future practices in radioactive 
waste management.
This brings particular challenges to scientists and to scientific knowledge building:
• What knowledge is appropriate for each step and who determines when enough is 
enough?
• How can trust in scientific knowledge be rebuilt?
• How can scientists accept the loss of power involved in letting consultation 
determine the pace of the process?
These questions require scientists to consider both the knowledge that they deliver 
(outcomes) and the manner in which they deliver that knowledge (process). The use of 
scientific knowledge in the RCF Planning Inquiry provides case study material that can 
give insights into how these two aspects of scientific knowledge have been addressed in 
the past. This is discussed further in the next Chapter. Particular emphasis has been 
given to looking at the use of the risk analyses (called performance assessments by 
Nirex) and its supporting geoscientific knowledge.
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7 THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT 
THE DEEP DISPOSAL OF THE UK’S RADIOACTIVE WASTE.
At a Public Inquiry into proposals to further investigate the Sellafield site for deep 
disposal, the available scientific knowledge about a repository at the site was actively 
explored. The manner in which information about long term risks was put to the Inquiry 
and subsequently explored at the Inquiry is outlined below. The representation below 
reflects my personal experience and it must be stated that I had a high level of 
ownership of much of the geoscientific information under discussion. Hence this account 
will inevitably reflect my own values and my own belief in the benefits of pursuing deep 
geological disposal as a management solution for the problem of radioactive wastes. 
Nevertheless, whatever the perspective, the RCF Inquiry experience can help to explore 
the nature of dialogue about risks and radioactive waste management that can be 
expected in the future. Hence we can use it to guide ideas about building a more 
participatory knowledge platform for future decisions.
7.1 Background
7.1.1 Context
In the nineties, Nirex proposed to construct an underground “Rock Characterisation 
Facility” (RCF) in order to carry out further research into the suitability of a site near 
Sellafield (Longlands Farm) to host a deep waste repository. The RCF Public Inquiry, 
was an inquiry into whether or not Nirex should be allowed to develop the RCF. Prior to 
the inquiry, Nirex had applied to Cumbria County Council for planning permission for the 
RCF, an application that was rejected. Nirex appealed against this decision, which led 
to the Secretary of State to convene a planning inquiry under the Town and Country 
Planning Act. Following the planning inquiry, the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment upheld the refusal of planning permission, and investigations into the 
suitability of the Longlands farm site were effectively terminated.
The refusal of planning permission for the RCF had a major affect on the scientific and 
research communities involved in radioactive waste management. In particular, the 
earth science community was hard hit, having been intimately involved in the Sellafield 
investigation programme - one of the largest site investigation programmes to be 
undertaken within the United Kingdom and representing a commitment of some £200 
million. The manner in which the results of this research programme were presented to 
the RCF Public Inquiry is the subject of this chapter.
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There is almost unanimous agreement that history teaches us the importance of 
following a transparent and inclusive programme of decision-making. This was 
discussed earlier in Chapter 6. The question being addressed in this chapter is what we 
can learn from past experience in terms of the use of scientific knowledge in making 
decisions where the decision stakes are high. To explore this, information about the RCF 
Inquiry has been analysed, primarily using the sources presented in the footnote3.
7.1.2 The Nirex proposals at the time of the RCF Public Inquiry
The Sellafield repository concept was based on the idea of deep geological disposal, 
and multibarrier containment. This concept, in which natural and engineered barriers 
work together to contain radioactive materials and limit radionuclide migration (Figure16) 
is discussed extensively elsewhere [Savage, 1994; NEA, 1999a; Nirex, 2001a; Bailey 
and Littleboy, 2000]. As discussed in Chapter 5, the idea is that the performance if the 
repository does not rely on the performance of a single barrier.
The Sellafield proposal was based on four phases of operation: waste packaging; 
transportation to the repository; emplacement in the repository; backfilling; closure. The 
Sellafield proposals were therefore different to more recent proposals embedded in the 
Nirex phased disposal concept which includes an explicit phase of monitoring and 
retrievability. These ideas formed the basis for a detailed design for an underground 
repository.
a The report of the Inquiry submitted by the Planning Inspector to the then Secretary of State on 21 November 
1996. This provides a comprehensive record of the discussion at the Inquiry and the Inspector’s conclusions, 
recorded in the Inspector’s words;
Haszeldine R.S and Smythe D.K (Eds). Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sellafield: site selection, geological and 
engineering problems. University of Glasgow publication 1996a; This report draws together various Proofs of 
Evidence from organisations (Cumbria County Council, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace) opposed to 
Nirex’ proposals;
Nirex Proofs of Evidence which are available from Nirex via its website www.nirex.co.uk;
A report from the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Radioactive Waste -  Where Next. This 
report was publlished in 1997 and provides an independent analysis of the Sellafield project, including the 
matters discussed at the RCF Public Inquiry.
Haszeldine R.S and Smythe,D.K Why was Sellafield rejected as a disposal site for radioactive waste? In 
Geoscientist, vol 7,No 7,pp 18 -  20a This presents an interpretation of the Inspector’s report from the point of 
view of those involved in opposing Nirex’ proposals at the Inquiry;
Observations and conclusions from attending the Inquiry during the examination of evidence about the site 
investigations and safety analysis [Personal experience].
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Figure 16: Deep geological disposal, as considered at the Sellafield site
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designed to provide a chemical environment 
that inhibits the movement of radioactivity. 
This part of the concept is called “THE NEAR  
FIELD”
The packages containing the wastes provide 
a barrier. This is called “PHYSICAL 
CONTAINM ENT”
7.1.3 Stakes at the RCF Inquiry
A number of stakeholders contributed evidence to Stage 2 of the RCF Public Inquiry. The 
procedure was overseen by a Senior Planning Inspector, who was supported by another 
planning inspector and by a Scientific Advisor. The Inspector chose to undertake the 
Inquiry in two stages. The first stage considered the typical planning issues associated 
with the project. The second stage focussed on the level of scientific understanding that 
Nirex had at the time, and the implications of the uncertainty remaining in Nirex’s 
understanding of the long-term risks associated with deep geological disposal. This thesis 
is solely concerned with the second stage and the debate that ensued about the scientific 
knowledge available to make the RCF decision.
Below, an outline of the stakes present at the second stage of the Inquiry is given. This is 
primarily drawn from personal experience and will inevitably be biased by my own stake in 
the outcome of the Inquiry. However, I have tried to link the stakes discussed below back 
to the Proofs of Evidence provided to the Inquiry and the unfolding of the procedure. 
Figure 17 provides a schematic illustration.
The Inspector’s responsibility was to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for 
the Environment about whether Nirex should be permitted to build a Rock Characterisation 
Facility near Sellafield.
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Nirex was requesting approval to build the RCF in order to provide scientific information 
that was not obtainable from surface-based information. They (we) believed that this 
information was required to build assessments of the risks of deep geological disposal near 
Sellafield on which to base decision about whether to begin development of a repository at 
the site. Nirex chose senior members of staff to present evidence to the Inquiry, supported 
by a senior and well respected academic who had acted in a peer review capacity on 
Nirex’s overall science programme.
Figure 17: Stakeholders during Stage 2 of the RCF Planning Inquiry
Independents-
various
Copeland Borough 
Council
Friend of the Earth - No
-  other solutions are 
more responsible
Planning Inspector
Should an RCF be 
permitted at 
Sellafield?
Cumbria County 
Council -  No
Wrong site chosen for 
the wrong reasons
Greenpeace -  No
Any decision such as this should 
be part of an overall review of 
the need for nuclear power
To determine whether Sellafield 
is suitable for deep geological 
disposal
Nirex -  yes
Cumbria County Council were the regional council to whom the application to construct the 
RCF had previously been made. They had refused permission, and presented their 
reasons for this at the RCF Inquiry. In this refusal, they were supported by Copeland 
Borough Council, the local council in whose borough the investigations were happening. 
Cumbria County Council appointed Environmental Management Resources (ERM) to 
support them in presenting evidence to the Inquiry. ERM used academic experts for this.
The national bodies of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace also provided evidence to the 
Inquiry. Both organisations were opposed to the RCF development but for slightly different 
reasons. They pooled resources, and marshalled a range of academic experts to give 
evidence on their behalf at the Inquiry regarding the scientific advisability of various 
aspects of the Nirex proposals. The evidence of these experts has been collated into a 
permanent record (Hazeldine and Smythe, 1998).
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There were also a number of independent stakeholders who presented evidence to the 
Inquiry regarding specific aspects of the science of radioactive waste management and 
deep geological disposal.
For all stakeholders, a key topic for debate was the level of geoscientific understanding of 
the site and the way uncertainty in this understanding could affect potential long term 
consequences as a result of a deep repository. Hence a large number of geoscientific 
expert evidence was presented to the Inquiry, and a key topic for debate was how 
geoscientific understanding and uncertainty were represented in assessments of long term 
performance.
My role within Nirex had been to develop and coordinate the programme of hydrogeological 
investigations to understand groundwater flow at the site and provide information to go into 
the performance assessment. As such, I had a very high personal stake at the Public 
Inquiry. In the following sections I have tried to present (to the extent possible) a 
reasonably objective assessment of the dialogue about the Nirex proposal.
7.2 The role of the Sellafield site investigations
A site near Sellafield was under investigation for its suitability as a host for such a 
repository. Extensive investigations at the site had been undertaken from the surface 
[Nirex, 1994] and it was felt by Nirex that the remaining key uncertainties affecting the 
calculation of risks from a repository could not be investigated without having direct 
access to the rocks at depth. Therefore a key aim of the RCF was to provide this access 
so that more detailed investigations could proceed and uncertainties could be reduced 
[Nirex, 1995a].
One of the main sources of actual risk is if radionuclides within the repository come into 
contact with groundwater, become entrained in the groundwater and subsequently move 
through the rock mass. This is called the “groundwater pathway” and is central to most 
past risk analyses undertaken by Nirex, and all the post-closure risk analyses of the 
Sellafield site [Bailey and Littleboy, 2000].
Therefore, a focus of the investigations was on understanding and modelling 
groundwater flow at Sellafield so that this information could be used to calculate how the 
geosphere would behave and the chance and extent of radionuclide migration in 
groundwater back to the biosphere. Whilst there are other important elements to site 
investigations for a deep repository (geotechnical stability, gas, likelihood of natural 
hazards and disruptive events, factors that might result in human intrusion into the rock 
mass) this thesis focusses on understanding groundwater flow. However, this does not
114
mean that the discussion is a purely hydrogeological one. Developing a credible 
understanding of groundwater flow is a truly multidisciplinary exercise that requires the 
close integration of geological, hydrogeological geochemical and hydrochemical studies 
[Nirex, 1998a].
Generally speaking, the performance assessment assumes that it is necessary to 
understand a range of factors in order to understand groundwater flow. The Sellafield 
investigations considered issues such as:
• What are the rock types that occur at the site?
• How do they relate to each other?
• What properties do they have, in particular properties that will affect the movement of 
groundwater (the nature of void spaces through which groundwater might move, the 
chemistry and physical properties of rock surfaces with which groundwater might come 
into contact)
• What processes have affected the rock mass in the past?
• What are the current driving forces for groundwater movement?
• What is the evidence for groundwater movement now and in the past (chemical
evidence, mineralogy, measurements)?
Answers to these questions, developed through a linked programme of data acquisition, 
interpretation and modelling provided one of the foundations for analysing the potential 
risks arising from a radioactive waste repository [Nirex, 1998a, Nirex, 1995b]
In order to analyse these risks, the knowledge gained through the Sellafield site 
investigations was captured by conceptual modelling [Nirex, 1998a, Nirex, 1995b]. 
Conceptual models of groundwater flow were therefore the vehicle for building the 
geological and hydrogeological understanding of the site into the risk analysis process 
[Littleboy et al, 1998] These analyses were called “performance assessments” by 
Nirex, and were a means of assessing whether the site was likely to meet the risk target 
laid down in legislation [Nirex, 1995a]
7.2.1 Performance assessments*1 of the groundwater flow path at Sellafield
In the nineties, the overall objective of the science programme undertaken by Nirex was 
to develop a progressively more confident analysis of the risks associated with a 
repository located at the Longlands Farm site near Sellafield. As part of this programme,
b In Nirex at the time, the process of analysing the long term risks from the repository was ( and still 
is) called performance assessment.
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performance assessments were periodically undertaken to determine whether or not the 
site continued to show promise of meeting the regulatory risk target [EA, 1997]. 
Assessments of risks arising from the operations of a repository and from the transport 
of wastes to the repository were (and still are) also undertaken. However, the long-term 
risks were (and still are) evaluated for a period following the closure of the repository 
extending for at least one million years into the future -  post-closure performance. A key 
performance requirement was that the radiological risk to individuals of cancer or a 
serious hereditary defect should be less than a value of 10'6 per year [DETR, 2000].
In general terms, post-closure performance assessment evaluates the ability of a 
repository to protect people and the environment in the very long term after closure. It 
represents the repository system and includes features, events and processes which 
may affect the repository system over long times (typically of order 1 million years) into 
the future. Mathematical models are used to represent these features, events and 
processes and to estimate radiological risk. The modelling process can be complex and 
may use probabilistic mathematical modelling techniques. In consequence, post-closure 
performance assessment reports are commonly written with a highly technical audience 
(such as the regulators) in mind.
As the project developed, Nirex sought to maintain a contemporary view on the 
continued suitability of the site. Therefore successive performance assessments were 
undertaken as new information became available from research programmes. The 
series of performance assessments of the Sellafield site are given in Table 10. Each 
assessment built on the experience and insights obtained from the previous 
assessments and incorporated new data and understanding emerging from research 
programmes.
Table 10: Nirex performance assessments of a repository at the Sellafield
site
Assessment Reported in
1987/88 CASCADE (or stage 1) (DSAT A301- 
A304)
1989 PERA/PSR
1991-92 Stage 2 assessment
1993 Stage 2 update assessment
1994 Nirex assessment 94
1995 Nirex 95
1996 Nirex assessment 96
1997 Nirex 97
Nirex Report 71 
Nirex report 337
Nirex Science Report S/95/012
Nirex Science Report S/97/012
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As the site investigations at Sellafield progressed, the performance assessments 
became increasingly related to the geological and hydrogeological knowledge of the 
Sellafield site. The information sources used in successive performance assessments 
are shown in Table 11 and give a sense of the progressive nature of the scientific 
research and analysis of the site.
Nirex 95: A preliminary assessment of the groundwater pathway at Sellafield [Nirex, 
1995b] was the document submitted to the RCF Inquiry. The RCF Inquiry was ongoing 
whilst the information used in support of Nirex 97 [Nirex, 1997] was being acquired and 
analysed.
Table 11: Relationship of assessments to data.
Assessment report Additional Site Characterisation data
PERA/PSR(1989) Desk study comparing different environments
Internal report (1991) Regional mapping and geophysics 
3 boreholes
Hydrology Desk Studies
Nirex Report 525 More geophysics 
2 more boreholes 
Surface hydrology studies
Nirex 95
(Nirex Science report 
S/95/012)
7 more boreholes 
Long term hydraulic monitoring 
Selected pump testing 
Fracture Mapping
Nirex 97
(Nirex Science Report 
S/97/012)
8 more boreholes 
Quaternary studies 
Stream and spring gauging 
Long term hydraulic monitoring 
Various hydraulic interference tests
7.2.2 The representation of earth science in the Sellafield assessments
The Sellafield performance assessments integrated multiple lines of evidence -  many of 
them geoscientific -  and a great many sources of uncertainty into an assessment model. 
Experts involved in the site investigations were involved in two key activities which 
underpinned the assessment models:
• A number of linked models were established, for example representing different parts 
of the repository system or different scales at which radionuclide migration processes 
might operate. These linked models underpinned the main risk model by taking data 
and understanding and producing output that was used to parameterise the risk 
model.
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• Where data were sparse and uncertainty high, a process called data elicitation was 
used to supplement measurement. Data elicitation is a process by which expert 
judgement is used to derive information to supplement measurements.
These activities had a particularly high profile for groundwater flow information where 
most of the input parameters to the risk model were “derived parameters”. Figure 18 
indicates the hierarchy of models which actually underpinned the risk model used for 
assessments of the groundwater pathway at Sellafield and Figure 19 indicates the 
process used to develop input parameters for the calculation of risk.
Figure 18: Groundwater model hierarchy
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Figure 19: Calculating risks from the groundwater pathway
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Understanding the way the assessment related to measurements is critical to an 
analysis of the use of science in the RCF Public Inquiry. By the time that the Nirex 95 
assessment had been produced, more information had been obtained from the site 
investigation programme. -  information that eventually fed into the Nirex 97 assessment 
subsequent to the Inquiry process. This meant that the understanding available at the 
time of the Inquiry was not the understanding that had been used to develop the models 
for Nirex 95. Although a synthesis of this additional understanding was made available 
to the Inquiry [Nirex, 1996], inevitably, the focus of attention was on the then current 
performance assessment - Nirex 95 - since it presented the risk calculations on the basis 
of which Nirex were claiming that the Sellafield site “showed good promise”. The 
robustness and credibility of Nirex 95 therefore became a key issue at the Inquiry.
7.3 Analysis - what does the RCF Inquiry teach us?
There has been much analysis (Haszeldine and Smythe, 1996) of the RCF Public 
Inquiry and the reasons for the planning refusal. Much of the debate at the Inquiry and 
subsequently has centred on the geological, hydrogeological and geochemical
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understanding of the site (gained from the prior surface-based investigations) and 
whether or not it was sufficient to support a decision to go underground for further work. 
By definition, Nirex considered that the understanding was adequate to warrant further 
investigations. In its “Statement of Case [Nirex, 1995a]” Nirex identified three key areas 
of continued uncertainty about the suitability of the Longlands farm site that could only 
be investigated from underground and were to be addressed by the RCF:
• The flow of groundwater and consequent radionuclide migration;
• The effects of natural changes and those caused by construction on the rock mass;
• Further detailed information for locating, planning and designing the repository.
At the Inquiry itself, there were four main areas of scientific debate about the adequacy 
of the science [Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2000]:
• Whether the complexity of the geology, hydrogeology and geochemistry of the 
proposed site was adequately understood;
The adequacy of the approach taken towards the analysis of risk associated with the 
repository -  this was represented in an assessment of repository performance ( post­
closure performance assessment) in terms of complying with a risk target laid down 
in regulatory guidance.
The validity of the mathematical models used;
• The adequacy of the RCF proposals to resolve the identified uncertainties.
In addition, evidence was presented regarding the site selection process used by Nirex 
to justify the selection of the Longlands Farm site for detailed investigations, and also on 
land-use and planning matters.
There was much that came out of the inquiry and the debate surrounding the Inquiry that 
challenged the use of geological and hydrogeological information within the decisions 
made by Nirex. Specifically, it has been claimed that [Haszeldine and Smythe, 1996]:
• the geological and hydrogeological information indicated that the Sellafield site would 
not meet the safety standards laid down in regulations; and
•  assessments of the suitability of the site did not accurately reflect those geological 
and hydrogeological research findings.
These claims challenge the manner in which Nirex linked together the site investigation 
work and its representation in the Nirex 95 performance assessment. As such, they go 
right to the heart of how scientific knowledge was being translated into calculations of
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risk and used in decision-making. A key question is whether stakeholders without vested 
interests or preconceived views were able to make sense of the arguments and develop 
their own view about the level of knowledge that existed, what that knowledge suggested 
and whether/what further knowledge was required. The experience of the RCF Public 
Inquiry suggests a number of important influences on this.
7.3.1 Developing a shared view about the scope of the dialogue
The Planning Inspector for the Public Inquiry into the Rock Characterisation Facility 
(RCF) at Sellafield states in his Inquiry report [McDonald, 1997] that one of the reasons 
for recommending the refusal of planning permission was the (lack of) maturity of the 
science presented at the Inquiry. And yet Nirex, an organisation with considerable 
expertise and experience had clearly considered that Sellafield “showed good promise” 
on the basis of its scientific knowledge and was willing to commit significant amounts of 
resource and expenditure to pursuing investigations from underground. This difference 
of opinion about the adequacy of the science bears further analysis.
At the RCF Inquiry, Nirex presented material they considered adequate to support an 
application for further research (the RCF) [Nirex, 1996]. From their point of view, the 
decision to investigate Sellafield had already been taken, but the level of knowledge was 
not yet such as to warrant an application to develop a repository. However, the link 
between site selection, the RCF and a potential subsequent repository was such that the 
Inquiry discussed both the process of selecting Sellafield in the first place, and also the 
suitability of the site for disposal in some depth. Both these issues are cited in the 
Inspectors report as reasons for recommending refusal of the RCF. So on face value, it 
appears that Nirex ‘s understanding of the scope of the Inquiry was much more limited 
than that which the Inspector chose to allow. Earlier chapters have already highlighted 
the importance of ensuring that those involved in the dialogue process are clear about 
what is being discussed, and that the process by which controversial projects are 
developed is transparent. For science to be used effectively in decision making, the 
decision being made must be clear to all parties.
7.3.2 The importance of the regulator as an expert reviewer/witness
In the United Kingdom, emissions arising from the disposal of radioactive wastes are 
regulated by the Environment Agency of England and Wales (EA) or by the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency or the Northern Ireland Department of the 
Environment. The operation of nuclear licensed site which a waste repository would be) 
is regulated under the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) by the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (Nil). For the purposes of developing ideas about the suitability of a site
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near Sellafield to host a deep geological repository, the Environment Agency was 
therefore a key player.
In the years leading up to the RCF Public Inquiry, Nirex made many important decisions, 
sometimes by advising the Government and sometimes as part of developing its own 
programme of work. Examples of such decision are:
• The abandonment of shallow site investigations;
• The decisions to explore Sellafield and Dounreay;
• The decision to investigate Sellafield as a “preferred site”;
• The decision to apply for planning permission to go underground by constructing a 
rock characterisation facility.
The common factor in all these decisions is that they were essentially made using a 
decide-announce defend” approach. For the majority of stakeholders there was very 
little clarity about the information going into these decisions, the basis on which they 
were made, the individuals or groups who were involved in the decision making process 
and their motivations. The criticism is that Nirex used a closed process whose pace was 
driven by pre-determined deadlines and not by the needs of stakeholders or orderly 
scientific research [Nirex, 2001b].
For all the decisions mentioned above, there was no requirement in legislation to involve 
the Environment Agency, since at no stage was an application being made for a disposal 
facility. The regulator was only minimally involved in evaluating any of the performance 
assessments which informed the decisions, and, although the regulator appeared at the 
Inquiry, it was not to give evidence in any formal capacity. So although Nirex 
approached the RCF Public Inquiry assuming an actor-based (decide-announce-defend) 
form of decision making, one of the key actors identified in Figure 4 had no formal role in 
the process.
Speculation about the direction of discussions at the Inquiry had the regulator been 
present is not useful. However, as discussed earlier, the performance assessment 
methods adopted by Nirex were driven by a need to consider levels of consistency with 
a regulatory target. The process involved in achieving this is complex -  as indicated by 
the model hierarchy and calculation processes shown in Figures 13 and 14. Enabling 
effective discussion and critical comment on these complex processes is difficult to 
achieve in an adversarial situation, in particular when no independent source of 
expertise is available to impartial stakeholders.
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Although there was no obvious expert regulation on the work undertaken by Nirex, there 
had been an independent review of its work undertaken by a Royal Society Study Group 
in 1995 [Royal Society, 1994]. Such “independent” work enables stakeholders to 
appreciate the breadth of thought and opinion being applied to the decision. It can be 
particularly important where a high level of science and technology is being applied to a 
project.
Since the RCF Inquiry, reports seeking to move the debate about radioactive waste 
management forwards (from the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology [HoL, 1999] and within Government [DEFRA, 2001]) anticipate the need for 
body to oversee implementation of the process. A key issue to address as policy 
formulation proceeds will be the relationship between this overseeing body, the 
regulator(s) and the developer.
7.3.3 The significance of the siting decision
Whatever options are chosen for long-term waste management, a site selection process 
will be required. At this point, the national need (to manage radioactive wastes safely) 
becomes a local problem (“not in my back yard”). Site selection needs to take account 
of the scientific and technical criteria required to develop “safe” options. The rationale 
behind the decision to undertake scientific research at Sellafield became a major subject 
for debate at the RCF Inquiry, even though it was a decision taken many years 
previously.
At the RCF Inquiry, Cumbria County Council gave evidence to the effect that the 
Sellafield site was “the wrong site chosen for the wrong reasons” [Cumbria County 
Council, 1995]. On this basis, the Inspector took evidence about the site selection 
process used to identify Sellafield as a preferred site [Nirex, 1996], Nirex had not 
anticipated that the siting decisions would be up for discussion since, in their view, they 
had met all the necessary criteria for the siting decision several years earlier. However, 
no information about the siting decision had been published and it was essentially made 
“behind closed doors” using a limited group of participants.
There is a large body of research that identifies that a technical approach to siting is not 
sufficient on its own to justify the selection of a site. Social and ethical issues become 
essential points for consideration, for example:
• what is an acceptable burden to place on a community?
• what rights does the community have? and
• what constitutes sufficient recompensation?
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Such consideration can only be legitimate if it is done in consultation with stakeholders. 
Hence the siting issue acts as a very tangible focus for scientific and technical research, 
social and behavioural research and consultation.
In the event, Nirex did provide evidence to the Public Inquiry about the multi-attribute- 
decision analysis process used to identify the Sellafield site (amongst others). The 
decision to focus research on Sellafield was made by Nirex, and endorsed by 
Government on the basis that many of the wastes already exist near the site and the 
transportation issues are significant if another site is considered. However, the fact that 
it became a primary issue at the RCF Inquiry tells us that there were a lot of 
stakeholders (including the local Government) who felt the decision had not had 
sufficient consultation. This tells us that there is a much wider group of audiences for 
information about a proposed course of action than acknowledged in the decide- 
announce-defend model illustrated in Figure 4.
7.3.4 The need to understand the audiences for analysis
Most stakeholder groups will agree that scientific work is an essential component of any 
decision-making process about solving the problem of radioactive waste. Analysis of the 
events that transpired at the RCF Inquiry suggests that Nirex relied on providing 
information of relevance to the regulator. In the end, much of the scientific debate 
focussed on the results of the Nirex 95 performance assessment. The primary audience 
for post-closure performance assessments produced by Nirex was the regulators, with 
secondary audiences being other international waste management organisations, 
consultancies and technical advisors to the Government. The performance assessments 
underpinning the key decisions of the nineties aimed to evaluate the performance of a 
repository should it be sited near Sellafield as a means of evaluating the technical 
viability of the Nirex proposals, based on compliance with regulatory requirements.
It is therefore highly significant that the regulator had no role at the RCF Inquiry to 
provide independent and authoritative comment on the adequacy of Nirex’s analysis in 
terms of complying with regulations.
7.3.5 The difficulty of debating uncertain scientific knowledge
The decisions Nirex made about how to present its scientific information to the Inquiry 
influenced the nature of the debate about scientific understanding. The first detailed 
scientific evidence presented by Nirex was on the most up-to date information arising 
from the ongoing site investigations. This was considered the paramount evidence in 
defending the Nirex proposals and its decision to apply for planning permission and then
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appeal against Cumbria County Council’s refusal. Nirex 95 as offered as the most 
recent assessment of performance.
However, a great deal of focus at the Inquiry was placed on the calculations contained 
within Nirex 95 and whether they justified further investigations at Sellafield. The 
performance assessment became a focus for a great deal of debate. However, the 
performance assessment process itself creates problems for a discussion of the more 
general understanding of the geology and hydrogeological knowledge of the site. 
Although this understanding has to be captured (in conceptual models) to identify what 
to model, (see Chapter 9 for more detail), the significance of uncertainties in the general 
understanding are not always easy to draw out and appreciate.
For example, it was known that the groundwater flow models used to develop the Nirex 
95 performance assessment were not able to reproduce measurements of groundwater 
pressure made at the site. Hence there was an uncertainty at the heart of the models on 
which the risk calculations were founded. Although Nirex 95 did indeed suggest that 
under most circumstances the Sellafield site would not exceed the regulatory risk target, 
opposition witnesses were able to challenge the validity of the results by highlighting 
uncertainties in the information, understanding and models on which the results were 
based.
There are many examples in the documentation of the inquiry where Nirex’ response to 
these challenges was to state that the uncertainties to which opposition witnesses 
referred had been taken into account in the modelling methods used to develop Nirex 
95. A probabilistic approach was adopted in an attempt to be very specific and 
systematic about the propogation of uncertainty through the model hierarchy (Figure 13) 
into the calculation of risk. When questioned about areas of conceptual uncertainty, as 
was done extensively in evidence submitted by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and 
Cumbria County Council, direct answers were rarely given. Nirex response was often 
that this uncertainty in conceptual understanding had been allowed for in the treatment 
of uncertainty within the model -  for example by the adoption of conservative 
assumptions in the risk models. Essentially, the Inquiry was being asked to believe that 
the Nirex method of handling uncertainty was adequate.
This type of response led towards fairly expert discussions about the treatment of 
uncertainty. The risk calculations became, de facto, the province of detailed discussion 
between experts who understood probabilistic modelling. However, the treatment of 
uncertainty is a tremendously dynamic area of academic research and debate involving 
scientists from all disciplines and social scientists as well. Hence it is impossible to
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identify any “best practice” approach. Therefore, such discussions inevitably lead 
towards a discussion/disagreement between experts about method and process, rather 
than the uncertainties themselves.
In consequence, many conceptual questions were not directly answered. And yet, a key 
value of performance assessment lies in the manner in which information, understanding 
and uncertainty is synthesised to develop a view on performance. So, answers to the 
questions could presumably have been provided by delving a little deeper into the 
assumptions and information underlying the performance assessment itself.
7.4 Conclusions
An analysis of the records and remembrances of the process suggests that:
• There was no obvious independent expert involved in the decision making 
process since the regulator was not involved;
• There was a lack of understanding of the scope of the decision and the material 
being discussed;
• There was a notable absence of true dialogue since there was a tendency to 
focus on the treatment of uncertainty rather than the evidence for and against 
certain assumptions.
• The inclusion of the issues and concerns of others formed no part of the 
assessment itself, which was developed purely to respond to regulatory 
requirements and a technocratic approach to uncertainty.
Whilst this does not necessarily mean that the RCF decision would have been any 
different, it can give us pointers for how to improve the use of science in public decisions 
making in the future. The RCF Inquiry suggested to me that the analytical methods 
themselves acted as a barrier for dialogue and discussion. Discussion about Nirex 95, a 
sophisticated performance assessment designed to meet the particular requirements of 
a regulatory audience, strongly influenced the nature of the discussion at the Inquiry and 
may not have met the needs of the other audiences present.
In the next section, performance assessments are analysed to look at their potential to 
serve a debate about science better in the future.
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8 WIDENING STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT -W HAT ARE THE ISSUES?
Section 1 explores the possibilities for using risk analyses generally as vehicles for debate. 
The aim for this debate would be to develop a shared knowledge platform that meets the 
requirements of expert regulation and is based on social inclusion. Experience at the RCF 
Inquiry (preceding chapter) has provided insights about the use of the Nirex performance 
assessments as a vehicle for debate and their ability at the time to meet the needs of 
different stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. In this chapter, the 
performance assessment process is examined in more detail to identify aspects that need 
to be addressed if an organisation such as Nirex desires to make the performance 
assessment process more participatory.
In order to examine the assessment process in detail, I wanted to consider a specific 
example and because of my familiarity with the work of Nirex, I have based much of the 
discussion below on post-closure assessments of the Nirex Phased Disposal Concept 
[Nirex, 2000a]. Appendix C presents the conceptual basis for anaysing the risks 
associated with this concept in some detail. To provide context for the analysis, Appendix 
D presents a short summary of a range of performance assessments developed 
internationally.
8.1 A way of thinking about performance assessments
Performance assessments have played a major part in decisions about radioactive waste 
management internationally for many decades. The scope and content of the performance 
assessments has received much attention over that time, generally from the expert 
community and from the point of view that a set of objective assumptions can be developed 
and used in models designed to calculate risk in a quantitative manner. However, Chapter 
4 identifies that the ability to treat uncertainty quantitatively and the claims of objectiveness 
are under challenge. The rather general nature of this challenge makes it difficult to move 
forwards in terms of evolving practice. It is therefore tempting to ignore the challenges as 
not being relevant to a practising scientist or to a specific performance assessment, not 
least because performance assessments have been developed to a point where they are 
seen as “best practice” within the specialist and regulatory communities.
However, a consequence of this approach could be the marginalisation of performance 
assessment and the scientific expertise that goes into it because of the perception of 
elitism. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to explore the content of performance
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assessments used to support ideas about the disposal of radioactive wastes from a new 
perspective. The hope is that viewing performance assessment in a different way may help 
rise to the challenges raised in the previous chapters and hence identify practical 
(evolutionary rather than revolutionary) ways forward for building knowledge about the 
environment in the context of radioactive waste management.
In analysing performance assessments, attention is often focussed on the modelling 
process. This is understandable, given the history of risk analysis as a means of capturing 
and quantifying uncertainty for discussion in the specialist domain. The primary purpose of 
the performance assessment is, after all, to quantify levels of safety for a system whose 
long-term evolution is bound to be subject to uncertainties. However, the approach adopted 
below is to move away from a strong focus on the modelling process and consider the 
inputs to a performance assessment in a more qualitative and subjective manner.
In Appendix C, the Nirex performance assessment is described in terms of a series of 
questions which the performance assessment seeks to answer. These are:
• What standards need to be met (generally defined in regulations)
• How the proposed course of action hopes to meet these standards (the project design)
• What is known now about environmental conditions, processes and evolution
• What potentially could happen in the future
• What are the risks?.
The exploration of these questions has identified a series of issues which will determine 
whether or not there is value in seeking to evolve the performance assessment process 
and widen participation in the assessment process.
Table 12 identifies some key issues for consideration. They are discussed in turn below.
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Table 12: Key issues to consider for evolving the role of performance
assessment in decision-making
What knowledge requirements does the decision-making process place on 
the performance assessment?
What are the value judgements inherent in the performance assessment?
Are there cultural barriers to widening stakeholder participation in the 
performance assessment?
How can opportunities for wider participation be created?
Can stakeholder inclusion and expert regulation be reconciled?
8.2 Knowledge requirements for different stages of decision-making.
Any vehicle that captures knowledge (such as a performance assessment) must be “fit for 
purpose”. Assuming that this purpose is defined by the decision-context, then the 
relationship between the performance assessment and the decision-making process must 
be explicit. Where a stepwise decision-process is being adopted, this relationship will be 
step-dependant and will change as the process is followed. There can be no simple 
formula for determining what should go into the performance assessment because different 
issues and concerns come into focus at different stages.
These ideas are not new. Experiences to widen deliberation and dialogue about 
environmental risk assessments in general and radioactive waste management in particular 
highlight the importance of context [Hunt and Simmons, 2001]. In a recent review of post­
closure performance assessments worldwide [NEA, 1997], guidelines for the content of a 
performance assessment were identified (Table 13). These guidelines identify the need for 
clarity in terms of:
• stakeholder input;
• the context for the performance assessment; and
• the relationship between the performance assessment and a wider development 
process.
In response to these ideas, a report on developing and communicating confidence in the 
long term safety of deep geological repositories, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 
[OECD/NEA, 1999b] recommends that context forms part of the “assessment basis”, which 
should be described as an integral component of the performance assessment
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The idea that the performance assessment and its role in the decision-making process 
evolves through the process bears further consideration if practice is to evolve so that 
performance assessments (and risk analyses more generally) can act as vehicles for 
shared knowledge building. In particular:
• How does the decision-context affect the performance assessment? This question 
relates to the process of environmental decision-making and the role of analysis within 
that process.
• What constitutes a sufficient assessment of performance? This question relates to the 
content of the assessment and the knowledge platform available to inform the analysis.
Table 13: Information desired in a performance assessment (after
[OECD/NEA, 1999b])
Information required Key questions
The context of the performance assessment. -What is the purpose of the performance
assessment?
A description of the disposal concept, the " What assumptions are made ( and why) about:
conditions at closure and the prediction or * The physical and chemical processes that
predictions of its possible evolution W'H affect the repository?
(scenarios) that are considered in the • Different “scenarios" about how the
assessment. repository will evolve over time?
- Why does the performance assessment focus 
on some scenarios and not others?
A description of the models used to estimate - What physical and chemical processes are 
risks. represented in the models and what is their
scientific basis?
- What data are used in the models, how 
representative are they and have they been 
used directly?
- What judgem ents were made during the 
development o f the models?
- How confidently can the models be used?
- Where are the uncertainties in the models and 
data?
The results of the performance assessment - Are any caveats on the results and conclusions
including an analysis of the results within the stated?
context of the performance assessment. - Has the potential impact on results o f any
limited scope been described explicitly?
A statement about the level of confidence in - What are the unresolved issues
the scientific and engineered elements of a - Could these be resolved and if so, how?
waste management system demonstrated by - If unresolved, how significant?
the performance assessment. - What stakeholder input has there been into the
performance assessment, fo r example by
suggesting which scenarios should be
considered?
- Is the performance assessment clearly related 
to a process addressing the ethical, economic
_________ and political aspects of waste management?
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8.2.1 How does decision-context affect performance assessment?
A quick look at Appendix D highlights considerable variation in assessment approaches 
internationally. Some have used highly complex mathematical models to compute a 
quantitative risk value (e.g. Nirex performance assessments, the Japanese H12 
assessment). Others present indicative calculations using much simpler mathematical 
representations of the future (TILA 99 from Finland and the Swedish SR97). Very few have 
explicitly incorporated dialogue in their construction, although many acknowledge that 
dialogue and consultation are potential end uses of the assessments. The difference 
between the assessments is a reflection of the fact that knowledge requirements will vary 
for different programmes, different stages in the programme, different repository concepts 
and different performance assessment methods. Knowledge requirements and hence 
performance assessments do not, therefore, lend themselves to standardisation.
In order to identify ideas about the relationships between performance assessment and 
decision-making, the contemporary performance assessments described in Appendix were 
classified in terms of decision context [after Bailey, 2003]. Decision context was defined 
using the stages identified in the Nirex Stepwise process (Figure 15). Obviously this 
process is specific to one organisation with a specific agenda, but it serves the purpose of 
enabling a comparison of the nature of a performance assessment required for the different 
stages of a generic decision making. Table 14 presents these assessments in terms of 
their essential components. Obviously such a categorisation is not rigorous, since different 
countries have different approaches.
Appendix C highlights the controlling influence of environmental standards on performance 
assessment practice in the UK. In practice, this leads to a tendency in the UK for 
performance assessments to be undertaken using a systematic, “tried and tested” (within 
the peer community) approach. Although there are inevitably some variations for different 
sites and situations, the tried and tested approach tends to be based on seeking to 
determine levels of compliance with standards, regardless of the decision-stage. Whether 
this is an appropriate objective is not always considered and the relationships between 
performance assessments and wider decision-making is not always clear.
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Table 14: Classification of international performance assessments based
on their decision- context (after [Bailey, 2003])
Stage in Stepwise 
Programme
Issue, principles,scope
Dialogue and research 
on options
Choice of option
Implementation
strategy
Site investigations
Site selection 
Implementation
PA Reference Disposal Concept
H-12,
formerly
Japan
agency)
2000a]
NUMO,
JNC,
(disposal
[JNC,
GPA, Nirex, UK 
(disposal agency) 
[Nirex, 2000a]
SAFIR 2, 
ONDRAF/NIRAS, 
Belgium (disposal 
agency)
[ONDRAF/NIRAS,
2001b]
Vitrified HLW encapsulated in thick steel overpack, 
surrounded by highly compacted bentonite mixed with 
quartz sand at depth in a stable generic geological 
environment
ILW and long-lived LLW in stainless steel or concrete 
containers, eventually surrounded by cement backfill in 
vaults at several 100’s metres depth in stable generic 
geological environment
Vitrified HLW and spent fuel in water-tight stainless steel 
containers with stainless steel overpack and 
bentonite/sand/graphite backfill, co-disposed with long-lived 
ILW in clay host rock with overlying aquifer
SR 97, SKB, 
Sweden (disposal 
agency) [SKB, 
1999]
SITE-94, SKI, 
Sweden (regulator) 
[SKI, 1996]
Kristallin-I, Nagra, 
Switzerland 
(disposal agency) 
[Nagra, 1994]
Tl LA-99, Posiva, 
Finland (disposal 
agency) [Vieno and 
Nordmann, 1999]
Nirex-97, Nirex, UK 
(disposal agency) 
[Nirex, 1997]
Yucca Mountain 
Viability 
Assessment, 
USDoE, US
(agency) [USDoE, 
1998]
Spent fuel in copper canisters with high-strength cast iron 
inserts, surrounded by bentonite in individual deposition 
holes at a depth of 500m in granitic bedrock (the ‘KBS-3 
concept’), using data from 3 different sites, none of which is 
a potential repository location
The ‘KBS-3 concept’ as above. An assessment 
hypothetical repository at a real site (Aspo)
of a
Vitrified HLW in massive steel canisters surrounded by 
compacted bentonite in tunnels at around 1,000m depth in 
crystalline basement rock of Northern Switzerland (two 
regions considered)
Spent fuel in copper-iron canisters with bentonite buffer at 
depth in crystalline bedrock (similar to the KBS-3 concept), 
compares performance of 4 named sites
ILW and long-lived LLW in stainless steel or concrete 
canisters, surrounded by cement backfill in vaults at around 
700m depth in fractured hard basement rock (Sellafield 
site)
Spent fuel and HLW in massive carbon steel packages with 
corrosion-resistant inner layer of high-nickel alloy, placed in 
tunnels 300m below surface but 300m above water table in 
unsaturated zone of volcanic Tuff rock in desert 
environment (Yucca Mountain, Nevada)
WIPP Compliance Long-lived transuranic (ILW) waste in mild steel drums and
Certification waste boxes, with added magnesium oxide, at 655m depth
Application, in bedded salt rock (Carlsbad, New Mexico)
USDoE, US
(agency) [USDoE,
1996]
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In a world dominated by a decide-announce-defend approach to decision-making, this lack 
of clarity was not so relevant or significant as with contemporary decision making. 
Primarily, this was because the scientific knowledge captured in the performance 
assessment was originated and discussed within a defined group of actors with expert 
knowledge and understanding. Within this epistemological community, issues such as the 
evolutionary nature of performance assessment were implicitly, rather than explicitly 
acknowledged. Many documents describing performance assessments in the 90’s discuss 
the iterative and evolutionary nature of assessments, and Nirex went so far as to adopt the 
concept of assessment cycles to frame its work at Sellafield [Bailey and Littleboy, 2001; 
Littleboy, 1995]. However, the relationship of these assessment cycles to the decisions 
that were required was only just being made explicit outside Nirex when the Sellafield 
investigations were terminated.
It is possible to identify commonalities between different performance assessment within 
the same category. This suggests some guidelines for good practice in developing context- 
specific performance assessments which are outlined Table 15. The stages illustrated in 
the Nirex stepwise process introduced in Chapter 7 (Figure 15) are used to reflect the 
development of the decision-making process.
Table 15 implies that performance assessments vary significantly depending on the 
decision-stage which they support. The idea is that the performance assessment should 
evolve as the state of knowledge evolved and a less sophisticated exercise would be 
required in the early stages where the levels of knowledge to inform the assessment were 
lower.
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Table 15: Commonalities between international performance assessment
developed for similar decision-contexts
Step in process
issues principles, 
scope of problem, 
process
Dialogue and
research on options
Choice of option
Implementation
strategy
Site investigations
Selection of site 
Implementation
Focus A pp ro ach O utpu t
Developing concepts Mostly qualitative Estimates of
understanding of hazard/risk/consequen
processes and ces ( e.g. peak doses,
scientific/technical 
principles
Development and Identification of Fluxes,
comparison of options features, events and conditional
impacts on health and 
the environment)
doses, 
risks,
processes (FEPs) and environmental
potential impact concentrations,
comparisons
natural
anthropogenic
analogues
with
and
Developing methods Generic scenarios and 
and assessment “what i f  calculations 
criteria, SEA for specific timeframes
assessment of options
Evaluation of sites Increasingly detailed Environmental impact
Environmental impacts 
and long term 
dose/risk impacts
calculations in iterative and long term
assessment cycles dose/risk calculations
Licensing submission, Rigorous quantitative Environmental 
demonstration of analysis, full scenario statement, risk
compliance
regulations
with analysis 
weightings
to
with potentially exposed
groups and evaluation 
against other
regulatory 
requirements
If the inputs and outputs vary for each stage of the process, then the information required 
at each stage of the process will vary. Equally, it is likely that the stakeholders who need to 
be involved in considering the performance assessment will vary for different stages.
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The RCF Inquiry discussed in Chapter 7 was when the decision was at the stage of site 
investigations. The evidence presented by the stakeholders involved at the RCF Inquiry 
(Figure 17) would suggest a need for them to be involved at:
• Issues stage (Greenpeace campaign strongly on the issue of nuclear 
power in general)
• Choice of option stage (FoE believe that long term storage is a better 
option)
• Site selection stage (CCC identified that Sellafield was the “wrong site for 
the wrong reason”)
So the concepts of front end consultation and stakeholder engagement from the earliest
opportunity manifest themselves for the specific case of radioactive waste disposal.
Table 16 postulates the nature of knowledge required for each stage. The knowledge 
requirements at each stage can be (and are) informed by performance assessments. 
However, it is only at the implementation stage that performance criteria (i.e. standards to 
be met) are really being established. Therefore, prior to that point, the assessment should 
be considered to be indicative only, and is not a sound basis for societal decisions.
Table 16: The nature of knowledge required for different stages of a
stepwise process of decision-making
Issues principles, scope of problem, process 
and organisational structure
Generic knowledge contributing to policy 
development
Dialogue and research on options Knowledge about different waste 
management options
Choice of option Generic knowledge about relative strengths 
and weaknesses
Implementation strategy Knowledge about preferred outcomes to be 
translated into performance criteria
Site investigations Increasingly detailed and site specific 
knowledge about environmental behaviour 
and outcomes
Selection of site Site specific knowledge
Implementation Observed knowledge about outcomes
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So the decision context is extremely important in defining the scope of the performance 
assessment. If this point is accepted, then it suggests that the assessment methodology is 
not time invariant, nor should it be solely defined by considerations of best technological 
practice in risk analysis. This is fairly intuitive and is in keeping with the notion of producing 
assessments that are “fit for purpose”. However, determining what is a sufficient level of 
knowledge for each decision-stage, and therefore what constitutes a sufficient 
performance assessment is an extremely difficult question.
8.2.2 What constitutes sufficient information for a performance assessment?
Even if the relationships between performance assessment and decision-stage are clear, a 
question in the minds of all stakeholders will be “have we dealt with uncertainty sufficiently 
to move to the next stage?” The content and outcomes of the performance assessment is 
traditionally used to inform opinion on this, and to identify continuing uncertainties. 
Therefore, the performance assessment needs to contain the necessary knowledge.
The influence of environmental standards on the knowledge requirements for a 
performance assessment cannot be underestimated. If regulations are the sole driver for 
performance assessment, then the necessary knowledge is that required to enable the 
performance assessment to be undertaken. The modelling methods identify input 
parameters and a research programme can be put in place to provide those inputs. 
Deciding when “sufficient” knowledge is available can be based on a consideration of 
confidence in the performance assessment process, the results and the level of compliance 
with standards.
In this case, one can identify further research on the basis of residual uncertainties that 
have a significant impact on the results of the performance assessment. This is an 
attractive idea. It offers the potential of being able to identify when to stop acquiring 
knowledge (based on peer review, residual uncertainties and levels of compliance with risk 
targets). However, there is a top-down aspect to this which leads some workers to claim 
that the analysts can become “blind slaves” to the regulations [Adams, 1995].
The idea of driving the performance assessment totally by a need to determine compliance 
no longer sits comfortably in our knowledge -based society. It is regulation-driven rather 
than knowledge driven. What about knowledge held by others which does not necessarily 
fit into the performance assessment method being used (for example, “lay knowledge”, 
extended facts or minority theories)?
In a knowledge-driven process, rather than seeking and obtaining scientific knowledge in 
order to undertake a performance assessment, the performance assessment should 
respond to the level of available scientific knowledge. The performance assessment
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becomes a servant of available knowledge. This would be a requirement if the performance 
assessment was expected to act as the vehicle for shared knowledge building. However, 
in this case, there is a problem in determining whether sufficient knowledge has been 
gained to inform the decision-context. Fundamentally, this becomes the biggest value 
judgement of all.
The analysis of the RCF Inquiry in Chapter 7 demonstrates that the key issues aired at the 
Inquiry centred around this very point -  did Nirex, or did it not have sufficient scientific 
knowledge to justify going underground and an even greater financial commitment to 
pursuing deep disposal at Sellafield? This question was further clouded by the lack of 
context for the Nirex 95 performance assessment presented to the Inquiry. Was the Inquiry 
about:
• site selection (why are you at Sellafield?);
• about building confidence in the Sellafield site by further research (why do you want 
to go underground?); or
• about the suitability of the Sellafield site for a deep disposal facility (should we or 
should we not build a repository in this local environment?)
Nirex 95 was designed to inform the context of why Nirex should be allowed to go 
underground. It was neither sufficiently generic for site selection nor sufficiently robust for 
determining the suitability of Sellafield. Used inappropriately, the performance assessment 
was not fit for purpose and confused dialogue about alternative contextual situations.
The above discussion highlights two very practical difficulties in developing performance 
assessments that are “fit for purpose”. These issues centre around the issue of what 
constitutes “fit for purpose” in different decision-contexts. This question will need to be 
understood in terms of what other assessment tools are being used to support the 
decision-making process. For example, if environmental impact assessment is to be used 
to guide the knowledge building for a decision, then the relationships between the 
performance assessment and the EIA needs to be clearly understood before either is 
embarked upon.
8.3 Participatory performance assessments - Is the relationship between 
values and knowledge well enough understood?
Values are discussed in Chapter 2. Judgements based on experience, data and 
constraints imposed by technology will all influence the rationale and conceptual 
assumptions and most people will agree that these judgements should lie in the expert
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domain. However, it is where value judgements make a significant contribution to the 
assumption that challenges creep inc. A value judgement is a view that is influenced by a 
range of subjective factors. These factors can be highly personalised and include 
worldview, past experiences, priorities, moral principles and ethics. So understanding 
something of where value judgements are significant is helpful in determining where other 
knowledge and extended facts may be appropriate. Therefore, a classification of value 
judgements made within the performance assessments is offered below.
8.3.1 A classification of value judgements in performance assessments
A number of judgements are being made as part of the performance assessment process. 
In the past, experts have made these judgements as necessary to complete the 
assessment process. In many instances, this may be entirely appropriate. Specialists have 
sought to act in good faith by making sound and logical judgements, based on scientific 
rationality and ethical concepts of societal good. However, there may also be instances 
where judgements are made that are not firmly based in scientific knowledge, but draw 
more heavily on assumptions about the relative importance of different issues. These 
assumptions are essentially “value systems” and the judgements that arise are often called 
“value judgements”.
However, value systems can vary for different individuals and groups. In consequence, 
where value judgements (for example, judgements about defining the future or futures, or 
deciding what constitutes a risk) are made by one stakeholder group the legitimacy of 
these value judgements is called into question. This has given rise to a debate about 
whether there should be more consultation during the performance assessment process. 
The debate centres around two questions.
• If the judgements underpinning the performance assessment are subjective, is it right 
that they are controlled by a single stakeholder group (technical specialists)? Hence
• In an increasingly consultative world, shouldn’t such judgements be opened up to the 
wider stakeholder community?
In theory, it is very easy to say that ’’all stakeholders should have a say in value 
judgements”. In practice, it may be that most stakeholders are happy to let the specialists 
get on with it, given certain guidelines and transparency of process. Understanding the 
nature of the value judgements made within a performance assessment may go someway 
to turning theory into practice by enhancing the transparency of assumptions underpinning
c As defined in Chapter 2, a value judgement is a subjective judgement informed by a specific set of
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performance assessments and determining whether wider participation is possible in the 
performance assessment process
Four performance assessment specialistsd were interviewed to identify where they 
considered subjectivity could be a factor in the assessment processes used for the Nirex 
97 and GPA performance assessments. Broadly speaking, three overall types of value 
judgements were identified in both Nirex 97 and in the GPA [Littleboy, 2002].
• judgements that determine the scope of the performance assessment and provide the 
background
• judgements that determine how performance will be assessed which therefore set the 
end points of the assessment process -  for example what criteria will be used to judge 
performance, determine compliance and evaluate confidence6, how will adequacy be 
determined?.
• judgements that determine the content of the performance assessment -  for example 
what’s in it, what isn’t, what methods will be adopted for the performance assessment 
process -  for example, what models will be used, how will uncertainty be handled, what 
input parameters should be adopted, who will conduct the performance assessment?
Together, these judgements capture the main elements of an “assessment basis” -  which 
has been described in a recent report by the NEA [OECD/NEA, 1999b] about building 
confidence in long term safety. The relationship between these value judgements and the 
performance assessment questions identified in Table 9 are shown in Table 17.
Table 17: A general relationship between value judgements and the
performance assessment process
Value s about how to What are we concerned about What standards need to be met
judge performance and why? (generally defined in regulations)
Value judgements What are we trying to do about it How the proposed course of action
affecting the scope of and what do we need to take into hopes to meet these standards (the
the assessment account? project design)
the What factors are sufficiently What is known now about
the important to go into the models environmental conditions,
and how should it go in? processes and evolution
(environmental knowledge)
What potentially could happen in 
the future
Values about 
content of 
performance 
assessment
d my thanks to Mike Poole and Lucy Bailey (Nirex) and David Hodgkinson (Quintessa UK) 
8 Using the NEA definition, these are the key aims of Safety Assessment.
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Examples of these value judgements for both the Nirex 97 and the GPA performance 
assessments are given below.
8.3.2 Judgements determining the scope of the PA
The scope of the Nirex97 and GPA performance assessments was defined by :
• the design of the facility to be assessed (based on the concept of deep geological 
disposal);
• the wastes that will be placed within the facility ( based on information held in the 
relevant version of the National Inventory [DETR, 1999a];) and
• the site at which the facility may be located.
In a recent report from the NEA [OECD/NEA, 1999b], these are fundamental components 
of a performance assessment that are referred to as the “system concept”. There are a 
number of judgements at this point that define the system concept to be modelled. 
Essentially, the idea of multibarrier containment defines the project. The selection of 
multibarrier containment is an important decision in its own right since it identifies deep 
geological disposal as the preferred option for radioactive waste management -  i.e. the one 
that best protects the things that society values most. Additionally, another defining 
decision is the one about what wastes will go to the repository. These are major societal 
decisions that have direct impacts on stakeholder groupsf. However, to specialists 
developing the generic performance assessment, these are “givens” and were generally 
not considered to be part of the performance assessment itself.
8.3.3 Judgements about evaluating performance
Assessing performance requires a clear view of how to measure and evaluate results. 
These are another form of value judgement. For example, the performance of a long­
distance runner can be assessed by considering: whether (s)he wins (if the assessor 
values first place); whether (s)he has beaten her previous time (if the assessor values 
improvement); or the number of calories burned (if the assessor values effort). Similarly, 
ideas about what is important will determine the way the performance of a radioactive 
waste management option is evaluated.
For Nirex 97 and the GPA, performance measures have been derived from the 
interpretation of regulatory guidelines [EA, 1997], which themselves include a value 
judgement about using risk as the measure of performance. These judgements about 
performance criteria (or evaluation measures as they are sometimes called) determine the
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outputs required from the performance assessment process so that levels of compliance 
with acceptance guidelines can be considered and confidence in the results can be 
evaluated. This has been called the “safety strategy” [OECD/NEA, 1999b]
Judgements about how to measure performance are highly significant. These judgements 
set the scene for the content and focus of the performance assessment and hence 
influence the actions of all those involved in the assessment process -  whether this be as a 
researcher, communicator, reviewer or analyst.
Table 18 indicates the value judgements about performance criteria adopted in Nirex 97 
and the GPA. It shows that different judgements were made for Nirex 97 and for the GPA, 
and indicates a much broader interpretation of the regulatory guidance for the later 
performance assessment.
Table 18: Value judgem ents about perform ance criteria
Value judgement Used in Nirex 97 Used in GPA
What timescales?
Passive safety when?
Up to 108 years
300 years following 
backfilling and closure
What indicators of safety Compliance with a 10'6 risk
are used?
Who/what is at risk?
How will adequacy 
determined?
be
target
Representative individual 
members of a “potentially 
exposed group” (PEGs)
which makes many
assumptions regarding 
collective averaging 
Robustness to interrogation 
and critical analysis (the 
precursor to Nirex 97 was a 
key piece of scientific
evidence at a Public Inquiry)
Up to 10 years
Immediately following backfilling 
and closure, which is after 300 
years extended monitoring period 
10"6 in any year at any time, flux 
out of the repository, flu to the 
biosphere, fraction decayed in 
different parts of the system plus 
a range of other performance 
indicators in supporting reports 
[Miller, 2000] looking at effects on 
the natural environment.
PEGs but also supporting work 
on impact on non-human species 
[IAEA, 1999]
Sufficiency to support advice 
about how to package wastes 
and examine sensitivity of the 
system to different conditions
8.3.4 Judgements about the content of the performance assessment
Finally, there are value judgements involved in determining what will go in to the 
performance assessment. These value judgements are essentially about deciding what is 
sufficiently important to be included within the performance assessment. This is identified
f For this reason, the current situation in the UK is one of Government consultation about options for
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as the “assessment capability” by the NEA [OECD/NEA, 1999b]. A range of such 
judgements are made within Nirex 97 and the GPA:
• Decisions about which features of the facility and the site will affect its post 
closure performance. Both performance assessments adopt a similar 
approach to this, based on years of scientific research and modelling.
• Careful consideration of how the facility will evolve in the future, and what 
processes will affect it. There are a range of possible futures, so 
assumptions of which are the important ones are obviously value 
judgements themselves.
• Decisions about what methods to adopt, in particular to deal with 
uncertainty in data and models. The uncertainties exist because of the 
difficulties of using data from short term observations and/or experiments 
to predictions of behaviour over very long timescales. The choice of 
methods for modelling complex information is also an expert judgement. It 
is rather fundamental to the performance assessment process since it 
leads to an identification of the information required as input to the 
performance assessment.
• Decisions about particular input parameters. Where data is sparse, expert 
judgement is used to supplement the available information.
Table 19 identifies the value judgements of this type used in Nirex 97 and in the GPA. 
Table 19: Value judgements about what’s in the performance assessment
What are the main Source term (homogenised Source term (homogenised 
components of the representation of the repository at representation of the repository at
Value judgement Used in Nirex 97 Used in GPA
What are the main Groundwater movement 
pathways back to Gas discharge 
the surface?
What future A “base scenario” (including
evolutions are features and processes deemed
considered? likely to happen) and some
Groundwater movement 
Gas discharge 
Inadvertent Human intrusion 
A “base scenario” (including 
features and processes deemed 
likely to happen) and some 
selected variant calculationsselected variant calculations
system and how closure)
are they Site specific geosphere
represented? (represented by path length, travel
closure)
Generic geosphere (represented 
by travel time, dilution factor and 
flux)time and flux) derived from support 
modelling)
Biosphere (represented as 
conversion factors derived from 
support modelling)_____________
Biosphere (represented as 
conversion factors derived from 
support modelling)
radioactive waste management.
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What modelling 
methods are
adopted?
What are the data 
inputs?
Probabilistic
Derived through a hierarchical 
model development process based 
on experimental data and field 
information from the Sellafield site
Probabilistic with some 
representative sensitivity analyses
Factors representing the 
geosphere were derived from 
expert judgement to be
representative for UK geology.
8.3.5 Balancing technical knowledge and values
The work above distinguishes between different types of value judgement within 
performance assessment. One of the reasons for this distinction is that the relative 
balance between technical input and input from wider stakeholder consultation and 
deliberation is likely to vary. It will vary because the level of detailed technical knowledge 
required to form a judgement and the level of interest from the wider community will vary 
for the three different types of value judgement.
Consultation work into concerns about radioactive waste management has already been 
undertaken. Strongly value-laden issues emerged from the dialogue processes. The value 
judgements identified by exploring past performance assessments were compared with 
these issues [Hunt and Simmons, 2001]'and findings are discussed below.
Those judgements of immediate concern to stakeholders are those that determine the 
scope of the performance assessment assessment rather than those that are used within 
the performance assessment process itself. As such they invite themselves for much wider 
consultation and are indeed the subject of current and widespread consultation by the UK 
Government. However, to specialists, these judgements are not considered to be part of 
the performance assessment process. Work by EDF [EDF, 2002] showed that non­
specialists do not make distinctions about what is, and what isn’t part of the performance 
assessment in the same way as the analysts. This is consistent with broader research on 
public deliberation that indicates that stakeholders will seek to explore context that is far 
broader than the issue in hand. This suggests that it would be naive to exclude issues 
about management options and wastes from a discussion of the science of radioactive 
waste management and performance assessment just because the scientists consider 
them to be defined by someone else.
At the other end of the spectrum, value judgements about the content of the performance 
assessment require a fairly high level of technical expertise and experience. 
Nevertheless, judgements that deal with uncertainty about the repository’s evolution lend 
themselves to wider consultation since they explore the future. Increasingly technical 
judgements that deal with data and model uncertainty require expert input and peer review
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and the opportunities for significantly wider stakeholder input are more limited. For 
example, both Nirex 97 and the GPA adopt a “probabilistic” approach to dealing with 
uncertainty. Others may choose to use “deterministic” methods. The distinction between 
these methods do not need to be articulated within this report -  they are both valid options 
for performance assessment modelling [NEA, 1997], The legitimacy of the modelling is 
generally determined by verification, validation and peer review.
This indicates that there will be a spectrum of interests into performance assessment from 
very high level inputs to highly detailed inputs. Therefore a balance needs to be struck 
between the relative inputs of lay and expert stakeholders. This is illustrated in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Relative balance between expert judgement and wider
consultation for different types of value judgement.
Type of value judgement Relative contribution from
experts and consultation
Performance assessment
Scope
Judging
performance
Content
It is reasonable to expect that as the decision process proceeds and a site or a few sites 
have been identified, the focus will slide down the scale of value judgements shown in 
Figure 20 towards those related to the content of the performance assessment. This was
Consultation
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illustrated by the evolution of two successive performance assessments of the Sellafield 
site - from Nirex 95 [Nirex, 1995b] to Nirex 97[Nirex, 1997]. As information from the site 
increased, the performance assessment models became more firmly founded in data. This 
did not mean that there was less inclusion. Indeed, once a site has been identified, a much 
greater level of interest in the content of the performance assessment could be expected, 
which may be a partial explanation for the emphasis on the Nirex 95 performance 
assessment at a Public Inquiry (see Chapter 7).
8.3.6 Balancing expert judgement and values
Many of the challenges to risk analysis discussed in Chapter 4 arise from the way in which 
uncertainty is treated. It is suggested that assumptions and judgements made in the face 
of uncertainty are influenced by subjectivity and personal value systems. A greater level of 
participation in establishing these judgements could increase the perceived legitimacy of 
the performance assessment to a wider range of stakeholders. This requires sharing ideas 
about the values that need to be incorporated into a participatory approach to performance 
assessment?
Traditionally, performance assessment is seen as a vehicle for knowledge, not values. 
However, at the heart of the assessment, the definition of environmental standards is 
fundamentally value driven -  who are we going to protect and from what? The above 
discussion illustrates that performance assessments juggle knowledge and values and the 
boundary between them is often very indistinct. For dealing with contemporary 
environmental situations this could be a very positive thing. It suggests that there are 
indeed very real opportunities for extending performance assessment to facilitate 
participatory knowledge building by opening up value judgements to wider deliberation. 
This would need to be done at each stage of the decision process since both values and 
knowledge will change through the decision-process.
If value judgements are to be used to open up performance assessment to wider 
stakeholder participation despite its technical nature, two cultural shifts must occur:
• The analysts must accept that there are value based assumptions within the 
performance assessment (as suggested in Chapter 5);
• The broader stakeholder communities must accept that their opinion is legitimate, 
despite lower levels of specific technical knowledge about performance assessments;
If these shifts occur, a simplistic view of a participatory performance assessment could be 
one that brings together values, via deliberation and consultation, and knowledge, as a 
response to those values. However, this is not really knowledge sharing. It perpetuates a
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simplistic distinction between axiological (value-based) and epistemological (knowledge- 
driven) information. It also makes the mistake of assuming that experts deal exclusively in 
knowledge and the lay public in values.
In reality, as shown by many workers in many different academic and practical fields, a 
much more complex relationship exists between values and knowledge, and the 
relationship is different for different stakeholder groups and different for different stages of 
a decision-making process. If performance assessment is to be the vehicle for shared 
knowledge building, then a shared perspective of what the assessment is trying to achieve 
will be required. However, to develop that shared perspective, the issues and concerns 
held by all stakeholders will need to be explored in an inclusive and iterative manner. This 
is one of the purposes of the overall decision-making process, rather than one of its 
constituent parts.
If this is so, it suggests that seeking to widen participation in performance assessment 
could confuse the relationship between performance assessment and the decision-making 
process -  hence re-establishing difficulties of context discussed above. At one extreme, it 
could lead to a conclusion that the performance assessment should provide the overall 
decision-making framework. At the other, it could suggest that there is no need for a 
performance assessment since the decision-making process will explore all the necessary 
issues and integrate them into a course of action.
Whatever the relationship between the decision-making process and the performance 
assessment, the difficulties of incorporating the multiple perspectives of a wide range of 
stakeholders points towards very real cultural barriers in developing truly participatory 
performance assessments. These are discussed below.
8.4 Cultural barriers to widening stakeholder participation in performance 
assessment
8.4.1 Cultural attitudes
The notion of performance assessment as a series of questions derived from Table 9 was 
discussed with a twelve experts from different disciplines working in the field. All these 
experts worked for Nirex. Interestingly, those working with the design and engineering of a 
repository were happy with the ordering of the questions but those working most closely 
with evaluating performance wanted to re-order the questions. The different perspectives 
seem to reflect two different cultural approaches:
• An approach that emphasises what contributes to safety (a safety -based approach);
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• An approach that emphasises what could go wrong and hence what could give rise to 
risk ( a risk based approach);
Figure 21 illustrates these different perspectives in terms of the questions posed in Table 9 
Figure 21: Integrating key questions in a performance assessment
SAFETY BASED 
APPROACH
♦
Environmental
Standards
What are the 
risks?
W hat is the 
proposed course of 
action
W hat potentially could 
happen in the future
W hat is known about 
current environmental 
conditions, processes 
and evolution
▲
RISK BASED 
APPROACH
As can be seen from Figure 21 these two approaches are compatible and are primarily 
distinguished by where the performance assessment process is considered to start. In 
both cases, the experts are confident that the performance assessment is an appropriate 
vehicle for dealing with uncertainty. Indeed, many performance assessment documents 
claim that the process provides a “systematic” way of dealing with uncertainty.
Table 20 explores this claim by considering:
• the uncertainty issues to be addressed at each stage of the assessment
• the approach adopted by the analysts for dealing with these issues; and
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• the challenges to this approach that arise from the academic literature.
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Table 20: Treatment of uncertainty in the performance assessment process
Performance assessment 
question_____________
What standards are we trying 
to meet?
What is the proposed course of 
action?
What do we know about current 
environmental processes and 
conditions?
What could happen in the 
future?
What are the risks?
Issue
Need to demonstrate compliance 
with a regulatory risk target
Need to ensure containment for 
very long periods
Lack of data (incompleteness)
Variability (temporal and spatial)
There are complex
interelationships between FEPs
What does the future hold?
Need to derive a meaningful 
number for comparison with 
standards
Approach
Calculating a risk value
Deep disposal and multibarrier 
containment
Develop knowledge using site 
investigations and R&D
Probabilistic modelling supported 
by sensitivity studies to derive 
expectation values of risk
Challenge
Who decides who we are trying to 
protect from what
Do we know enough?
Causal effects may not be known 
(ignorance)
Expectation value of risks masks 
’’latent fragility of understanding”
Different ethics may highlight the 
importance of individual or worst 
case risks rather than collective 
dose
Who decides what risks are 
important _
Supplement by expert judgement
Combine to develop probability 
distribution functions of potential 
property variation
FEP analysis and scenario 
development
Conservative consideration of 
potentially exposed groups.
Reference biospheres
Local and lay knowledge may not 
be adequately incorporated 
(extended facts)
“Guessing”
Causal effects may not be known 
(ignorance)
Relevant societal behaviour may 
not yet have been experienced 
(indeterminacy)
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Table 16 was compiled from the theoretical issues identified earlier (Chapters 3 and 4) and 
also on discussions with two individuals managing major elements of performance 
assessment development at Nirex. Also, informal requests for comment were made to 
individual representatives of the academic social science community a nuclear researcher 
from Friends of the Earth9.
Table 13 challenges whether the performance assessment really does provide a systematic 
treatment of uncertainty. To a certain extent, this depends on the definition of uncertainty. 
Once the more holistic definitions discussed in Chapter 9 are considered then it becomes 
apparent that the performance assessment does not deal with:
• Ignorance [Wynne, 1994];
• Indeterminacy [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992]; or
• Epistemological uncertainty [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992].
However, most performance assessment workers will claim that it was never intended to 
address these forms of uncertainty, but rather to provide a systematic treatment of data, 
model and future uncertainty (technical uncertainty in the terminology of Funtowizc and 
Ravetz [Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992]). The potential for cultural misunderstanding here is 
great. The misunderstanding opens up possibilities for criticism that are not about the 
quality of the scientific knowledge, but are about the definition of uncertainty and the 
application of knowledge within performance assessment methods. Whilst these are 
legitimate (but generally expert) areas for debate and discussion, the overall effect is to 
raise questions about the scientific knowledge and the trustworthiness of those offering it 
that may be unfounded.
The idea of using performance assessments as a platform for shared knowledge building 
requires the drawing together of different epistemological communities. These different 
communities will have their own expertise and, inevitably, preconceptions. Such 
preconceptions will have been built both from individual experience and cultural history and 
may act as barriers to widening participation in performance assessment for three key 
reasons:
• Different views about what a performance assessment is and who it is for;
• The difficulties of drawing together different ways of conceiving and articulating 
concerns about the environment from different stakeholder groups; and
9 My thanks to Lucy Bailey, Brendan Breen, Jane Hunt Juhani Vera and Rachel Western
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• The threatening nature of increased participation for many scientists and analysts since 
it requires an extension of thought outside the culturally understood boundaries of the 
scientific community.
8.4.2 Who are performance assessments for?
As discussed in above, for experts in performance assessment, its boundaries are clear 
and define its potential role in debate on the long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal 
facilities. It has been primarily a tool for experts involved developing technical evaluations 
and scientific research programmes focussed on key uncertainties. A key channel of 
communication served by performance assessment has been the regulator-operator 
relationship and therefore the performance assessment has tended to be focussed towards 
expert regulators.
This practice is evidenced by the performance assessments presented in Appendix D (after 
[Bailey, 2003]) where an overriding commonality is that they are aimed at specialist 
audiences. The preface to SR97 states that parts of it are expected to be of interest to non­
specialists. TILA-99 and the Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment aim to make the 
assessment accessible to wider audiences by emphasising, in particular, transparency of 
data and models and diagrammatic presentations respectively. Recognising that the main 
body of the performance assessment is therefore unsuitable for non-specialists, many of 
the assessments have summary documents. These include H-12, SAFIR2, SR97, 
SITE-94, Kristallin-1, Nirex-97, Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment and the WIPP CCA. 
However, these summaries vary in content and style. Some are simply technical overviews 
of the main report (H-12, SR 97, SITE-94 and Nirex-97), others have been written with 
wider, less-specialist audiences in mind (Kristallin-1, SAFIR2, Yucca Mountain) or 
specifically to encourage non-specialists to participate in the decision-making process 
(WIPP CCA).
The analysts are clearly of the view that the primary audience for performance assessment 
is a specialist one. Summary documents and visual representations are used as a means 
enhancing accessibility, but even so this seems to be in a fairly one-way sense of 
communication. Hence, even though the WIPP CCA summary is aimed at encouraging 
non-specialist input, this input is being requested right at the very end of a licensing 
procedure and decision-making process.
The implication is that the analysts themselves do not view performance assessment as a 
useful vehicle for dialogue with non-specialists or do not see how non-specialist views can 
add value to the assessment. This is probably due to the highly technical nature of a
151
performance assessment and the rigour that is required to produce an assessment that will 
stand up to the scrutiny of technical peer review and regulatory requirements,
However, it may also be a result of the analytical focus towards determining compliance 
with the highly quantitative environmental standards to which the performance assessment 
is responding. Hence the mathematical and statistical solutions developed to handle 
uncertainty quantitatively and hence the need for specialist knowledge to appreciate the 
results of the analysis.
This definition of performance assessment is too narrow to fulfil a useful role in promoting 
dialogue along the other axis shown in Figure 12 - that of social inclusion. It doesn’t 
necessarily address the questions that are of most concern to other stakeholders, notably 
the public. As discussed above, the need to determine compliance with a long-term risk 
target reduces the ability of a performance assessment to respond to different decision- 
stages. Consequentially, this will reduce the flexibility of performance assessment to act as 
a vehicle for dialogue with those who have values that are not reflected by the risk target.
However, a concern about increasing non-specialist participation in performance 
assessment is that its rigorous analytical nature will be diluted in the interests of developing 
a more widespread appeal. A “logical” conclusion from this statement is that the 
performance should remain a vehicle for debate and discussion between experts that 
enables performance to be measured systematically against defined regulatory criteria or 
environmental standards.
This attitude may appear to be contrary to the ideals of an analytic-deliberative approach to 
decision-making. However, this need not be so as long as the analysis contained within 
the performance assessment does not exclude or supersede other knowledge platforms or 
deliberative knowledge building. Indeed, there are component parts of the performance 
assessment process that can benefit from such deliberation and that lend themselves to 
broader discussion in a way that the overall complex performance assessment process 
does not.
8.4.3 Reconciling stakeholder attitudes and concerns
Table 21 identifies some of the difficulties of incorporating stakeholder values into 
performance assessment by comparing the issues of concern to the public (derived from 
[Hunt and Simmons, 2001]) with the factors on which expert performance assessment 
methods have tended to focus (based on the UK approach to performance assessment).
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Table 21: Com parison of public concerns w ith expert m ethods
People are concerned about.... Expert methods within Nirex have tended to focus
upon...
Tangible impacts on quality of Quantitative risk targets at long times into the
life future
Worst case scenarios “Probabilistic” modelling approach where model
inputs are sufficiently broad to cover all 
eventualities
Individual dose (maximum?) Representative individual members of a “potentially
exposed group” (PEGs), which makes many 
assumptions based on collective averaging
Spectacular future events Base scenarios (to date) although ‘what if
calculations are being developed via the use of 
variant scenarios
Table 21 gives a flavour of the cultural difficulties of drawing together performance 
assessment specialists with a broader stakeholder community. A significant (if 
unconscious) barrier is provided by the specialists themselves who have been developing 
the performance assessment process over the last twenty years into a sophisticated 
exercise that adopts state of the art modelling and knowledge management methods within 
a structured environment. Other stakeholders do not articulate their concerns in a manner 
that is readily incorporated into this framework.
Equally, the wider stakeholder community is not constrained by the niceties of where 
performance assessment begins and ends. Hence, discussion and debate about policy 
matters and regulations become intertwined into their considerations but tend to remain 
outside the domain of the specialists consideration.
8.4.4 Cultural attitudes on behalf of the scientists
As discussed in Chapter 5, the scientific method is ingrained in the trained scientific 
professional, as is the need to undertake research and analysis meticulously and in a 
manner that will have to be subjected to peer review. The notion that subjectivity (in the 
form of value judgements) may be influencing their work is threatening and may incur a 
defensive response. Additionally, following years of training and specialisation, the idea 
that non-specialists have something to offer is very difficult to grasp. It requires a re­
assessment of the relevance of information lying beyond the traditional boundaries of 
science. This requires courage, and may incur the sceptism of the traditional peer scientific 
community. Reconciling these issues can be very difficult and is generally achieved by the 
personal attributes of the scientists in question, rather than by the adoption of any particular 
practice.
153
If participatory performance assessment is to be an effective tool for shared knowledge, 
then this complex relationship needs unravelling for every decision-context. It may be that 
the relationship is too complex to be unravelled in a reductionist manner. Attempts to do so 
may end up diluting the performance assessment so that it contains a hybrid knowledge 
base that is owned by no stakeholder group.
8.5 Can stakeholder inclusion and expert regulation be reconciled in a 
participatory performance assessment?
Expert regulation has driven the development of performance assessments and risk 
analysis to date. Environmental standards provide the backdrop for most risk analysis 
practice. Determining compliance with these standards has been the primary purpose of 
performance assessments since the fifties. Environmental standards seek to encapsulate 
the concerns of society. However, these are notoriously difficult to standardise and 
stakeholders with different forms of knowledge and value systems will have different 
concerns. The risk target given in regulatory guidance for radioactive waste management in 
the UK is a technocratic attempt to integrate all these issues into a common, and 
measurable factor. However, it does not assist more qualitative dialogue and discussion 
about environmental concerns. Additionally, the risk target does not acknowledge the likely 
evolving nature of issues and concerns as a stepwise decision-process is followed.
However, the prospect of not using a quantitative environmental standard seems equally 
unrealistic since it removes the opportunity for an independent expert authority (the 
regulator) to develop a reasonably objective view about the validity of the proposals in 
question. This suggests that evolving the performance assessment so that it enables more 
qualitative dialogue and promotes social inclusion may undermine its ability to inform expert 
regulators. Philosophically, this should raise questions about the nature of the 
regulations. Realistically, it represents the difficulties of capturing technically specialist but 
uncertain knowledge in a rigorous manner. Practically, it means that performance 
assessment for post-closure risks from a radioactive waste repository are unlikely to act as 
vehicles for dialogue in their own right since the two objectives of social inclusion and 
expert regulation may work against each other. In view of the fact that the performance 
assessment has been developed for a specialist audience, it can be concluded that this 
should remain the prime focus.
Nevertheless, some components of the performance assessment process are seen to be 
amenable to wider participation -  most notably the development of scenarios about the 
future and choices about how to deal with uncertainty. However, offering the performance 
assessment process up for wider participation in these areas brings very significant cultural
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challenges. With variations in both the nature of the judgements being made and the level 
of interest from the wider stakeholder community, how is an appropriate balance between 
specialist and lay knowledge to be struck? Also, how is the right balance to be struck 
between values and knowledge?
This question goes right to the heart of modern scientific behaviour. How is a scientist to 
be both authoritative (because of his/her specialists knowledge and training) and
responsive (because his/her value system has no ascendancy over others)?
This brings us back to the issue of whether a common platform for shared knowledge can 
be identified, which can encompass both expert and lay knowledges and provide the 
foundations for differing stakeholder groups to service their own specific decision-needs. 
The quantitative nature of the performance assessment and its focus on evaluating risks 
against environmental standards acts as a barrier to dialogue. Because of the very real 
practical issues raised above, I would suggest that it is not possible to reconcile the needs 
of social inclusion and expert regulation by adapting performance assessments without 
major cultural shifts in the attitudes of scientists and analysts. This shift needs to give 
conceptual and qualitative debate a higher profile in the performance assessment process.
8.6 Widening stakeholder participation -  Summary of issues
8.6.1 Performance assessment and decision-context
Fundamentally, where an uncertain future is involved, there appears to be a conflict 
between the idea that a performance assessment helps determine compliance with a 
quantitative environmental standard (or standards) which are fixed in regulations, and the 
need to evolve for different decision contexts. Until this conflict can be resolved, how can 
performance assessment be used confidently in support of a stepwise decision-process. 
At each stage of the process, questions must be considered such as:
• Is it helpful to determine compliance with the environmental standard at this stage of
the process?
• Is it meaningful to determine compliance with the environmental standard given the 
current level of knowledge?
• What level of compliance with the environmental standard is acceptable to move to the 
next stage?
• Is it meaningful and helpful to consider these sorts of questions at this stage of the 
process?
Another big issue underlying the above questions is the issue of whether enough
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information is available to support the performance assessment and to support the decision 
in hand.
8.6.2 Performance assessment, knowledge and values
Performance assessments juggle knowledge and values implicitly. The environmental 
standards to which they respond contain value judgements about who/what requires 
protection, from what. Although their cultural nature suggests that the value judgements in 
performance assessment could provide the means of opening up the assessment process 
to wider stakeholder participation, their subjectivity means that each stakeholder will be 
coming to the performance assessment with differing perspectives of
• what the performance assessment is, or should be, trying to assess ; and
• how performance should be judged;
• whether values have any place in a traditionally technocratic, analytical process;
• who has a legitimate voice in a traditionally technocratic, analytical process.
Rationalising these different perspectives will be extremely difficult and will explore 
stakeholder issues and concerns more properly discussed as part of the wider decision­
making process.
8.6.3 Cultural barriers
There are some real difficulties in using performance assessment as a platform for shared 
knowledge building arising from the drawing together of different epistemological 
communities, with different culture, language and expertise. These are, generally 
speaking:
• Difficulties of knowing who the performance assessment is for and why it is relevant to 
those outside the traditional performance assessment community;
• Difficulties in developing a shared language for articulating and discussing 
environmental concerns;
Pushing the scientific community outside its “comfort zone”, potentially leading to defensive 
and non-constructive attitudes
8.6.4 Conclusions
There are real practical challenges to the use of performance assessments as they are 
currently conceived as a vehicle for dialogue and shared knowledge building. However, 
some of the qualitative content of the experiences, questions and theory encapsulated in 
the performance assessment is reflected in the questions and issues raised by 
stakeholders during consultations [Hunt and Simmons, 2001; EDF, 2002]. This suggests an 
interest outside the scientific community in the subject matter of the assessment. So even
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if the analysis is not the best vehicle for dialogue and shared knowledge building, it may be 
worth exploring the effectiveness of finding another vehicle for the dialogue required for 
analytic-deliberative decision-making. The next section explores whether the conceptual 
and qualitative understanding of environmental processes, causes and effects can 
stimulate debate amongst non-scientific stakeholders, and simultaneously enable the 
development of a quantitative risk analysis that continues to satisfy regulations.
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Section 3
Towards an analytic-deliberative 
assessment of long-term risks for 
deep geological disposal
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9 CONCEPTUAL MODELS -  A PLATFORM FOR SHARED KNOWLEDGE 
BUILDING?
The research in this thesis is looking for vehicles to enable broad ranging debate about 
environmental issues and platforms on which to develop shared knowledge. Section 1 
identified the changing contexts for the use of risk analyses and scientific knowledge in 
environmental decision making. In Section 2, the performance assessments developed by 
Nirex to examine the risks of deep geological disposal at Sellafield have been examined. 
Conclusions are:
• That it is important to have a vehicle whereby knowledge about environmental 
consequences can be shared between experts and lay communities;
• That the process used to build that knowledge, and the relationships that develop 
between participants can have a dramatic effect on the manner in which the 
scientific knowledge is ultimately used;
• That a vehicle for building a shared knowledge base of potential concerns about the 
environment on which to conduct a quantitative risk analysis would be a valuable 
contribution to a participatory decision making.
• That science and risk analyses will always need to be robust to expert peer review, 
but a focus solely on that objective can act as a barrier to the participation of other 
communities, which will undermine the value of that scientific knowledge in the 
decision-making process. This has (in my subjective opinion) been demonstrated 
by the use of highly complex risk analyses in decisions about the Nirex RCF;
• That scientists will have to develop their work in conjunction with other communities 
holding different types of expertise. Dialogue should commence as early as 
possible;
• That the translation between conceptual descriptions of what could happen, to 
numerical representations of quantitative risk is a major barrier to communication 
and dialogue.
• That the heuristic and descriptive nature of the earth sciences, and the fact that they 
deal with environmental processes and outcomes means that the discipline is well 
placed to bridge the gap between qualitative concepts and quantitative analyses.
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This chapter explores the potential for conceptual understandings to act as a vehicle for 
dialogue and to build a shared knowledge platform on which to base risk analyses.
9.1 Elements of a shared knowledge platform
Dialogue with a socially inclusive range of stakeholders will need to address conceptual 
understandings and different perceptions of what constitutes a hazard. This can lead 
towards ethical discussions about who is likely to be harmed and who needs to be 
protected. Dialogue to enable expert regulation is centred on assessments of compliance 
with environmental standards and regulatory targets. This can lead to further discussion 
about what the risk results mean, the level of compliance indicated by the assessment and 
discussion about whether the environmental standards and regulatory targets are 
appropriate.
These two, apparently different, interests are not so far apart. The challenging of 
environmental standards can go back to debate about what who needs to be protected 
from what hazard. A common thread is an overriding concern with hazards and risks to the 
environment. The question is whether we can break into the circular process of discussion 
and define a platform that can:
• grow and evolve as the recursive discussion continues; and
• remain relevant to both axes for the discussion of scientific knowledge.
9.2 Encouraging engagement
A desire for stakeholder involvement in the development of knowledge implies a willingness 
to listen. Dialogue undertaken on behalf of Nirex has identified a number of issues which 
stakeholders feel should be addressed by scientists working in radioactive waste 
management [Hunt and Simmons, 2001]. An analysis of this work suggests that 
stakeholders engage better if they have:
• The means to reassure themselves about the integrity of the scientific work (in 
particular the risk analysis or performance assessment) and its results.
• The opportunity to help influence and comment on the work
Figure 22 draws together these ideas into a framework for encouraging stakeholder 
involvement.
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Figure 22. Engaging the public in scientific work
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Figure 22 identifies a range of factors that combine to enable stakeholder involvement. 
Each of these factors is necessary, but not sufficient for the building of shared knowledge 
about the environment. The presentation of scientific work is one part of the picture -  
hence the many initiatives on developing the public understanding of science and the focus 
of the research presented here. Other factors are the development of trust and the 
provision of opportunities for dialogue. These social and organisational factors have been 
discussed in earlier sections and are the subject of extensive academic study.
Figure 22 also implies requirements for clear recording of the decisions and assumptions 
used to develop the analysis. The ideal of transparency has therefore become central to 
the behaviour of many organisations seeking to be socially responsible and is an 
increasingly common value in organisational behaviour. This includes auditable records of 
all the models and data sets used in any calculations and a transparent, comprehensive 
presentation of the facts and value judgements used in developing proposals. However, the 
need for comprehensiveness and auditability should not be allowed to undermine 
comprehensibility.
The problem is that in the scientific arena there is not a straight dividing line between facts 
and value judgements. Rather there is a spectrum, which has a lot to do with how much 
trust and confidence a person has in a particular piece of 'evidence'. This evidence is
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interpreted at the conceptual level, inevitably against a set of values. Therefore, it can be 
postulated that this conceptual level is an appropriate level for engagement with 
stakeholders.
9.3 Providing opportunities at a conceptual level
Much of the perceived value in widening stakeholder involvement in assessment arises 
from the way that subjective assumptions and judgements are used to help deal with 
uncertainty. A greater level of participation in making these judgements could increase the 
legitimacy of the performance assessment for a wider range of stakeholders. This 
focussing on variable information, information that is influenced by experience and values, 
will inevitably shift attention away from hard quantitative knowledge to a more conceptual 
exploration of issues.
Table 22 compiles a representation of key assumptions made in performance assessments 
(taken from Chapter 8) and classifies them into the different types of value judgements and 
different classes of uncertainty identified in the NUSAP system. The NUSAP system has 
been chosen for this analysis primarily because of parallels between performance 
assessment and evaluations of global climate change (long timescales, widely distributed 
risks and major future uncertainties.
Generally speaking, Table 22 shows that the assumptions dealing with:
• Technical uncertainties: tend to be those based on an understanding of existing 
conditions or well established knowledge of environmental processes
• Methodological uncertainties: tend to be about the extrapolation of current knowledge.
• Epistemological uncertainties: are those to do with deciding what is important -  how 
performance is to be judged -  and also the more sweeping assertions that define the 
content of the performance assessment -  for example that the future can be 
extrapolated from the present (nature/society preconceptions [Stirling 1999]).
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Table 22: Analysis of key assumptions against the NUSAP classification of
uncertainty.
mmm L umDtiQn Classification Type of value judgement
Radiological risk is wriat matters;
Because of potential harm to human health;
At any point and with equal importance over an indeterminate period into the future that will span 
H  many many generations
epistemological
epistemological
epistemological
Judging performance 
Judging performance
Judging performance
(or rather not identified!) in regulations;
that it is possible to capture the main risks from a repository by considering three pathways back 
to ,he surface: groundwater flow leading to natural disharge; Gas migration; and human 
intrusion.
that the physical and chemical processes occurring within the engineered barrier and the 
1  geosphere will mean that the concentration of radionuclides reaching the biosphere will be 
significantly less than the concentration leaving the repository;
that knowledge of radionuclide transfer processes and dosimetry means that it is possible to 
convert dose to a radiological risk;
that the groundwater pathway can be represented by considering containment, dispersion, 
spreading and decay;
about the nature and quantity of wastes that will be disposed of; 
about the way the repository will be built and the amount of backfill required 
■  about how the repository will evolve prior to closure
methodological
methodological
technical
technical
methodological
technical
technical
epistemological
scope
Content
Content
Content
Content
Scope
Scope
Content
■  that the groundwater path can be represented by four parameters: travel time, path length, a 
retardation factor and dispersion;
that these parameters can be investigated by site investigation and interpretation;
■ H H t h a t  an understanding of the current groundwater flow system can be extrapolated and used as 
^ | t h e  basis for deriving these parameters into the future;
methodological
methodological
methodological
Content
Content
Content
^ ^ T h a t  it is possible to capture future uncertainty within a range of scenarios
That some scenarios can be 'subsumed" because their effects are less significant; 
H ^ ^ H l h a t  the future can be represented by scenarios linking features, events and processes; 
^ | T h a t  current knowledge can be used as the basis of developing scenarios for the future
methodological
methodological
epistemological
epistemological
Content
Content
Content
Content
^H d eterm in ed  by investigation, data and expert judgement 
F 7 if iW lif iT !W T V i» f fy ^ M c a n  use a representative individual of a potentially exposzed group
■  biosphere factor can be derived by considering exposure routes and dose/risk conversion 
1 factors
■ H H  future human behaviour can be represented based on current knowledge 
future climate states can be predicted
technical
epistemological
methodological
epistemological
epistemological
Content
Judging performance 
Content
Judging performance 
Content
The work of Funtowizc and Ravetz [2001] suggests that the assumptions made to handle 
technical uncertainties can legitimately remain within the scientific domain. Therefore, the 
analysis given in Table 22 suggests three areas for wider participation, all sitting within the 
domain of methodological and epistemological uncertainty. These are: the identification of 
environmental standards; consideration of how to judge performance; and the identification 
of future scenarios.
9.3.1 Setting standards
The difficulty of standardising the concerns of society should not be underestimated. It is at 
the point of setting standards that the incorporation of values is most important and most 
tricky. This has been discussed extensively by the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution [RCEP, 1998] and will not be repeated here.
9.3.2 Criteria for judging performance
In terms of a more participatory approach to determining how to judge performance, 
regulatory and specialist guidance documentation is increasingly identifying confidence 
building measures and multiple lines of reasoning as necessary safety arguments [EA, 
1997; OECD/NEA, 1999b]. This allows for much broader evaluation criteria to be identified. 
It opens up significant scope for wider participation in advance of the performance
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assessment itself. However, the need to respond to even one quantitative measure laid 
down in regulation still tends to be a dominant focus for the analysis.
9.3.3 Identifying future scenarios
A quick look at the performance assessments described in Appendix C shows assumptions 
about future scenarios are very important to the development of a performance assessment 
and therefore the legitimacy of those assumptions needs to be closely examined. There is 
general agreement that scenario development (identifying the potential future evolution of 
the repository), which is a fundamental component of performance assessment, has the 
potential for consultation. Indeed, a decade ago it was noted that:
“The partly speculative nature of scenarios, and the relative ease with which they can be 
described, can provide a rich and accessible means for public involvement”.
Scenario development has been identified in various sections of this thesis as a point at 
which uncertainties, value judgements and analytical methods come together. Different 
combinations can lead to alternative concepts and alternative possible futures (scenarios).
9.4 Conceptual models as a means of building a shared foundation for 
performance assessment
I am going to use the term “conceptual models” to describe the input to the risk analysis, 
where the definition of a conceptual model is, loosely:
“a brief, clear, simple and unambiguous description of the system. It defines the processes 
acting within the system, the parameters required to model those processes and the 
conditions on the boundaries of the system” [Nirex 1995b].
As discussed in Chapter 4, conceptual models are developed as part of the risk analysis 
process. Conceptual models effectively capture the general understanding of the system 
and its evolution that underpins the risk analysis process (see Figure 8). Development of 
this conceptual model or models which will underpin a risk analysis involves considering 
and collating the available data and describing and justifying the physical and chemical 
processes which the model will seek to represent. The development of conceptual models 
for a risk analysis is, to my mind, the fundamental step in the analytical process. Everything 
else in the analytical process will stem from choices about the conceptual model -  the data 
required, the sources to use, the algorithms in the model. The conceptual model itself 
stems from identifying the things you are concerned about and therefore it sits at the 
fulcrum of the scientific knowledge used to analyse risks (Figure 23).
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Figure 23. A simplified representation of the scientific knowledge 
base for risk analysis
RisksConcerns
Conceptual
models
Conceptual models are essentially descriptive. They therefore provide powerful tools for 
capturing the many types of uncertainty that affect the environment and the assumptions 
(both implicit and explicit) that are made to handle some of these uncertainties. Conceptual 
models do not seek to capture all uncertainty. In developing a conceptual model, no claim 
about comprehensiveness is being made -  it is a possible state of the system, now, in the 
future or in dynamic transition between them. Hence the conceptual model does not 
exclude ignorance or indeterminacy. Transparency about what is going into the risk 
assessment is thus helped tremendously by a well-presented set of conceptual models.
Conceptual models are not quantitative. They are descriptive in nature, and in the arena of 
risk analysis have tended to take a subordinate role to the numerical methods used for the 
quantitative treatment of uncertainty and risk. Nevertheless, they are the point at which 
various scientific disciplines come together to inform the risk analysis process, before the 
problem is handed over to the mathematicians and modeller. As such, they are 
tremendously vibrant areas of dialogue between those involved, even peripherally in the 
risk process. This is evidenced in the climate modelling arena where the high profile 
debate centres around the cause and effect of global warming (what to model) rather than 
the relative values derived from the model.
I observed the power and use of conceptual models for knowledge building during 
investigations into the suitability of a site near Sellafield in Cumbria for the disposal of
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radioactive wastes. This experience has been described elsewhere [Littleboy, 1997], but 
essentially it was only when the conceptual model was used as a platform for iterative 
dialogue between the risk modellers and the Earth scientists investigating the site that 
Nirex produced risk models in their Nirex 97 assessment that reproduced site observations. 
At that point, the conceptual model became a knowledge platform that was shared between 
the modellers and the Earth scientists. The Earth scientists could identify how their work 
led up to it, and the modellers could see how their risk calculations were derived from it.
Before adopting a successfully integrated and iterative approach to conceptual model 
development, the results of a Nirex performance assessment were vulnerable to a 
disownment by all. The Earth scientists could claim that the models did not represent their 
knowledge of the field and the modellers could claim that their models were as good as the 
available data. The problem was that the available data was sparse and open to non­
unique interpretations. Without developing a shared view on what interpretations to adopt, 
the link between data and risk calculation was easily lost.
In theory, this experience of encouraging shared knowledge building between field 
scientists and modellers could be extended outside the scientific community. Given its 
descriptive nature, it seems entirely possible to consider extending the scope of conceptual 
models to encompass issues raised outside the expert risk community. Using the 
conceptual model avoids the confusion and obfuscation of the detailed mathematical 
structures used to calculate risk and the challenges of post-normal science.
Figure 24 gives an indication of what this shared knowledge platform might look like. More 
importantly, it shows how specific areas of academic research can contribute to the 
knowledge building process when integrated into this common platform.
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Figure 24. Knowledge platform in support of an analytic-deliberative 
approach to decision-making
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The shared knowledge base proposed in Figure 24 recognises a number of key factors in 
the effective development of an analytic-deliberative approach:
• the continued importance of the regulator as an expert commentator on environmental 
risk and management;
• the need to be responsive to the issues and concerns of a wider cross-section of 
society;
• the continued relevance of scientific analysis, expertise and training to the knowledge 
development process;
So, in response to the question raised at the beginning of this thesis:
“how can we get the right science in an appropriate social context to build an effective 
knowledge base for decision-m aking?”
I am proposing that conceptual models of the cause and effect of environmental impact be 
used as a common platform for debate and discussion. These conceptual models can be 
developed in a participatory fashion. The conceptual models can then be used to develop
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quantitative analyses in order to determine compliance with regulations. To do this, a 
number of factors need to be taken into account:
• The conceptual description should capture the scientific at an appropriate level of detail. 
The appropriate level of detail may well be different for different types of dialogue and 
different players in the dialogue process.
• Additionally, it will be important to provide information that responds to questions raised 
by those engaged in the dialogue. These questions will evolve as the dialogue 
proceeds, and this may well affect the level of detail that is valuable in support of the 
dialogue.
• Finally, in the interests of openness, this common frame of reference must openly 
acknowledge scientific uncertainty so that those with differing values can form their own 
judgements about risk.
Typically, scientific experts working in the field of risk analysis will claim that all these 
criteria are met within the risk analysis process. However, this opinion is not shared 
outside the expert risk community. There are many examples of natural scientists, 
engineers, social scientists, non-governmental organisations and political commentaters 
disputing the view that risk analysis captures all necessary scientific knowledge. It appears 
that the risk analysis process can obfuscate the contributions made by others so that they 
become unrecognisable in the output.
9.5 The relevance of Earth Science
The idea presented in Figure 24 is to develop a common knowledge platform based on 
conceptual models. The relevance of Earth Science to environmental decision-making has 
been discussed in Chapter 5. Earth scientists need to emphasise their role in providing 
expert knowledge about the physical and chemical processes affecting the environment. 
This knowledge includes facts, speculation and uncertainty, all of which become tied 
together into a conceptual understanding of environmental behaviour. Earth Science 
therefore has the potential to contribute significantly to an analytic-deliberative approach to 
environmental decision-making. The knowledge of the Earth Science community could be 
a valuable starting point for iterative knowledge development, both with experts and with a 
wider cross-section of interested stakeholders.
Earth Science has always been important for risk analyses in waste disposal. Chapters 5 
and 8 describe the need for Earth Science information to underpin risk analyses and 
performance assessments and identifies that the knowledge of Earth Scientists tends to be 
translated into the mathematical risk analysis via the conceptual model. The conceptual
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model and Earth Scientists are therefore fundamental to effecting the intellectual 
transformations described in Table 9 -  turning knowledge into model into parameters via 
the application of expert judgement. Since there will always be incomplete knowledge 
about natural systems, there will always be the need for such intellectual transformations. 
Conceptual models offer a vehicle for capturing this intellectual transformation and for 
discussing the judgements that are used with peers and expert audiences such as the 
regulator.
On the more inclusive axes for dialogue Earth scientists can contribute to dialogue about 
environmental concerns for a number of reasons, all of which tend to be captured within 
conceptual models:
• As discussed earlier, the Earth Sciences are essentially about understanding the Earth 
as a dynamic system. Many of the (both expert and lay) concerns about environmental 
hazard and the causes of environmental harm stem from Earth Science research and 
Earth resource exploitation.
• Earth Science interprets environmental conditions in terms of sequences of events that 
have developed over long time periods. It has also developed into a predictve science, 
with uncertainty being an implicit part of any Earth science training. The timescales 
involved and the non-uniqueness of Earth Science theories make it well suited to 
considering and debating the potential for environmental harm in the future.
• The Earth Sciences covers a range of very different scientific disciplines and mindsets, 
from those working on the micro-scale to those working on a global (even an 
astronomical scale), from integrationists (lumpers) and reductionists (splitters), from 
theorists (modellers) to activists (field geologists).As a discipline, Earth Science is well 
used to debating issues in a descriptive and heuristic manner.
Hence, an increased focus on conceptual models within environmental decision making is 
likely to have repercussions for the role of Earth scientists within the decision-making 
process.
9.6 Testing the hypothesis that conceptual models can promote debate 
and hence iterative knowledge building.
Taking all these things together, the hypothesis becomes that clear and understandable 
conceptual models may be helpful as a vehicle for debate. The intended outcome is a 
common platform of knowledge on which to based risk analyses can be developed. 
Moreover, it is hoped that earth scientists will confidently claim a central role in the 
development and evolution of these conceptual models. This hypothesis is tested in the
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sections that follow for the issue of radioactive waste management. As with the previous 
section, the reasons for this concentration on one example of an environmental problem is 
my familiarity with the subject. However, in the concluding chapters I consider the lessons 
learned from this exemplar in a broader context.
More specifically, the focus of the work is on two particular aspects of radioactive waste 
management -  the role of rocks in deep geological disposal and the post-closure 
performance assessment. The reasons for this specificity (apart from an ongoing familiarity 
with the subjects) is to test the assumption underlying this thesis that Earth science is 
highly relevant to environmental decisions because of its descriptive and interpretative 
nature and its ability to deal with long timescales.
The studies described in the succeeding chapters were initiated using a public dialogue 
process to explore issues and concerns with deep geological disposal. This was, in effect, 
a front end consultation for the research and is described in the following chapter.
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10 DEEP GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL- DIALOGUE ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT
10.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis identifies early, broad stakeholder involvement as an important 
component of an analytic-deliberative approach to decision making. That idea is followed 
in this chapter in order to provide input to more detailed studies about using conceptual 
models to build knowledge for decision about radioactive waste management.
An opportunity to design and develop a public dialogue study for Nirex was used to explore 
issues and concerns about the deep geological disposal of radioactive waste. Whilst it was 
not possible to completely structure the study to the ideal needs of this research, it was 
possible to work with others to develop a study with aims that met Nirex’s immediate needs 
and also amounted to a “front end” dialogue for this research. As well as the information 
from the dialogue providing valuable material for the direction of this research, the dialogue 
design process itself provided a valuable opportunity for reflective practice in terms of 
engaging in dialogue about deep geological disposal. The study is outlined first and then 
reflections on its progress are presented.
10.2 Aims of the dialogue
An independent facilitator (The Future Foundation) was engaged to run the study, which 
had the following aims:
• To articulate succinctly the concerns and risk perceptions of the general public resulting 
from a discussion of the phased disposal concept
• To provide guidelines as to how Nirex can better communicate complex issues and 
provide readily understandable information to the public
• To inform the technical process with suggestions for the kind of assessment work 
required to address public fears that may arise
• To assess the effectiveness of the research process as a means of public engagement 
and to suggest improvements
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Additionally, subsidiary aims were identified that were specific to exploring the hypothesis 
set out in this these -  that conceptual models can act as a vehicle for dialogue about the 
risks involved in deep geological disposal of radioactive wastes.
These subsidiary aims were to:
• develop a conceptual representation of the science underpinning deep geological 
disposal;
• test whether the public could and would engage in discussion about the science of 
deep geological disposal if presented with these conceptual ideas;
• consider the impact of this type of dialogue for the presentation of scientific information 
and the role of the scientist in environmental decision-making.
10.3 Dialogue Methodology
The dialogue was designed to enable plenty of time and open-ended discussion to 
generate thoughtful responses from the participants. Eight focus group discussions were 
held with members of the UK public. All groups comprised equal numbers of men and 
women but their composition varied in terms of age, lifestage and socio-economic 
circumstances, allowing us to achieve a broad cross-section of the UK population. The 
groups were conducted in a variety of locations around the country: Carlisle, North London 
(Cockfosters), Paisley and Cardiff. The Carlisle and North London groups were held in late 
November/early December 2001, while the Paisley and Cardiff groups were held in January 
2002.
The groups were composed as follows:
Carlisle 20-30 yrs No children at home ABC1
Carlisle 40-50 yrs Children at home C2DE
North London 30-40 yrs Children at home ABC1
North London 50-65 yrs No children at home C2DE
Paisley 30-40 yrs Children at home ABC1
Paisley 50-65 yrs No children at home C2DE
Cardiff 20-30 yrs No children at home ABC1
Cardiff 40-50 yrs Children at home C2DE
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People who are or have ever been employed by or connected with (i.e. no close family 
member employed by) the nuclear power industry, the Ministry of Defence or any other 
government department were excluded, as were employees of environmental campaign 
organisations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and CND. This was to reduce the 
chances of distortion in the findings of the survey.
Each group of people were invited to two sessions. The first session was a general 
discussion of the issues of nuclear energy and radioactive waste, while the second session 
focused on the specific issue of the phased disposal concept. Each session lasted 
approximately two hours. The two sessions were held on successive evenings in order to 
maximise the amount of learning and thinking that people retained from the first session 
and carried into the second session. In addition, by holding the sessions so close together, 
it was hoped to minimise the degree to which any individual participant was able to discuss 
the first session with a relative, friend or colleague who might have specialist knowledge or 
interest in the issues involved and might, therefore, influence the participant’s approach to 
the second session.
The purpose of the first session was to bring the participants ‘up to speed’ in terms of their 
knowledge and awareness of nuclear energy and radioactive waste. This was considered 
essential for participants to then be able to address the specific topic of phased disposal. It 
was also important for establishing the various participants initial positions, so that we 
could better appreciate their subsequent responses to the idea of phased disposal.
At the start of the session, participants were asked about their spontaneous knowledge of 
radioactive waste. They were then given printed material outlining the basic issues and 
facts involved in the management of radioactive waste. Participants were encouraged to 
give their views on the information that they had been given: what was new to them, what 
they did or didn’t believe, what they did or didn’t understand, and whether or not the 
information had altered their understanding and attitudes.
The second session focused on the specific topic of the phased disposal concept. 
Participants were asked to read an introductory pack that explained the overall framework 
of the concept. They were then encouraged to share their thoughts on what they had read.
Next, they were lead through a step-by-step discussion of the concept’s phases. For each 
phase, they were given a page of text and an illustration that explained the phase in greater 
detail. They were then encouraged to comment upon what they had read before moving on 
the next phase.
The introductory material used for the discussions (a combination of printed text and 
illustrations) was adapted from existing Nirex literature. Printed material was used. In
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previous focus group discussions (Establishing the Value of Wider Public Consultation, 
November 2000.) it was found that people tended to prefer a written text to, say, a video 
presentation because they felt that the text gave them a greater sense of control over the 
subject matter. They were able to read things at their own speed and to re-read bits that 
they weren’t sure about. Also, it was useful for both facilitator and participants to be able to 
refer to the material during the course of the subsequent discussion.
A summary of the findings is given below. The full report from the Future Foundation can 
be viewed on Nirex’s website www.nirex.co.uk. Throughout this summary, verbatim 
quotations from the focus group discussions are given in italics.
10.4 Summary of findings
10.4.1 Overall
Generally speaking, the participant’s awareness and attitudes were in keeping with findings 
from previous studies (Future Foundation 2002).
• By their own admission, people knew very little about the issues of nuclear energy 
and radioactive waste. They had never given much, if any, thought to the matter. 
Nevertheless, they expressed a strong but vague mistrust of nuclear energy and 
were cynical and suspicious about the nuclear industry.
• Once they had been given information about radioactive waste, they recognised the 
importance of the issue and were surprised at how little they -  and, by extension, 
the public in general -  knew about such an important topic.
• There was widespread agreement that radioactive waste was a problem that 
needed to be tackled by the current generation -  and participants were surprised 
and alarmed to read that no long-term solution had yet been agreed.
• For many people, the scale of the problem was a strong argument for stopping 
nuclear energy now. They were unwilling to separate the issue of waste 
management from the issue of waste generation. Given that no agreement had 
been reached on what to do with the existing waste, it was considered irresponsible 
and immoral to continue producing any more.
• There was strong support for the wider dissemination of information about 
radioactive waste into the public domain. This was regarded as a prerequisite to 
proper accountability.
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• There was a common feeling that, whilst the public should be kept informed, the 
final decisions about the management of radioactive waste should be made on its 
behalf by representative organisations. It was crucial, however, that these 
organisations should be accountable to the public and open to public scrutiny.
• Participants suggested that, in addition to the wider dissemination of information, 
accountability and scrutiny could be achieved through two key measures:
o Involving a cross-section of interested parties in the decision-making 
process
o Establishing a credible, independent watchdog to oversee the management 
of radioactive waste
The views that people expressed were often contradictory. For instance, participants 
argued that the public should be better informed but they also said that Nirex should 
concentrate on finding a technical solution rather than wasting time on communicating with 
the public. They also admitted that they were unlikely in real life to read or watch any 
material that was produced on the subject. Partly such contradictions stemmed from the 
fact that people did not have established views on the subject. They knew little about the 
issue and had never given it much, if any, thought. Consequently, their views were fresh, 
spontaneous and easily changed in the light of other people’s comments.
Participants continued to express contradictory attitudes in their discussion of phased 
disposal. For instance, they expressed a desire to ‘get rid of the stuff but, at the same 
time, they argued against the idea that monitoring of the waste would ever cease.
10.4.2 Concerns about deep geological disposal
Many people were reassured by what they read about phased deep geological disposal. 
The level of detail -  especially in the information about the individual phases -  reassured 
them that the experts were giving serious thought to the matter.
“It’s the common sense option. I can’t see them coming up with anything better.”
I’m happier knowing that they’re really working at it and trying to make it safe. ”
“I ’m convinced now that it’s a lot better organised and safer than I expected. ”
As in any focus group discussion, the critics of an idea or issue were far more vocal than 
those who were in favour or who did not have strong feelings. In these sessions, the 
participants who said that they were reassured tended to be those who did not offer 
spontaneous opinions. Rather, they needed to be prompted to contribute to the discussion. 
Their quietness does not mean that their opinions are any less valid (or any less
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representative of the wider population), but it is inevitable that such a discussion will be 
dominated by those who were more vocal. Also, the dialogue was designed to encourage 
participants to express their concerns.
Many participants expressed broad satisfaction with the phased disposal concept ‘in 
theory’. They were concerned, however, about what would actually happen in practice, 
once the concept was put into action. In particular, they wanted to know:
a) What happens if something goes wrong?
b) How are you going to pay for it?
c) How do you get the timing right?
What happens if something goes wrong?
Participants were not concerned primarily about the routine, day-to-day operations of 
phased disposal. Rather, they wanted to know what would happen if something out of the 
ordinary occurred. They were worried about the scale of damage to the wider environment 
if there was, say, an explosion or a leakage -  and they wanted to be reassured that there 
were mechanisms in place to limit the scale of the damage. Participants queried whether 
there were back-up plans that anticipated and took account of potential accidents and 
mishaps. In particular, they were keen to know whether it was possible to close the deep 
repository immediately in an emergency situation. They wanted to hear that there was 
some form of ultimate safety option that would contain the potential threat to the wider 
environment.
“They don’t say what they’ll do if there is a leakage. ”
“Is there a safety feature in place - and I know it’s not the ideal option - where you 
could just seal it?”
“Flick a switch and it’ll fill up with concrete. ”
The concern about ‘something going wrong’ was crucial with regard to the post-closure 
phase, since people tended to regard the eventual corrosion of barriers and the leakage of 
radiation as ‘something going wrong’, rather than as anticipated aspects of the process.
How are you going to pay for it?
Participants were concerned about how phased disposal would be financed over such 
enormous timescales. They wanted to know how a budget could be ensured for the 
hundreds and thousands of years that would be involved. People were worried that money
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for the project would eventually run out and the waste would not receive the proper 
attention to ensure its safe management.
“How much money have they got?”
“Who’s going to keep funding it? Because if the company went bust, well, we’re not 
going to pay for all the people working [in the repository]. It’s going to be quite 
expensive, isn’t it?”
“Someone will have to be paid to look after this stuff. The more dangerous it gets, the 
higher the price. ”
How do you get the timing right?
Some participants could see that the success of the concept rested on ‘getting the timing 
right’ -  that is, on containing the waste for long enough for its radioactivity to decline to 
acceptable, background levels. Given that timing was critical, participants were concerned 
that they were not being given more precise timescales. In this way, the flexibility of the 
concept was seen as a negative attribute. They considered phrases in the prompt material 
(‘at a future date’, ‘at a measured pace’, ‘at an appropriate time’, ‘for a period of up to 
several hundred years’) to be too vague.
Participants wanted to understand the basis for scientific and technical models and 
forecasts.
• How can scientists know how long a material will remain radioactive?
• Given that mankind has only been producing radioactive waste for a few decades, 
how are scientists able to extrapolate the waste’s behaviour over the course of 
hundreds and thousands of years?
• And how do they know how the materials of the barriers (for instance, the stainless 
steel canisters, the backfill cement) will interact with the radioactive waste over the 
very long term?
“I don’t think they can forecast what condition the container or the cement will be in a 
thousand years. ”
10.4.3 Prompted concerns about what happens after the repository is closed
During the second session, participants were asked for their comments on specific stages 
of deep geological disposal. In some cases, these concerns were prompted by the 
facilitator’s questioning. The issues that arose when discussing the post-closure stage are 
outlined below.
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Most participants were disturbed by the idea that there would ever be an end to human 
management. They argued that monitoring should continue for as long as the waste exists.
Furthermore, many participants resisted the idea that the containers -  like any other 
material -  could not be guaranteed to last forever. They were worried that, over the long 
timescales under consideration, the containers would eventually corrode and that the 
radioactivity would dissipate into the surrounding geology. Corrosion of the containers and 
leakage were regarded as ‘something going wrong’ rather than as being anticipated and 
acceptable developments in the phased disposal concept.
“They can’t guarantee that the things they put them in will last forever, can they?”
The potential for leakage was all the more alarming if the sealed repository was no longer 
being monitored.
“It’s a bigger problem with it sealed than if it’s open.”
“Surely you can’t just lock it away and throw away the key and forget about it. 
Someone’s got to monitor it. ”
People expressed a fear that, without monitoring, the location of the repository would be 
forgotten and that future generations would build housing on contaminated land above the 
site.
“I don’t like to think of loads of these places underground, under housing estates, 
under children’s playgrounds, or whatever. I mean, we’re going to move... and we’re 
going to build in different places. ”
The major concern about the post-closure phase was the question of ‘getting the timing 
right’ -  that is, containing the waste and isolating it from the wider environment long 
enough for the radioactivity to decline to acceptable levels. Participants were worried that 
there would be leaks while the waste was still dangerous and that the leaked radioactivity 
would reach the human environment on the earth’s surface.
“What if it corroded quicker than expected?”
Participants were concerned about whether Nirex knew enough about future geological 
developments to be sure that the radioactivity would be contained.
• What would be the impact of earthquakes?
• Or the shifting of tectonic plates?
• Could the level of the land fall, so that the repository was no longer so deep 
underground after thousands of years?
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• What were the implications of rising sea levels?
• Some of the Carlisle participants, who were familiar with the RCF refusal, were 
concerned about the impact of groundwater and the need for the repository to be 
sited in a suitable geology.
Underlying people’s unease about post-closure was their desire for a ‘full stop’ to the whole 
process. Many people accepted that there was no ‘magic wand’ solution -  and that the 
reality of the waste’s existence could not be simply wished away -  but they continued to 
hope for a 100% guarantee of safety, which phased disposal does not provide.
“They say ‘decrease the risk’, but they should say, ‘There’s no way it’s going to 
happen. ’ It’s not very reassuring, is it?”
This desire for a definitive resolution explains the popularity of partitioning and 
transmutation -  the idea that radioactivity can be reduced or removed (but, again, we 
stress that participants were not actually given any detailed information about P&T).
10.5 Reflections on the dialogue design
Useful material to guide the development of an analytic-deliberative approach to 
performance assessments can be obtained from looking at both the outcomes of the 
dialogue process and the process by which it was developed.
The design stage was a crucial aspect of this study. Initially, experts within Nirex3 and the 
facilitator from the Future Foundation discussed ways in which the science of the Nirex 
Phased Disposal Concept could be presented. We set out to have a lateral discussion 
about how to structure discussion material for this trial in a manner not necessarily 
influenced by how scientific research is managed within Nirex, nor the manner in which 
scientists tend to think of the environmental impacts.
The scientific basis for deep geological disposal is often presented as a set of discrete 
topics. In 2000, Nirex published three separate “Foundation Reports” describing the 
science and engineering basis for deep geological disposal. The “Generic Assessments” 
published by Nirex in 2001 describe the phased disposal concept and its associated risks 
in detail and are similarly divided into three discrete assessments which capture the
a My thanks and acknowledgement to Brendan Breen and Elizabeth Atherton.
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outcome of extensive research programmes managed by three separate departments 
within Nirex (Table 23).
Table 23 Management of technical research within Nirex during 2002
Engineering System design, operational 
safety
Generic Operational 
Assessment
Safety
Packaging and Transport Package design, transport 
safety, packaging advice
Generic Transport 
Assessment
Safety
Science environmental and repository Generic post-closure
evolution performance assessment
With extensive cross-departmental working and integration this is a valid means of 
managing a research budget involving a wide range of different scientific and engineering 
expertise. However, it does not necessarily provide an appropriate structure for 
presentation to non-expert audiences for the following reasons:
• the distinction between science and engineering is not clear and is slightly different for 
different people;
• the distinction between different scientific disciplines is not obvious;
• the public will not necessarily distinguish between the operations of a facility and its
subsequent evolution or impact;
Therefore, it was felt that using the generic assessment structure might not be helpful to the 
discussion of perceived hazards and concerns. It was felt that such an approach could 
both end up leading the consultation exercise and could promote semantic debate about 
definitions. Either of these outcomes would divert precious time away from the aim of the 
consultation work -  to identify perceived hazards and concerns about the phased disposal
concept, regardless of where they would impact the research programme.
Nevertheless, some structure was felt necessary. The Nirex Phased Disposal Concept 
identifies a series of different stages in the life of a repository for the long term 
management of radioactive wastes. These are:
• Transport to a repository site;
• Emplacement of waste in a repository deep underground;
179
• Underground monitored storage with the option of waste retrieval
• Sealing of the repository
• Post-closure period
These occur sequentially and provide a way of structuring thought about the repository 
based on time horizons. Since the long time for which radioactive wastes will be 
hazardous is identified as one of the main difficulties in making decisions about radioactive 
waste management, it was felt that structuring on the basis of time would be a useful way 
of developing discussion guides for the consultation exercise.
10.6 Reviewing the output of the dialogue
The aims of this trial were to test whether people could and would engage in discussion 
about the science of deep geological disposal and consider the impact of this type of 
dialogue for the scientist. Lessons can be learned from this exercise by analysing both the 
output of the consultation and the process of undertaking the consultation.
10.6.1 Is engagement possible?
In order to determine whether people can and will engage with the science of deep 
geological disposal it is useful to consider the output of the consultation process itself. The 
Future Foundation report contained in Appendix F provides a significant amount of analysis 
of the output of the consultation process. In summarising the exercise, the Future 
Foundation concluded that:
“The research exercise for this project was undoubtedly a demanding one: members of the 
public were being asked to read and discuss a considerable amount of printed material on 
a complex issue that they knew nothing about. Nevertheless, we found that people were 
able to engage with the subject matter and expressed considerable interest in the 
information that they had been given. Furthermore, they were able to comprehend the 
broad outline of the phased disposal concept and to articulate their responses to the 
concept and its different phases. ”
Therefore, it seems that people can and will engage with a highly technical issue.
10.6.2 Was the information useful?
The Future Foundation’s report includes a lot of comments that relate to the value of the 
discussion material for the participants. The report states that:
“Many participants commented that there was a limit to the amount of information that they 
felt able to take on board in a single reading. While few claimed to have had trouble
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actually understanding the material, several people said that they would have liked more 
time to absorb what they had read. On the evidence of the discussion that followed, it was 
apparent that participants had indeed followed much of the information -  but also that there 
was plenty that they had not absorbed or had only half-understood. Crucially, it was clear 
that some participants had not picked up all of the key elements of the phased disposal 
concept -  either at the end of having read the prompt material or even at the end of the 
whole discussion. ”
Nevertheless, in the limited time available to them, it seems that the participant absorbed a 
considerable amount of information and were able to contribute significantly to the technical 
debates and discussion about the Nirex Phased Disposal Concept.
10.6.3 What were the issues of concern?
Comparing published statements about key research areas [Nirex 2001] with the list of 
frequently asked questions provided at the end of the report also establishes that the public 
were able to articulate points of technical detail that are very relevant to the research areas 
of expert scientists. I have reproduced the list of frequently asked questions directly from 
the Future Foundation’s report in Box 6. The list is not structured in any way although it 
broadly reflects questions about the different phases of the disposal concept and hence 
broadly relates to ever more distant times into the future.
The issues raised in Box 6 cover an immensely broad range of topics from technical 
question to cultural concerns, management issues and questions about design. Embedded 
within the issues raised in Box 6 are some “showstopping” questions and some trivial 
issues. Determining which are the showstoppers and which are trivial will be a matter of 
perception and cultural perspective. The issues are raised in a very superficial manner and 
many of them would split into a number of subsidiary issues if explored any further. This 
suggests that visual language, with its hierarchical approach to information, offers some 
potential to assist dialogue about the issues.
The public articulation of the issues identified in Box 6 is not necessarily given with the level 
of technical accuracy and precision that experts may have come to expect, and is generally 
not framed in the same way. For example, the focus groups identified a very real concern 
with “getting the timing right, which has been highlighted strongly in the Future 
Foundation report. The translation of this provided by the Future Foundation is that
“People wanted to understand the basis for Nirex’s scientific and technical forecasts. The 
precision of these forecasts was regarded as crucial, given that the success of the concept 
rests on ‘getting the timing right’ -  that is, on containing the waste and isolating it from the 
wider environment long enough for the radioactivity to decline to acceptable levels. ”
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This shows that the focus groups identified and engaged with the crucial issue in the long­
term management of radioactive wastes -  mitigating any potential exposure to radioactivity 
for the very very long timescales for which the wastes can remain radioactive. This concern 
drives the majority of Nirex’s research on environmental and repository evolution and post­
closure risks assessments (technical forecasts).
The Future Foundation report identifies that: “the transportation of radioactive waste was 
probably the largest concern expressed free lf and “Participants also expressed 
considerable unease about the post-ciosure phase". These two stages of the Nirex 
Phased Disposal concept represent the one with the most direct and tangible impact 
(transportation) and the one over which society retains no control (post-closure). These 
concerns influenced a lot of the comments made during consultation and seemed to lead 
people back to one or two central issues such as the sheer quantity of waste in existence 
and the enormous timescales involved.
10.6.4 Was the dialogue appropriate?
There were some indications that the context for the dialogue was not clear to the 
participants. The UK national situation is one of policy review and formulation with no firm 
option being supported by the Government. However, participants were being asked to 
comment on a specific option. Additionally, in the Future Foundation’s reports there are 
some indications of a reaction to being asked for concerns -  as if it meant that the experts 
didn’t know what they were doing.
Participants were unhappy because, as they had already said, they believed that the public 
should be kept informed but that it was inappropriate for the public to be responsible for 
decision-making about the technical management of radioactive waste.
Some participants said that they didn’t want to be given any details, let alone be told about 
the different options. They simply wanted to be given a guarantee of safety, to be told that
the problem had been dealt with. Until they attended the focus group, they hadn’t given any
thought to the issue -  or even been aware that there was an issue -  and now they wanted 
to be given reassurance that they wouldn’t need to worry any further about it.
• “I just want to know that it’s safe. ”
• “If the top scientists in the world agree that the best thing is to put it 5 miles
underground, then put it 10 miles underground...Be doubly safe.”
• “Explaining it raises doubts in people’s minds. ”
• “The more you make an issue out o f  it, the more people are going to be worried. ”
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10.6.5 What could help in the future?
The Future Foundation commented that the discussion moved back and forth over certain 
issues to an “unusual degree”. They state that:
“This curious fluctuation in the discussion suggests that many participants had only a 
tentative grasp on the information that they had been given, due to the complexity of the 
issues involved and the short length of time they were given to absorb the material. By 
moving onto the more detailed, complex issue of phased disposal, we were taking people 
further and further away from solid ground. After all, they had only been introduced to the 
general topic of radioactive waste on the previous evening and had not had any opportunity 
to consolidate their basic understanding before moving on to a discussion of the phased 
disposal concept”
This suggests that there should be limitations to expectations about public engagement 
with technical detail. The Future Foundation conclude that:
“People need the ‘building blocks’ of knowledge about the general issues of radioactive 
waste before they can move on to discuss a more detailed, complex topic such as the 
phased disposal concept."
However, many participants took confidence from the material that was presented. The 
Future Foundation report that:
“Many people were reassured by what they read about phased disposal. The level of detail 
-  especially in the information about the individual phases -  reassured them that the 
experts were giving serious thought to the matter.
This is encouraging since it suggests the participant were recognising the complexity of the 
issue being addressed and allowing that a lot of expertise was being applied to the issue. 
In the Nirex 95 performance assessment which formed the basis for the discussion of 
science at the RCF Public Inquiry, the emphasis of the scientific material is on risks -  
elimination, mitigation and identification. So although there can have been little doubt about 
the level of scientific effort being put into the issue, it is not surprising that the message 
communicated at the Public Inquiry was one of uncertainty and lack of knowledge.
So the choices made about the style of the discussion material seemed to be effective in 
enabling debate.
10.6.6 Implications for the scientist
A number of lessons about developing scientific material for consultation purposes can be 
learned from process of conducting this trial and its output. These are outlined below.
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The public will not necessarily engage with a scientific subject in the manner with which the 
scientists approaches the same subject. This has already been highlighted in Chapter 8. 
The scientists needs to understand this, and be prepared to work with a different 
articulation of issues than that which may arise from peer group. It does not necessarily 
mean that the insights from public consultation are less valid.
Culture and mindset will influence the manner in which any individual presents information 
for dialogue and may give an impression markedly different to the one desired. This 
happened twice during the development of the discussion material for this consultation 
exercise.
The first occurrence was when the facilitator was developing a consultation guide, as 
agreed, on the stages of the phased disposal concept. The first draft of the guide ended at 
repository closure. On reflection, this is a natural enough conclusion for the non-expert to 
make. However, one of the most difficult areas of scientific research into deep geological 
disposal is into what will happen post closure. The importance of this stage had obviously 
not been conveyed to the facilitator, despite the fact that it is fundamental to any 
consideration of environmental hazards from the Phased Disposal Concept.
The second occurrence where my mindset and culture was a barrier to communication was 
when the facilitator sought to rectify the omission of the post-closure stage in his 
consultation guide. Having been referred (by me) to a recent publication on post-closure 
behaviour (which I co-authored) he identified that what Nirex was concerned about post 
closure was finding the best route for radionuclides to return to the surface environment. 
This is almost diametrically opposed to what we are trying to do -  which is to contain the 
radionuclides under the ground for as long as possible. However, because the focus of the 
Nirex scientific work is on researching what could go wrong, we can forget to discuss the 
conceptual reasons for disposal deep under the ground. This mindset clearly affected the 
manner in which I conveyed information about the post-closure stage of the Nirex Phased 
Disposal Concept to the facilitator.
The key point from this experience was that I had to iterate with the facilitator in order to 
develop a shared understanding of the information we wished to provide to the discussion 
groups. As a result of this iteration, we both learned and were able to shift our respective 
positions to develop information that was hopefully more relevant and appropriate to the 
intended audience. The opportunity for this iteration therefore influenced the success of the
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subsequent dialogue. I had to learn to see this iteration as necessary and valuable, rather 
than as a failure on my part to communicate “my” science.
Another lesson to be learned from the consultation exercise, was that the public want 
experts to be authoritative. The Future Foundation report a degree of reluctance to express 
an opinion. This is, in itself a barrier to dialogue which cannot be addressed by considering 
more conceptual presentations of an environmental issue. The Future Foundation record 
that:
“Participants argued that they lacked the scientific knowledge to form a valid opinion -  and, 
realistically, they would never acquire the levels of expertise possessed by scientists who 
deal with the issue on a daily basis. They had no means to assess the scientific and 
technical bases to the phased disposal concept”.
Furthermore, some participants argued that the little knowledge they did have (and which 
they based their opinions on) was derived solely from the introductory material that they 
had been given to read. They had no way of knowing how accurate or exhaustive this 
information was -  and, therefore, they had no way of knowing whether or not their opinions 
were rooted in solid facts and sound arguments.
This finding reflects conclusions within the academic literature [Pette and Leach, 2000] that 
public consultation benefits from the provision of expert information from many different 
sources. In the case of this consultation exercise, the discussion material provided was 
developed linearly on the basis of the sequential stages of the phased disposal concept. It 
was produced by Nirex experts and contained no discussion of alternative viewpoints. No 
alternative opinion was provided to the consultation process and this clearly affected the 
contributions made by the participant.
This suggests that the provision of material from a single source is not sufficient to 
overcome the problem of institutional trust.
10.6.7 Can people, and do they want to engage with scientists in building knowledge 
about environmental hazards?
The work described above indicates that the public are capable of engaging with the 
concept of deep geological disposal at a “scientific” level. The format used -  two sessions 
of two hours long was not as long as other forms of consultation such as citizens panels or 
public meetings. Nevertheless, the participants were able to assimilate a large amount of 
knowledge and respond with astute and relevant questions.
The results of the consultation and the questions asked during the consultation 
demonstrated an interest in the topic and an agreement of its significance and importance.
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Whilst some concern about why scientists were consulting with the public was expressed, 
this seemed to be more motivated by the lack of context provided and a mistrust of Nirex, 
rather than science.
Similarly, review and discussion of the presentational material generated a lot of comments 
that indicated a raising of interest levels and a heightened awareness of scientific concepts 
influencing the role of the geosphere in deep geological disposal. Indeed, the review gave 
rise to a number of valid challenges to the scientific mindset. Sometimes the opposite 
impression to that intended was given. The fact that this was identified and discussed is 
evidence that engagement and dialogue was being achieved.
However, the results of the consultation give strong indications that the public will not 
necessarily respond in the manner expected by the scientists or by those preparing briefing 
material. At the very least, the level of understanding of science will vary dramatically. The 
expert could choose to view the frequently asked questions recorded by the facilitator could 
be regarded as naive. Unless scientists manage their expectations, it is possible that the 
knowledge that could be gained from public consultation may not be fully appreciated.
10.7 Conclusions for this thesis
An impressive aspect of the consultation was the speed with which, once the engagement 
had begun, the participants got to the really key (and tricky) issues associated with 
radioactive waste management. Whilst they were not articulated in the manner used by the 
decision-makers and technical experts, the participants targeted similar points to those 
being raised by the experts. Many of these points, for example, the way the industry is 
organised, the behaviour of the industry, the agendas of the key players and the need for 
openness are reflected in current UK thinking about developing a future policy.
The findings of this study, on the very specific topic of deep geological disposal, supports 
the general literature discussed earlier. There is interest in the topic of radioactive waste 
management, stakeholders and public constituents can engage with it and make sense of 
even highly technical issues but the opportunities to do so need to be created. The 
question is, how can this interest be stimulated and engaged in the knowledge building 
processes adopted by scientists?
The facilitator recorded that the consultation exercise was undeniably demanding on the 
participant since they were expected to “read and discuss a considerable amount of printed 
material on a complex issue that they knew nothing about'. Nevertheless, a considerable 
amount of simplification went into preparing the discussion material for the consultation 
exercise -  and this was by scientists and engineers committed to making their work
186
transparent and open to wide discussion. So there are very different definitions of what 
constitutes scientific complexity between those trying to convey the science of deep 
disposal and those seeking to engage with it.
This difference is also evidenced by the review of what experts and non-experts think about 
performance assessment -  work undertaken by the French as a contribution to the 
RISCOM project [EDF 2001]. It was noted earlier that, based on an analysis of value 
judgements, the focus of attention for experts was at a completely different level than 
those which were the focus for non-experts. In essence, different epistemic communities 
have very different frames for viewing the scientific underpinnings of deep geological 
disposal, depending on culture and training.
This conclusion suggests that the idea of engaging the public by seeking to improve the 
communication and presentation of performance assessment as defined by the experts has 
limited application in improving the engagement of, and dialogue with non-experts. Hence 
the focus of this research used two of the highlighted issues to come out of the dialogue 
work for further investigation. These were the issue of the long timescales involved (how 
do you get the timing right?) and the interest in what happened under the ground when the 
repository was no longer under any form of human control.
A key finding from the study was the dawning awareness of the issues raised by the long 
term nature of the problem of radioactive wastes was also significant, particularly when 
coupled with the alarm that this began to raise in people’ minds. It suggests that it is 
possible to ask people to engage with the longer term post closure performance issues. 
However, in doing so it would be very easy to undermine confidence in the concept of deep 
geological disposal before any meaningful dialogue had taken place. This appears to be a 
matter of risk communication which is worth some attention. In response to this finding, 
Chapter 11 examines new ways of communicating the results from analyses designed to 
assess the environmental risks once a repository has been closed.
This dialogue process indicates that stakeholder engagement will not necessarily conform 
to the expectations of experts. The issues of concern, the linking up of issues and the 
manner of discussion were a surprise to the experts. The desire for material from a range 
of sources has also been highlighted. In Chapter 12, new ways of presenting the scientific 
basis for deep geological disposal, in order to build knowledge about risks is presented and 
tested. And finally, Chapter 13 draws together all these studies an offers a revised 
methodology for the assessment of risks associated with deep geological disposal based 
on scientific analysis and stakeholder consultation.
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Box 7: Technical questions that people would like answered
Why does Nirex use stainless steel for its containers? Isn’t lead a more effective means to 
contain radioactivity? Isn’t titanium more resilient and longer lasting?
Aren’t the walls of the 500 litre drum too thin? Wouldn’t they be easily damaged or pierced? 
Hasn’t Nirex thought about making the walls thicker?
Is cement effective as waste packaging and backfill? Is Nirex proposing to use normal 
cement from the local hardware store?
Why has Nirex chosen 4 cubic metres as the size for a box? And why a 500 litre drum? 
Why not use a bigger container -  or smaller?
Why can’t you just keep on repackaging the waste?
Why would you ever need to repackage the waste? Why not get the packaging right in the 
first place?
How do you put waste into a container without contaminating the outside of the container? 
Does conditioning produce more waste?
Can I stand safely next to a container?
Is anyone else testing and monitoring Nirex’s specifications?
Do Nirex staff visit the waste producer sites? Does they take the waste packages away and 
test them at Nirex’s laboratories?
Why do the waste packages need to be placed inside transport containers? Does this 
mean that the packages aren’t adequate?
Would a lorry carrying radioactive waste be given a police escort? Would the vehicle be 
marked or unmarked?
Has a test crash been conducted on a transport container with actual waste inside? Is it 
possible that the impact of a crash would trigger some kind of reaction or explosion in the 
waste?
Would transport containers be able to withstand a fire generated by aviation fuel?
Why do the waste packages need to be taken out of the transport containers on arrival at 
the repository? If the containers afford an extra level of containment and protection, then 
why remove them?
If the waste packages are safe, then why do workers need to be protected by shielded 
bays?
If the packaging is effective in containing the radioactivity, then why would there be any 
need to monitor contamination of the rail tunnel and vertical shaft?
Is it more dangerous to have the waste distributed at different sites or to stockpile the waste 
in a single location? Does putting all the waste together increase the risk of an accident or 
explosion?
Has an underground repository already been built? If yes, then why isn’t it already being 
used? Is there a technical reason for needing to keep the waste packages on the surface 
for a few more decades?
Where will the repository/repositories be built?
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How will you dig a hole big enough for a repository? Won’t the earth on top of the repository 
be looser than before (because you’ve dug it up)? And won’t that affect the ability of the 
geology to contain the waste?
Has anyone ever built anything this far down? On this scale?
What is the capacity of the repository?
How many vaults are there going to be?
How quickly will the vaults be filled up?
What will be done with the additional waste that is generated in the future? (Based on an 
assumption that the proposed repository would only accommodate the waste that is 
currently in existence.)
Is the repository a fixed size? Or can it be expanded to accommodate additional waste? 
How many repositories need to be built?
Won’t the weight of all the overlying rock crush the vaults and the containers?
Will it be possible to close the repository immediately in an emergency situation?
What would happen if there was a spillage in the contaminated areas? How would it be 
dealt with?
What would happen if the overhead crane malfunctioned? How would it be retrieved and 
repaired?
How would the waste packages be monitored? Would monitors be fitted on the inside or 
the outside of each container? If there was a leakage, would the monitors remain intact or 
would they be damaged by the radioactive materials?
What are the ‘acceptable levels’ of radiation that workers would be exposed to? What does 
acceptable’ mean?
How do you decontaminate things?
What happens to the water that is used to decontaminate things? Does it wash away into 
the wider environment?
Are you going to have a drift tunnel or a vertical shaft -  or both? Why can’t you decide 
which is best?
Will you backfill everything (ladders, rooms, etc) -  or just the vaults containing the waste 
packages?
Would it be possible to retrieve the waste packages from the backfill?
Can the repository be accessed after closure? Is anything ever really sealed and closed?
Have you got enough cement to carry out all the necessary backfilling and the sealing of 
the repository?
What would be the impact of earthquakes on the repository and the waste?
Or the impact of shifting tectonic plates?
Could the level of the land fall, so that the repository was no longer so deep underground 
after thousands of years?
What are the implications of rising sea levels?
How do scientists know how long a material will remain radioactive?
Given that waste has only been generated for a few decades, how are scientists able to 
predict the waste’s behaviour over the course of hundreds and thousands of years?_______
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How do scientists know how the materials of the barriers (for instance, the stainless steel 
canisters, the backfill cement) will interact with the radioactive waste over the very long 
term?
How can scientists be sure that the materials won’t behave differently once they’re placed 
at deep levels?
Once the repository has been closed, how will people know if there has been a leakage?
Are you expecting that waste will eventually leak out of the containers?
Is rock effective at stopping the spread of a leakage? How long does it take for radioactivity 
to travel through rock?
If there’s a leak underground, does the radiation go up or does it go sideways?
How do you limit the spread of a leakage into the surrounding geology once it has started? 
What would be the impact if the radiation did leak to the surface?
What impact will groundwater have on the vaults and containers?
If you dropped a bomb on a storage facility, would there be a nuclear explosion?
Can you make a bomb from the waste? Can containers be turned into weapons?
If there was an explosion or leakage, how far away would people need to be to be safe? 
What is going to be done with high level waste?
What are the precise timescales for each phase?
Would the repository take in other country’s waste? Or are we just dealing with UK waste? 
What are other countries doing with their waste?
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11 CONVEYING PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF TIME AND EVOLUTION
11.1 Introduction
The dialogue presented in the preceding chapter identified the long timescales and the lack of 
human control as issues for non-expert stakeholders. Previous work has highlighted the 
importance of style in the presentation of information into dialogue. In this chapter the possibilities 
for making the timescales and output of the performance assessment more comprehensible are 
considered. A critical issue under investigation here is whether the performance of a potential 
repository can be made more accessible to wider audiences without compromising its ability to 
meet the requirements of the regulator. In part, this is looking at the notion that demonstrating 
compliance with quantitative regulatory criteria have been allowed to overshadow more qualitative 
indicators of performance and that this has moved the performance assessment outside the realm 
of interest to the wider stakeholder community. The work was undertaken primarily in discussion 
with performance assessment specialists.
Regulatory criteria tend to focus on doses or risks. However, over the past decade, the regulators 
have made significant efforts to increase emphasis in regulatory guidance on qualitative measures 
of performance [EA, 1997]. This has had the effect of shifting the debate about performance a 
little and encouraging scientific debate on the effectiveness of each of the engineered and natural 
barriers.
This means that it is appropriate for a performance assessment to consider both the manner in 
which each barrier contributes to safety and the extent to which they are likely to perform. The 
results need presentation in close association with a discussion of the underlying scientific 
reasoning. In particular, discussions of barrier efficiency should refer directly to key experiments 
and natural evidence and openly debate the uncertainties. This is increasingly being recognised 
and reflected in more recent assessments of performance [NEA, 1997, Nirex, 2001f]and also in 
regulatory guidance documentation [EA, 1997],
11.1.1 Aims
The aim of this work was to explore ways of making the scientific knowledge about the long term 
evolution of the repository more transparent by considering how to represent performance in a 
meaningful way.
Nirex assesses the risks from radioactive waste management facilities in a number of ways. As 
discussed in Chapter 8, “post-closure” performance assessments evaluate the possibility of 
environmental contamination once a repository is no longer being managed by humans. These 
assessments primarily aim to represent the behaviour of a radioactive waste management system
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for millions of years into the future. They therefore seek to capture and quantify complex science 
and uncertainty. Methods for assessing performance have been developing over the past twenty 
years [NEA, 1997] as a result of increasingly sophisticated analytical methods and developing 
experience in setting environmental standards. Earlier chapters raise the question whether 
greater focus on conceptual understanding could help dialogue about risks with both regulatory 
and non-regulatory audiences. The work on visual language presented earlier is one way of 
raising the profile of conceptual knowledge. Another is to consider how to represent conceptually 
the information coming out of the risk models.
11.1.2 Approach
The work included reviews of current trends in the communication of complex information, not 
solely in the nuclear industry. Additionally, feedback on different presentations of results was 
sought, from both scientific and non-scientific audiences. The application of these studies to the 
presentation of performance assessment was considered, in order to identify potential 
developments for future assessments.
11.2 Envisioning information
The output of a post-closure performance assessment is typically shown graphically as the 
variation in “expectation value of risk” over a million years. Furthermore, the variation in risks 
associated with individual radionuclides is commonly given as well, often on the same plot. 
Wrapped up in this single representation of risk is a plethora of complexity in terms of possible 
futures, important features events and processes, knowledge and lack of knowledge about data -  
all the information identified in Chapter 8 that has been translated via the risk analysis into a 
calculation of risk.
In his book “The visual display of quantitative information”[ Tufte, 1983], Edward Tufte explores the 
way in which graphical representations can either encourage or discourage reasoning. He 
concludes that
“What is to be sought in designs for the display of information is the clear portrayal of complexity. 
Not the complication of the simple: rather the task if the designer is to give visual access to the 
subtle and the difficult —that is,
the revelation of the complex,.”
Tufte has worked extensively in the area of how to design graphics to convey understanding and 
he identifies six principles to be followed [Tufte, 1997]:
• The representation of numbers, as physically measured on the surface of the graphic itself, 
should be directly proportional to the numerical quantities represented
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• Clear, detailed and thorough labelling should be used to defeat graphical distortion and 
ambiguity
• Show data variation, not design variation
• In time-series displays, deflated and standardized units of monetary measurements are nearly 
always better than nominal units
• The number of information carrying dimensions depicted should not exceed the number of 
dimensions in the data
• Graphics must not quote data out of context.
A typical representation of risk from a post-closure performance assessment does not conform to 
a number of these principles. In particular, to accommodate the long timescales involved, 
logarithmic scales are used with exponential labelling. Key events, such as the changing role of 
the engineered and natural barriers in containing radionuclides are not shown at all on a typical 
risk/time curve.
So in terms of conveying performance, existing post-closure performance assessments focus very 
significantly on a single, lumped representation in which a number of complexities are bundled 
together to represent repository performance over very long timescales into the future. This brings 
its own difficulties in terms of envisioning results. Conceptually, this form of presentation does not 
begin to give an idea of how the repository may evolve over time.
However, presenting the safety concept and the conceptual understanding underlying the post­
closure performance assessment in a manner which is accessible to a wide range of audiences 
therefore requires careful thought. “Information overload” is a common complaint for many issues 
where complex ideas need to be conveyed to a wide range of audiences. However, it has been 
suggested that problems with information overload are less a function of the volume of information 
han the gap between the compiled information and the audience’s ability to make sense of it 
Horne, 1998]. Recent advances in techniques for mapping ideas and combining visual and verbal 
skills could be applied for the presentation of performance assessments. Such skills are in 
common usage in journalism, advertising and the design of hands-on dynamic computer displays 
md are increasingly being applied to the presentation of scientific data [Tufte, 1983]. The power 
ind accessibility of the conceptual basis of a performance assessment could be enhanced if it was 
iraphically presented using some of the novel ways of combining ideas and visual images.
)ne of the problems with communicating concepts about the long term evolution of the disposal 
oncept is the complex interaction of events and processes which could possibly affect it. A 
omprehensive scientific description of all these possible events, the permutations resulting from 
neir interactions, and associated uncertainty could give rise to a rather indigestible treatise which 
/ould do very little to contribute to debate and dialogue. Those reading it would probably be
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considered to be experts, and the ensuing dialogue would be over the areas of the conceptual 
presentation with which they disagreed. It is uncommon for experts to identify areas of agreement 
when engaged in scientific debate. Other interested parties hearing the debate receive a 
reinforced sense that the “experts” cannot agree over the disposal concept. Therefore it becomes 
easy to mistrust claims of safety or expressions of confidence by scientific experts.
However, techniques for mapping debates are being developed [Horne, 1998]. In the preceding 
chapter, the concept of “visual language” is used to capture the essence of the safety concept and 
the areas of ongoing scientific debate (representing areas of scientific uncertainty). The 
hierarchical presentation of this information seeks to enable audiences with different levels of 
expertise to consider the conceptual understanding and associated levels of uncertainty in a 
manner appropriate to their level of interest.
In this chapter, the emphasis is on conveying the results of a risk analysis in a descriptive manner 
aimed at responding to the more qualitative aspects of environmental standards and regulations 
for the disposal of radioactive wastes [EA, 1997]. The work focusses on two aspects:
• Presenting the time dependency of the results with much more clarity; and
• Conveying repository performance without resorting to risk results
Earth science can assist in both these areas. The historical timescales of interest to the earth 
scientist are on a par with the future timescales of interest in a post-closure performance 
assessment. Additionally, the descriptions of environmental processes and multiple evolution 
hypotheses provide the foundations of earth science analysis as well as the basis on which to 
describe future repository performance.
11.3 Presenting results for long timescales into the future
Traditionally, the results from Nirex post-closure performance assessments have been presented 
in terms of graphs showing how calculated radiological risk varies with time. It is often difficult to 
gain an appreciation of the timescales under consideration since they extend for millions of years 
into the future. The presentation of risk/time graphs makes very little concession to non-scientists 
or to the fact that factors affecting the perception of risks from a repository will be different in 
different timeframes. In particular:
• the function of the different components of the repository system will change
• the validity of different indicators of performance will change over time
• the relative value of quantitative risk modelling and qualitative arguments will change
• the level of concern (about different timeframes into the future) felt by stakeholders will vary.
The presentation of results therefore needs to give some meaning to the timescales under 
discussion and also recognise the need for assistance in understanding the terms used in a
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graphical representation of risk. Such presentations may have a significant impact in terms of 
promoting dialogue.
11.3.1 Representing time
The very long timescales considered in a post-closure performance assessment are difficult to 
assimilate. In past assessments, most attention has been focussed on times in excess of 
thousands or tens of thousands of years into the future. There are large uncertainties inherent in 
making assessments over this timescale. In addition, it is very difficult to convey the magnitude of 
the timescales involved to the general public. Continuous risk against time plots do not present 
results in a manner which addresses either of these points because:
• the line indicating expectation value of risk tends to be taken as indicating a best estimate 
prediction of risk;
• especially on a log scale, it is not possible to meaningfully convey temporal yardsticks such as 
time since civilisation started;
• it is not scientifically justifiable to seek to match predictions to observations for specific times in 
the future, given the small amount of information upon which such predictions are based and 
the uncertainty in this information;
• the cursory impression created by a continuous risk plot can vary significantly depending on 
the choice of scale.
To illustrate this point, Figure 25 shows the same data from the generic post closure performance 
assessment [Nirex, 2001 f] (how the risk from the proposed repository changes into the future) 
plotted against three different time axes. Each representation reflects a different stylisation of the 
same data and the impression given by each graph is very different. Since the stylisation and the 
manner in which the data are represented are design choices they are subjective. The question is 
therefore whether the design choices are equally legitimate. If not, then the legitimacy of any 
stylistic representation of a more complex dataset can ever be legitimate.
Good communication practice might suggest that time be plotted on a linear, rather than 
logorithmic scale (see plots b and c in Figure 25). However, in comparison with plot a, does it help 
to give the impression that high risks arise early in the time period under consideration (plot b) or 
that the risks are still rising at the end of the time period under considerations (plot c)? Partly this 
problem arises because the plots all relate to a single time-period (100 million years for plots a and 
b and 10,000 years for plot c).
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Figure 25: Risk variations with time plotted on different time axes
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Another problem with the plots illustrated in Figure 25 is that the risks are plotted on a logarithmic 
scale and use numbers that are relatively meaningless. Partly this is because a single parameter 
(risk) is being defined to cover a tremendous period of time, and the root causes of the risks in 
different timeframes will vary. The plots therefore end up capturing a multitude of issues in a 
single parameter which. Of necessity, this parameter becomes fairly coarse, particularly when the 
myriad sources of uncertainty are taken into account, as discussed in Chapter 8.
Breaking time down into several periods may help overcome some of the design issues raised by 
seeking to represent the variation of one parameter over a single timeframe. Therefore, other 
presentations that explicitly seek to provide a meaningful representation of time have been 
suggested. For example, risk estimates for particular time frames (e.g. 1 to 100 years, 100 to 1000
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years etc) would enable differentiation between different timeframes for which different processes 
may be significant or for which there are different levels of concern. The main events in these 
identified timeframes could be indicated (perhaps pictorially) to give further perspective, possibly 
with an indication of what was happening in the past on the same timeframe. This idea is taken 
further in Chapter 13.
Figure 26 illustrates a historical perspective, (primarily from anthropological history) juxtaposed 
against a schematic illustration of potential risks. Obviously Earth scientists could provide 
additional perspectives and illustrations of geological history and it is this familiarity with the 
timescales of interest that enable Earth scientists to bring a special understanding to the result of 
risk calculations for the far future.
Remembering the importance of design choices, Figure 26 contravenes many ideas of best 
practice in scientific communication. For example, it uses a logarithmic scale and talks about dose 
as an undefined measure. Some work would be required to modify Figure 26 so that it conforms 
to design ideals, and more (possibly contradictory) work would be required to represent dates and 
uncertainty precisely. The question needs to be asked whether it is more important to resolve 
these potential conflicts and do more work, or whether a diagram such as Figure 26 should be got 
into the dialogue process “warts and all” at the earliest opportunity.
Figure 26: Relationship of timeframes to past events -  a pathway through time
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If the motivation for Figure 26 is
• to convey expertise, then it needs to be precise and accurate;
• to communicate, then it should be pleasing and representational;
• to promote dialogue then it needs to find a balance between the two and needs to be made 
available to the dialogue participants.
An alternative technique would be the use of time series visualisations to describe the evolution of
the repository. Different visualisations could be used to indicate different aspects of the repository
system at different scales. It is suggested that such visual storyboards should be constructed at 
the waste package, repository vault and geological scales showing both the evolution of the 
system and of radionuclide migration. Examples of different storyboards on different scales are 
given in Figures 27, 28 and 29. Although such techniques have been used in scientific reports, in 
the past they have not often been adopted within a performance assessment report itself.
Figure 27: Visual storyboard of canister evolution
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Figure 28: Visual storyboard of a canister plume
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Figure 29: Repository vault evolution illustration
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(a) Over hundreds of years
During this period, repository
evolution would be characterised by:
• resaturation with inflowing 
groundwater;
• consumption of trapped oxygen 
by aerobic corrosion;
• conditioning of cement pore 
watertoahighpH;
• a high degree of physical 
containment of radionuclides;
• gas generation from corrosion of 
wastes, containers and the 
microbial degradation of organic 
materials.
(b) Over thousands of years
During this period, repository
evolution would be characterised by:
• the equilibration of repository 
pore water to high pH and 
reducing conditions (low Eh);
• the continued slow anaerobic 
corrosion of the steel containers 
(releasing gas and leading to 
penetration);
• physical and mineralogical 
changes to the cementitious 
backfill;
• the continuing radioactive decay 
(including ingrowth) of the initial 
inventory.
(c) Up to one million years
During this period, repository
evolution would be characterised by:
• the maintenance of long-term 
chem ical cond ition ing  of 
repository pore water;
• slow mineralisation processes 
preventing the migration of 
residual activity;
• the cont inued decay of 
radionuclides.
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11.3.2 Presenting risk results
To investigate how easy it is to understand the graphs that are typically used to present the risks 
calculated by a post closure performance assessment, 10 non-technical staff at Nirex were asked 
for comments. Various graphs were presented to the participants, who included non-scientists. In 
most cases, the axes of the graphs have logarithmic scales and span a very large timescale. 
Examples are shown in Figure 30(a and b).
Figure 30: Typical presentation of results calculated in the Generic Performance
Assessment [Nirex, 2001f].
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b. Radioactivity levels arising from the presence of chlorine-36 in repository groundwater
As a result of feedback from the review participants, it is suggested that the presentation could be 
improved for non-scientists in several ways:
• by not using scientific notation
• when talking about risk, by saying 1 in a million, ( rather than 1E-6 or 0.000001)
• by trying not to use ‘technical’ definitions
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• by writing the names of radionuclides, not their symbols
• by keeping information on one graph succinct
• by using linear plots and highlighting early times.
Implementing these suggestions would develop the graphs into those shown in Figure 31. (a and b 
are plotted on different scales). During the meetings people said that these graphs were easier to 
understand and clearer.
Figure 31: Average annual individual risk from the repository as calculated in the
Generic Performance Assessment [Nirex, 2001f], presented on a linear timescale 
with descriptive labels.
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results in context whilst appreciating a bigger picture was expressed. Suggestions for achieving 
this included:
Make sure that key issues are covered in the text surrounding the graph and that technical terms 
are explained carefully. Assumptions need to be stated clearly and uncertainty in the models and 
the data should be explained or reflected in the graphs. This is especially true over long time 
scales.
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• Try to use measurements and scales that people understand or can relate to. This will be 
audience specific and may require some preparation in terms of understanding the 
stakeholder’s perspectives and values.
• Try to relate the timescales to dates in the past and the future, to give people some context.
• Too much information can be confusing.
• If levels of radiation from the repository are to be compared to levels in nature, the context of 
the natural levels needs to be explained. Average UK values would be useful. This also needs 
to be related to how dangerous the levels are to people.
• It is important to emphasise that people are already living in a radioactive environment and that 
the area around the repository contains natural radiation. Then people can see how much 
radiation the repository is adding to what is already there. However, recent has indicated that 
a comparison between natural and man-made radioactivity is often rejected by the public, so 
this point should not be overemphasised.
• People want to understand the chain of events and how things change over time.
• People would like pictorial representations of the information and ‘story board’ information.
• As people like or dislike different presentations (they may prefer pie charts to histograms) it will 
not be possible to please everyone. The important issue is using a range of techniques to 
present information in a clear way. A reference work on information graphics has recently been 
published [Horne, 1998], which should prove useful in this context.
A further useful perspective is provided by comparing the results with those from earlier
assessments by Nirex and by overseas organisation. For example, Figure 32 presents such a
comparison that was included in the recent JNC H12 assessment [JNC, 2000b].
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Figure 32: Comparison of radiological dose calculated in various performance
assessments.
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A direct comparison between the different performance assessments is not meaningful since they 
are for different inventories of radioactive waste and adopt different repository systems in different 
environments. However, such a comparison helps to establish the timescales of concern in 
different countries and also invites consideration of the differences in terms of different 
assumptions about the repository system. It thus focusses attention on the underlying basis of the 
performance assessment.
11.3.3 Implications
There are a number of competing themes here. A balance has to be achieved between simplifying 
technical descriptions, so that they are understandable to non-technical audiences, while retaining 
technical accuracy. Also, there is a desire for results to be presented in context with more 
background information, and yet to reduce the amount of information contained in graphical 
presentations of results. The results have to be comprehensive and accurate, but they also need 
to convey large amounts of information in a comprehensible manner. Some representations are 
good for some people, others are good for others. All this implies the need for a toolkit of 
presentational methods that can be applied in an audience-specific way. Specifically, there is 
benefit in adopting much wider use of:
• relevant and understandable yardsticks;
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• high quality schematic diagrams for explaining key processes and the flow of information and 
models from measurements to assessment;
• making greater use of presenting consequences in specific time frames (rather than as 
continuous functions of time);
• visual storyboards to illustrate the evolution of the repository system at different scales.
However, different audiences are responsive to different presentational styles and different issues. 
The need to “ know your audience” remains valid, particularly if seeking to engage in dialogue and 
debate. Research into audience requirements could help develop a range of presentations of 
similar information. The compilation of this information into a performance assessment therefore 
has the potential to become unwieldy. This suggests that a central core of information is valuable 
within the performance assessment, with the flexibility to adapt presentational styles for different 
audiences. Once again, hierarchical documentation could be a way of addressing this issue.
Assumptions about future human behaviour become progressively harder to justify as one moves 
further into the future. In consequence, there is increasing consideration being given to additional 
means of indicating levels of safety and building confidence in repository performance. These are 
considered below.
11.4 Conveying repository performance
Much of the above discussion emphasises the importance of a meaningful context for the 
presentation of results. Increasingly attention is being focussed on the use of multiple lines of 
reasoning to reflect repository performance over long timescales. In terms of complying with 
regulations, both qualitative and illustrative demonstrations of safety have their place, as well as 
consideration of a wide range of quantitative safety indicators to provide alternative perspectives 
and supporting arguments [IAEA, 1994]. Examples of safety demonstrations include comparisons 
with natural analogues [Knight, 1998] and the creation of demonstration facilities [SKB, 1996]. 
Recent international guidelines indicate that greater consideration should be given to the 
protection of the natural environment itself [IAEA, 1999]. This chapter discusses ways of providing 
additional context by considering both alternative presentations that emphasise barrier 
performance and alternative lines of evidence.
11.4.1 Emphasising barrier performance
Since the multibarrier concept relies on various barriers to radionuclide migration, stakeholder 
confidence in performance assessment is likely to centre on indicators of how well the barriers are 
likely to perform. In consequence, the presentation of results in terms of the performance of these 
barriers is increasing [USDoE, 2000]. Figure 33 indicates an alternative representation of the 
results of the Generic post closure Performance Assessment. Although this does not directly
205
equate to risk to an individual at long timescales it does convey the idea of the near field providing 
containment for some long time into the future. Once again, there may be a need to trade off 
comprehensiveness in the visual presentation of results in order to make key points and achieve 
comprehension. Amongst the non-scientific review groups, this presentation was well received.
Figure 33: Accumulated radioactivity levels from iodine-129 in the repository, the
geosphere and the biosphere at different times (after [Nirex, 2001 f])
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Representations of the amount of radioactivity (flux) passing through the barriers of the multibarrier 
containment system is also a useful indicator of barrier performance. Such fluxes are calculated 
as part of the process of calculating radiological risk. However, in the past they have not been 
emphasised in the presentation of the performance assessment.
An indicator of barrier performance that relates directly to timescale is the consideration of 
radiotoxicity indices. These indices use the inherent hazard presented by radioactive waste as a 
safety measure, typically considering the time needed before the hazard presented by the waste 
declines to that of natural uranium ore. Radiotoxicity indices show how the hazard declines with 
time (due to radioactive decay), and are qualitative indicators of the time scales of interest for 
safety analysis.
As discussed earlier, the roles of the barriers change over time. Figure 34 indicates the different 
roles played by the geological barrier over the timescales of relevance. This point is not always 
clearly drawn out in performance assessments focusing on radiological risk as an end point.
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Figure 34: The role of the geological barrier with time
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11.4.2 Considering radiological impact on the surface environment
The performance assessment calculates the amount of radioactivity emerging into the accessible 
environment (the biosphere) as part of the process of calculating radiological risk. This information 
can be presented in the form of:
• fluxes in the biosphere;
• environmental concentrations.
Given such a presentation, additional context can be provided by comparing assessed results with 
naturally occurring radioactivity in the environment. Such comparisons allow an estimation of the 
radiological impact on the environment resulting from the presence of a repository. Although there 
is some evidence that the public do not feel that comparisons between natural and man-made 
radioactivity are valid, they do provide context for discussion and are valid for discussions of 
environmental impact.
Recent work [Miller, 2000] has used the distributions of naturally-occurring chemical species as a 
datum against which repository releases can be compared and assessed. The fluxes derived as 
part of the calculation of radiological risk in-the performance assessment were used. Context was 
provided by comparing these results with naturally occurring elemental and nuclide concentrations 
and fluxes for four geological environments in the UK:
• the Carnmenellis Granite in Cornwall;
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• the chalk aquifer of the London Basin;
• the thermal springs of Bath;
• the Oxford Clay.
These environments were partly chosen because they are geologically diverse and, therefore, 
provide some estimation of the potential variation in natural fluxes across the country. Additional 
context was provided by identifying “screening” concentrations: maximum permissible 
concentrations based on health considerations, such as drinking water standards or other 
toxicological information. Figures 35, 36 and 37 give examples of the results calculated by the 
performance assessment (indicated as Well(GPA) on Figures 35 and 36) and their comparison 
with naturally occurring radioactivity levels and a “screening level” advised by the World Health 
Orgnisations which indicates the level not to be exceeded in potable water.
Figure 35: Comparison of calculated and naturally occurring uranium
concentrations in groundwater
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Figure 37: Comparison of calculated and naturally occurring radioactivity levels.
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There is still a lot of scientific debate about the validity of such comparisons and the level to which 
conclusions regarding repository safety can be drawn from them. However, since these 
complementary indicators of performance (such as radionuclide flux to the land surface) are 
calculated as part of the process of calculating radiological risk, there is a lot of potential for 
developing these ideas into alternative presentations of repository performance for wider audience 
consumption.
11.4.3 Natural Analogues
Natural analogues provide another source of information that can make more tangible the aims 
and results of performance assessments. Natural analogues are naturally-occurring examples of 
how materials and processes present in a deep geological repository will operate over both 
archaeological and geological (measured in many millions of years) timescales [Knight, 1998], 
These are both in excess of repository operational timescales. They can complement results from 
better controlled laboratory experiments exploring the chemical, physical and biological changes 
that could occur in a repository. These laboratory experiments are normally of short duration (at 
most of the order of 10’s of years), compared with the long time-scales typically of interest in a 
performance assessment.
An example of geological ‘natural analogues’ are ancient high grade uranium ore bodies, which 
have been studied as analogues of uranium spent fuel in a repository for high-level waste. 
Anthropogenic analogues (e.g. archaeological and industrial artefacts) can also provide 
information relevant to processes occurring over timescales measured in hundreds to thousands 
of years, for example the extension of steel corrosion rates to corrosion measured in buried 
industrial pipelines or archaeological artefacts. In fact such man-made analogues could be more
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in tune with public perception precisely because their origins are not natural, and thus they are 
more relevant to a man-made repository
Natural analogue studies have been the subject of a number of international collaborative 
exercises. These have tended to focus on materials and processes likely to be found within the 
repository itself. However, analogies based on the geological environments with some unique 
attribute also provide a means of identifying how a similar geological site may evolve in the future. 
For example, Figure 38 is a picture of calcium-rich deposits at the Maqarin (Jordan) natural 
analogue site. It indicates the deposition that can occur when highly alkaline groundwater reacts 
with carbon dioxide in air. At Maqarin, the groundwater has become alkaline (and saturated with 
calcium) as it passes through a naturally occurring cement, similar to the backfill being considered 
for the Nirex Phased Disposal Concept. Reference to this natural analogue creates a powerful 
image of processes similar to those anticipated within the repository system.
However, natural analogues have a complex, often imperfectly understood, developmental history, 
which ultimately limits how the data can be used. Whilst initially it was considered that the use of 
natural analogues could provide ‘hard’ data, similar to those obtained from carefully controlled 
laboratory experiments, this has only proved possible in some circumstances, rather than as a 
generality. In some circumstances, natural analogues have also provided a valuable, albeit 
limited, test of software and databases used in performance assessment.
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Figure 38: Calcium carbonate formation at Maqarin (Jordan) caused by the
reaction of highly alkaline groundwater with carbon dioxide in the air.
Experience of the use of natural analogues within the radioactive waste community has 
demonstrated that a more qualitative, ‘softer’ use of analogues increases the range of materials 
and processes for which natural analogue data can be considered. Natural analogues can 
therefore provide an important line of evidence to enhance understanding of the long-term
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behaviour of emplaced radioactive waste, although the limitations on their use must be 
recognised.
Natural analogues offer evidence for the effects of natural processes in the past. As such, they 
can be used as supporting arguments for ideas about how natural processes will develop in the 
future. However, because natural analogues are essentially present day manifestations of a range 
of intertwined and complex past processes there is rarely a unique explanation for their existence. 
Alternative conceptual models for their development can frequently be put forward and this has 
been one of the limitations in using them for performance assessments in the past. If a 
conceptual understanding of environmental processes achieves a higher profile in debate about 
environmental risk then natural analogues may similarly adopt a higher profile role in the 
performance assessment process.
11.5 Analysis
One of the reasons for focussing on the performance assessment in this chapter is because one of 
its key values lies in the manner in which it synthesises information, understanding and uncertainty 
to develop a view on performance. Capturing this, without it being overshadowed by technical 
detail could encourage the debate about the knowledge underpinning the performance 
assessment in more general stakeholder dialogue. Therefore, there should be considerable 
mileage in conveying repository performance by considering how to present the output of the 
performance assessment.
A balance has to be achieved between simplifying technical descriptions, so that they are 
understandable to non-technical audiences, while retaining technical accuracy. Also, there is a 
desire for results to be presented in context with more background information, and yet to reduce 
the amount of information contained in graphical presentations of results. The results have to be 
comprehensive and accurate, but they also need to convey large amounts of information in a 
comprehensible manner. Some representations are good for some people, others are good for 
others
In summary, there is a lot of potential for increasing the application of performance assessment as 
a tool for communication. Realising this potential is more difficult and requires modifications to the 
focus and presentation of the assessment. Remembering the importance of the regulator as an 
expert champion in the analytic deliberative model of environmental decision-making, we need to 
ensure that any modifications to performance assessment do not detract from its primary purpose 
- to rigorously and transparently analyse and quantify long term risks from a radioactive waste 
disposal facility.
The work described above puts forward some specific recommendations which are mainly aimed 
at those involved in undertaking performance assessments. These recommendations are not
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rocket science and do not fundamentally affect either what the performance assessor will do, nor 
what his peer reviewers will expect to see. It may make the presentation of the performance 
assessment more attractive to non-experts, but it suffers from being a one way form of risk 
communication. Those with broader interests in the proposed repository but without specific risk 
assessment expertise are not enabled to input their issues and concerns -  they do not have an 
opportunity to influence the performance assessment itself. In consequence, this approach does 
not really open up dialogue and discussion about environmental risks in their broadest sense. The 
definition of environmental risks remains that determined by the expert community.
However, three crucial observations were noted when developing the work described above:
• tremendous variation and entrenched opinion in the experts definition of performance 
assessment;
• a real worry that any attempt to improve the accessibility of the performance assessment to
those other than performance assessment experts would result in a loss of rigour.
• The work described here is essentially a one way form of risk communication. It does not
necessarily enable input to the performance assessment process in its early stages.
These observations are worth analysing in more detail.
11.5.1 The definition of performance assessment as a barrier to dialogue
The differences of opinion amongst performance assessment experts about what a performance 
assessment is derived, in part, from the many similar but different terms used in the radioactive 
waste industry to represent an analysis of a proposed facility. Terms such as risk assessment, 
performance assessment, safety assessment, safety case, risk analysis, safety analysis have 
been used interchangeably in the past, depending on organisational and cultural affiliations. The 
difficulties raised by this have now been recognised, and recently the NEA have sought to provide 
very clear guidelines on the definitions of safety case, safety assessment and performance 
assessment. I have seen for myself a lot more rigour amongst the expert community to define 
what is meant when a term such as performance assessment is used. Nevertheless, until, the 
experts have settled into a consistent use of the terminology, the phrase “performance 
assessment” itself is likely to act as a barrier to dialogue with other stakeholders.
In undertaking this work, I was adopting the idea of a very broad definition of performance 
assessment. In this broad definition, any scientific knowledge, or lack of knowledge was an 
integral part of the performance assessment. So information that built confidence in the proposed 
repository was just as much a part of the performance assessment as information that helped to 
parameterise the assessment models. However, for many experienced workers in this area, 
confidence building measures are not part of the performance assessment but part of the
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development of a broader “safety case”, one aspect of which is to build confidence in the results of 
the performance assessment.
These are two very different ways of looking at the relationship between the performance 
assessment and the conceptual understanding of the environmental risks from a proposed 
repository.
As a result of this work, and the Visual Language work described in Chapter 13, I now believe that 
it is not helpful to try and impose a certain definition of performance assessment to the exclusion 
of all others. We will end up in semantic debate between performance assessment experts, rather 
than an opening up of discussion about environmental risks with other stakeholders. Therefore, 
although the work described above indicates possibilities for improving dialogue, it doesn’t seem to 
realise the full potential of conceptual earth sciences for enabling dialogue about environmental 
risk. The definition of “performance assessment” remains a barrier to dialogue.
11.5.2 Is the opening up of performance assessment to dialogue desirable
Careful consideration needs to be given to the extent to which it is valuable to open up 
performance assessment to dialogue, and which stakeholder groups might get involved. 
Consideration of the work presented above suggests that pursuing ways of making the 
performance assessment accessible actually deflected me from the real objective: to shift the 
emphasis of debate and discussion from quantitative measures of risk and the methods used to 
derive them, to the key uncertainties about the chances of harm being caused to the environment.
When coupled with the concerns expressed by experienced performance assessment specialists - 
that too much emphasis on other stakeholder groups could undermine the rigour with which the 
performance assessment addresses the concerns of the regulatory stakeholders - there seems to 
be a danger in trying to make the performance assessment itself a vehicle for dialogue. It could 
end up being neither an expert evaluation for expert peer review, nor something enabling broader 
debate and discussion.
11.5.3 Does this form of risk communication open up the performance assessment process
In essence, the ideas described above are about communicating the output of the assessment 
process. A danger of this type of approach is that it ends up being a sophisticated form of the 
deficit model of the public understanding of science. The deficit model adopts the idea that the 
need is for the education of the non-scientific audiences and hence it does not make cultural 
demands on the scientists. This may be partial explanation for the many examples of work by 
scientists emphasising risk communication as a way of meeting the challenges of consultative 
decision-making. However, risk communication on its own will not open up dialogue between 
expert and lay audiences in the early stages of the assessment process. Hence it does not
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conform to the idea of iterative and recursive knowledge building put forward at the beginning of 
this thesis.
Nevertheless, risk communication could operate in a different way and provide opportunities for 
discovery and co-operative learning that enables dialogue and knowledge building. The 
differentiation between risk communication operating as a deficit model or as an opportunity for co­
discovery will depend on the attitude of the presenter and his/her objectives in seeking new ways 
of presenting risk results. As with the visual language trial, the attitude of the information 
presenter is critical in determining whether or not an iterative knowledge building process is able to 
occur. For the iterative knowledge building advocated in Section 1, dialogue has to happen and 
scientific methods have to be open to incorporating the output of such dialogue. The next two 
chapters look at whether such early dialogue and iteration is possible.
11.5.4 Conclusions
The traditional methods used for presenting the output of performance assessment can be 
enhanced in many ways. However, such enhancement will not, of themselves, promote dialogue, 
particularly if they are undertaken after the analysis has been performed. Ideally, the scope of the 
analytical process should be established via dialogue, in particular about the environmental issues 
and concerns held by a broad representation of stakeholders. So the need is for a medium by 
which stakeholder issues and concerns about the environment can be collected and described in a 
manner that can be incorporated by the specialists into the performance assessment.
The next chapter explores the use of visual information in a different manner -  to promote 
dialogue rather then to communicate information. A particular approach called visual language is 
adopted for the study since it is advocated as a new medium for communication in the 21st century 
(Horne 2000).
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12 PRESENTING DEEP GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL IN VISUAL LANGUAGE
12.1 Background
The previous chapters establish a hypothesis that the conceptual scientific underpinnings of 
technological applications have the potential to act as a vehicle for dialogue and debate. This was 
not tested in the previous study, which was about communicating numerical information in a more 
accessible form so that stakeholders can understand the timescales and evolution involved in 
deep geological disposal. The use of conceptual descriptions in a far more dialogic manner 
requires the development of new skills on behalf of the scientists. A balance between 
simplification and comprehensiveness needs to be achieved so that dialogue is promoted. To do 
this, a number of factors need to be taken into account:
• The conceptual description should capture the scientific knowledge on which a proposed 
technological application is based at an appropriate level of detail. The appropriate level of 
detail may well be different for different types of dialogue and different players in the dialogue 
process.
• Additionally, it will be important to provide information that responds to questions raised by 
those engaged in the dialogue. These questions will evolve as the dialogue proceeds, and this 
may well affect the level of detail that is valuable in support of the dialogue.
• Finally, in the interests of openness, this common frame of reference must openly 
acknowledge scientific uncertainty so that those with differing values can form their own 
judgements about risk.
Recent developments in the integration of images and words to help convey complex information 
appear to have the potential to address these points. The theory behind these developments can 
loosely be called “ Visual Language”.
12.1.1 Aims
In this chapter, “Visual Language” -  the tight integration of images and words to improve the 
communication of complex subjects - has been used to represent part of the conceptual basis on 
which deep geological disposal is founded. The research was undertaken to assess the value of 
visual language in facilitating dialogue about the physical and chemical processes which affect the 
environmental impact of burying radioactive wastes.
There were two aims for the work presented here:
• To encouraging dialogue about the environmental impact of radioactive waste disposal outside 
the field of specialists;
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• To develop transparency in terms of what scientists do and don’t know about the physical and 
chemical processes affecting radioactivity in the environment.
12.1.2 The potential for change
The power of presentation is universally acknowledged from the business world to the fashion 
industry, from marketing to the delivery of academic papers. The impact of information on its 
audience is very much determined by its presentation and by its presenter. Since the need 
identified in Chapter 8 is to develop new ways of sharing and building information, it seems 
reasonable to look at the presentation of information as an agent for bringing about this change.
In this chapter, changes in how to present complex scientific ideas are considered with a view to 
altering the audiences perceptions of their own ability to engage with the material. If the audience 
can feel empowered to enter into discussion and dialogue about the material, then there should 
be scope for a qualitative change in the content of the material as a result of dialogue and social 
learning.
However, there is a fine line between dialogue and communication, and an even finer one 
between communication and marketing. How can complex information be presented in a manner 
that enables, rather than inhibits dialogue? To explore this, recent trends in the presentation of 
complex phenomena and debates were considered.
12.1.3 Visual Language
Pictures and words are frequently used in communicating information. However, it has been 
observed [Tufte, 1983, p180] that:
’’Words and pictures are sometimes jurisdictional enemies, as artists feud with writers for 
scarce space. An unfortunate legacy of these craft-union differences is the artificial 
separation of words and pictures; a few style sheets even forbid printing on 
graphics Words and pictures belong together.”
With the advance of information technology, the use of images has expanded exponentially. In the 
United States, it is now being claimed that the full integration of words, shapes and images into a 
single communication unit is emerging as a distinct language [Horne 2000],
• Words provide shape to the communication. They enable the naming and classification of
distinct elements and also supply the capacity to discuss relevant abstract concepts.
• Images draw on other parts of the brain and are very powerful in their own right. However, in
the absence of words, they remain visual art.
• Shapes are more abstract than images. They have been used in the presentation of scientific
information for centuries and, when combined with words they have formed the basis of
diagramming systems.
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Table 24 presents a description of the key elements of visual language [Horne 1996]. This work 
has been exploring the use of concept diagrams, information graphics and information murals to
the science underpinning deep geological disposal.
Table 24: Visual Language Communication Units
Name
Icon/Vlicon elements
Concept diagram
Information graphic 
“infographic”
Information mural 
“infomural”
Description
Smallest unit of meaning in 
visual language. Usually a 
simple graphic containing 
one or two works or a phrase 
to clarify the visual elements
A simple to moderately 
complicated accompanied by 
one or two sentences. 
Usually cannot stand alone 
as an autonomous 
communication chunk, but 
appears in the context of 
sequencing or grouping.
or Larger spreads usually 
containing a large and often 
complex central visual 
element or group of visual 
elements. Frequently
contains several blocks of 
text. Can stand alone as an 
autonomous communication 
chunk
or Includes one or more 
infographics. Types: usually 
recognisable by format: 
landscapes, mandalas, 
matrices, process diagrams, 
time lines and so forth
Size
Generally small ( < 1 inch 
square)
Roughly a quarter to half a 
page
Half, 1 or 2 page spread
Usually the size of a wall or 
part of a wall
12.1.4 The issue for debate - deep geological disposal
As discussed earlier, the long-term management of radioactive wastes is a contemporary 
environmental issue with a history of failures in finding an acceptable solution. The scientific 
underpinnings of deep geological disposal have traditionally been communicated using 
performance assessments in which mathematical calculations of risk are used to assess 
compliance with a quantitative risk target. Experience in the nineties shows that this medium has 
not necessarily ensured effective debate and dialogue about the underlying scientific issues. 
Therefore, deep geological disposal is a valid and valuable issue for the application of visual 
language in order to enhance debate and dialogue.
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As discussed in Chapter 5, deep geological disposal is generally accepted as a potential means of 
ensuring the necessary level of isolation for long lived radioactive wastes. This disposal concept 
makes use of engineered and natural barriers, working in conjunction to prevent or limit the 
movement of radionuclides from the repository to the human environment (multibarrier 
containment). There are many aspects of the science underpinning radioactive waste disposal 
that make it difficult to enter into widespread dialogue about the technical basis of deep geological 
disposal. This is because:
• There are a complex set of interacting physical and chemical processes that may affect the 
system;
• Long timescales require consideration (up to millions of years). This means that there are very 
many possible future evolutions that need to be taken into account.
• There is a wide choice of different levels of detail and topics of interest around which 
communication could be based;
These aspects mean that the science underpinning deep geological disposal has essentially 
remained in the specialist domain. There has been little opportunity for other stakeholders to enter 
the scientific debate. Additionally, debate has tended to focus on scientific uncertainty, most often 
manifested as disagreements between scientists working on behalf of organisations with different 
objectives. I have hypothesised that there is value in moving scientific discussion towards a more 
balanced debate, and to enable others to enter the debate and understand the key issues. Visual 
language may offer a means of doing this.
12.1.5 Approach
The approach used in this research was to develop visual language representations of important 
geosphere processes, with particular emphasis on capturing uncertainty about the behaviour of 
the geosphere by identifying the main points of departure in the scientific debate about the same 
geosphere processes;
Visual language was used to develop a scientific representation of the geosphere in deep 
geological disposal.The work was undertaken in a number of stages.
1. Initially, a diagrammatic representation of the key factors influencing the long-term safety of 
a deep geological disposal system was developed. In a simple manner, this representation 
links high level questions about the behaviour of the disposal system, to scientific 
processes addressed as part of the underlying research programme.
2. One of the components of this diagram -  the Geosphere - was selected for the trial 
application of visual language. Previous work has indicated that the behaviour of the 
geosphere is very important to the levels of safety offered by the Nirex concept for deep 
geological disposal. A “ visual framework” was developed to explain the role of the
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geosphere in the disposal system. The visual framework comprises a series of hypertext- 
linked pages that link fairly high level scientific concepts to increasingly detailed 
representations of the important scientific processes typically addressed as part of the 
research programme.
3. At some level of detail, scientific uncertainty becomes significant. Where this happens, 
“argumentation maps” have been developed. These argumentation maps seek to capture 
the different lines of argument that can ensue as a result of scientific uncertainty. The 
intention is not to promote one line of argument, rather to capture areas of agreement and 
areas of disagreement, together with the point of departure. In this way, it is hoped that 
argumentation maps can help increase transparency in the scientific debate surrounding 
the behaviour of the geosphere.
4. Subsequently, the visual language representation of the geosphere were subject to both
technical and non-technical review. The review was undertaken in two stages. Firstly,
technical and non-technical focus groups using staff at Nirex - the agency charged with
developing options for the long term management of radioactive wastes - were involved in 
an initial round of review (see Appendix E). The Visual Language materials were modified 
as a result of comments received. Version 2 of the visual language products are 
provided on the accompanying CD. Subsequently, an external review was undertaken 
using staff and researchers at the University of Lancaster (see Appendix F).
5. Finally, the outcome of the different stages of review were analysed to determine how 
effective Visual Language was at communicating the role of the geosphere in deep 
geological disposal and the state of scientific knowledge about geosphere processes. The 
success of the trial was be considered both in terms of how well technical and non­
technical audiences are able to comprehend the science, and in terms of whether they are 
able to engage in debate and form opinions about the science.
The visual language material was developed in discussion and dialogue with a researcher who
has a long history working for Friends of the Earth1 in opposition to the nuclear industry’s
proposals for radioactive waste management. Many ideas about the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of visual language arose out of this collaborative working which are captured in the 
discussion below.
12.2 Deep geological disposal -  in visual language.
Visual Language representations of key elements of deep geological disposal were developed in
three stages. These are illustrated in Figure 39
1 My thanks to Rachel Western
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Figure 39: Stages in the visual language project
Representing the factors 
that determine the 
performance of a deep 
geological repository .
Illustrating important physical and 
chemical processes that occur in the 
geosphere
Developing argumentation maps that capture scientific 
uncertainty in selected physical and chemical processes
The application of these three stages to the issue of deep geological disposal is discussed further 
below.
12.2.1 Stage 1: Factors influencing performance
The scientific research programme underpinning deep geological disposal focuses on many 
important physical and chemical processes, often at quite a high level of technical detail. A 
starting point for the trial was the development of a diagrammatic way of relating these physical 
and chemical processes to simple questions about the repository on a single sheet of paper. There 
were a number of important aims for this diagram:
• That it should act as a bridge between the technical terms used by the scientists and more 
common questions raised by other stakeholders;
• That it should reflect the different barriers of the repository system, since the multibarrier 
concept is the broad principle on which deep geological disposal is founded;
• That it should provide a reference point for the full scope of the scientific research work 
undertaken by Nirex;
A brainstorming session was convened with members of the science department within Nirex. 
After many debates, the diagrammatic representation shown in Figure 40 was developed.
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Figure 40: Factors affecting the performance of a deep geological repository
IN OBSTACLES en route OUT
How do physical and 
chemical obstacles 
delay movement?
What are the 
physical obstacles 
to movement?
What routes 
give a dose?
How 
harmful is 
the dose?
How can the 
rock be “short 
circuited”?
Half life What are the 
chemical obstacles 
to movement?
Human uptake
Inventory
Environmental 
behavioursorption solubility
Package
integrity
Human 
rvention
sorptionsolubility toxicity
Groundwater flow
Rock matrix diffusion
Subsequent discussions identified that there was an element of confusion in this diagram between 
factors influencing safety, and studies undertaken by Nirex as part of its scientific research 
programme. An alternative representation of similar information was developed (Figure 41).
Figure 41: Questions about long term safety
What radioactive 
materials?
What other 
materials?
Inventory
[^Quantity/Form
How long do physical obstacles 
work?
How long do chemical 
obstacles work?
What are the transporting fluids?
How do repository materials 
change with time?
What are the pathways?
How quickly does 
groundwater fill the repository?
How much groundwater flows 
through the repository'.'
How long does it take?
Are there short circuits?
Changes with time?
How much gas is generated?
Nirex Studies
Geosphere
[~ Package behaviour^
Backfill behaviour 
cement/bentoni te
Rock properties
♦permeabilitry/porosity
•sorption
•rock matrix diffusion
solubility
sorption 
| disturbed zone |
How much is released?
When does the release 
occur?
Where does the release occur?
What are the 
concentrations?
Who/what is affected?
Biosphere
Climate change
Environmental process modelling
| Uptake studies |
Groundwater
•solubility/flow field/dispersion/dilution/changes with time
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These diagrams (Figures 40 and 41) are concept diagrams (using the terminology of visual 
language). They cannot easily standalone as an autonomous communication unit, but in the 
context of some supporting text, they can convey a lot of information at a single glance. The 
diagrams also have relevance in providing context for much of the scientific research undertaken 
by Nirex. In view of the fact that Figure 40 was developed in a more consultative manner, it was 
the one selected for use.
In both Figure 40 and 41, key questions are asked in the green boxes and the detailed physical 
and chemical processes that determine the answers to those questions are identified in the pink 
boxes. Linkage is provided, where necessary, in the white boxes. The ability of visual language to 
represent the processes indicated in the pink boxes was then considered.
12.2.2 Visual representation of selected processes
A major part of the visual language project was to explore the success of visual language in 
representing complex physical and chemical processes. Information graphics were identified as a 
potential w ay forward for this. Information graphics have the ability to stand alone as a 
communication unit and they frequently contain, not only blocks of text, but also several visual 
elements.
Representing all relevant physical and chemical processes (pink boxes in Figure 33) in detail was 
unrealistic at this stage of the research. However, because of the complex and interacting nature 
of these processes, it was important to select a group that were related and that would stretch the 
ability of visual language to illustrate interrelationships. Since the emphasis of this research is on 
the role of earth science in environmental decision making, processes that influence the behaviour 
of the geosphere were chosen -  i.e. those that affect the question “ how well does the rock prevent 
keep radioactivity away from people” (Figure 40) or “how well does rock prevent the movement of 
radioactivity to the surface environment” (Figure 41)
It quickly becam e apparent that there were many levels of detail at which these processes could 
be tackled. It would be necessary to reflect both:
• the hierarchical link between the top level question and a detailed representation of the 
process; and
• the interactions between different processes at similar levels of detail.
Therefore, it was necessary to develop a three-dimensional framework of information graphics, 
which we termed a “Visual Framework”. The visual framework was developed within Microsoft 
PowerPoint and m ade use of its drawing facilities, clip art library and also its facility for hypertext 
linkages
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12.2.3 Capturing scientific uncertainty
The visual framework seeks to capture scientific principles that are generally fairly well accepted. 
However, ultimately the performance of a deep geological repository is dependent on the extent to 
which those processes may or may not operate in the future. This is uncertain. There are a 
number of general reasons for that uncertainty, for example:
• the process may be dependent on certain physical and chemical conditions. The conditions 
that will prevail may be unclear;
• the relationship between the process and the physical and/or chemical conditions may be 
unclear;
• the evidence for the process may be ambiguous;
• confidence in our ability to represent the process in a predictive model may be low.
The source of uncertainty will be different for different processes. The reasons for scientific debate 
will therefore be process-specific. In the trial, information murals were developed for selected 
processes. These murals sought to capture explicitly the source of uncertainty for that process 
and the specific point of departure for scientists with differing opinions. These process-specific 
murals were called “argumentation maps” [Horne 1998]. The intention is not to promote one line 
of argument, rather to capture areas of agreement and areas of disagreement, together with the 
point of departure. In this way, it is hoped that argumentation maps can help increase 
transparency in scientific debate and openness about uncertainty.
Two topics were selected for argumentation maps:
• Uncertainty in solubility -  a process that is reasonably constrained in terms of is relationship to 
physical and chemical conditions;
• Uncertainty in rock matrix diffusion -  a process that is relatively unconstrained in terms of
evidence for its existence and the extent to which it may operate under different conditions;
12.3 Review and development
The aim of this trial was to assess the ability of visual language to communicate and enable 
debate and discussion. Its success is therefore dependent on what other people think of the 
Visual Language products. Additionally, it would be arrogant to presume that the design and 
presentation of information within visual language can be undertaken by the project team alone. 
Feedback from prospective audiences has to considered a major input to developing a useful 
product. Therefore the review process for visual language was undertaken in three discrete stages 
as an integral part of the project, rather than as a concluding activity:
• An initial review using focus groups made up of technical and non-technical staff at Nirex;
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• Modification of he visual language materials in the lights of the focus group comments
• External review of Version 2 of the visual language materials at an independent workshop 
involving the staff of the Institute of Public Policy and Philosophy at Lancaster University.
12.3.1 Focus group comments on version 1.
Version 1 of the visual framework and argumentation maps (described above) were initially subject 
to focus group discussions. Four focus groups were run, each for one hours duration. The 
facilitator of these groups was not involved with the project and recorded the comments from the 
groups independently (see Appendix E). The groups were organised so that those with similar 
levels of technical knowledge about the long-term safety of deep geological disposal were 
together. There were two non-technical groups, and two technical groups, of which one was a 
group of scientists working on the subject of post closure safety.
During the discussion, the participants were:
• initially presented with the first few electronic, hypertext linked pages of the visual framework 
and asked to comment on whether the idea was sound;
• encouraged to look at a hard copy presentation of the visual framework and asked for their 
views as to whether they preferred electronic or hard copy presentations;
• shown the solubility argumentation map and asked whether they could follow the 
discussion/debate and whether there were any detailed comments on the material;
• asked if they would like to be involved in a second round of review, and how they think this 
review should be run.
In general terms, there was fairly universal support for the concept, both from the technical and the 
non-technical groups. A big success was the fact that everyone was keen to be involved in the 
second round of review, and even “looking forward” to it.
A general preference for the electronic version of the visual language products was given. 
Browsing the material electronically gives a sense of control over the material, as long as it can be 
considered at ones own speed. Some people felt that having both together would help people to 
have an idea of the “big” picture whilst moving through the information in their own way.
A number of comments were made about the need to improve the introductory material and 
manage expectations -  the index to version 1 of the Visual Framework was clearly unfriendly and 
some of the earlier slides suggest material that is not there. For example, knowledge of the other 
barriers (non-geosphere) is assumed and hence the importance of hydroxide ions on solubility is 
discussed. However, there is no explanation anywhere as to why hydroxide ions may be present
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in the first place (because the near field is cementitious, partly to provide a source of hydroxide
ions);
Comments on the hard copy presentations were mixed. There was a general feeling that there 
was too much to take in, and that this was off-putting. However, for some people, it was useful to 
be able to see the full extent of the material available electronically. The posters were likely to be 
more useful for some audiences -  in particular for schools audiences and to act as browsing 
material at meetings and in support of more general discussion.
People read the posters in very different ways. The layout was very influential in leading the eye, 
and what one person liked, another disliked. It was suggested that “chunking” the information up 
into more manageable bites would be helpful -  the eye could ignore the detail and focus on the 
headlines.
The non-technical groups identified a number of issues where things had been taken for granted, 
and also where an inappropriate impression had been given. For example, in the solubility 
argumentation map, the impression is given that we are trying to do everything we can to get as 
much radioactivity to dissolve as possible. Similarly, it could be construed that post closure safety 
is about getting as much radioactivity back to the surface as possible.
The technical groups identified a great number of detailed comments about words, phrasing and 
diagrams used in the slides. Whilst there was general support for the idea of simplifying the 
scientific concepts, everyone had a different way of doing it. Crucially, when at the greatest levels 
of detail in the argumentation maps, phrasing and layout determine the overall impression about 
the quality of the science. The technical groups were not happy with the way that the solubility 
issues were presented as it cast doubt over the whole modelling process.
A lot of useful comments were made about the general layout and feel of the slides -  for example 
going for consistency with the Corporate image, utilising existing sketches for different 
management options presented in the Options paper.
There was a lot of enthusiasm for involvement in a second round of review. It will be important to 
provide adequate time for this, and people would like to be able to explore the electronic material 
themselves. Different people like to work in different ways. There was general support for the 
idea of issuing the material electronically (perhaps an individual version that could be commented 
on using a change tracking system). Additionally, the idea was mooted of setting up a number of 
terminals in the same room, providing 1 0 - 1 5  minutes for exploration followed by a 10 -  5 minutes 
sharing of ideas -  repeated a few times.
Some other, generally held, comments were made:
• Who is the audience?
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•  What are you aiming to achieve with the material?
•  How do you expect to present the information (as this will involve slightly different approaches)
•  The headings need to be appealing
•  Words and style need to be consistent
•  There is a balance between making information accessible and being patronising or too
simplistic
•  It is important that the posters have a clear end or “close off’ rather than leaving people 
hanging
•  Important to introduce timeframes
•  Be careful not to introduce unfamiliar terms at the detailed levels that have not been explained
•  More pictures -  fewer words
In summary, it was concluded that the visual language products contained great potential for 
changing the perception of scientific information and encouraging engagement. Comments from 
the technical focus group differed from those of the non-technical focus groups, reflecting the 
different cultural backgrounds. The design of the information required very careful consideration. 
However, such design decisions are, in essence, an exercise of power and condition how the 
information is received.
12.3.2 Modification and Development
In the light of the first ground of review, the Visual Language products were modified and revised. 
Not all comments were taken into account. Points of detail were not always addressed due to 
time considerations.
In summary, the revisions addressed the following points:
1. Revision of the visual framework to:
• Improve the introductory slides -  in particular the index
• Use the options sketches to provide more information about “other options”
• Establish some slides identifying the role of physical containment, the near field and the 
biosphere.
• Incorporate the reference diagram as a fast track route to the key issues and the 
argumentation maps
• The development of “signpost questions” to help provide a storyline running through the 
material and enable fast-tracking to points of interest.
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2. Consideration of a common format for the argumentation maps adopting an approach that lays 
the material out against three questions: does the process exist (theory), to what extent does it 
exist (experimentation) and is it significant (modelling) ( see Figure 42)
3. Revision of the argumentation maps using the common format
4. Modification of the “key questions” diagram to present the issues in a common way -  i.e. to
describe how the various scientific processes contributed to safety (as opposed to undermining
it, or mixing the two). The revised diagram is given in Figure 43.
5. Development of a range of hard copy layouts of the visual framework and one argumentation 
map.
6. Consideration and incorporation (where appropriate) of more detailed comments from the 
focus groups.
Greater weight was given to the comments of the non-technical focus groups since they were 
considered to be more representative of the stakeholders and public constituents who we are 
seeking to engage. Additionally, a mixture of styles was used in all the products, despite the first 
round comments about consistency. This was partly to flush out any comments about what styles 
worked and what didn’t with the external reviewers.
Following these revisions, new products were developed and have been recorded on the attached 
CD. In addition, hard copy posters of the revised material were also made.
Figure 42: Common format for the Version 2 argumentation maps
Matrix structure used for the argumentation maps
Theory
Observation/
investigation Modelling
General
science
What is the 
general theory 
for the process?
What support is 
there from general 
observation?
Applied
science
Hypothesis - how 
does this contribute 
to safety?
Is there evidence to 
support this 
hypothesis?
How can we make 
calculations based on 
this hypothesis?
..........  ...... .... . .1 ...............
What
isn’t
What is known? 
known?
How significant is 
this for safety?
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Figure 43: Version 2 safety factors diagram
Deep geological disposal - what physical and chemical processes 
will affect how the option works?
Chemical conditions that 
reduce the mobility of 
radioactive particles, 
which is affected by...
sorption
solubility
Physical 
obstacles, which 
are affected by...
Long distances to 
travel to the 
surface, which may 
be short circuited 
by...
Rock matrix diffusion
Physical and 
chemical conditions 
that delay movement, 
which is affected by...
k
sorption
Package integrity
gas
solubility
colloids
groundwater llow
The routes by 
which people 
can receive a 
“dose”, which 
is affected by...
Human
uptake
Environmental
behaviour
fau lts
fractures
The level of harm 
caused by the 
“dose”, which is 
affected by...
Human intervention toxicity
So we need research and modelling to understand how these factors will affect a repository
12.3.3 External Review of Version 2
An external review of the visual language products was undertaken by members of the Institute of 
Public Policy and Philosophy at the University of Lancaster. A key component of this review was 
the conduct of a workshop on 15th February 2002. Appendix F is the review report compiled by the 
University of Lancaster.
A key output of the review was, once again, the need for consistency of style, and also the obvious 
value of applying IT design and graphics to the project. A designer was asked to undertake a pilot 
study to indicate the potential of the material in the hands of a professional designer with modern 
IT techniques. A CD of the output is available.
The second round review identified many issues that had not been considered at the outset of the 
Visual Language trial. These are comprehensively documented in the review report and specific 
points are summarised in Box 8.
The external review report suggests that there are three fundamental issues which need to be 
addressed if Visual Language is to be used to open up dialogue.
Firstly, control over the information is still being exercised by the technicians -  the scientists are 
still in the position of presenting “their” science and hence it is still a (rather sophisticated) form of 
the defecit model of the public understanding of science. This was evidenced by an emphasis on 
technical (to the exclusion of all other) issues, as highlighted by the key questions diagram. The
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diagram itself was found to be quite helpful, but also very narrow in scope. It raised none of the 
social issues related to phased disposal and yet such questions were begged by the text used in 
the boxes on the diagram. Following on from this, the external review commented on the closed 
nature of the signpost questions. These questions were intended to open up discussion. 
However, they were criticised as being the sort of questions that the scientists would ask, not the 
audience.
Secondly, an informal, but important comment made at the workshop was that, by trying to capture 
all lines of discussion arising from scientific uncertainty, the argumentation maps may be in danger 
of marginalising non-specialist stakeholders even further. The laudible intention of opening up 
debate so that others can make up their own minds could be misinterpreted to be one of 
demonstrating that not only do the authors have their own opinion -  but they also know about all 
the other potential opinions.
Thirdly (and very practically) the external review report suggests that it is not the complexity of the 
information that is a barrier to dialogue, but rather the provision of opportunities to engage with the 
sort of material contained in the visual language products. This suggests that the presentation of 
information on its own is not enough. Physically, audiences have to be brought into contact with 
the information for there to be any chance of consequential shared knowledge building.
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Box 8: Summary of Key Points from the External review of Visual
Language
The following key points have been abstracted from Appendix E.
General comment: “the potential for use of the material to encourage and enable dialogue and two-way 
communication is welcome, Q with the caveat that [] the reader is positioned as a passive recipient of 
authorised knowledge”.
Scope of material: “the VL project has scoped the scientific map of radioactive waste management, and 
selected particular topics for detailed working up. The context of these topics is presented as being the 
overall scientific requirements of deep geological disposal (or phased underground disposal). The social, 
ethical, political and economic context is entirely invisible”
“The slide entitled ‘key questions’ makes this very clear. In response to the question ‘radioactive waste -  
what is the problem?’ we are given a number of responses -  all in terms of rock, water movement through 
rock, etc. Not only does this presume deep geological disposal on the Nirex model, but it makes no reference 
whatsoever to any non-scientific issues. The question should be ‘radioactive waste -  what are the scientific 
issues in relation to deep geological disposal, not claim the entire territory of radioactive waste problems and 
then define them so narrowly. This narrow framing is off-putting, offensive, and inappropriate. A much wider 
‘funnel’ at the beginning of the material is required, which at least acknowledges the breadth of the issues, 
and then goes on to focus on specific sub-areas.”
The relevance of earth science: 'The material is inherently interesting for many. Particularly, many 
reviewers mentioned the diagrams of rock structure and water movement through rock: it seems that some 
contents of science are more interesting than others”.
Dialogue ‘The material clearly has uses in relation to dialogue and consultation, both as information provision 
and as a prompt to discussion. If the material is basically envisaged as information provision [] there are 
different implications for design. The material currently reads as if this is the intention. If, however, the 
intention is to generate discussion, then questions about the purpose of that discussion need to be answered, 
or at least considered.] However, the design in relation to dialogue uses is not the most important 
consideration: developing the material as information provision will not preclude its use within dialogue. That 
the material provides access points to discussion is itself valuable.”
Audience: “It is not at all clear who the intended audience or readership is. If a ‘general’ readership is 
assumed then the comments on providing a ‘simple story line’ as well as more detailed and complex 
storylines is extremely pertinent, as are comments on the need for a clear map of the structure of the 
information. A much simpler and more straightforward ‘top layer’ needs to be produced -  similar in tone and 
detail to the options descriptions poster -  where users can gain an overview of the material and decide which 
areas to pursue”.
Accessible Science “ In general, the material was considered successful in providing an introductory 
understanding of solubility, rock matrix diffusion and sorption. However, quite what this understanding was is 
another question. The issue of whether people understood what was being presented in terms of the content 
presented -  whether they could then answer a test ‘correctly’, for example - was not a focus of this review; 
some informal discussion indicates that understanding in this sense was not comprehensive”
“The accessibility of the science in the sense of providing introductory and/or framework understandings was 
considered to be patchy. The solubility argumentation map is clearer and more understandable than the rock 
matrix diffusion, and it is worth considering why this is the case. Firstly, solubility is a more familiar concept 
than the immediately incomprehensible terminology of ‘rock matrix diffusion’. Secondly, the solubility AM lays 
out a clearer sequence of concepts and steps, whilst the rock matrix diffusion AM is more difficult to follow in 
terms of its internal logic, and is more sloppily produced in terms of explaining unfamiliar terms, providing an 
accessible sequence of ideas, and making its points clear. This provides some clues as to what makes 
science more accessible: familiarity is one dimension, but clarity of presentation is highly important”
“Too much too soon” -  there are several places where a clutch of concepts are introduced simultaneously [] -  
i.e. a series of maps of key concepts. It is good practice when ‘teaching’ to introduce one concept at a time, 
and use or apply or give example to that concept before moving on to the next.
The importance of design “The wav in which something is represented carries its own message. Design 
and stylistic choices themselves communicate particular messages, including messages about how the 
authors of the material wish to present themselves. No design choice is neutral.
“The particular points regarding design can be summarised in one comment “this is crying out for a 
professional designer -  and it’s a plum job for someone”. This captures the enthusiasm and potential of the 
project -  and the recognition that the development of VL in Nirex is in its early stages.”
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12.4 Analysis
Throughout the trial, there has been consistent enthusiasm for the Visual Language project from 
those who have been exposed to its aims and outputs. A common reaction has been “how can I 
use this in my work?” which suggests that it does indeed have potential for engaging people who 
are trying to communicate. Additionally, those who have been involved in its review (both 
technical, and non-technical) have expressed readiness and keenness to be involved in later 
stage, which suggests that it has potential for engaging those who might be considered the 
communication targets.
Nevertheless, three factors suggest that the “real” (as opposed to trial) application of visual 
language should not be undertaken lightly. These factors are:
• the extensiveness of the external review comments, which draw on research from a range of 
fields to identify issues about the presentation of, and response to, such information that need 
careful consideration. However, a better definition of target audience, and the purpose of 
developing a visual language presentation might enable strategies for responding to these 
comments to be developed.
• the response of technical experts to the visual language material was generally very 
supportive. However, once that generality was articulated, there was considerable (and 
generally critical) comment about the (lack of) details, accuracy and precision of the wording 
and graphics used. These comments were primarily triggered by the simplification techniques 
adopted in an attempt to get over the sense of the scientific process, without being bogged 
down by the jargon and detail. In the trial, these sorts of comments were purposely not 
addressed as they were not perceived to be helpful to the aim of rapid visual engagement of a 
less expert audience. Nevertheless, in a real application of visual language, this may prove a 
difficult issue to address in developing an approved representation of complex scientific issues 
for use in a Corporate context.
• The costs of developing new visual language products would be high. The level of effort 
required to develop the material used in this trial was about 0.5 man-years of professional staff 
time. Because the development of diagrams is part of the thought process, this could not be 
significantly reduced in the developmental stages.
To set against these three difficulties, a tighter definition of the target audience for Visual 
Language, and the communication aim would help resources to be much more efficiently 
focussed. The trial concentrated on the tremendous potential of visual language to take “vertical” 
slices through hierarchical information and to cut down into greater and greater detail. In the
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review process, it was noticeable that different people tended to take “horizontal” slices through 
the material depending on their background, enthusiasm, available time and willingness to 
engage. Often, people were frustrated in taking these horizontal slices because they very quickly 
came to the boundaries of the information. A further application of visual language, with a more 
tightly defined target audience could concentrate on developing context of relevance to the 
audience, and need not provide so much opportunity for “mining down” through the information. 
There was clearly a lot of ambiguity over the audience for the trial - which was exacerbated by the 
vertical linking of information from contextual information to very detailed scientific concepts and 
debates. There was strong feeling that we should be much clearer about the audience for visual 
language.
Context is very important. During each round of review, more context was requested. The focus 
of visual language on phased disposal, and indeed on very detailed technical aspects of phased 
disposal was confusing. Those who knew a little about radioactive waste management wanted to 
be encouraged to explore the live questions -  for example about policy development and the 
relationship to nuclear power.
Design styles had a strong impact, both on the way people reacted to the material and on the 
general “feel” of the information. There was no unified style in the visual language products 
developed. Once again, care is needed in adopting a design style -  too sophisticated and the 
material may appear too much like propaganda, too little and it will appear amateurish. There is 
also a fine line between people feeling patronised by simple diagrams, and comfortable because 
they help relate the concepts to everyday things.
The importance of design choices cannot be underestimated. The same material can be 
developed into very different hard copy presentations, just by adopting different approaches to the 
structuring of the slides in two dimensions. Tremendous power is wielded by the designer and the 
resulting design, whilst tremendously powerful, may be highly schematic (for example the London 
Underground map).
A key conclusion of the external review is therefore the importance of applying graphical design 
expertise. Experience with developing the multimedia pilot CD indicates that this design process 
will need to occur after the development of the raw products, since the designer needs the content 
in order to start the design process.
A distinction needs to be drawn between the success of visual language as a communication 
media, and its success in terms of drawing out scientific uncertainty via argumentation maps. It is 
more difficult to draw conclusions about the success of the argumentation mapping. In the first 
place, significant argumentation was elusive. As the arguments were debated and considered, 
ways of representing the issue in a manner agreeable to both parties were identified. Therefore,
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argumentation was taken over by dialogue, which generated new meanings. Obviously this 
should be considered a success in its own right, but it casts doubt on the ability to develop a 
structured presentation of a polarised debate within an argumentation map developed in a single 
organisation -  things are never as black and white as they seem, especially where scientific 
uncertainty is involved!
Once again, this may be an audience issue. The argumentation maps, which fundamentally need 
to mine down into scientific detail and theoretical debate are probably more relevant to a different 
audience than those who seek context at the higher levels. Again, this challenges the value of 
vertical slicing through the information that formed part of the initial aspirations of the visual 
language trial.
Another challenge to the development of argumentation maps was that eventually, there was very 
little argumentation in then! This reflects the difficulty of capturing exactly where the point of 
departure lies for two lines of reasoning. As the argumentation maps have been developing, and 
dialogue about areas of scientific uncertainty has occurred, the maps have focussed on presenting 
the common understanding, and the point of debate has been elusive. Further work will be 
required to ensure that the scientific issues are not lost in ever more sophisticated ways of 
presenting common knowledge.
12.5 Going forward -  points for discussion
A key question for this thesis is determining whether visual language is simply a sophisticated 
communication tool, or whether it is somehow greater than the sum of its parts and can take a 
formative role in encouraging dialogue about science. Whilst this question cannot be answered 
conclusively without further application of visual language in dialogue and research into its value, it 
is important to identify that visual language played two very distinct roles during this trial:
• assisting broad stakeholder dialogue about science: where the visual language products 
worked as a tool to enable experts to share understanding and promote dialogue by 
encouraging people with more than a passing interest to engage with the live debate as policy 
for radioactive waste management develops;
• encouraging expert-expert learning: where the process of developing the visual language 
products acted as a vehicle for experts to develop shared ideas about scientific concepts, 
methods and key points of departure between those with differing opinions about evaluating 
options for the long-term management of radioactive waste,.
In conclusion, considerable potential for visual language to help encourage dialogue and debate 
has been identified. In particular, visual language helped elucidate ideas about areas of scientific 
uncertainty, and to develop new meanings between researchers ( both experts in the field and
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from other fields) about the nature of that uncertainty. The nature of visual language encourages 
experts to move from their zone of comfort (terminology, concepts and reference literature) and 
face up to different ways of thinking and presentation. In a way visual language can facilitate two- 
way discussion between different groups, rather than the giving of information from the expert, and 
the receipt of information on the part of the non-expert. This can be very valuable in developing 
research needs in areas of uncertainty. A number of examples of this happening were experienced 
during the visual language trial.
The audiences for visual language used in this context are likely to be different to the 
“stakeholders and public constituents” which this work originally sought to engage in dialogue. 
Since the aim would be to highlight areas of uncertainty, visual language used in this mode could 
contribute to a review, preview and expert regulation. In this mode, the need for design and review 
is not so important. The development of visual language information graphics using packages 
such as PowerPoint could be undertaken by the people involved in the discussion, or by a third 
party involved as a facilitator. The value of this exercise is that it may help us understand some of 
the difficulties people have in engaging with long term risk calculations in the face of high scientific 
uncertainty. However, it will not necessarily enable social inclusion..
Whether visual language is a useful tool for sharing understanding depends on having a clear 
purpose for doing so. Given the observations about the importance of context, visual language is 
likely to be most effective in a more central role, rather than focussing purely on scientific issues. 
The boundaries imposed by focussing solely on scientific issues undermine the value of visual 
language and frustrate the audience. If it is to be taken forward in this way then significant 
resources are required for developing the content and then for its design and review. Additionally, 
opportunities for stakeholder and public engagement with the development of the visual language 
products need to be created, early in the process and continuously during its development. Those 
responsible for its development need to be receptive to input from others with different frames of 
reference.
Nevertheless, it does appear to have benefits in enabling the scientific and technical issues to be 
presented as part of a broader communication tool. The tremendous flexibility of visual language 
means that it is capable of absorbing and representing a very broad scope of information and 
hence seems a valuable tool for developing a shared knowledge platform.
In both cases, a key benefit of visual language arose from the development process rather than 
solely from the product. In terms of promoting dialogue, whether it is between experts or between 
a broader range of audiences, this suggests that there is value in sharing information early in any 
development process. This is again an aspect of moving forwards which may be very 
uncomfortable for some scientists and experts who are used to providing the “right” information
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and for whom it is very important to “have the space” to develop ideas and information prior to 
sharing it.
In the next chapter, opportunities for applying visual language and dialogue as part of the 
performance assessment process are considered. By so doing, it is hoped to develop a truly 
analytic-deliberative process for assessing risks from deep geological disposal.
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13 A NEW APPROACH TO BUILDING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN SUPPORT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS .
The previous chapters have considered new ways of presenting and discussing information and 
knowledge about deep geological disposal. The aim of these studies has been to look at how to 
engage with a greater range of stakeholders. However, for a truly analytic-deliberative approach, 
both analysis and deliberation should be integrated. In this chapter, the potential for building 
deliberation into the risk assessment process described in Appendix C is considered.
13.1 Integrating science and dialogue for radioactive waste disposal -  what have 
we learned?
Chapter 9 postulated that clear and understandable presentations of conceptual models of 
environmental processes may be helpful as a common platform for iterative knowledge building, 
and Earth scientists should claim a central role in the development and evolution of these 
conceptual models.
Chapter 10 confirmed previous findings that there is interest in engaging in discussion about the 
scientific underpinnings of deep geological disposal waste. However, these discussions will not 
necessarily be on terms that the scientists are used to dealing with. In particular, time was a big 
stumbling block for those seeking to engage with scientific projection into the far future. Two points 
highlighted in the public consultation exercise were the question” how do you get the timing right?” 
and concerns about the lack of control once the repository was finally closed. Both of these issues 
are central to the scientific rationale for the deep geological disposal of radioactive wastes. 
Decisions about the safety of a deep repository consider calculations of risks for millions of years 
into the future, based on the idea that the natural system will provide “passive safety” -  safety 
without reliance on any human intervention or control. However, although they are central to the 
concept of deep geological disposal, the concept of passive safety, and the amount of active 
management that goes into designing, operating and monitoring the repository prior to closure get 
very little mention in the post-closure performance assessment.
Although many frequently asked questions relate to the post-closure period, the public are most 
concerned with the behaviour of the repository system during its operational period and in the time 
period immediately following repository closure. Since the results of the performance assessment 
are integrated over millions of years it is very difficult to draw out scientific knowledge about what 
may happen on shorter timeframes and how the system may evolve over time. It has also become 
apparent that the previous assessment methodology (which, loosely speaking, considers how 
radioactivity could “leak out” so as to calculate risk) actually undermines the presentation and
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communication of the concepts underpinning deep geological disposal in which the physical and 
natural barriers both act to contain radionuclides.
Chapter 11 examined evolving ways of re-presenting the output of the performance assessment 
and the complex system that will develop around a radioactive waste repository. The limitations of 
using a single parameter to represent performance over a single (and very long) time period into 
the far future were examined and representational methods to address this were considered. 
Broadly speaking, alternative representational methods broke down future time into discrete 
periods and increased the use of qualitative supporting evidence (such as analogues) for 
environmental processes in the different time periods. However, there was a concern that 
changing the representation of risk for a wider audience would reduce its robustness to peer 
review and expert regulation -  which continue to be requirements for the development of a 
legitimate scientific knowledge platform on which to base environmental decisions.
Following on from this, Chapter 12 examined the use of visual language as a means of presenting 
complex scientific knowledge conceptually. Analysis of the work suggested three important 
issues needed to be addressed if visual language was to be more than just a sophisticated 
communication tool. Firstly, the importance of context and framing was identified and the need to 
be open to other forms of expression. Secondly, the process of developing visual language 
presentations was as valuable as the output in terms of engendering shared understanding. 
Thirdly, design choices exerted a strong influence over the output and the manner in which the 
output is received. Legitimate design choices need to be made which meet the needs of the 
audiences. All of these issues mean that there needs to be opportunities for involvement 
throughout the development of a visual language representation of a scientific topic -  i.e. 
continuous dialogue between specialists bringing expert knowledge to the debate, and other 
participants seeking to engage with, and contribute to the debate.
Based on these findings, a new framework for scientific knowledge building in support of 
environmental decision-making needs to provide certain things. The process of scientific 
knowledge building needs to provide opportunities for involvement and dialogue throughout the 
knowledge building process. This includes involvement very early on when the knowledge 
platform is being specified, framed and designed. As part of this discussion, consideration should 
be given to how to breakdown the time period of concern into manageable chunks (timeframes). 
The number of timeframes required will depend on the decision-problem and the timescales of 
concern.
Additionally, the resulting scientific knowledge base needs to be sufficiently flexible to respond to 
the needs and interests of potential audiences from outside the expert community. This flexibility 
needs to recognise the importance of context (for example why are you proposing certain design 
aspects) and assumptions (about what will happen in the future) which tend to be implicitly
238
accepted amongst a specialist audience. Cultural attitudes and design issues will strongly affect 
this flexibility. Enhanced use of supporting evidence based on environmental observations may 
encourage involvement but such supporting evidence needs to be described and represented in a 
manner that meets the needs of the audience -  which requires careful consideration of who the 
potential audiences are;
And finally, the scientific knowledge base needs to be developed with sufficient rigour and 
analytical precision that consequential risk calculations remain robust to detailed peer review. The 
expert community remains an important, if not the most important audience for risk analysis and 
risk analysis remains an explicit user of scientific knowledge. The need to provide methods that 
evaluate compliance with environmental standards in a scientifically robust manner cannot be 
overstated.
All these issues combine to provide a new framework for the presentation and discussion of the 
scientific knowledge underpinning deep geological disposal. Whilst this new framework may not 
significantly change the cognitive content of the knowledge base, the hope is that it will to better 
meet the needs of a more consultative approach to decisions about the management of 
radioactive wastes.
13.2 A new framework for scientific analysis
Analysis has always been central to the scientific method. Given the continued need for expert 
regulation in environmental decision-making, analysis should continue with a central role in 
scientific knowledge building. The question is how can the analytical process be opened up so that 
other stakeholders and public constituents can engage with the underlying scientific principles and 
influence the analytical content?
Based on the preceding research, the following issues need to be considered:
• The analysis needs to be robust to scientific and technical peer review
• Context ( whether scientific or non-scientific) should be explicitly discussed from the beginning 
of the analytical process
• Opportunities for non-expert input should be created as early as possible
• The analytical process should be open to non-expert input (if any) from the beginning.
• The analysis needs to enable an evaluation of compliance with environmental standards
• The analysis needs a balanced presentation of calculations of risk, expected performance and 
levels of safety
• The analysis should recognise the importance of early timeframes in the minds of many 
stakeholders
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• Opportunities for stakeholder involvement in making the value judgements that define the 
analytical process (e.g scenarios) should be provided at the earliest opportunity
• Stakeholder concerns can and should be explicitly addressed
• A range of ways of indicating performance should be considered
• Whilst the adoption of conservatism in modelling assumptions remains valid and necessary for 
robust calculations, it may not command confidence for the non-expert audience.
If analytical methods can be adapted to address these issues, then the analysis can developed 
from debate and discussions between lay and expert audiences. As discussed in Chapter 9, at 
the very least this requires a shift of analytical focus away from the cleverness and complexity of 
the model calculation and also requires that stakeholder concerns are addressed as part of the 
analysis -  particularly when values are to be considered.
Visual Language offers a tool that can help with this shift in focus. The hierarchical presentation of 
information provides a flexible tool which can be developed and built upon as dialogue proceeds. 
However, opportunities for dialogue need to be created, and individuals need to be identified with 
responsibility to develop visual language representations based on the output of this dialogue. 
Iterations are required before a truly shared scientific understanding will be captured visually.
Once captured, this understanding can be used as the basis for analysis. In order to communicate 
to both audiences using the same underlying scientific knowledge, the challenge therefore is to 
develop a methodology that can meet expert and regulatory requirements whilst demonstrably 
responding to stakeholder concerns. The balance between these two drivers will depend on the 
manner in which the analysis is to be used within a decision-making process and the nature of the 
decision-making process itself.
And finally, there is little point in re-inventing the wheel. The focus here is on evolution of 
analytical methodologies, rather than developing a revolutionary approach which would not be 
easily accepted by those experts with years of experience in the business of risk analysis. 
Therefore, the approach adopted in this thesis is to work with an established and peer reviewed 
process to enable its adaptation into a more inclusive analytical approach.
13.3 Illustration: How might this framework apply to performance assessment 
methods for radioactive waste disposal?
The framework described above is very general. Below, its specific application for the 
development of a new analytical approach for the assessment of deep geological disposal is 
outlined, in order to consider its practical implications.
Many countries adopt an approach to performance assessment that are centred upon an analysis 
of environmental processes and scenarios about how they might combine in the future (scenario
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analysis). For example, in the UK, Nirex has developed a five stage approach to performance 
assessment [Bailey and Billington 1997], as indicated in Figure 44. In this approach, a systematic 
analysis of all the features, events and processes (FEPs) relevant to the performance of the 
disposal concept leads to the identification of a base scenario and a number of variant scenarios 
that define potential evolutions of the repository. Each scenario is represented by a range of 
conceptual models, developed from a knowledge of the FEPs operating in the scenario.
Figure 44: The Nirex 5-stage assessment methodology
1. FEP Analysis -  
auditable, comprehensive,
5. Confidence building -  
peer review, stakeholder
The feasibility and practicality of integrating stakeholder views into different processes of scenario 
definition requires consideration. In common with many other countries, Nirex has developed an 
approach to scenario development that uses very structured analysis of the features, events and 
processes that could affect the repository evolution (the FEP analysis approach) [Nirex, 1998b],
The approach has been reviewed and endorsed by the scientific peer community. However, partly 
because of its robustness and structure, it has some limitations in terms of taking on board the 
concerns (value judgements) of others. The methodology allows for the screening of features if 
they are deemed to be of low probability or consequence. Alternatively, they may be “subsumed” 
into other scenarios. If this process of screening and subsuming to establish key scenarios is 
undertaken in isolation from the values of non-expert stakeholder groups it can appear as if FEPs 
of genuine concern to some stakeholders may be lost from the calculations.
producing structured FEP 
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2. Scenario and conceptual
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defining basflscenario and
M r
3. Mathematical model
developm ent
1
4. Software development
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This is matter of method application. The FEP analysis approach provides a logical, systematic 
and comprehensive framework for developing scenarios for investigation in a performance 
assessment process. It could be applied in a manner that involves stakeholders in the process of 
identifying scenarios, screening and subsuming. In this way, the base scenario could be, at a 
minimum, supplemented by the additional exploration of variant “what-if” scenarios derived during 
dialogue or expected to be of concern to stakeholders.
The FEP analysis approach to scenario development is inherently reductionist -  it seeks to break 
a complex system down into component parts and their interactions. This is one of its strengths 
since this breakdown offers real potential for the incorporation of extended facts and local 
knowledge within a structured framework of scientific knowledge. However, it also leads to 
challenges because of its underlying assumption that we can identify all the necessary processes 
and couplings between processes. Complex system studies suggest that a more holistic approach 
to the overall system may be a better way of tacking what might happen in the future. However, 
these areas of study are highly innovative and require learning on the part of the specialists, let 
alone the lay publics. Meanwhile, the view of performance assessment specialists is that the use 
of a known and structured system such as is offered by the FEP analysis approach can be used to 
draw together and balance various forms of lay knowledge.
Scenarios are fundamentally conceptual. Hence in my opinion, the conceptual models used to 
underpin the mathematical analysis of risk in a performance assessment offer a way forward. 
These conceptual models seek to capture what is known and what is not known about the physical 
and chemical processes that may give rise to environmental problems. If this were the focus for 
dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders, social negotiation can then occur around tangible 
concepts - rivers and streams, rainfall and crops, weather and pollution. These are issues with 
which people have direct knowledge, whether specialist or experiential.
In the Nirex five stage process (Figure 44), Stages 1 and 2 (FEP analysis and conceptual model 
and scenario development) are essentially qualitative and descriptive exercises. Given the 
research described above, they are stages that lend themselves to debate and discussion which 
need not be contained within the expert community. Visual Language, with its hierarchical 
approach to information and its ability to identify links and consequences multidimensionally offers 
a tool to assist in such debate. For this to occur, there must be a willingness to open up the FEP 
analysis work and scenario development stages to wider discussion. This has significant time and 
resource implications.
Since FEP lists already exists, and pre-existing assessments already contain predefined 
scenarios, it is very tempting, when time is of essence, to undertake Stages 1 and 2 by returning to 
pre-existing information without any further questioning. This approach prioritises the technically 
demanding task of developing mathematical models over the socially and ethically demanding task
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of debating issues and environmental futures. New approaches to analysis for environmental 
decision making need to rethink these priorities and consider what is most significant in developing 
a legitimate knowledge base on which to make decisions.
Given the lessons learned from the previous research, the need for an inclusive approach to 
stages 1 and 2 in Figure 44 (and equivalent stages in other analytical approaches and 
performance assessment methods) is significant. The interest in time and scenarios shown by the 
participants in the dialogue described in Chapter 10 suggests that there is great merit in using the 
scenarios as a vehicle for dialogue, perhaps with a greater delineation of time within the 
assessment. This idea has been used to propose a new approach to performance assessment 
based on the identification of discrete timeframes and the subsequent description of important 
features, events and processes for each timeframe. However, this raises important questions 
about how should timeframes be defined, who should define them and how should common FEPs 
in different timeframes be linked.
13.3.1 Timeframe definition
One approach to defining the timeframes could be based on the evolution of the repository 
system, with timeframes being distinguished by the importance of certain significant FEPs. For 
example, timeframes could be defined by: the period of institutional control; the expected time of 
container integrity; or the period for which the geosphere can be assumed to remain in more or 
less its current form. This approach provides a clear link to the changes in the repository system
with time, but needs to acknowledge the uncertainty associated with the timing of particular FEPs
becoming important and hence with the definition of the timeframes.
An alternative approach would be to define timeframes to reflect the periods of interest to 
stakeholders. This latter approach provides a clear mechanism for stakeholders to make early 
inputs to the assessment process, but may not always be easy to integrate into the production of a 
safety assessment that has to respond to scientific and technically-defined regulatory 
requirements.
The challenge then is for an approach which simultaneously:
• accommodates the uncertainty in the timing of the impact of particular FEPs;
• presents a clear view of the most likely repository system evolution; and
• enables stakeholders to make inputs to the assessment process and explore a range of 
different assumptions regarding the timeframes of interest to them.
It is believed the above requirements can be achieved if, rather than defining timeframes 
sequentially, they are ‘nested’. Nesting means that for modelling purposes each timeframe is
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started at time zero, but the timeframes extend for progressively longer periods, as indicated 
schematically in Figure 45.
Figure 45: Alternative approaches to timeframe definition
TF1
Sequential
timeframes:
TF2 TF3 TF4
time
Nested TF1 
timeframes
TF2
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Dividing the assessment timescales into different timeframes will provide flexibility to model each 
timeframe in a different way. This will be true for both nested or sequential timeframes. Each 
timeframe can be analysed differently (for example, encompassing different FEPs and hence 
different conceptual models, using different ranges of parameter values and even different 
assessment software). The aim is that by allowing this flexibility it may be possible to use tighter 
definitions of repository conditions, particularly for the earlier timeframes, and hence produce a 
more meaningful and robust assessment. It also increases the ability of the assessment to 
incorporate directly issues and concerns raised by stakeholder dialogue programme such as that 
presented in Chapter 10.
Chapter 12 identifies the potential of supporting arguments and analogues for informing dialogue. 
Whilst this is not a new idea, there has been little progress in explicitly linking supporting 
arguments and risk calculations for ten years. Either approach to timeframes would enable 
supporting evidence to be woven into the fabric of the assessment (for example, alternative 
performance indicators, the use of natural analogues, confidence arguments, heterogeneity 
representation and new methods of risk communication), rather than just present them as add­
ons. For example, natural analogues could be presented up front as arguments in support of the 
conceptual assumptions made for a particular timeframe, and there would be the flexibility to look 
at different performance indicators in different timeframes, rather than focusing solely on meeting a 
radiological risk target. This would shift the focus of the performance assessment more towards 
describing the factors that contribute to safety, rather than just calculating risk.
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A key difference between a sequential and nested timeframes approach is that with the former the 
decision on when to move from one representation of the system (timeframe) to the next is made 
at the stage of defining the basis for the performance assessment, whereas with nested 
timeframes sufficient information is presented to enable the assessment audience to make this 
decision if they so choose. This means that stakeholders can explore different possibilities by 
deciding when to make the transition between timeframes. The sequential timeframes approach 
would be less flexible to such ‘what if?’ queries regarding the timing of particular FEPs as it would 
be necessary to define and assess a new timeframe sequence (timeline) for each scenario.
13.3.2 Constructing an assessment based on timeframes
In view of the uncertainty regarding when particular FEPs might be of most importance, it is 
sensible not to define the timeframes too tightly based on elapsed time. Instead, each timeframe 
could be defined in terms of the aspects of the repository system that are contributing to its overall 
safety and the timeframes will overlap and be open-ended.
However, it is considered that it will also be important to define a “base scenario” that gives a 
broadbrush description of a reasonable expectation of how the repository system may evolve. 
This base scenario would include a recommendation of how each timeframe relates to the others 
(as illustrated in Figure 46). It is suggested that the base scenario be defined on a cautious, but 
not overly pessimistic, basis. In addition to the base scenario, a number of variant scenarios 
would also be considered to deal with uncertainty about the way the timeframes of the FEPs relate 
to each other and to enable the assessment to consider the implications of FEPs not included in 
the base scenario. Determination of which variant scenarios to be considered could be the subject 
of further debate and discussion based on the articulation of specific stakeholder concerns such as 
those indicated in Box 7.
Figure 46: Construction of a base scenario from nested timeframes
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As an illustration, the following five timeframes could be used to form the base scenario:
Timeframe 1 -  waste containers as emplaced, repository backfilled and closed 
Timeframe 2 -  physical and chemical barriers evolving, institutional control of repository site 
Timeframe 3 -  chemical barrier operating as designed, near-field reducing conditions 
established
Timeframe 4 -  homogeneous near field, stable geological barrier 
Timeframe 5 -  system responding to external change 
In constructing the assessment, for each timeframe consideration would be given to the following:
• The definition of the timeframe, in terms of the importance of key FEPs relevant to changes in
the repository system (the base scenario description).
• An indicative timescale (i.e. the period within the base scenario for which the timeframe 
assumptions might reasonably be considered appropriate).
• Confidence arguments -  natural analogues and other arguments which support the scientific 
basis adopted in the base scenario, i.e. those used to define the timeframe.
• Relevant performance indicators.
• General modelling approaches, including:
• appropriate model scales;
• importance and relevance of different components of the repository system;
• importance and relevance of different pathways.
• Potential variant scenarios for consideration. For example, human intrusion into the repository 
would need to be considered as a possibility from Timeframe 3 onwards, once there is no 
longer institutional control over the site.
The assessment would include a description of the base scenario. Assessment results would then 
be presented for each timeframe (for example a chapter on each timeframe). Each timeframe 
chapter would include an explanation of the modelling approaches and their results, covering all 
the key impacts of the base scenario. Confidence arguments and comparisons with natural 
analogues would be interwoven in the discussion to explain how the repository system provides 
safety on the timescale in question. In particular, for the earliest timeframe it would be
emphasised that there is confidence the only releases from the waste packages would be gas.
For this earliest timeframe, the assessment results would focus on showing illustrations of the 
decay of levels of radioactivity within the waste packages.
Figure 47 provides an illustration of what could be envisaged for a post-closure performance 
assessment of a deep geological repository.
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Figure 47. Possible base scenarios for a timeframes-based approach to
performance assessment
m Timeframe 1: Waste containers as emplaced■ Institutional control and monitoring (may include long-term storage period)■ Physical barrier intact, containment of radionuclides■ Repository starting to resaturate
■ Releases limited to minor diffusive releases through vents and gaseous 
emissions
K.ev Performance Indicators
■ Decrease in radionuclide 
inventory
■ Zero flux from near field
■ Gaseous releases
Confidence arguments:
■ Steel corrosion measurements
■ Decay o f short-lived radionuclides
Modelling approaches:
■ Decay within packages
■ Gas generation and transport
Timeframe 2: Physical and chemical barriers evolving
■ Repository fully saturated
■ Physical barrier may start to break down but wasteform limits mobility
■ Many radionuclides relatively insoluble, greatest release by diffusion
■ Degradation of organics producing complexants
■ Gas generation and migration
Key Performance Indicators
■ Decrease in inventory
■ Flux from near field
■ Gaseous releases
Confidence arguments:
■ Comparisons with corrosion of 
Roman nails
■ Cement analogues
Modelling approaches:
■ Package-scale model
■ Near-field chemistry
■ Gas modelling
Timeframe 3: Chemical barrier
■ Reducing conditions in near field fully established
■ Corrosion causes failure of significant number of packages
■ Advective-diffusive release of radionuclides, particularly those which are 
poorly sorbed
■ Gas generation and migration
Key Performance Indicators
■ Flux from near field
■ Gaseous releases
Confidence arguments:
■ Cement analogues
■ Maqarin site -  limited movement 
of radionuclides away from 
repository
Modelling approaches:
■ Repository-scale near-field model
■ Steady-state, regional-scale 
groundwater flow
Fig 47 continued overleaf
Figure 47 cont. Possible base scenarios for a timeframes-
based approach to performance assessment
Timeframe 4: Stable geological barrier
■ Most waste packages have failed, offering little resistance to radionuclide 
migration, therefore the near field is treated as homogeneous
■ Migration of radionuclides from near field through far field
Kev Performance Indicators
■ Fluxes out of near and far field
■ Radiological risk
■ Environmental effects
■ Comparisons with natural fluxes
Confidence arguments:
■ Maqarin site -  limited migration
■ Oklo -  retardation
■ Palaeohydrogeology -  geosphere 
stability
Modelling approaches:
■ Homogeneous near-field ‘soup’ 
model
■ Groundwater transport models
Timeframe 5: System responding to external change
■ Homogeneous near field
■ Migration of radionuclides from near field through far field
■ Need to consider climate change and hydrogeological changes
■ Releases to different climate states
Kev Performance Indicators
■ Radiological dose or risk
■ Comparison with background 
radiation levels
Confidence arguments:
■ Comparisons with natural radiation 
levels
Modelling approaches:
■ Homogeneous near-field ‘soup’ 
model
■ Reference geosphere
■ Reference biospheres representing 
different climate states
The modelling approach proposed for Timeframe 5 is directly comparable with that used 
throughout earlier post-closure performance assessments, (e.g Nirex 2001a). The results for 
Timeframe 5 would therefore provide a direct comparison with Nirex’s previous assessment work, 
whilst the results from the earlier timeframes will allow a more realistic evaluation of the roles of 
the barriers in containing the radionuclides at early times.
Whilst the nested timeframes approach avoids the need to define specific start and stop times and 
consistent boundary conditions for each timeframe, it will still be necessary to demonstrate 
consistency between the results from the various models at early times and to avoid the potential 
confusion of presenting multiple assessment results. These issues will need to be taken into 
account in the process of constructing the assessment. If conservatism (i.e the use of worst case 
ideas on an uncertainty issue or parameter) is being applied effectively in performance 
assessments as a means of dealing with future uncertainty, then this should result in a gradually 
worsening risk result as the timeframe of interest increases. If this is not the case, then the 
effectiveness of conservatism a means of handling uncertainty needs to be questioned.
It is suggested that variant scenarios are similarly represented on a timeframe by timeframe basis. 
A worst case scenario could be developed collaboratively for each timeframe. This would be 
presented in terms of all the things that would have to go wrong for the scenario to materialise, 
whilst explaining the mitigating features that would help to prevent each happening. This would 
ensure that these low probability scenarios are given appropriate conceptual consideration and are 
‘visible’ to stakeholders.
Overall, the evolved methodology suggests a move away from presenting continuous risk-time 
curves, with the implication that the assessment is predicting what will happen at specific times. 
Instead, the focus would be on explaining why it is believed that the repository will be safe over 
each of the timeframes and what the expected impact (whether that is risk, flux out of the 
repository etc.) will be within each timeframe. Additionally, information would be presented on the 
worst, reasonably conceivable, scenarios for each timeframe.
The proposed approach will present some new challenges for research programmes, in that by 
increasing the focus on the earlier timeframes it will be necessary to develop a more detailed 
understanding of how the repository system is likely to evolve, including, for example, the 
resaturation phase and the effects of gas release and two-phase flow. Overall, it is hoped there 
will be less reliance on conservative assumptions for modelling processes and a greater 
conceptual understanding of the repository system behaviour.
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13.4 Next Steps
The next obvious step in this research would be to trial the methodology using stakeholders 
perhaps drawn from the focus groups described in Chapter 10. However, this has not been 
possible within the scope of this research. Obviously any engagement with stakeholders has an 
affect on the relationships and levels of trust at play. There is continued uncertainty over UK policy 
for radioactive waste disposal. At the time of this research, Nirex considered it injudicious to 
pursue further dialogue on such a specific issue as the post closure performance of a deep 
geological repository. Understandably, a concentration on one option, and a specific aspect of 
that option could imply that the much broader policy dialogue being undertaken by DEFRA was 
not truly an open discussion.
13.5 Generic application -  How would this framework be applied for building 
scientific knowledge in support of environmental decisions
13.5.1 Generic conclusions
The illustration given above suggests that without significant change to individual elements of 
traditional method and practice it should be possible to create increased opportunities for non 
expert audiences to be involved in the process of performance assessment. The illustration 
focuses on how to improve early involvement in developing conceptual knowledge about possible 
futures and in establishing an appropriate scope and design for a mathematical assessment of 
risks. Visual language work looking at new ways of bringing information into dialogue can be 
combined iteratively with analyses to build a knowledge platform about important timeframes and 
important features, events and processes that is equally relevant to lay audiences and specialists. 
However, for this to occur, the process of dialogue and interaction has to be seen to be as 
important as the output of visual language or risk assessments.
In more general terms, the proposed new framework for the development of scientific knowledge 
and the analysis of risks to the environment requires some significant changes to scientific practice 
in support of environmental decision making:
• A willingness on the part of scientists to open up their work, and be responsive to discussion 
and debate early in the analytical process
• An increased focus on the context surrounding the analysis
• A willingness to use descriptive methods to discuss underlying concepts and understanding
• An ability to think flexibly about the scope of the analysis and the value of different sources of 
information
However, these changes are more about attitude and about clearly understanding the role of the 
analysis than about methodological changes or changes to the analytical tools. Most competent
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scientists will already be fully aware of the context for their analysis and of any ambiguity in the 
way it relates to the decision-in-hand. Openess about these issues become a pre-requisite for an 
analytical-deliberative approach to environmental decision-making.
The biggest challenges will be about attitude changes. Even in this area, many competent 
scientists are aware of the need for greater openess and dialogue about their work. However, 
their attitude towards this dialogue may currently conform to a defecit model or may be strongly 
influenced by past dialogues with experts from “opposing” schools of thought or from non- 
Governmental Organisations. Time will be the main factor in changing this -  time and experience 
in applying a deliberative framework for scientific knowledge building.
Another aspect of attitude change, will be the need for increased flexibility in thinking about and 
articulating the potential for environmental harm. In the performance assessment illustration given 
above, the definition of timeframes, the FEPs important within the timeframe and the way the 
timeframes link together into a base scenario and variant scenarios provide the platform for 
description and discussion of conceptual knowledge. These ideas:
• What timeframes are important
• What are the important features, events and processes that distinguish them from each other
• How do they link together into a prediction of the future
Are common to all considerations of environmental risk and all analytical procedures involving the 
future ( e.g. a HAZOP study, a safety case for a new installation, a risk analysis for a landfill 
facility). However, quite often, these considerations are undertaken implicitly and then described 
once the analysis has been done when the report is being written up. The new framework 
suggests a much more explicit treatment of these issues and a declaration of them much earlier in 
the process. The aim of this early declaration is to initiate an iterative and recursive dialogue 
process between the analysts, and other stakeholders and interested public constituents.
Different individuals learn and think in different ways. If an aim of the early articulation of 
scenarios is to promote dialogue is will be valuable for individuals to be involved who think and 
work best in a descriptive, qualitative manner. This is one of the reasons why Earth scientists (as 
a group) may be significantly affected by the proposed framework.
13.5.2 The significance of conceptual geoscience
Hopefully the value of the Earth sciences will have already been apparent in the preceding 
discussion. Essentially, the evolved analytical approach relies more heavily on supporting 
evidence and on being more explicit about the environmental processes that could be operating in 
different timeframes into the far future. Earth science, with its emphasis on interpreting 
environmental observations in terms of processes operating in the past is a key source of 
evidence for both these issues.
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T h e  proposed framework is encouraging a greater emphasis on the description of important 
tim efram es and important features, events and processes within those timeframes. Earth 
scientis ts  and conceptual geoscience has always informed these considerations. However, the 
n e w  framework is encouraging these considerations to be undertaken much more openly, and to 
b e  used to stimulate iterative and recursive dialogue with non-experts. Earth scientists will be 
im p ortan t individuals to involve in this dialogue. Indeed, conceptual geoscience is well placed to 
a c t  in this capacity since it is interpretive, qualitative and heuristic. As long as it is backed up by 
s o lid  scientific theory, precedence and evidence then there is considerable potential for it to whet 
th e  appetite of non-specialist audiences and encourage input and debate.
It w a s  noticeable at the RCF Public Inquiry presented in Chapter 9 that a large proportion of the 
cross-exam ination about the science of Nirex’s proposals at Sellafield involved geoscientific 
considerations and differences of opinion fuelled by geological uncertainty. This emphasis cannot 
be v e ry  different to that expected when considering proposals for toxic waste disposal and climate 
c h a n g e  implications since over long timescales, thinking inevitably turns towards the 
environm ental processes which are the subject of the Earth sciences. This is not to say that 
considerations of societal and biological futures are less important. They are not. However, on 
lo n g  timescales and large spatial scales, societal and biological futures generally receive a more 
statistical treatment and there is a shorter period of historical evidence to draw in to long term 
fu tu re  predictions.
13 .5 .3  Would this respond to the needs of expert regulation?
It is important that the proposed approach is consistent with regulatory requirements and capable 
of eventually being applied as part of a regulatory submission. Guidance on regulatory 
requirem ents in the UK is publicly available. However, as with any regulatory guidance, it can be 
o p e n  to interpretation. Past performance assessments have been presented as focussed on 
determ in ing consistency with the quantitative risk target laid down in the regulatory guidance. If 
this w as  all that was done, this could be seen as a very narrow interpretation of the guidance, 
w h ich  also sets out a number of qualitative principles such as the use of best science and the 
application of multiple lines of reasoning.
T h e  assessment methodology proposed here would remain consistent with past, quantitative 
approaches since it will deliver a risk calculation in Timeframes 4 and 5. However, it will also 
respo nd  more explicitly to the broader considerations set out in the regulatory guidance by 
integrating evidence from analogue studies, underlying research and performance indicators other 
than risk into the overall approach.
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13.5.4 Would this assist social inclusion?
The methodology outlined above has the potential to remove some of the barriers to dialogue 
described in the preceding chapters of this thesis:
•  It avoids the need to judge the exact timing of FEPs -  timeframes are defined on the basis of 
key characteristics of the repository evolution, rather than with reference to elapsed time.
•  The approach is consistent with previous published approaches, but provides more flexibility.
•  The use of nested timeframes, with different modelling approaches in each, should enable a 
more accurate representation of the repository system for early times, whilst the approach 
proposed for the longest timeframe provides a direct comparison with previous modelling 
approaches.
•  Confidence arguments and the use of natural analogues are interwoven into the assessment, 
hopefully providing an overall assessment that will be more meaningful to stakeholders.
•  The approach addresses stakeholder concerns by placing more emphasis on the early 
timeframes and allows stakeholders to explore a range of ‘what if?’ scenarios by presenting 
nested, open-ended timeframes with different modelling approaches.
•  Effectively, calculations would be performed for a series of different conceptual models of the 
repository system. Each conceptual model would be most relevant over a particular timeframe 
and the base scenario would describe a view on the most appropriate times to move between 
the conceptual models. However by nesting the timeframes, stakeholders are afforded the 
opportunity to form their own views on the time periods over which they believe each conceptual 
model to be valid. It is therefore hoped that this timeframes-based approach would not only 
provide the flexibility to take on board new trends in performance assessment, but will also be 
more meaningful to stakeholders.
13.5.5 Implications for practical application
Although the proposed framework seeks to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, there are a 
number of practical implications associated with its adoption. The complexity of the modelling 
requirements for such an approach have not been considered here. Whilst I do not believe that 
the proposed framework necessarily affects the mathematical model adopted for risk analysis, 
there must be some question over the level of data available to support a greater emphasis on 
conceptual models for a range of different timeframes and for a range of variant scenarios. 
Nevertheless, even developing the conceptual models for a performance assessment using the 
above approach will yield some benefit since it will move the mathematical modellers out of their 
comfort zone, and provide opportunities for stakeholder engagement that have not existed in the 
past. Even if the tried and tested mathematical models are used for the calculations (because the
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data to support an evolved approach to not exist), the presentation and documentation of the 
performance assessment will be subtly different by having a different approach to conceptual 
development applied at the beginning of the process.
13.6 To what extent has the research identified new platforms for dialogue?
This section has explored the hypothesis that there may be sufficient common interest in the 
conceptual issues that underpin the risk analysis process for conceptual models to act as a vehicle 
for shared knowledge building. The work presented above shows that there is considerable 
interest in talking about environmental issues at a conceptual level and that careful use of visual 
techniques can help to promote such discussion. The attitude of the scientists will be a deciding 
factor on whether such dialogue is successful in enabling shared knowledge building and social 
inclusion in the analytical process.
A framework for scientific knowledge building in the future has been put forward. The implications 
of this on scientific practice do not appear to be significant but should increase the profile of 
geoscientific information in both the analytical process and in deliberation. Conceptual geoscience 
could thus become a pivotal factor in adopting an analytical approach to environmental decision­
making.
However, the extent to which adopting these new approaches will engender a common platform of 
knowledge has to be questioned. In the absence of any testing of the proposed method, this 
question cannot be adequately addressed. Nevertheless, there are indicators that some 
stakeholders will continue to be excluded, or will self-exclude themselves. However, there does 
seem to be sufficient evidence that the new approaches advocated, and in particular the visual 
language have real potential to act as vehicles for debate, even if the resulting platform of 
knowledge is not truly shared.
In the following chapter, these conclusions are summarised against a general overview of the work 
contained in all three of the Sections of this thesis.
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14 CONCLUSIONS -  CAN WE IDENTIFY PLATFORMS FOR ITERATIVE 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE BUILDING AND SOCIAL LEARNING?
The thesis started with the question:
“How can we get the right science in an appropriate social context to build an effective 
knowledge base for decision-making?
This question is about building capacity -  developing a shared understanding with which to 
inform decision-making. However, as research into this question has progressed, an 
alternative and highly practical subsidiary question has emerged:
“What would help different stakeholders and public constituents engage in dialogue about 
scientific knowledge?
In this chapter, my conclusions are presented in an attempt to respond to both these 
questions and consider their implications on scientific practice. During the course of this 
research, the rather simplistic notion that I started with -  that we should use risk analysis 
more effectively in public dialogue -  has been overturned. The dependencies between 
knowledge, values and individual characteristics are so complex that no single action on 
behalf of an individual or a group will make the difference between a legitimate process 
and a dictatorial one. Hence I pursued a notion of developing a shared knowledge 
platform, or providing a vehicle for dialogue.
14.1 An outline of the preceding research
Section 1 of the thesis examined the social science and risk literature in order to identify the 
issues that are faced by decision-makers in the contemporary environmental arena. Issues 
such as:
• the move towards deliberative and inclusive decision-making processes;
• the nature of participation and the difficulties of collective choice; and
• the cultural nature of risk and the treatment of future uncertainty in risk analyses 
are explored in general theoretical terms.
Section 1 concludes that a platform to enable knowledge building involving both 
scientific/expert and lay audiences could help the process of dialogue about environmental 
decisions. This presents significant challenges for the scientist. Earth sciences may have 
some particular attributes that can assist.
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Section 2 examines the suitability of risk analyses as a platform for shared knowledge 
building. These have been the traditional vehicles for scientific knowledge in environmental 
decision-making. The specific case of radioactive waste management is considered in 
some detail. Past practices and (post-closure) performance assessment methods for the 
deep geological disposal of radioactive wastes are examined to consider:
• challenges to the way they treat uncertainty;
• the extent to which value judgements influence the analysis;
• whether the relationship between the analysis and the decision-making process are 
clear and hence whether the analysis is fit for purpose.
Section 2 concludes that there are some very real limitations to the use of post-closure 
performance assessments for wider dialogue, primarily resulting from its highly quantitative 
nature.
Therefore, in Section 3, more qualitative ways of communicating both the risk from, and the 
concepts underlying post-closure performance assessments are examined. Issues 
expressed by the public are described, based on an independently facilitated consultation 
process. An (as yet untested) evolved methodology has been proposed that seeks to 
integrate all these studies into a viable risk analysis process for radioactive waste disposal. 
It is hoped that this method will measure up to peer review, will respond to regulatory 
requirements and will provide opportunities for lay audiences to engage and contribute at 
an early stage.
• Figure 48 Linking between different elements of this research
Dialogue 
What are the areas of concern 
with deep geological disposal?
Participatory risk assessment 
Can we integrate dialogue and analysis?
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Risk communication 
Can we present risk 
results in a more 
meaningful way?
isual Languag
Can we encourage 
debate about the 
underpinning 
concepts?
14.2 The challenges scientists face from an analytic-deliberative approach 
to decision-making
The process for environmental decision-making is changing (Chapter 2). As the move 
toward combining analysis and deliberation in environmental decision-making gains 
momentum, the implications for scientists and scientific practice are becoming increasingly 
apparent (Chapter 8). New decision-making processes provide new context for scientific 
knowledge.
Three inter-related issues emerge that are individually very threatening for scientists. 
Collectively, they suggest that new thinking is required if scientific knowledge is to continue 
to influence socially inclusive processes.
• Scientists have lost the executive power they once enjoyed as a result of holding 
expert knowledge. Too many situations have now been experienced where scientific 
knowledge has been shown to be limited or hotly disputed. Trust in experts is at an all 
time low, and hence the power of scientific knowledge has been significantly reduced 
(Chapter 3).
• Where uncertainty3 is high, the influence of subjective judgements, based on personal 
value systems and ethics, has been exposed by the work of people like Brian Wynne 
(Chapter 4). This does not sit comfortably with the notion of a scientific method that is 
impartial, value free and is based on the systematic interpretation of observations.
• Scientists no longer have control over dialogue about scientific knowledge. The frames 
of reference used by some scientists are not necessarily shared by other stakeholders, 
which means that scientific knowledge is often viewed from perspectives that differ 
from those of scientists (Chapter 3). This was evidenced at the RCF Public Inquiry 
where the scope of the discussions placed a lot of focus on the Nirex 95 performance 
assessment although the Nirex scientists were focussed on more recent information 
(Chapter 7).
It is quite tempting to ignore these issues as not being relevant to scientific practice. An 
argument could be advanced that the scientific method is tried and tested and is not aimed 
at the non-scientific community and hence the issues outlined above are not the scientists
a Here, as in the rest of the thesis except where otherwise mentioned, the term “uncertainty” is used 
in a general sense to mean lack of certainty, whatever the cause.
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problem. Unfortunately, there are signs that this rather parochial attitude results in a 
downplaying of the value of scientific knowledge in the decision-making process. In 
consequence the decisions will not be well founded in an observational understanding of 
environmental processes and one of the conditions for deeply sustainable solutions (a 
broad and deep exploration of environmental issues [Chapter 2]) will not be met.
In consequence, it is my firm conviction that the scientific community needs to take action 
if it is to maintain an influential role in environmental decision-making. However, the action 
required must be constructive and outward looking, rather than parochial and paternalistic. 
Hence the focus in this thesis on identifying platforms for knowledge building that can be 
shared between scientific and lay audiences (Chapter 9).
14.3 What is required to build a shared knowledge platform?
Inclusive, stepwise decision-processes (see Chapter 6 for an example) need to be 
supported by knowledge building that is:
• Iterative; so it comes under constant and repeated scrutiny from both expert and lay 
perspectives and
• Reflexive; so that the knowledge supporting any step in the decision-process is never 
considered to be unassailable;
• Adaptive; so that it can respond to new issues arising as the decision-making process 
progresses or as new information comes into the frame.
Such iterative knowledge building is a pre-requisite for a parallel process of social learning 
(for both scientific and lay stakeholder groups). A process of social learning means that 
successive steps in the decision-process can be increasingly informed (Chapter 3). 
Therefore, a shared knowledge platform needs to be one which can adequately inform and 
respond to both experts -  who may be involved in peer review or expert regulation; and 
other stakeholders -  to enable social inclusion and permit the inclusion of lay knowledge 
(Chapter 5).
Nevertheless, experience shows that expert regulation is important in providing a “public 
champion” with the knowledge and expertise to provide effective checks and balances on 
scientific work (Chapters 5 and 7). A legitimate decision therefore requires a knowledge 
platform has scientific substance -  i.e. it is supported by rigorous, peer reviewed analysis 
and detail. At this point, I considered that risk analysis would be the obvious candidate for 
such a platform, with suitable modifications and evolutions.
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14.4 The use of risk analysis as a platform for shared knowledge building
Risk analysis is the traditional vehicle for inputting scientific knowledge into environmental 
decisions. Risk analysis generally arose for engineering decisions, but methods have been 
adapted into sophisticated analytical processes for more complex environmental decisions 
requiring consideration of potential consequences far into the future (Chapter 4). For 
radioactive waste management, this thesis uses the term (post closure) performance 
assessment for the risk analysis conducted to analyses what might happen once a deep 
geological repository is closed.
Broadly speaking, the risk analysis is a process of intellectual translation conducted in three 
stages:
• Development of conceptual foundations, based on an understanding of what is, and 
what isn.t known to develop hypotheses about current and future environmental 
processes and their cause and effect;
• Numerical representation in mathematical models, which includes thinking about how 
to represent uncertainty in a quantitative manner;
• Calculation of risks, which can then be compared with environmental standards.
For radioactive waste management, the ultimate need to compare the risk results with 
environmental standards has led to the development of highly quantitative numerical 
methods (Chapter 8). The claim is that these methods enable a systematic treatment of 
uncertainty within a mathematical framework. However, experience shows that the 
sophistication of these methods acts as a barrier to dialogue outside the specialist 
community (Chapter 8). Nevertheless, amongst the specialist audience there is a measure 
of agreement that these methods exemplify best practice in risk analysis.
Adaptation of the risk analysis to be a shared knowledge platform would have a number of 
difficulties:
• The “education” of non-specialist audiences to understand the numerical methods 
used would be an example of the deficit model of the public understanding of science. 
It may be appropriate for some audiences in some circumstances but is unlikely to be 
a good general approach since it is a one-way communicative action and rather 
paternalistic. The specialist will begin the process in a position of authority over the 
other stakeholders and this unequal power relationship would not be conducive for 
shared knowledge building.
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• Encouraging interest and involvement in the quantitative risk analysis is likely to be 
difficult, not least because of the amount of education required to understand the 
analytical process.
• The claim that the numerical methods enable a systematic treatment of uncertainty is 
challenged by contemporary thinking about science and society. If very broad 
classifications of uncertainty are considered, the risk analysis does not address issues 
of “ignorance” or “indeterminacy” since they are, by definition, uncertainties that are 
not known (Chapter 4).
My first thought was to de-emphasise the quantitative nature of the analytical process, 
and to reformulate ideas about risk analysis that were based on qualitative illustrations of 
risk. However, following research into this idea, it appeared that this would result in an 
overriding concern in the minds of the analysts - that such a qualitative approach would be 
at the expense of developing a risk analysis that meets the requirements for analytical 
rigour and precedence anticipated by expert peer review and regulation (Chapter 8 and 
11).
An alternative approach could be to focus on the first stage of the risk analysis and use 
the development of conceptual understanding as a platform for shared knowledge 
building. This would de-emphasise the quantitative nature of the analytical process for the 
purposes of dialogue with non-specialist stakeholders, but maintain it for the purposes of 
expert regulation and peer review.
14.5 Developing the conceptual foundations of risk analyses as a platform 
for shared knowledge building.
There are many examples in the literature where non-specialist stakeholders have 
expressed concerns about the environment using conceptual descriptions of 
environmental processes. These may not be articulated in the terms used by scientists, 
but that is a difference of expression, not substance. The first stage of the risk analysis is 
essentially descriptive -  descriptions that can be informed by both scientific and lay 
knowledge about environmental processes. At this stage of the risk analysis process, 
stakeholders are exploring what their concerns and issues are, and the ideas that come 
forward are non-unique and hence able to adapt towards other frames of reference.
Initially, the idea that the conceptual foundations of risk analysis could act as a platform 
for shared knowledge building was explored by considering various was of communicating 
complex information (Chapters 11 and 12). There is a plethora of methods in the literature 
for making information available and attractive to different audiences and different
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personality types. However, a key finding from the work presented in Chapters 12 was the 
importance of the purpose of making such information available. Consultation into the 
Nirex Phased Disposal Concept demonstrated that stakeholders are sufficiently 
perceptive that the way they receive information is conditioned by the motives they 
ascribe to the holder of the information (Chapter 10).
The purpose of any information provision in support of shared knowledge building should 
be to enable dialogue, not to communicate. In consequence, it is probably more important 
to get broadly appropriate and accurate information out, than to get every last detail right. 
The notion of a “right” answer where environmental risks are concerned is under 
challenge anyway. This attitude of mind will be difficult for many scientists who are 
trained to provide rigorously analysed information that is robust to highly technical and 
critical peer review. So I now consider that in certain circumstances it is necessary for 
scientists to sacrifice precision and accuracy in the interest of providing understandable 
information -  sacrificing comprehensiveness for comprehensibility.
However, the review of the Visual Language trial (Chapter 12 and Appendix F) suggested 
that even with this changed attitude, the aim of dialogue can be undermined because the 
scientist is still trying define (control?) the scope of the dialogue. A lot of power is given to 
the individual who provides the information about the conceptual underpinnings of risk 
analysis -  and in the case of the Visual Language trial this was essentially done from a 
scientific perspective. Hence there is a danger that qualitative descriptions created by 
scientists can alienate both scientific stakeholders and lay stakeholder. For the scientists 
and analysts, removal of the quantitative rigour of their work, the sacrifice of accuracy for 
understanding diluted its ability to measure up to scientific peer review. For a lay 
audience, they are being asked to accept context that is predefined by an expert 
audience. Since the frames of these two stakeholder groups are very different there is a 
high chance that the content of material prepared by scientists will not cover the context 
that the lay audience wishes to consider (Chapter 12). This is not conducive to 
encouraging stakeholder involvement in the conceptual foundations of a risk analysis.
Nevertheless, past experience in public consultations, together with the discussion groups 
described in Chapter 10 indicate that there is broad stakeholder interest in discussing the 
processes, cause and effects that affect the environment and hence give rise to risks. 
Generally speaking, such engagement needs to be proactively encouraged, but once 
engaged, sensible dialogue quickly ensues (Chapter 10).
The discussion groups described in Chapter 10 identify an important focus on (Box 6):
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• The timescales involved in thinking about the environmental impacts of radioactive 
waste disposal (e.g. “how can you get the timing right?”);and
• The scenarios that are being considered (e.g. “what would be the impact of 
earthquakes..?”)
It is possible to respond to these issues using new methods of conceiving the substance of 
the performance assessment. Evolved assessment methods that focus on environmental 
processes in different timeframes have been proposed (Chapter 13) and, theoretically at 
least, have been well received by performance assessment specialists [Bailey and 
Littleboy, 2002].
However, the practical application of these new methods has not yet been tested. The 
explicit modelling of separate timeframes will require new mathematical models and the 
evolved approach will be very data intensive. Nevertheless, even if it is not possible to 
adapt the mathematical models to directly reflect timeframes-based conceptual 
foundations, the act of describing the conceptual foundations in terms of discrete 
timeframes should have served to build technical knowledge that is shared between a wide 
range of expert and lay stakeholders.
14.6 So what?
This research has suggested to me that it will be extremely difficult to build a single 
consistent platform of shared knowledge for environmental decision-making that will serve 
all needs equally well. However, the attempt to do so will develop very valuable 
opportunities for dialogue and relationship building that will support the decision-making 
process well. The process of deliberation is as important as the material outcome of the 
deliberation. This means that practitioners would be wise to focus their attention on 
process throughout all stages of the decision-making process.
It is always dangerous to offer sweeping generalisations about different groups of people. 
Any group is not homogeneous and inevitably individual characteristics and specific 
organisational situations will exert a very strong influence over practice. Nevertheless, in 
order to highlight some of the significance of the research presented above, I have outlined 
below some of the implications for different groups of people involved in environmental 
decision-making.
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14.6.1 The significance for Earth scientists
A key thrust of these conclusions is a greater focus on qualitative descriptions and 
conceptual hypotheses about environmental processes. These provide an opportunity for 
Earth scientists to claim a leading role in the knowledge building process. In particular, 
there are three characteristics of Earth science that place it in a good position to facilitate 
shared knowledge building about the environment:
• Earth scientists have a grasp of the timescales under consideration when dealing with 
risks from radioactive wastes. The focus of Earth scientists on the evolution of the 
Earth over many millions of years in the past gives them subliminal yardsticks which 
can be used to delineate and differentiate between timescales for millions of years into 
the future (Chapter 5).
• Additionally, Earth scientists work in an essentially descriptive manner -  a key 
difference between the Earth sciences and other physical sciences. Earth scientists 
seek to identify hypotheses about the way the Earth behaves that unify environmental 
observations. These hypotheses can rarely be proven and are often non-unique 
because of the high levels of uncertainty about environmental conditions. This non­
uniqueness and lack of certainty equate very well with the difficulties of predicting what 
will happen to the environment in the future.
• Finally, Earth scientists work with the Earth and its environment. In that respect, Earth 
scientists have knowledge that is tangible to people’s experiences, which ought to 
provide many opportunities for dialogue.
However, if Earth scientists are to grasp this opportunity and take a central role in enabling 
shared knowledge building for environmental decision-making, they need to adopt an 
outward focus, rather than concentrating on their own epistemological community. This is 
difficult as it tends to detract from the scientific principles which scientists are trained to 
adopt (Chapter 5). Also, active dialogue outside a specialised audience will challenge 
mindsets and require individuals to re-appraise the way they work, the content of their 
work and the context for their work (Chapters 5 and 8). Individual characteristics will 
determine whether and how individual Earth scientists rise to these challenges. If enough 
seek to do so, then there is a chance that Earth scientists could regain a position as expert, 
innovative and informed voices in the environmental arena.
14.6.2 The significance for social scientists
As the scientific community becomes more receptive towards the idea that cultural 
influences affect their work they may become more receptive to the constructive criticism
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offered by social scientists. Social scientists may then be challenged to work constructively 
towards changing practice in response to that criticism. A recognition of the magnitude of 
the cultural change being requested of the scientists would be of great assistance, as 
would an understanding of why the scientific culture is as it is. Understanding these issues 
will be fundamental to developing mutual respect between scientists and social scientists, a 
prerequisite for real change to occur. In itself, this may require a change in attitudes on the 
part of the social scientist and a willingness to move beyond theoretical ideas of process 
and legitimacy to the practical aspects of implementation.
14.6.3 The significance for decision-makers
Those accountable for making decisions that affect the environment are, in a way, the 
sponsors of the decision-making process. The idea that a shared platform for knowledge 
building could be developed using the conceptual understanding of environmental cause 
and effect provides a focus for the decision-maker to begin weighing up the environmental 
knowledge available to inform the decision. Since the notion is that this shared knowledge 
platform is qualitative and used in dialogue, the decision-maker should have a decision- 
focus that is understandable and comprehensible. This should serve to reduce his/her 
reliance on the expert interpretation of expert processes such as risk analysis.
However, as discussed earlier, there is still a need in any legitimate decision process for 
independent expert regulation and review. The development of a shared knowledge 
platform in no way changes this. Neither does it inhibit it since the idea is that risk analyses 
can be developed from the shared knowledge platform and regulated according to 
legislation. The decision-maker therefore still has access to an independent expert voice 
about the environmental implications and risks associated with the decision. However, the 
foundations of the risk analysis may be more readily accessible to him/her which should 
increase the meaningfulness of the risk calculations.
14.6.4 The significance for stakeholders and public constituents
The ideas offered in this thesis will only affect stakeholders and public constituents if they 
engage in opportunities for dialogue about environmental decisions. Additionally, it is 
probable that debate about the conceptual understanding of environmental processes will 
only occur once such stakeholders and public participants are quite extensively and 
actively engaged in dialogue about a decision. However, once so involved, the idea of 
being involved in building a shared knowledge platform based on qualitative knowledge 
and experience will engender a feeling of empowerment and involvement in the decision- 
process. It is also possible to speculate that it may also lead to an increased level of lay
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interest in the risk analysis itself, something that I originally conceived as a desired 
endpoint of this thesis.
14.6.5 The significance for campaigners
Those campaigning against a project will seek for weaknesses in both the decision-process 
and the knowledge on which the decision is being built. The development of a shared 
knowledge platform will not change that. However, it may act as a focus for the challenges 
of such campaigners. Such challenges are, of themselves very valuable for knowledge 
building. This may be a way of enabling more constructive dialogue between those who 
otherwise could be considered opponents. It is not possible whether this will be seen as a 
good thing or a bad thing by the campaigners -  that depends on the motivation behind the 
campaign.
14.6.6 The significance of individuality and specificity
As the empirical work described in Section 3 has progressed, I have become increasingly 
aware that the success of using conceptual understanding as a shared knowledge platform 
to enable dialogue will be very dependent on:
• The personal characteristics of those involved in its development; and
• There being a very clear contextual relationship between conceptual knowledge, 
risk analysis and the different stages of the decision-making process which it is 
seeking to inform.
These issues are themselves the subject of active and extensive research and are very 
dependant on policy frameworks, organisational structure and culture. Therefore, there 
appears to be no single definitive recipe for developing a legitimate knowledge base for 
environmental decision-making. However, the hypothesis that we seek vehicles that 
enable shared knowledge building at a conceptual level should at least get different 
stakeholder groups talking with each other about environmental processes in a meaningful 
manner. In this way, a knowledge platform may be built that can support both the detailed 
technical and quantitative calculation (analysis) and the contextual dialogue (deliberation) 
called for an analytic-deliberative approach to decision-making. The proposed framework 
for scientific knowledge building around conceptual models showed signs of this emerging 
for the issue of radioactive waste management despite the very ambiguous context for 
radioactive waste management prevalent in the UK at the time of the research.
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14.7 Concluding Thoughts
This uncertain policy framework fuelled my ambition to undertake this thesis in the first 
place. The ambiguity of policy in the nineties meant that although people talked to each 
other, it is difficult to conclude that true dialogue occurred. As I write now, the Department 
of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is in the middle of a six-year policy development 
process for managing radioactive wastes safely. Until policy is decided, little progress can 
be made with finding a solution for the problem of our radioactive wastes. Although 
frustrations with this policy vacuum are now emerging in many different ways, it does 
provide an opportunity to reflect on how to improve the quality of scientific dialogue in the 
future. If by doing so we can prevent failure of decision-processes in the future then we will 
have made our own contribution to managing the present day (and increasing) risks from 
radioactive wastes.
As in so many areas, it is no longer possible to impose ideas on society by claiming 
superior knowledge and training. Whilst society still wants to have experts and expertise, 
and continues to be happy to be guided by such expertise, the relationship between society 
and experts has changed significantly over the past few decades. Experts no longer 
command authority by virtue of being experts -  they need to demonstrate personal 
credibility and integrity at the same time. Such characteristics emerge from the way 
experts behave, amongst other experts, in the public arena and in their personal lives. It is 
no longer enough to state that rigorous procedures have been applied to an analysis. In 
the contemporary social arena, the analysis will stand or all based on the thinking that has 
gone into defining its scope -  in particular, the clarity with which the analysis is fit for the 
purpose for which it was intended. If that purpose was decision-making on behalf of 
society, then society has a right to opportunities for involvement in defining the scope of the 
analysis.
Without acknowledging this change, scientific expertise runs the risk of being relegated to 
“supporting information” in the environmental decision arena -  information that may or may 
not be taken on board depending on the predilections and knowledge of the decision­
maker. This concerns me greatly since I believe that the natural sciences hold the key to 
our best achievable understanding of possible environmental futures. I also believe that 
arrogance about the supremacy of scientific practice over social theory will not help science 
to retain its rightful place in consultative decision-making.
My argument is for conceptual and descriptive models about environmental processes to 
act as bridges between quantitative analysis and social learning. By combining conceptual 
descriptions with a willingness to trade precision for tangibility and comprehensibility we
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may rebuild the notion of science as a valuable contributor to social debate. Earth science 
has a formative role to play since the subject is the earth itself, a complex system of which 
people are a part and which they can observe in their daily lives.
The implications of this approach vary. Not least, it makes demands on scientists to 
present their science in a manner which will appear very vulnerable to those used t the cut 
and thrust of peer review and academic rivalry. By arguing for qualitative, rather than 
quantitative analysis, I am asking scientists to accept that non-expert audiences are 
significant and important. However, I am not advocating that analytical rigour and accuracy 
be sacrificed o the alter of dialogue. They remain as important as ever in demonstrating 
the credibility of the experts involved in dialogue and in facilitating dialogue between 
experts. The trick is about opening up the conceptual development behind the analysis -  
developments which have traditionally taken place well before publication and often in the 
head of the expert analyst.
In speaking with social scientists about this research, they tell me that I have been on a 
“personal journey” as I have developed my understanding and arguments. Initially, I 
adopted a fairly technocratic approach to the issue -  what can “we” scientists do to enable 
others to contribute to “our” work. This rather parochial attitude has a place since often the 
most effective evolutions are from within. However, over the past few years I have found 
myself becoming more of a translator -  seeking to convey the concerns and challenges of 
the social sciences into the scientific arena in a non-threatening manner. I realise that I 
have accepted many of the challenges arising from the social theorists and believe that 
scientific practice can be enhanced by rising to those challenges. My internal questioning 
has subtly altered -  how can I engender change in scientific culture so that science can 
learn from other sources of expertise.
At the end of the day, I doubt that any individual can engender such a widespread change 
in thinking. It has to arise as a result of a great many individuals all making personal 
journeys similar to my own. I sometimes wonder whether my own evolution means that I 
have “gone over” and forfeited my scientific status. However, I think it merely reflects a 
very uncomfortable position sitting at the interface of two very different cultures -  science 
and society. Since so much has been written about the relationship between these two 
cultures, I cant be the only one sitting on this uncomfortable interface. If I am merely one in 
an ever increasing number of people considering these issues and willing to learn and 
adapt from them then there should be a lot of hope that time will bring about the cultural 
change that I believe is necessary.
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Appendix A
INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF CONSULTATION 
AND DIALOGUE IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT UP TO 2001
Countries included in the study are Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Czech Republic, United Kingdom and the 
United States. Given the wealth of detail associated with various radioactive waste 
management programmes internationally, this analysis focuses on particular sites 
and aspects of waste management programmes that provide the most useful lessons 
with respect to stakeholder dialogue and consultation. The analysis was undertaken 
in 2001.
A1. BELGIUM
Low-level and short-lived intermediate waste
Since 1999 the Belgian radioactive waste management organisation, 
ONDRAF/NIRAS has taken novel steps forward to address the question of public 
acceptability within its programme for establishing suitable sites for low and short­
lived intermediate level waste.
This has involved the development of local “partnerships” in areas where there is a 
measure of local interest in hosting a facility.
The partnerships depend upon independent mediators from a local University 
working with local stakeholders in the development of increased understanding of the 
issues surrounding proposals for disposal. Membership is specific to the individual 
partnership and including representatives of the local political parties, the various 
economic, social, cultural and ecological stakeholders, and local industry.
To date two partnerships have been signed. The first was signed on 30 September 
1999, between ONDRAF/NIRAS and the local community of Dessel. The second 
partnership was signed on 9 February 2000 with the local community of Mol, where 
the national nuclear research centre CEN/SCK is located.
The partnerships have their own budgets provided by ONDRAF/NIRAS and operate 
at four levels:
• The “general assembly” (or Partnership Council), which involves all the parties 
and formally represents the “Partnership”;
• The management committee which is appointed by the general assembly;
• Project Co-ordination on a day-to-day basis; and
• Working Groups which are the active basis of the partnerships.
The working groups review and develop draft project proposals with the support of 
ONDRAF/NIRAS acting as “partner and expert”, but they also have access to 
independent expertise paid for by the company. The partnerships as a whole will:
• decide on priorities and take decisions;
• organise dialogue; and
• be responsible for keeping the local population informed.
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Final proposals will have to be approved by the local councils concerned prior to 
submission to the Federal Government in 2001-2002.
High-level and long-lived intermediate-level waste
ONDRAF/NIRAS are investigating Boom Clay and Yper Clays for the disposal of 
high-level and long-lived intermediate-level waste. The Mol/Dessel nuclear zone is 
regarded as a methodological R & D site and the Doel nuclear zone as an alternative 
R&D site.
ONDRAF/NIRAS intends to publish a report (SAFIR 2) by the end of 2001, on 
research undertaken to date. This report will be subject to independent peer review. 
An accompanying strategic document will address potential approaches for 
stakeholder dialogue on high-level waste and long-lived intermediate-level waste in 
Belgium.
A2. CANADA
Low-level waste
The LLW inventory in Canada mainly comprises historic wastes, consisting of 
contaminated soils (1 million m3) for which the original producer is no longer 
responsible. Most of this waste is located at two waste management sites in the Port 
Hope area of Ontario. In 1982, the Government established a Low-level Radioactive 
Waste Management Office to assume responsibility for these wastes. Subsequently, 
in 1988, the Federal Government appointed an independent Siting Task Force to 
carry out a voluntary siting process to find a disposal site. In 1995, the Task Force 
issued its final report to the Minister for Natural Resources, identifying Deep River in 
Ontario as a likely site.
Deep River’s interest was supported by a 72% majority in a municipal referendum. It 
was based on a Community Agreement in Principle (CAP) negotiated between the 
Siting Task Force and the town. An important part of the Agreement was a guarantee 
for employment. The population of Deep River is heavily dependent on employment 
from AECL, and plans announced in late 1996 to downsize that organisation, as a 
precursor to privatisation, caused uncertainty about long-term employment prospects 
in the area.
In July 1996, the Minister for Natural Resources Canada announced the Federal 
Government’s intention to proceed with negotiations to develop a legal agreement 
establishing the terms and conditions under which the town would agree to host the 
facility. The government’s urgency to tie the community into a legal agreement was 
met with negative reaction. Negotiations subsequently ceased and the Community 
Agreement in Principle lapsed at the end of 1996. In late October 1997, the Deep 
River Council voted to withdraw from the process completely, although Natural 
Resources Canada has still not ruled the community out. In August 1997, Hope 
Township asked to be considered as a potential repository host location.
Spent fuel
Over the last thirty years, spent fuel from Canadian nuclear utilities has been stored 
at reactor sites in pools and concrete containers. It is likely that final disposal will take 
place in a deep geological repository. To meet engineering requirements, the facility
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must be sited in igneous rock of the Canadian Shield. The Shield is located in the 
northern parts of several provinces including Ontario.
In 1988, the Minister of Environment established the terms of reference for an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the disposal concept proposed by AECL 
and Ontario Hydro. The results of the EIA were reviewed by a government appointed 
Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel (FEARP) prior to the start of work 
on siting.
The terms of reference for the EIA comprised four key components:
• A requirement for review and evaluation of the safety and acceptability of the
nuclear fuel waste disposal concept and a range of other nuclear fuel waste
management issues;
• A requirement for comparison of the concept with other long-term management 
options and with the management of hazardous waste;
• Scientific review; and
• An instruction to the FEARP to refrain from discussing Canadian energy policy
and the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
Several stakeholder groups criticised the terms of reference on the grounds of lack of 
public input. Many also held the view that the proponent’s credibility regarding future 
waste projects was inseparable from the safety and management records of current 
operations. The ability to consider and address this concern was denied through the 
limitations imposed in the terms of reference. Moreover, objections to the 
composition of the scientific review panel resulted in a stipulation by the panel itself 
that a peer review by social scientists and ethicists would be required to evaluate 
social acceptability of the proposed concept.
Over the course of the following seven years, opportunities for stakeholder 
participation in the EIA included numerous open houses, scoping meetings, hearings, 
written briefs and roundtable sessions. Public participation occurred throughout the 
five provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. 
Participants included invited speakers (both pro- and anti-nuclear), environmental 
professionals, engineers, Aboriginal groups, professional associations, industrial and 
technical specialists, government ministries, social and physical scientists, women’s 
groups and private citizens.
One of the drawbacks of the public consultation process within the EIA framework is 
that the role of participants is limited in that they have no decision-making power. The 
extent of the influence of opinion is dependent on the will of those with political 
authority. This was of particular concern to the Aboriginal inhabitants since the 
disposal facility would probably be sited on land claimed by them as their traditional 
territory.
The submission of the EIA by AECL in 1992 was followed by a series of public 
hearings between March 1996 and March 1997, covering a broad range of issues. 
The hearings, held in numerous communities across Ontario, took place before the 
FEARP as stipulated in the terms of reference, and was managed by the 
independent Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA). Included in 
AECL’s EIA were recommendations for the siting process, which included 
volunteerism and shared decision-making.
Stakeholders from organisations and individual members of the public who wished to 
make submissions to the panel were able to apply for ‘intervenor funding’, for the use 
of external consultants and advisors. ‘Participant funding’, to allow individual
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stakeholders and members of community councils to attend hearings in their 
localities, was also made available.
The range of views that the FEARP attempted to balance represented a continuum 
from total endorsement by members of the nuclear community, to total rejection by 
various non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The latter contended that the 
existence of irreducible uncertainty in areas such as modelling and long-term 
predictions requires an inclusive political arena in which to debate and resolve 
issues.
The FEARP released its public report on 13 March 1998. The FEARP concluded that 
although AECL’s plan appeared technically sound, ‘in its present form it does not 
have the required level o f acceptability to be adopted as Canada’s approach for 
managing nuclear waste.” The FEARP recommended that a new Nuclear Fuel 
Waste Management Agency (NFWMA) should be established. By May 2000, the 
utilities had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a Waste Management 
Organisation. A draft plan for long-term options is being developed.
A3 CZECH REPUBLIC
Low-level waste and short-lived intermediate-level waste
LLW is currently stored in one of three near-surface repositories: Dukovany, Richard 
and Bratrstvi. Dukovany, being the biggest of the repositories can hold 30 000 m3 
waste. It is the most modern repository -  in operation since 1995 - and reportedly 
complies with advanced European standards. It is situated near Dukovany power 
plant in the Trebic district. Richard is situated in a disused limestone mine, near the 
town of LitomSfice, and has been in operation since 1964. This repository has a total 
volume of 16 000 m3 but has a capacity of half that figure, due to waste storage in 
100 litre drums. Bratrstvi is solely for the disposal of natural radionuclides and has 
been in operation since 1974. It is developed in a mining shaft with 5 disposal 
chambers from which discharged water is drained into retention tanks.
Disposal of all radioactive waste is the responsibility of RAWRA (the Radioactive 
Waste Repository Authority), who seek to develop active and responsive co­
operation with the communities affected by the waste repositories, as well as with the 
general public and non-government organisations. To this end, they have had 
personal meetings with representatives from the communities and initiated 
publication of information as well as production of a comprehensive website. They 
have also organised visits for Swiss and French groups to tour processing and 
disposal facilities.
High-level waste and spent fuel
The Czech Energy Board in Prague is responsible for the programme dealing with 
the management of spent fuel and wastes from Czech nuclear power plants. 
Research institutes, such as the Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) and universities 
participate in research supporting this programme.
The Czech Power Enterprise (EZ) has conducted several studies concerning spent 
fuel management in the Czech Republic. Alternatives include:
• interim storage followed by final disposal in the Czech Republic;
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•  re-processing in another country with return of the wastes to the Czech 
Republic, or
•  final waste disposal in another country.
In 1993, development for a deep geological repository began, with the aim of 
producing at the end of five years, a plan for: a) a generic design for a repository in 
granitic rock and b) a generic plan for geological activities to be performed leading up 
to a siting consultation. Owing to the facility being the first site within the Czech 
Republic to be designed and organised under a democratic society, expectations are 
for a lengthy, complicated process. Procedures considering site selection have 
included technological development of engineered barriers, experimental data from 
selected test sites, natural analogue studies, and underground research laboratories 
for safety and performance assessments. The latter issue has included international 
collaboration with ENRESA (Spain) and NAGRA (Switzerland). Results from the 
individual projects will be compiled for the use of the National Concept of Radioactive 
Management, a strategic document that will direct future activities. This document 
will be subject to EIA evaluation including a public hearing.
Following on from the ‘Concept’, RAWRA plans to initiate public discussion on the 
matter of national policy for radioactive waste management. Firstly, RAWRA plan to 
disseminate information to the media, politicians and technical experts. Secondly, 
they plan to hold discussions with students from technical, economic, sociological, 
environmental and legal University departments. RAWRA plan to invite the media to 
monitor the discussions. The final stage of public consultation will conduct public 
surveys within different social groups.
Czech radioactive waste management is based on the Atomic Law approved by 
Parliament in 1997. This law established RAWRA, the state organisation charged 
with the mission of assuring safe disposal of all radioactive waste, present and future. 
RAWRA took over the co-ordination of the development of a deep geological 
repository in 1998. Much of the development of a deep geological repository is 
contracted out to NRI who have extensive experience with repository development. 
Along with development of a national deep repository, RAWRA are also considering 
plans for long-term interim storage procedures, reprocessing, transmutation and the 
possibility of a European repository.
Public attitudes in the Czech republic have changed markedly over the last 10 years 
or more, from support in the early 1990’s when people approved of the move away 
from ‘dirty’ coal-fired power stations, to anti-nuclear attitudes, emphasised by 
increasing pressure from near-by Austria, who are nuclear-free. In the period from 
1993 to 1997 NRI conducted opinion polls with different social groups and began to 
aid the public relations arm of RAWRA. Following the Atomic Law, RAWRA have 
involved the public, including 4, out of 11, representatives from the public on the 
Board of members.
A4 FINLAND 
Spent fuel
Prior to the establishment of Posiva Oy, in 1983, TVO identified 101 potential 
disposal sites and undertook a consultation process with the communities affected. 
By 1985, 5 potential volunteer sites remained. It was proposed that further detailed 
investigations were carried out at these sites. In 1992, following further safety and 
geological assessments, TVO announced that further investigations would only be 
carried out at Romuvaara in Kuhmo, Kivetty in Aanekoski and Eurajoki (near the 
Olkiluoto nuclear site). Interim reports on these sites were produced at the end of
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1996. An additional site at Loviisa (host to an existing nuclear site) was added to the 
list in response to indications by the local community in Loviisa, that they too wished 
to be included.
In terms of Finland’s Nuclear Energy Act, the first authorisation step towards a final 
repository of nuclear waste is the Decision in Principle (DiP). This requires the 
Government to consider whether the “construction project is in line with the overall 
good of society”. In particular, the government should consider the need for the 
facility, the suitability of the proposed site, and its potential environmental impact. 
Legislation subsequently requires that the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) should make a preliminary safety appraisal of the DiP. The proposed host 
municipality must state its acceptance or rejection for siting the facility. The decision 
has then to be endorsed by the Finnish Parliament. The application for the DiP also 
includes an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the planned facility.
An EIA report to the Ministry if Trade and Industry (MTI) and a DiP application to the 
Government were submitted by Posiva Oy in May 1999. The EIA covered the four 
candidate sites and incorporated a number of consultation methodologies including 
open meetings, dissemination of printed materials and videos, an opinion survey, 
theme interviews, small group discussions and analyses of written feedback. The 
submission of the EIA was followed by a series of public hearings. During the hearing 
period, 15 authorities and public bodies, 5 civic organisations and communities, and 
23 municipalities submitted their statements on the EIA report to the MTI. In 
November 1999, the Ministry gave its statement, which completed the EIA process
The authorities and municipalities were mainly positive and the EIA report was 
generally regarded as having been wide ranging and thorough. O f primary concern 
was the issue of social stigmatism - the potential deterioration in the self and external 
image of a municipality. This was particularly in relation to the inland sites 
(Romuvaara and Kivetty), where there are no existing power utilities and small-scale 
tourism and agriculture are regarded as important components of the local economy. 
The possible impact on health associated with the transport of spent fuel and 
potential transport accidents were also of concern.
Private individuals' and civic organisations’ opinions on the EIA, as well as on the 
whole disposal project, were critical and opposing. Their viewpoints tended to focus 
on issues outside the scope of the EIA. There appeared to be some confusion 
regarding the purpose of the EIA, which was to assess the impacts of the programme 
rather than to identify a specific site.
Nevertheless, the MTI concluded that the EIA was sufficiently comprehensive and 
detailed and fulfilled the requirements set by the EIA legislation. The MTI did request 
however, that a construction licence application for the disposal facility, scheduled to 
be submitted by 2010 at the earliest, should include an updated EIA report.
Posiva Oy plans to construct an investigation shaft at the chosen site in 2003, and to 
apply for a construction permit in 2010. The first emplacement of spent fuel could not 
take place b 
before 2020.
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A5 FRANCE
High-level waste
The 1991 Waste Act redirected the French deep site investigation process following 
the abandonment of an earlier high-level waste (HLW) programme which sought to 
identify promising disposal sites primarily by reference to geological considerations. 
This methodology resulted in strong opposition and, in 1990, a moratorium was 
declared on drilling activities by the Government. The 1991 law contains several 
provisions aimed at a more equitable siting process including a requirement that local 
officials and members of the public from the affected sites be consulted before any 
site investigations begin preliminary to Underground Research Laboratory (UGL) 
construction.
The creation of URLs is a key requirement of the 1991 law. M. Christian Bataille was 
appointed as a mediator and specifically charged with leading public involvement 
prior to the selection of URL sites. His mediation mission had three objectives:
• information provision to the public,
• open dialogue, and
• decision facilitation.
The siting process for the URLs began in January 1993. By December of that year 
some 30 sites had volunteered for consideration. Ultimately, four potentially suitable 
sites were recommended by M. Bataille. Two were subsequently merged so that 
three locations were then under consideration:
• a clay geology in north-eastern France on the border of the Meuse and Haute 
Mame Departments (the Bure site);
• a clay geology beneath the Marcoule nuclear site in the south of the country in 
the Gard Department;
• and a granite geology in the Vienne Department in western France. 
Surface-based investigations at these sites, including drilling between two and four 
boreholes and geophysical measurements, were completed in April 1996.
The Council of Ministers authorised ANDRA to submit requests for the installation 
and operation of URLs at each of the three sites in May 1996,. Authorisation of the 
URLs was scheduled to have been completed in 1998, following review of the 
submissions by the Division of Nuclear Safety (DSIN) within the Ministry of Industry, 
and the Ministry of Research. The reviews were to take place in conjunction with 
public hearings and local consultation. The hearings at the sites ran from January to 
May 1997. The following December, the Government advised that investigations 
should continue at the Bure site and that further research should be undertaken 
towards identifying a suitable site in granite. A decree was issued in August 1999 
allowing ANDRA to commence construction of the Bure URL, providing for the 
establishment of a Local Information Committee at Bure, and launching a 
consultation exercise to select a granite site.
The selection process for a granite site was initiated with a geological screening 
process that began in February 1999. This resulted in the identification of 180 
plutons in the country and, by July 1999, this number was reduced to about 15 sites 
following consideration of hydrogeology. As a result of further screening, the number 
of potentially suitable sites was narrowed down to seven in February 2000. The next 
phase of the programme is divided into five stages and is being managed by a 
Granite Advisory Committee comprising two international experts, two government 
appointees, and four members recommended by the Academy of Sciences and 
approved by government. The stages are as follows:
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•  1 - seek consensus through consultation;
•  2 - selection by government of a site or sites where the community wishes 
further consideration;
• 3 - confirmation of geological suitability (by ANDRA); confirmation of 
safety factors by DSIN; and setting up of Local Information Committees made 
up of environmental groups, government officials, local community 
representatives, farm councils, professional associations, etc;
•  4 -  enquetes publiques (public enquiries) and endorsement by local authorities 
within a 10 km radius of a site.
•  5 - decision by central government to authorise construction of a URL .
It was originally intended that the granite site selection process would be completed 
by 2003. However, the process is stalled at Stage 1, the objective of which is to seek 
consensus through consultation with the communities in proximity to geologically 
suitable sites identified during the Phase 1 screening exercise. A government 
delegation sent to consult with the affected communities was strongly opposed in all 
communities that were visited. The negative attitude of the community leaders could 
have resulted from a range of factors, including a ratcheting up of concern by NGO  
representatives from outside the communities, a perception that the government 
delegation was not sufficiently representative, and the nature of the screening phase 
with consultation coming too late in the process.
A6GERMANY
Low-level and intermediate-level waste
At present a number of sites exist but are not licensed largely due to disagreements 
at government level. A Working Group Committee on Site Selection has been 
established by BMU (Federal Ministry for the Environment), membership of which 
includes environmental groups and nuclear experts. Use of the internet and 
workshops for MPs, NGOs and unions are amongst the techniques used to 
encourage stakeholder participation. The working group will review existing criteria 
and will look at international practice before proposing the “relatively best site” in the 
country. W e understand that an Interim Report by the Committee on Site Selection 
has recently been issued. The sites under investigation include Konrad, Morsleben 
and Asse. The most detailed consultation programme has taken place in relation to 
Konrad.
The Konrad mine in Lower Saxony was investigated by GSF (Federal Research 
Centre) from 1976 to 1982 to determine its suitability as a radioactive waste 
repository for L/ILW. The site was found suitable for the disposal of L/ILW and, in 
1982, an application was made, initiating a licensing procedure. The compliance 
report for the Konrad project was submitted in 1986.
In 1991, a revised version of the compliance report was made available for public 
comment. Due to a strong political campaign in Lower Saxony and by the Green 
parties, approximately 10,000 objections were raised on the compliance report.
The Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), responsible for the construction 
and operation of repositories, consequently started an intensive preparation period 
prior to the public inquiry in September 1992. A team of 11 representatives with 
expert knowledge regarding all aspects of the project was assembled and coached 
by psychologists to improve their understanding of stakeholder concerns and prepare
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them for discussions with the public. The public inquiry ran for 75 days and is the 
longest atomic law debate ever held in Germany. In the first few days of the inquiry, 
formal procedures were established for raising objections and discussions. Issues 
were categorised and an agenda was devised stipulating time frames and who would 
be allowed to participation in discussions.
A range of issues were debated, many of which were not directly relevant to the 
licensing procedure but were, nevertheless of public interest, for example, risks 
associated with the transport of wastes and reasons why the Konrad site was 
selected. These issues were dealt with in detail by BfS. Other key issues included 
safety aspects, waste origin, waste amount, and how the waste acceptance criteria 
for waste returned from other countries would be met.
Despite a highly charged atmosphere during the inquiry, the public appeared to trust 
the proponent’s team and were generally satisfied with the manner in which issues 
were addressed. The licensing process is still continuing but a stand off exists 
between BfS and the State Government.
A7 THE NETHERLANDS 
Low-level and short-lived intermediate-level waste
LLW and ILW are currently stored at COVRA’s central facility. In 1982, a Committee 
(HVRA) was established to investigate the issue of long-term storage of radioactive 
waste. The HVRA Committee included representatives from environmental and 
industrial organisations. Following a report by the HVRA Committee to government, a 
Radioactive Waste Storage Facility Site Selection Committee (LOFRA) was 
established and asked to identify suitable sites where all types of radioactive waste 
could be processed and stored. LOFRA was asked to give particular consideration to 
the willingness of provincial and local authorities to co-operate.
Twelve sites were initially identified by LOFRA and discussions held with local and 
regional authorities, planners and politicians. Following further screening, the number 
of technically feasible sites was narrowed to three.
In 1985, LOFRA identified the Sloe area as the most suitable location and a site 
close to the nuclear power station at Borsele was chosen. A second site was 
subsequently identified by the Tijdens Committee (named for the alderman of the 
municipality of Borsele). This was the site already occupied by COVRA at Vlissingen 
Oost. An EIA was produced for each site. Although public meetings and working 
groups did form part of the process, communication with stakeholders was not 
effective (see below). A licence for the second site was, however, granted and the 
storage facility was constructed between 1990 and 1992. Compensation for the host 
community by COVRA was restricted to employment, benefits from the sale of land, 
and purchasing of local goods and services.
Recently an inquiry into perceptions around the establishment of the COVRA storage 
facility has revealed a number of stakeholder issues and concerns. Four 
categories/groups of stakeholders were identified: directly aggrieved parties, 
indirectly aggrieved parties, advocates and environmental lobbyists. The concerns of 
these groups are briefly summarised below:
Directly aggrieved parties
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This group is still actively objecting to the COVRA facility. Their grievances are based 
largely on issues around safety, location of the facility on the river-banks, and the 
effect on property values. The specific objections of this group tend to focus on the 
consequences of events, such as an accident or flooding of the river, rather than the 
likelihood of occurrence of the events. Concern was also expressed with regard to 
compensation and liability issues.
Indirectly aggrieved parties
Indirectly aggrieved parties are mostly concerned about the fact that the COVRA 
facility is yet another example of a development which affects the community without, 
as they see it, community members being adequately involved in decision-making. 
They are satisfied that it is in COVRA’s own interest to meet requirements and 
standards that would minimise the likelihood of accidents, but would like to see an 
integrated approach to planning of future developments and possible expansion of 
the facility.
Non-aggrieved parties I advocates
Many of those whom were not necessarily against the establishment of the facility 
followed the argument that it is logical to have a storage location in the vicinity of a 
nuclear power station. However, this group has also criticised the procedure followed 
and lack of consultation in decision-making. Some claim that at one time people in 
Borsele took pride in the presence of the power station and people’s perceptions and 
regard for COVRA have subsequently changed.
Environmental lobbyists
In their objections to the storage site, the anti-nuclear movement have disassociated 
themselves from the local community’s perceptions and grievances. Anti-nuclear and 
anti-COVRA demonstrators come from outside the community and many local 
residents feel that the presence of lobbying groups enhances a negative perception 
of the area.
A8 SPAIN 
Low-level and intermediate-level waste
L/ILW waste was initially stored at a facility sited at El Cabril near Cordoba. 
Characterisation work to assess the suitability for disposing of waste there began in 
1986. In 1989, the local planning authority approved a disposal application and the 
facility came into operation in 1992. The area surrounding El Cabril has a low 
population density.
The Spanish radioactive waste management organisation, ENRESA, pursues a 
“good neighbour” policy with the local villages and has studied social and economic 
needs in the area around El Cabril. Training courses have been held, and locals are 
employed as contractors. ENRESA has also stated their willingness to help improve 
the local road infrastructure in order to encourage investment in the area.
Interestingly, for high level waste and spent fuel, Spain’s General Radioactive Waste 
Plan of 1999 states that research on separation and transmutation of radioactive 
waste should be supported in addition to geological disposal options.
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High-level waste and spent fuel
A programme to site a deep repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel 
was initiated by SKB in 1992. It was envisaged that first-stage operation would begin 
in 2008. The concept suggested for disposal is abbreviated to KBS-3, and comprises 
a bedrock repository at a depth of approximately 500 m where spent fuel will be 
encapsulated in copper-steel canisters surrounded by layers of bentonite clay.
The Government gave broad approval to the initial proposed siting process but 
emphasised the importance of a well-defined and transparent programme that 
incorporated the following steps:
• publication of siting factors, covering safety, technology, land and environmental 
impact, and societal aspects;
• content and publication of countrywide siting studies;
• undertaking largely desk-based feasibility studies of between five and ten sites, 
followed by more intensive surface-based investigations at two or more sites;
• a final application for construction of a shaft and/or tunnel for detailed 
investigation at a preferred site.
The updated R&D programme presented to the government by SKB in 1998 was 
reviewed by a large number of national organisations, including the Swedish 
Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate 
(SKI). In April 1999, SKI delivered its recommendations to the government, following 
which the government stated, in January 2000, that the programme fulfils the 
requirements contained in the Act on Nuclear Activities.
Feasibility studies have been conducted at eight sites chosen on the basis of 
municipalities volunteering to allow the study and subsequently being provided with 
up to Euro 250,000 per year from the waste funds for its own costs related to relevant 
activities. In addition, a National Co-ordinator was appointed by the Government in 
1996 to promote information exchange and co-ordinate liaison between local 
authorities.
The first two feasibility studies were conducted for sites at Mala and Storuman, both 
situated in the far northern part of Sweden. Following completion of the studies, both 
the communities held a referendum and voted against continuing with the next step 
in the programme, namely site characterisation. An overview of the referenda 
timetables is provided in Table B1 below.
Table B1: An overview of referenda for Storuman and Maid.
Procedures Storuman Maid
Decision, overview study June 1993 November 1993
Decision, referendum February 1995 November 1993
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Referendum September 1995 September 1997
Interviews November 1995 November 1997
Despite the absence of specific legislation governing siting in Sweden, SKB has 
agreed to respect the results of local referenda in municipalities. Any local veto, 
however, has no statutory force and the Swedish Government could override local 
objections and grant permission for further studies to be carried out. This did not 
happen with respect to Mala and Storuman and no further investigations have been 
undertaken at these localities. KASAM has requested the Government to specify the 
circumstances in which local objections may be overridden.
Feasibility studies have now been undertaken at sites in four other municipalities, 
namely Nykoping (near the nuclear research centre at Studsvik), Osthammer (near 
the Forsmark nuclear site), Oskarshamn (site of encapsulation research laboratory) 
and Tierp. Each of these communities had volunteered to take part in the process in 
1996. SKB has recently proposed that surface-based characterisation activities, 
including deep drilling, should proceed at three of the sites (Oskarshamn, 
Osthammer and Tierp). If regulator reviews are favourable, and the municipality and 
the government agree to the work, then drilling could commence as early as 2002.
Of the four municipalities, the consultation process at Oskarshamn provides the most 
useful example of community involvement in decision making. This process is 
referred to as the Oskarshamn Model and is described in more detail below.
The Oskarshamn Model
When Oskarshamn was identified as a possible site for the encapsulation plant, the 
municipality announced two prerequisites to its acceptance as a candidate site. The 
first was that the participation of the municipality in discussions and investigations 
was to be paid for from the Nuclear Waste Fund, and the second was that the key 
parties (SKB, SKI, SSI and the county) accepted the idea of an EIA Forum chaired by 
the Lt. Governor of Kalmer County. The municipality specifically chose EIA as the 
lead process for its involvement as the philosophy behind EIA, according to the 
municipality’s understanding, provided the key elements of public involvement, i.e. 
openness, early involvement and identification of alternatives.
One of the first tasks of the EIA Forum was to set up a local reference group. The 
EIA Forum felt that the municipality council with 51 elected members should fulfill this 
function. Efforts were subsequently made to engage the local population through 
public meetings, seminars and local study organisations. Each of the neighbouring 
municipalities was also asked to identify a contact person. Six working groups were 
established to monitor the various aspects of the investigation. The elected 
representatives had full autonomy in terms of using external consultants and advisors 
when required.
The municipality was formally asked by SKB in 1995 whether they would accept a 
feasibility study for the siting of the deep repository. The municipality took one year to 
investigate the programme and engage as many stakeholders as possible in the 
decision-making process. To aid the discussion, two task groups were established by 
the municipality council, and were asked to report back to the full council with 
recommendations. One group consisted of the most experienced politicians in the 
council and the other group comprised the youngest members of each political party. 
Following positive feedback from both groups, the council voted to accept a feasibility 
study in October 1996 with certain conditions.
A12
To monitor the feasibility study, six working groups were set up with different areas of 
focus. Each group comprises two council members, one civil servant, two local 
citizens and one external expert. Numerous meetings have been held with SKB and 
various consultants and scientists involved in the feasibility study, and all the minutes 
of these discussions are available on request or via the internet. The main questions 
and concerns raised by the working groups are forwarded to the EIA Forum for 
further discussion with representatives from SKB, SSI and SKI.
The structure of the EIA consultation process is presented in Table A2, followed by a 
list of the key features of the Oskarshamn Model.
Table B2: Structure of the EIA process.
Phases in the EIA 
process
Participants Activities Product
Phase 1
EIA Scoping Study
All stakeholders Meeting with EIA 
Forum
Meetings, hearings at 
local level
Advice on EIA 
document
Phase 2
Proponent’s work
Proponent Project work Licence application
Continued EIA process All stakeholders Hearings, seminars Understanding
Phase 3
Final phase of EIA = 1* 
phase of licensing
Regulator interacting 
with community
Review and decide 
followed by hearings
Improved licence 
application
Key features of the Oskarshamn Model:
• Commitment to openness and participation;
• The EIA process as a framework for interaction and stakeholder involvement;
• The municipality council as reference group as a means of increasing 
knowledge of political decision makers;
• Local involvement through task groups and working groups;
• Regulator involvement;
• Participation by environmental groups;
• Transparency and challenging SKB.
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Currently, all licensing procedures are within the remit of the Federal Government 
whilst the Cantons and Communities grant building licences. The Federal 
Commission on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (KSA) and the Federal Office of 
Energy, Nuclear Safety Department (HSK) draw up guidelines for disposal. Federal 
law also requires that Cantons be consulted before a licence is granted. This means 
that the public are consulted through a referendum, a ballot or a Cantonal Assembly, 
although the outcome is not legally binding on the Federal Government. Cantonal 
politics in Switzerland, nevertheless, plays an important role in that perceived 
procedural fairness between Cantons is essential for the legitimacy of the site 
selection process.
In June 1999 the Federal Government’s Expert Committee on Disposal Concepts for 
Radioactive Waste (EKRA) was established. The Expert Committee’s membership
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included a specialist on ethical issues and was chaired by a geologist who was 
known not to be in favour of disposal. EKRA presented their final report in February 
2000. They proposed monitored long-term geological disposal, which combines final 
disposal with the possibility of retrievability of waste.
Low-level and intermediate-level waste
The Swiss radioactive waste management organisation, NAGRA, has developed a 
concept for the disposal of short-lived L/ILW in a repository mined into a 
mountainside. NAGRA began the process of site identification as long ago as 1978. 
By 1993, one hundred locations had been identified as having potential from a 
geological perspective. As a result of further screening processes, the initial number 
of sites was narrowed down to four in three different host geologies. In 1994, NAGRA 
sought the opinion of the Government inter-agency body AGNEB when it proposed 
Wellenberg to the Government as its preferred location. AGNEB agreed that the 
process had been transparent and that the site was a “good choice”. As a result, 
NAGRA made public that it recommended siting a repository at Wellenberg (in the 
community of Wolfenschiessen within the Nidwalden Canton). However, in June 
1995, the Nidwalden Canton voted narrowly against the development of a L/ILW 
repository at Wellenberg, despite an outcome in favour of further investigations from 
the local Wolfenschiessen community.
EKRA however has indicated that it supports NAGRA’s choice of the Wellenberg site 
and a final decision by the Federal Government should follow a Cantonal referendum 
which is expected to be held on the construction of an exploratory tunnel in 2001. 
Should approval to proceed be obtained, a Technical Group will be then be formed 
together with an Advisory Committee established by GNW  (a daughter company of 
NAGRA).
A11 UNITED KINGDOM  
Low-level waste
LLW waste is disposed of in near-surface disposal facilities by BNFL at Drigg, 
Cumbria. LLW has been disposed of in shallow pits by UKAEA at Dounreay in 
Caithness.
Long-lived ILW and HLW are currently in long-term storage, pending the outcome of 
a Government review to establish a new national waste management policy. The 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and Technology, having undertaken 
an investigation spanning 15 months, published a report dealing with the 
Management of Nuclear Waste in March 1999 (HL Paper 41). Its main 
recommendation was that the Government should seek to build public consensus 
before attempting to implement its chosen policy.
In October 1999, the Government responded to the report of the House of Lords’ 
Select Committee on Science and Technology on the management of nuclear waste. 
The Government announced its intention to undertake wide public consultation on 
the future management of radioactive wastes, including consideration of the options, 
such as whether to continue storage above ground or move to deep storage 
underground and eventual disposal. Whilst the House of Lords’ report was prepared 
independent of Government, Ministers have indicated that its findings will provide the 
foundation for subsequent Government consultation.
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Citizen’s Panel
Although not formally a part of the Government consultation process, a “Consensus 
Conference" on radioactive waste management, held in London in May 1999, 
provided a further input. Consensus Conferences are a method of involving the 
public in the assessment of key issues of science and technology. Pioneered in 
Denmark, Consensus Conferences create a forum for a Citizen’s Panel, made up of 
lay members of the public, to take part in an informed debate with expert witnesses 
of their choice.
The panel of fifteen citizens, recruited from throughout Britain, came together in 
London to debate the issue of radioactive waste management, following two 
weekends of intensive preparation. At the end of the Conference, the Panel 
produced a report on its views as to what are the key issues for circulation to the 
Government, media and other interested parties, thus opening up the debate in an 
area which is usually dominated by scientists and specialists.
The key issues/questions identified include:
1 What do you see as the primary advantages/disadvantages of deep disposal? 
What do you see as the primary advantages/disadvantages of 
shallow/surface storage?
2 What is the current/future policy with regard to companies other than BNFL
who produce radioactive waste?
3 Currently, what research and development is there into nuclear waste
treatment?
4 Would privatisation mean that an integrated approach to dealing with the
problem of radioactive waste management would be more difficult? How can 
you guarantee that shareholders’ profits will not become more important than 
preserving current safety standards?
5 What is the current/future policy with regard to informing the public about
radioactive waste?
6 What benefits does the UK gain from importing spent fuel for reprocessing?
7 What is your opinion on the continuation of nuclear power? What are the
financial, environmental and social costs?
8 Who supervises the military? How do we deal with decommissioned
submarines? What research into “lost” waste is currently being undertaken 
(e.g. in the ocean, on Ministry of Defence land)?
9 What are your opinions on the current terminology used for the classification
of radioactive waste?
The key conclusions of the Citizen’s Panel were:
• Radioactive waste must be removed from the surface and stored underground, 
but must be monitored and retrievable. Cost cannot be an issue. W e must 
leave options open for future solutions.
• A neutral body should be appointed to deal with waste management including 
site selection.
• Public awareness must be raised. Decision-making must be open and 
transparent.
• Research and development must be continued on a much larger scale.
National Consultation
It is envisaged that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(DETR) will issue a Consultation Paper on future radioactive waste management in
2001, setting out options for public consultation. It is possible that the Consultation
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Paper may include a proposal for “consultation about consultation”. This would be a 
so-called “Front End” process of consultation which is designed to enable all 
stakeholders to enter into early dialogue and potential consensus regarding the 
manner in which consultation about substantive and procedural/ planning issues 
should be undertaken.
In addition, it is likely that the nuclear industry will itself initiate an open dialogue 
process about the state of scientific research knowledge regarding radioactive waste 
management and disposal. This so-called “Science Review” is also likely to 
incorporate a “Front End” process.
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Low-level waste
A small number of essentially national low-level waste (LLW) repositories had been 
operating at Barnwell, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington, and at several 
other locations across the US prior to 1985. However, The Low Level Waste Policy 
Act of 1985 instructed each state to solve the problem of disposing of its own LLW. 
The legislation encourages States to join together and form so-called “compacts”, 
and to develop joint facilities. Although the Act specified that the new facilities should 
be operational by 1992, not one new facility has been developed to date.
Many compacts have engaged in detailed siting programmes. The most advanced 
programme at present is for the Southwest Compact in California, where a site 
selected by the Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) method has met with intense public 
opposition.
Other compacts have introduced volunteerism, with detailed programmes around 
financial incentives. For example, in the Northeast Compact, it was announced that a 
town that decides to participate would be paid $250,000, and that the first town to 
volunteer would receive an additional $100,000. If the town stayed in the programme 
for six months, identified a site and continued negotiations “in good faith”, it would 
receive a further $250,000. A town that approved a site and facility development 
agreement by referendum would then receive $1 million. Despite these significant 
financial incentives, no final site has yet been selected in any State in the Northeast 
Compact.
Transuranic waste
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste 
opened for disposal in May 1999. It was constructed between 1980 and 1990, 
following siting studies which commenced subsequent to a 1957 report by the 
National Academy of Sciences recommending disposal in salt formations. WIPP is 
located in a salt formation at 650 m depth, some 50 km from Carlsbad, New Mexico. 
Less than 100,000 people reside within an 80 km radius of the facility.
In 1996, the Department of Energy, (DOE) submitted a Compliance Certification 
Application (CCA) to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to demonstrate 
that the W IPP complies with the EPA criteria. EPA public consultation, including 
public hearings in New Mexico, began in February 1997.
The EPA concluded in October 1997 that, subject to certain provisions, WIPP  
complies with its disposal standards and should be certified. This action initiated a 
120-day public consultation period involving further hearings. The details of the EPA
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CCA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (covering hazardous waste 
components of the WIPP inventory) consultation and permitting processes, including 
the relationship between the State of New Mexico, Carlsbad and the US DOE, are 
extensive and complex. Suffice to say that the licensing of the WIPP facility was 
subjected to some of the most innovative and transparent methods of stakeholder 
review to have been applied in the US if not elsewhere.
Key features of the approach included:
• Enhancing realism, reducing uncertainties and simplification of conceptual and 
numerical models;
• Responding to public concerns in terms that are non-technical and readily 
understood;
• Active encouragement and participation in joint international collaborative efforts 
in the USA and abroad.
High-level waste and spent fuel
Following the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987, the US 
siting programme for high-level waste and spent fuel has been centred on Yucca 
Mountain in the State of Nevada. A number of locations in various geological settings 
across the US had previously been under consideration, but the Amendments Act 
directed the DOE to examine only the Yucca Mountain site. The 1987 legislation was 
criticised by the State of Nevada as unfair, although the Act specified that if studies 
showed the site to be unsuitable then investigations would cease. The legislation 
also provides for a benefit package for Nevada of $10-20 million per year provided 
the State waives its right to object to the proposal, not surprisingly, this condition has 
not been accepted by the State.
Under US Law, the DOE takes title to the spent fuel from utilities prior to final 
disposal. For the interim, the DOE proposes to store the spent fuel at the surface in a 
centralised facility known as the Monitorable Retrievable Store (MRS). To enable the 
siting of the MRS, the 1987 NWPAA established the Independent Office of the 
Nuclear Waste Negotiator to try to find a willing host in exchange for certain benefits. 
However, although some progress was made with a number of Native American 
Tribes, the negotiation process was terminated without result.
Despite the assurances of the DOE that Yucca Mountain can never become a 
repository without reasonable assurance of its ability to contain and isolate the waste, 
the Nevada public remains sceptical. Much of this scepticism is based on previous 
experience where the government had assured stakeholders that there would be no 
adverse effects associated with weapons testing in the 1950s. Trust in the 
government was seriously undermined when people were exposed to radiation doses 
downwind of the atmospheric testing area. High-level nuclear waste disposal at 
Yucca Mountain is unlikely to pose the same threat, but the choice of a site with a 
history of radiation exposure does affect public opinion.
A “Viability Assessment” (VA) was published by the DOE in 1998. The purpose of the 
assessment was to provide Congress, the President, and the public with information 
on the progress of the Yucca Mountain Characterisation Project, as well as to identify 
critical issues that needed to be addressed before a decision is made by the 
Secretary of Energy on whether to recommend the Yucca Mountain site for a 
repository. The assessment comprised a collection of largely technical documents 
aimed at stakeholders with different levels of understanding.
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The VA report identified the main advantages of the Yucca Mountain Site as being its 
previous use as a nuclear weapons testing area, and the desert environment (no 
significant water sources in proximity to the site). From a health and safety 
perspective the report predicted that maximum radiation exposure from the repository 
is expected to occur after about 300,000 years. People living approximately 20 km 
form the site at that time might receive additional radiation exposures equivalent to 
present-day background radiation.
Six months after the publication of the VA, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
was produced. The purpose of the EIS was to provide information on potential 
environmental impacts throughout the life cycle of the proposed repository at the 
Yucca Mountain site. As a baseline for comparison, the No-Action alternative was 
also considered in the EIS. Public input to the EIS included fifteen Public Scoping 
Meetings between August and October 1995. Of the issues identified, a number were 
addressed in the EIS, including aspects of the characterisation programme, 
construction, operating and monitoring, consistency with existing land-uses, effects of 
earthquakes and volcanism, health and safety, long term and cumulative impacts and 
possibility of sabotage. Other issues raised were considered to be unrelated to the 
proposed action. These included general statements in support of or in opposition to 
a repository at Yucca Mountain, geological repositories in general and nuclear power; 
lack of confidence in the Yucca Mountain Programme; perceived inequities and 
political aspects of the siting process; the constitutional basis for waste disposal in 
Nevada, perceived psychological costs and effects; risk perception and 
stigmatization; and legal issues involving Native American land claims and treaty 
rights.
The EIS did not identify significant adverse effects associated with the long-term 
performance of the site. Peak doses of 1.3 millirem per year over 10,000 years are 
predicted to a maximally exposed individual hypothetically located 5 km from the 
repository.
The cultural issues associated with the Native American Tribes in the Yucca 
Mountain region were identified as an “area of controversy". The tribes consider the 
intrusive nature of the repository to be an adverse impact to all elements of the 
natural and physical environment. In addition, one Native American ethnic group (the 
Western Shoshone) continue to claim title to land at Yucca Mountain.
In the next year or so, it is possible that the site will be recommended by the DOE for 
approval by the President of the United States. However, the NWPAA provides the 
State of Nevada with veto powers over the President’s decision. If exercised, 
however, the State veto can itself be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
US Congress.
If the site is approved, the DOE considers that a repository at Yucca Mountain could 
become operational by 2010. However, the siting issue, as indicated above, is as 
much a political issue as technical issue. A decision by the Federal Government to 
proceed with the repository at Yucca Mountain is likely to severely test the 
constitutional framework of the United States.
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Appendix B
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM -  A SHORT RUN THROUGH 
HISTORY
B1.UP TO 1982
The management of radioactive wastes from nuclear power in the United Kingdom 
was addressed through initial legislation in 1954 (the Atomic Energy Authority Act) 
and subsequently in 1960 (the Radioactive Substances Act). The latter Act was 
based on the 1959 White Paper The Control of Radioactive Wastes’ [HM 
Government, 1959]. This legislation enabled the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) to provide a national disposal service for (what are now 
termed) low- and intermediate-level wastes. Disposal of these wastes was 
achieved through near-surface disposal and sea dumping.
In 1976 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution published its sixth 
report (the Flowers Report) [RCEP, 1976] on the management of radioactive 
waste. The report identified that the increased volumes and diversity of wastes 
brought about by the envisaged expansion of nuclear power in the UK would 
require new means of disposal. The report suggested that plans to dispose of 
nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (now classed as ILW) at sea would be 
inadequate. The report called for research into the disposal to geological 
formations on land and under the ocean bed. However, it was duly noted that a 
decision on the acceptability of sub-ocean bed disposal might lie outside the 
jurisdiction of a British Government.
The Flowers report made recommendations to allow a strategy on long-term 
radioactive waste management to be drawn up and then implemented. In 
particular, the formation of a ‘Nuclear Waste Management Advisory Committee’ 
and a ‘Nuclear Waste Disposal Corporation’ were advocated. The Government 
responded in 1977 setting out its basic principles [Hansard, 1985] and, in 1978, 
creating the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee.
Meanwhile, HLW disposal on land was being investigated through a European 
Union (then European Economic Community) funded research programme that 
had started in 1975. The work was performed by the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority (UKAEA) and the British Geological Survey (BGS, then called the 
Institute of Geological Sciences). A number of sites were investigated through 
desk studies but, despite a number of planning applications for permission to drill, 
the only place where any drilling was done was at Altnabreac in Caithness, 
Scotland (1978-79). Early in 1980 the Natural Environment Research Council (the 
parent body of BGS) took over responsibility for this HLW research from UKAEA 
but made slow progress and met with a lot of opposition. The dumping of HLW at 
sea (which had never taken place) was prohibited by the London Dumping 
Convention of 1975.
In response to the lack of progress regarding the HLW programme, the 
Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee suggested in its second 
annual report that solidified HLW might be usefully stored above or below ground 
in a suitably engineered facility for at least 50 years. Accordingly, in 1981, the 
programme of research into HLW disposal was to be abandoned. A policy of
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surface storage of HLW for at least 50 years was subsequently confirmed in the 
1982 White Paper [HM Government, 1982]
Although there was an existing route for the disposal of LLW, the capacity of the 
existing LLW disposal site at Drigg, operated by BNFL, was limited. Incineration 
and supercompaction of LLW were considered as methods of volume reduction for 
these wastes. However, in the 80s, neither was properly tested. There was 
therefore a need to identify additional routes for the disposal of LLW.
These considerations had the effect of defining the remit of Nirex, formed in 1982 
as NIREX, the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive. This remit was to 
work with other parts of the nuclear industry to develop and implement solutions 
for the long-term management of ILW and LLW. The Company had many of the 
functions of the Nuclear Waste Disposal Corporation envisaged by the Flower’s 
Report [RCEP, 1976], but in some respects the framework diverged from the 
recommended model. For instance, Nirex was directly responsible to its 
shareholders (taken from the nuclear industry) and the Department of Trade and 
Industry rather than to an independent Radioactive Waste Disposal Commission.
B2.1982 -1997
Nirex was, and still is, owned and financed by the nuclear industry. In 1985 the 
organisation became a limited company -  United Kingdom Nirex Limited (Nirex). 
Currently BNFL/Magnox is the major shareholder with a 74.5% share of the 
company, contributing 69.3% of the funding. Other shareholders are UKAEA 
(14.7%), British Energy (10.8%) who contribute 14.8% and 7.7% of the funding 
respectively. The MOD is not a shareholder but contributes 8.2% of the funding. 
Additionally, the government holds a special share giving it power of veto over 
some decisions. The shareholdings and financing arrangements relate to the 
amount of waste owned by each customer.
In the eighties and early nineties, Nirex was responsible for finding long-term 
management solutions for all intermediate-level waste (ILW) and also for low-level 
waste (LLW) unsuitable for disposal at the Drigg near-surface disposal facility 
operated by BNFL in Cumbria. After its formation in 1982, Nirex began a process 
of site selection for disposal facilities for low level waste (LLW) and intermediate- 
level waste (ILW). Broadly speaking, Nirex was considering the option of deep 
disposal for ILW and shallow disposal for LLW. In 1983 it announced an interest in 
a site at Elstow in Bedfordshire and a disused anhydrite mine at Billingham.
At Billingham, Nirex was considering a deep disposal facility for ILW. As a result of 
strong local opposition, ICI, the owner of the Billingham site, withdrew its offer of 
sale. Consequently, the Government announced its intention to focus on shallow 
disposal and noted that there was ‘less urgency about the identification of a deep 
facility [Hansard, 1985]. The Government also requested that other sites for 
shallow disposal should be investigated in addition to Elstow.
By 1987, four sites had been identified. Despite strong local opposition, on-site 
investigations in support of a shallow disposal facility for LLW were commenced. 
Just before the 1987 general election the Secretary of State for the Environment in 
May 1987 announced that both LLW and ILW should be disposed to a deep 
facility. This decision was justified on the basis of the rising costs of a near-surface 
disposal facility brought about by the need to respond to public perception. Studies 
had shown that, if the LLW could be added to the wastes already allocated for 
disposal at depth, the cost of deep disposal of LLW would be ’broadly similar’ to 
the cost of near-surface disposal in a new facility [Baker, 1987].
This switch in policy prompted a new search for a site for a deep geological 
repository to take all ILW and LLW. Around one third of the UK landmass was
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considered to have potentially suitable geology. By 1989 Nirex had compiled a 
shortlist of ten land-based potential sites plus two generic offshore options. From 
these Dounreay and Sellafield were selected for detailed study. Sellafield was 
then chosen as the preferred site for continued investigation in 1991. Nirex 
considered both sites to have potentially suitable geology but a large percentage 
of the waste was already located at Sellafield so that risks and costs associated 
with transport of waste would be lower there. Also, an existing nuclear industry 
presence at Sellafield was expected to provide a measure of local support for a 
deep repository.
An extensive programme of geological investigations was focused on the 
Sellafield site. Twenty-nine deep boreholes were drilled to investigate the 
properties of the geology around the site, and considerable modelling work carried 
out to assess the suitability of the site for a repository. In 1992, a need for a Rock 
Characterisation Facility (RCF), an underground laboratory was identified. The 
purpose of the RCF was to investigate further the detailed properties of the 
potential host rock. Nirex applied for planning permission to build the RCF in June 
1994. Cumbria County Council rejected the application in December 1994. Nirex 
appealed against the decision and this resulted in a public inquiry that took place 
between October 1995 and February 1996.
The result of the public inquiry was that the rejection of planning permission for the 
RCF was upheld. The Secretary of State for the Environment announced on 17th 
March 1997 that he supported the decision not to allow the construction of the 
RCF and consequently Nirex terminated its work at Sellafield.
B3.1997-2000
The RCF decision ended serious pursuit of any specific long-term management 
option for solid ILW radioactive wastes. In a report summarising the national 
situation with regard to radioactive waste management [Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology, 2000], the Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology concludes that:
“The refusal o f the planning appeal by the last Government brought to an abrupt 
halt a process started as long ago as 1976 and which has involved investments of 
approaching £4501/1 over the intervening years -  now with little to show for it. 
While site characteristics and the way in which Nirex was perceived to operate no 
doubt contributed to the particular problems, the experience does throw up many 
serious questions over the mechanism for determining the appropriate approach 
to what would have to be a unique and national facility.’’
The report was the first in a series of comments about the future of radioactive 
waste management in the United Kingdom from influential organisations. 
Following the RCF Public Inquiry decision and the election of a new party into 
government in May 1997, the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Science and 
Technology launched an enquiry into the management of nuclear waste, inviting 
evidence from a wide range of experts and stakeholders. Their report, The 
Management of Nuclear Waste [HoL, 1999] was published in March 1999. An 
extract of the executive summary of the report, is presented below:
II. The bulk of nuclear waste that exists now and is certain to arise in future originates 
from past military and civil nuclear programmes. The problem exists and has to be solved. 
It could not be avoided by deciding today to discontinue nuclear power production or the 
reprocessing of spent fuel.
IV. The long time-scales involved might be thought to be a reason for postponing 
decisions. The contrary is the case, since existing storage arrangements have a limited life
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and will require replacement and eventually the repackaging and transfer of stored waste. 
Reliance on supervision for very long periods increases the probability of human error.
V. We received a great deal of evidence on the technical issues and conclude that phased
disposal in a deep repository is feasible and desirable  The phased approach which we
recommend would allow decisions to be taken in a considered way as technical confidence 
and experience develop, and would avoid premature decisions which may be difficult to 
reverse.
VI. The future policy for nuclear waste management will require public acceptance... 
Central to this is the need for widespread public consultation before a policy is settled by 
Government and presented to Parliament for endorsement....
VII. Present policy for nuclear waste management is fragmented. There are wastes for 
which no long term management option has yet been decided and there are a number of 
significant materials, for which no use is foreseen, which are not categorised as waste at 
all. This leads to uncertainties in the planning of future facilities and to the continued 
storage of hazardous materials in an essentially temporary state...
VIII. These problems require changes in the present organisational structure for 
nuclear waste management.....
B 4:2000 -  present
Since the House of Lords report, the Department of the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs have launched a consultation process to develop a new policy for the 
United Kingdom on Managing Radioactive Waste Safely. An initial public 
consultation has been undertaken and response collected and collated. As a 
result of this, DEFRA has established a Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) to steer DEFRA’s policy development process through the 
next stage -  the development of options for consideration.
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Appendix C:
UNPACKING THE NIREX PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEEP DISPOSAL OF 
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
In this appendix, the analysis which goes into the post closure performance assessments 
used by Nirex to examine the risks associated with a deep geological repository is 
summarised. The aim is to draw out the rationale behind specific performance 
assessments in terms of fundamental knowledge, conceptual assumptions and 
mathematical models in order to support conclusions and analysis in the main body of this 
thesis.
C1 BACKGROUND
In the context of radioactive waste disposal, one form of risk analysis is the “post-closure 
performance assessment”. This process evaluates the ability of a repository to protect 
people and the environment in the very long term after closure. It represents the repository 
system and includes features, events and processes which may affect the repository 
system, of order 1 million years into the future. Mathematical models are used to represent 
these features, events and processes and to estimate radiological risk. The modelling 
process can be complex and may use probabilistic mathematical modelling techniques. In 
consequence, post-closure performance assessment reports are commonly written with a 
highly technical audience (such as the regulators) in mind [EA, 1997]
C1.1 The approach taken to analysing the performance assessment
In analysing performance assessments, attention is often focussed on the modelling 
process. This is understandable, given the history of risk analysis as a means of capturing 
and quantifying uncertainty for discussion in the specialist domain. The primary purpose of 
the performance assessment is, after all, to quantify levels of safety for a system whose 
long-term evolution is bound to be subject to uncertainties. However, the approach adopted 
below is to move away from a strong focus on the modelling process and consider the 
inputs to a performance assessment in a more qualitative and subjective manner. A 
specific performance assessment is analysed below using different stages of “intellectual 
translation” of information and knowledge into modelling methods identified in Chapter 4:
•  What standards need to be met (generally defined in regulations)
• How the proposed course of action hopes to meet these standards (the project design)
• What is known now about environmental conditions, processes and evolution
•  What potentially could happen in the future
•  What are the risks?
The aim of this classification is to establish the scope and complexity of the environmental 
issues being handled within the context of radioactive waste management.
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C1.2 The performance assessments3
Performance assessment is a process that aims to represent the behaviour of a radioactive 
waste management system. In this thesis, it is used synonymously with the term “safety 
assessment”, defined by the NEA [OECD/NEA, 1999b] as
Trie evaluation of long-term performance, of compliance with acceptance 
guidelines and of confidence in the safety indicated by the assessment results”.
An assessment should therefore allow judgements about the safety of the proposed 
management system. Performance assessments may be used as part of the process of 
confidence building and decision making surrounding proposals for developing a particular 
facility.
Historically within the nuclear industry, both nationally and internationally, a great deal of 
attention has been focussed on considering how radionuclides could return to the surface 
in the future. This is a classic risk focus -  if radionuclides can return to the surface then 
people could receive a radioactive dose which could result in harm to health. Performance 
assessments are used to evaluate that possibility and are an important aspect of all 
radioactive waste management programmes.
Appendix D presents a short summary of a range of performance assessments developed 
internationally. However, in order to examine the assessment process in detail, I wanted to 
consider a specific example and because of my familiarity with the work of Nirex, I have 
based much of the discussion below on post-closure assessments of the Nirex Phased 
Disposal Concept [Nirex, 2000a].
The Nirex Phased Disposal Concept is an example of a deep geological radioactive waste 
repository in which post-closure safety is provided by a series of barriers to radionuclide 
movement. The scientific underpinnings of deep geological disposal have been described 
elsewhere [Nirex, 2001a; Savage 1994], The nature of “performance assessments” is also 
described in more detail elsewhere. In support of the Nirex Phased Disposal Concept, 
three underlying technical evaluations have been undertaken. These address: the safety of 
waste transport [Nirex, 2001 ej; the safety of repository operation prior to repository closure 
[Nirex, 2001 cj; and the long-term performance of the repository [Nirex, 2001 dj. The 
assessment of the long-term performance of the repository is called the generic post­
closure performance assessment (GPA). The GPA forms the initial basis for the 
descriptions given below.
However, the GPA is a performance assessment of a generic concept undertaken during a 
period of reflection and consultation regarding the future of radioactive waste management. 
Chapter 6 suggests that the identification of a specific site brings a number of different 
factors into the development of proposals. Therefore, the analysis also considers Nirex 97 
[Nirex, 1997], a post closure performance assessment that was undertaken when Nirex 
was investigating the suitability of a site near Sellafield in West Cumbria as a potential host 
for a deep geological repository. As discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, this project ended 
following the refusal of planning permission to construct an underground “Rock 
Characterisation Facility” for further scientific investigations. This planning refusal led to the 
current period of Government consultation and deliberation about the future of radioactive 
waste management in the United Kingdom [Nirex, 2000a].
Juxtaposing two successive, but different performance assessments gives us the 
opportunity to consider trends in performance assessment, and also explore how context 
and experience affects the role of value judgements in performance assessment.
3 In the context of the UK radioactive waste management industry, the term “performance 
assessment” is typically used for a specific risk analysis. Throughout this thesis, I have adopted this 
protocol when talking about risk analyses produced by the radioactive waste management industry.
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C2 THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
C2.1 What standards need to be met?
Environm ental standards a re  set out, often in legislation in order to protect the  
environm ent. T h ey  are  typically established by careful consideration of cau se and effect in 
order to determ ine thresholds for acceptab le  levels of im pact. For exam ple, the W orld  
H ealth  O rganisation identifies w ate r quality standards w hich indicate concentration levels 
that a re  acceptab le  in potable w ater.
In the UK, standards that would need to be m et for any long-term  m anag em ent option for 
radioactive are  set out in the form  o f G uid ance from  the regulatory authorities. Both 
qualitative and quantitative principles a re  identified.
T h e  regulatory gu idance for radioactive w aste disposal facilities is couched m ainly in term s  
o f :
•  A  dose constraint -  applicable during the operation o f a  facility and for a period o f a few  
hundred years thereafter. This constraint sets limits on the am ount o f exposure to 
radioactivity for an y  individual;
•  A  risk target -  applicable once the repository has been closed which states that 
assessed radiological risk (to a  “representa tive individual from  a potentially exposed  
group”) should be consistent with a target o f 1 C 6, or one in a million, per year. T he  
guidance does not indicate a  cut off tim e for this target.
Implicitly, these standards assum e that risks can be controlled or limited whilst the 
repository is in operation and under active m anag em ent. T h e y  are  also based on the idea 
that the protection of hum ans will also ensure the necessary level o f protection o f the  
environm ent in its broadest sense.
C 2.2 How the proposed course of action hopes to meet these standards
G enera lly  speaking, regulatory standards m ean that it is necessary to isolate radionuclides 
from  hum ans sufficiently so that they never return to the hum an environm ent in 
concentrations that exceed  the radiological risk target. T h e re  is broad international 
consensus that a good w ay o f achieving this is by constructing an eng ineered repository 
under the ground. In this w ay, both m an -m ad e and natural system s can w ork together to 
contain and isolate the radionuclides. This is the concept o f m ultibarrier containm ent 
[Bailey and Littleboy, 2 00 1 ]. In essence, the concept can be considered in term s o f three  
com ponents which control the m ovem en t o f radionuclides and the chance of exposure to 
ionising radiation. T h e se  are:
•  T h e  eng ineered system , w hich com prises the w astes them selves, their packaging and  
the eng ineered  elem ents o f the repository in which they a re  p laced for long-term  
disposal;
•  T h e  geosphere, which is the geological system  in w hich the repository is constructed; 
and
•  T h e  biosphere, w hich is the n ea r surface environm ent in w hich flora and fauna exist. 
W ithin each  o f these  com ponents, physical and chem ical processes operate  that determ ine  
the levels o f isolation provided by the repository. T h e  scientific research providing evidence  
for the operation o f these  processes is described e lsew here  [S ava g e  1994],
N irex has developed a P h ased  Disposal C o ncept based on the idea o f m ultibarrier 
containm ent. This concept, illustrated schem atically in F igure A 1 , is designed to m eet the  
n ecessary safety standards and ensure long-term  environm ental protection. T h e  concept 
includes an extended period o f underground containm ent and m onitoring (geological 
isolation), during which the option of retrieving the w astes will be kept open. This w as  
included into the concept as a  result o f consultation with a  w ide  range of stakeholders. T he  
concept is generic, in that it could be applied at any suitable site.
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Figure C1: The Nirex Phased D isposal C oncept
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T h e  Nirex phased disposal concept is a  m ulti-barrier system , w hich envisages:
•  imm obilisation and packaging o f w astes (physical containm ent);
•  transport to a repository;
•  em p lacem en t in vaults excavated  d eep  underground within a  suitable geological 
environm ent (geological isolation);
•  a period o f monitoring during w hich the w astes would be retrievable;
•  backfilling o f the repository a t a tim e determ ined by future generations (chem ical 
conditioning); and
•  sealing o f the repository (geological containm ent).
It is env isaged that such a  repository would be located several hundreds o f m etres below  
the earth ’s surface in an  a rea  o f naturally low groun dw ater flow.
T h e  cem entitious m atrix and the steel and concrete  containers in w hich radioactive w astes  
are  packaged will provide a  physical barrier to the m ovem en t o f radionuclides by initially 
preventing, and th ereafte r limiting the access o f g roun dw ater to the w astes. M ost w aste  
containers have vents to allow  the re lease  o f gases . How ever, even  allow ing for the  
presence o f these  vents it is expected  that the conditioning and packaging o f the w astes  
will reduce the re lease  o f radionuclides or up to o ne  thousand years as the radionuclides  
take  a long tim e to diffuse through w aster in the pore spaces of the w aste matrix.
T h e  w aste packages are  to be surrounded by a  cem en t-b ased  backfill. This backfill is 
designed to  evo lve to create  stable, uniform and alkaline conditions around the w aste  
packages that will tend to reduce solubility -  thereby limiting the extent to w hich som e  
radionuclides can dissolve into groundw ater. T h e  cem entitious backfill a lso has a  high 
potential for “sorbing” radionuclides (capturing radionuclides on the surface o f the backfill 
so that they a re  no longer m obile), thus inhibiting the m ovem en t o f radionuclides aw a y  from  
the repository. T h e  backfill is also des igned to allow  the re lease  o f g ases  from  the  
repository in order to prevent any build-up of pressure.
T h e  geological env ironm ent (geosp here) is in tended to provide a  stab le  setting and  
isolation from inadvertent hum an intrusion or disruption by natural events . T h e  g eo sp h ere  
can be selected s that it is one in w hich there a re  low levels o f current g ro u n d w ater flow  in 
order to reduce the rate as w hich radionuclides could eventu ally  be carried aw a y  from  the  
repository. Additionally, the longer the g roun dw ater takes  to reach the surface, the m ore
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tim e th ere  is for radioactive d ec ay  to occur -  a  natural physical process by w hich  
radioactivity dec re ases  over tim e. A n y radionuclides that a re  re leased  from  the repository  
will spread out (d isperse) as  they a re  carried through the  g eo sp h ere  by groundw ater. T h e  
m o vem en t o f radionuclides will a lso be slow ed dow n by sorption (adsorption onto rock 
surfaces or into m ineral structures). S o  the  p erfo rm ance of th e  g eo sp h ere  is d ep en d en t on 
a com bination of g roun dw ater flow  rate, decay, dispersion and sorption that will d eterm in e  
the  concentration of radionuclides in g roun dw ater reach ing the surface. G en era lly  
speakin g, these  processes h av e  been  studied and observed through the practice of 
hydrogeology and con tam inant m igration studies for m any years . In con sequen ce, the  
assum ption  is that the  con centration reach ing th e  b iosphere will be very m uch low er than  
the con centration leaving the repository.
Although it is assum ed that the m ajority o f radionuclides will be p revented from  reach ing  
the b iosphere, those that do m ay be  ingested  or inhaled by hum ans, giving rise to a 
radiological dose. Ingestion can occur if radionuclides en te r the food chain; radionuclides  
w hich becom e airborne m ay be  inhaled. Additionally, radionuclides m ay give rise to an  
external dose. M an y  years  o f m onitoring and research on d ischarges from  nuc lear  
installations m eans that radionuclide transfer processes in the b iosphere and consequential 
doses a re  “w ell understood” [IC R P , 1991].
C 2.3 What do we know now about environmental processes, conditions and 
evolution?
2.3.1 What information do we want?
T h e  p erfo rm ance assessm ents  gen era lly  consider th ree m ain routes back to the  hum an  
env ironm ent [Bailey and Littleboy, 2001]:
•  the  dissolution or entra inm ent o f radionuclides into groun dw ater and their consequentia l 
m igration back to  th e  surface  as a  result o f th e  hydrological cycle;
•  the  production o f rad ioactive gas and its sub sequen t m ovem en t back to the surface; 
and
•  the  intrusion o f hum an s into the repository or into surrounding rocks that h av e  been  
affected  by radionuclide m igration (F igure A 2 ).
T h e  nature o f the eng ineered  and natural barriers is exp ected  to prevent o r limit o f 
exp osure by these  routes. Th is  expectation  is based on certain assum ptions, supported  
by theory, observation  and practice, about the  perform ance o f the different barriers  
[S ava g e  1994],
G ro u n d w ater provides an  im portant route for radionuclides in a d ee p  w aste  repository to  
reach  the b iosphere and is often the focus of attention in a p erfo rm ance assessm ent. T h e  
groun dw ater m ust en te r the w a s te  containers, dissolve radionuclides or detach  particulate  
m atter from  the w astes  and  transport radionuclides in solution or as suspended  solids to 
th e  b iosphere. W h e th e r or not radionuclides from  the  w as te  return to the  b iosph ere at 
concentrations that w ould pose a radiological risk exceed ing  the regulatory target d ep ends  
on the w a y  the various system  com ponents function tog eth er over tim e. M ore specifically, it 
dep ends on the geo log ical system  surrounding the  repository.
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Figure C2: E xposure pathw ays in post-c losure perform ance assessm ents .
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C u rren t conditions provide a starting point for an y  ana lysis  or d iscussion abo ut ho w  the  
geo log ical system  will function. For this reason, a good understanding o f the g roun dw ater  
flow  reg im e a t the proposed site is regarded  as  a prerequ is ite  for calculating risks from  the  
groun dw ater flow  path. Ideally, the g eo sp h ere  barrier n eed s to en s u re  low groun dw ater  
flow  into and through the repository and chem ical conditions (particularly in the  
g roun dw ater) that do not adverse ly  affect the  en g in eered  system . T h e s e  characteristics will 
com bine to allow  tim e for radionuclide d ec ay  and dispersion within the n ea r field an d  the  
geo sp h ere , thus reducing the am oun t of radionuclides re leased  into the b iosph ere during  
any given tim e period.
T h e  N irex app ro ach to m odelling the geo log ical system  und er current env ironm ental 
conditions is to consider the geo log ical barrier in term s o f a num ber o f factors that govern  
the  fraction o f the  initial inventory transm itted  through the  g eo sp h ere  and the  g eo sp h ere  
spread ing  time:
•  th e  d istance the  g roun dw ater m ust travel through th e  g eo sp h ere  -  the  g roun dw ater  
‘path length ’;
•  the  ave ra g e  tim e taken  by g roun dw ater to travel through the  g eo sp h ere  - the  
‘g roun dw ater travel tim e’;
•  the  extent to w hich eac h  radionuclide is d e layed  as  it travels  through the  g e o s p h e re  (for 
e xa m p le  by sorption onto rocks) - th e  ‘retardation  factor’ for eac h  radionuclide;
•  th e  exten t to w hich  rad ionuclides a re  spread  out into th e  rocks as  th ey  travel a long the  
g roun dw ater path - exp ressed  in term s o f the  ‘dispersion length ’.
2.3.2 The role o f geological site investigations
T h e s e  factors dep end  upon m easu ra b le  physical and chem ical properties of th e  repository  
and its geo log ical setting, as  indicated in F igure A 3 .
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Figure C3: R elationship  betw een geosphere facto rs and geological
properties
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There fore, geological investigations are  fundam en tal to providing the n ecessary know ledge
for a perform ance assessm ent. Specifically, site investigations a re  used to build know ledge
that helps to:
•  understand the perform ance o f the g eo sphere at a  potential repository site;
•  dem on strate  a  broad based, se lf consistent geological understanding o f a  site (this 
includes geology, hydrogeology, geotechnical aspects and the  geochem istry  of the site) 
to a w ide  audience;
•  develop practical eng ineering  designs for the  construction o f a  potential repository; and
•  en h an ce  the gen eric  understanding o f key processes that will im pact g eo sphere  
perform ance;
•  understand the  potential interactions betw een  eng ineered  barriers and the g eo sphere  
over long tim escales; and
T h e  broad types o f inform ation required from  a site characterisation p rogram m e are
therefore:
•  structural and lithological inform ation on the  disposition, internal structure and inter­
relationships o f all o f the rock form ations in and around a site, to depths below  the  
potential repository location and including surface sed im ent cover and soil form ations;
•  distribution o f hydraulic properties o f each  form ation, in term s o f perm eability, porosity, 
and nature of groun dw ater flow  through rock units and individual structural fea tures  and  
the connectivity o f d ifferent fea tures  in which flow  occurs;
•  geochem istry  o f rocks and groundw aters in different form ations and features  (e .g . faults  
and fractures), including hydrochem istry, fracture and pore surface m ineralogy and  
chem ical indicators o f groun dw ater residence tim es and m ovem ent;
•  inform ation on the  spatial variability o f all the  abo ve  properties and on the spatial sca les  
over w hich they can confidently be interpolated or extrapolated;
•  indicators o f the potential variability  of these  properties with tim e;
•  conceptual m odels o f groun dw ater flow  und er current conditions and indications o f how  
this could change in the future;
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•  indicators o f stability o r instability o f the geological o r hydrogeological system  from  the  
geological record, including ev idence  for recent (neotectonic) structural m ovem ents or 
environm ental changes;
•  indications o f the resource potential o f the d ifferent rock units and evidence o f past 
drilling and excavation  practices; and
•  in situ rock stress distributions and geo m echan ica l properties within each form ation and  
in m ajor structural features.
This know ledge is sup plem en ted by o ther research  activities to provide inform ation on key  
processes such as  sorption, d ispersion, solubility, retardation and  the potential corrosion 
and evolution o f eng ineered  m ateria ls  and w astes  within the  repository. There fore , w hen it 
com es to translating w hat w e know  now  about the current conditions into m odel input 
param eters  there  should be a fairly large set o f inform ation.
H ow ever, determ in ing the re levance  and  the robustness of data  in the  context o f a  post­
closure p erfo rm ance assessm en t is not straightforw ard. Tak ing  know ledge about the  
geo sphere  as an  exa m p le , raw  (or prim ary) data  is g en erated  directly by m easu re m en ts  in 
the field or on sam ples  ana lysed  in the  laboratory. Th is  prim ary datase t m ay require  
processing, e ith er b ecau se  the prim ary data  a re  not d irectly representa tive o f the in situ 
conditions (gaining access to the  sam ple can disturb the  natural env ironm ent) or b ec au se  
the m easu rem en t is correlated in som e w ay  to the data  o f interest. D a ta  processing gives  
rise to a  secondary datase t (processed d ata). T h e  inform ation o f m ost re levan ce  in 
establishing the characteristics o f a site is often derived from  the  secondary data  by 
interpretation. For exam p le, m odels o f the  geological structure a re  extrapolated  from  som e  
com bination o f borehole  inform ation and geophysical surveys. G ro undw ater com positions  
a re  often com pared by exam in ing the ratios o f certain  chem ical species.
S o  a key  asp ect o f the site investigation program m e is the integration o f m any data  from  
m any different sources to provide a  m ore com preh ensive  understanding. Th is  integration  
can also help to reduce uncertainties arising from  a  single datase t and provide an  
indepen dent verification o f conclusions draw n from  a n y  single dataset. Th is  all helps to 
increase the  self consistency in an y  description of the  current env ironm ental conditions at 
the site, and hen ce  increase confidence in conclusions draw n from  indepen dent data.
A  key output from  a site investigation program m e is a  conceptual description o f w hat is 
know n abo ut current env ironm ental conditions and processes and how  they h ave  evolved. 
This  conceptual description helps develop conceptual m odels  -  the  key staring point for the  
risk ana lysis (F ig ure 9 .1 ).
2.3.3 The role o f models
An assessm en t o f the groun dw ater flow  pathw ay requires cred ib le  g roun dw ater flow  
m odels. T h e  conceptual description itse lf is not sufficient to cap ture the  geological system  
in a form suitab le for calculating risks from  the  groun dw ater flow  pathw ay. M odels  m ust be  
used to derive the factors that describe the  g eo sp h ere  behaviour -  the groun dw ater path  
length, groun dw ater travel tim e, retardation factor and dispersion length. S ince  m odels will 
also h ave  been used to help process the prim ary da ta  and develop  secondary d atase ts  (for  
exa m p le  in the interpretation o f borehole  test data , chem ical com position or geophysical 
inform ation), there  is a h ierarchy of m odels  that contributes to kno w ledge about current 
environm ental conditions. Th is  h ierarchy o f m o del-based  inform ation is illustrated in 
Figure A 4. An im portant issue is to keep  the  consistency b etw een  th ese  m odels  since that  
is the only w ay  that the param eters  going into the  risk m odel can  be re lated  back to  
observation and m easu rem en ts.
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2.3.4 Integrating investigations and modelling.
Figure A 4  im plies a  linear process for develop ing kno w ledge about current env ironm ental 
conditions and groun dw ater flow. H ow ever, since m easu rem en t, m odelling and expert 
ju d g em en t com bine a t all s tages o f the  process, it is genera lly  not und ertaken in a linear 
m anner.
K now ledge evo lves as  inform ation becom es ava ilab le . T h e  ability to review  inform ation  
against identified a im s to s e e  how  understanding is develop ing and w h ere  there are  key  
rem ain ing  uncertainties is im portant to any  research program m e. T h e re fo re , develop ing an  
understanding o f current env ironm ental conditions is genera lly  deve lop ed  by iterating  
b etw een  data gathering , interpretation and groundw ater m odelling [Littleboy, 1995]. Each  
iteration provides an  evo lved understanding o f the a rea . [Littleboy et al, 1998].
T h e  m ain  e lem ents  o f this cyclical process are:
•  A n initial hypothesis is constructed for the behaviour o f the  site, or a specific feature, 
even t o r process contributing to the overall system ;
•  D a ta  are  gathered  to test this hypothesis;
•  By considering th ese  data , a re a s  o f uncertainty in the hypothesis can be identified, and  
num erical m odels (with associa ted  uncertainties) can be developed to produce results  
that indicate the  possible range o f beh avio ur o f the site that is consistent w ith the  
hypothesis;
•  Using an iterative process, rem ain ing a reas  o f uncertainty in the  hypothesis a re  
add ressed  by obtaining additional inform ation from  specifically des igned tests;
•  A  m easu re  o f the  valid ity o f the  m odels is obtained by com paring predictions from  
m odels o f the  test with actual results. Tests  for w hich the m odel does not ade q u ate ly  
predict results highlight those a reas  w h ere  further work is required to im prove the  
m odel; and
•  A  new  cycle then co m m en c es with a revised hypothesis.
A  g rea te r level o f understanding o f the site is ach ieved during each  cycle o f m odel 
develop m ent. O n com pletion o f each  cycle, the  opportunity to refocus characterisation  
activities, o r im prove gro u n d w ater f low  m odels in a structured m anner is provided.
2.3.5 Integrating uncertainty and expertise
T h e re  is n ev er going to be com plete  kno w ledge about the geological system  o r the  
environm ental processes that o pera te . In translating know ledge about current 
environm ental p rocesses into m odelling m ethods, expert ju dgem ents  a re  used to  
sup p lem en t sparse  data  (data  uncertain ty) and ensure that know ledge abo ut heterogeneity  
and uncertainty a re  captured within the m odels.
T h e re  a re  a num ber o f possible app ro aches for dealing with uncertainty. A t the  level o f 
m odelling prim ary data  and deriving secondary d atase ts  from  site investigation, p reced en t  
practice can be draw n on -  s ta te -o f-th e-art processing and m odelling techn iques for the  
in terpretation and processing o f geological, hydrogeological and geo chem ical inform ation. 
T h e  tools and techn iques a re  ava ilab le  for application but exp erien c e  and  exp ertise  in 
th ese  particular techniques is called on to determ in e w hich m ethod is m ost su itab le  for the  
m atter in hand. Additionally, exp erien c e  is required to  interpret the output o f th ese  
techniques . H e n ce  a t this s tag e  in the process exp erience  and m odelling w ork to g e th er to  
dea l w ith uncertainty, gu ided by fairly well estab lished p recedent practices.
H o w ever, further dow n the process described in F igure A 4 , m any d ifferen t types  o f  
inform ation a re  being integrated into an overall understanding. A t this point -  w h ere  
conceptual m odels are  being develop ed and turned into num erical m odels  - a nu m b er of 
com plex issues and key uncertainties a re  being draw n together. P re c e d e n t practice no  
longer provides a  useful b en chm ark s ince the  requ irem ent is to  m odel a  com plex  sys tem  o f
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interelating environmental features and processes. Both conceptual uncertainty and data 
uncertainty are significant.
Conceptual uncertainty tends to be dealt with by using experience and expertise to identify 
a range of conceptual models that could be consistent with the available information. 
During the iterative process of investigation and modelling, conceptual models maybe 
refined and some maybe eliminated as conceptual uncertainty is reduced. Hence expertise 
is used to ensure that uncertainty is encompassed within the range of proposed conceptual 
models.
Data uncertainty can be very significant. Data about the parameter of interest and its 
variability can be obtained but needs to be extrapolated and modelled for a volume of rock. 
At any point within that volume, the property could adopt one of a range of values. The 
potential range of values is affected both by natural variability and by uncertainty due to 
lack of information.
In the UK, Nirex has adopted a probabilistic approach to handling the numerous sources of 
uncertainty inherent in knowledge about the site conditions. The approach seeks to 
establish the range of possible values for each uncertain parameter. Typically this range is 
based on measured values, supplemented by the judgement of suitably qualified experts, 
and takes into account any sparsity of data or bias from measurements. The uncertainty is 
described by a ‘probability density function’, which describes the probability that the 
parameter will have a particular value within the assigned range of possible values.
When doing the modelling it is possible to sample values from the probability density 
functions for each of the uncertain parameters. The models can be run many times, 
sampling a different set of values each time. The rationale behind this approach is that it 
ensures that wide ranges of possible parameter value combinations are considered within 
the models.
2.3.6 What could happen in the future
Performance assessments evaluate behaviour into the future. This requires assumptions 
to be made about the possible future evolution of the repository (scenarios). This future 
evolution is uncertain, and so more than one possible scenario can be envisaged. 
Additionally, the likelihood of people receiving a dose from radionuclides returning to the 
surface is very dependent on living conditions. This will be very dependent on the nature of 
the biosphere.
2.3.7 Future Scenarios
Identifying scenarios about what could happen in the future lies at the heart of performance 
assessment. There are number of different ways of doing this, all of which essentially 
adopt an approach of identifying broad-brush descriptions of possible evolutions of the 
repository system. However, given the long timescales of interest in radioactive waste 
management, the range of possible future scenarios is essentially unlimited. Two distinct 
and often competing approaches for dealing with this non-uniqueness are worth a special 
mention.
Scenario development is an approach favoured by many performance assessment 
specialists working in the field of radioactive waste management (see Appendix D). 
Scenario development entails the identification of a select number of future scenarios that 
essentially bound the full range of potential future scenarios. However, with this approach, 
there are always some scenarios that are not specifically included within the assessment, 
leaving it open to challenges of incompleteness.
Simulation seeks to identify a more complete representation of the range of potential future 
scenarios and to incorporate them into the assessment. With this approach, the modelling
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complexity increases significantly and it is possible for some incredible scenarios to be 
included in the assessment (leaving it open to challenges of unreliability). Additionally, 
given Wynnes work on ignorance, it is naive to claim that all possible futures have been 
taken into account.
Both approaches have been developed in an attempt to provide systematic and transparent 
means by which the features, events and processes included in a performance assessment 
can be selected and documented. However, the methods have been developed for 
application by experts and can appear complex and full of jargon and mystique. For 
example, Nirex has developed a systematic approach to the identification and 
consideration of the factors that could affect the performance of the repository [Nirex, 
1998b]. These factors are often referred to as FEPs (features, events and processes) and 
are combined together to form scenarios. Examples of FEPs include waste package 
corrosion, groundwater movement, climate change, earthquakes and potential future 
human actions.
The FEP analysis approach links those FEPs that are almost certain to occur (such as 
climate change and fundamental physical and chemical processes) into a “base scenario” 
which is intended to represent the likely natural evolution of the system. Those FEPs which 
are less likely or unlikely to occur (such as large earthquakes and certain human actions) 
can be explored via “variant scenarios”.
For each of the variant scenarios it is possible to calculate the probability that it will occur, 
based upon the probabilities of the FEPs which define the scenario. For example, it is 
possible to estimate the probability of a large earthquake occurring, based upon the 
historical frequency of such events.
The FEP analysis methodology developed by Nirex seeks to identify a manageable set of 
scenarios that embraces all significant and relevant repository evolutions. Less harmful 
scenarios are enveloped (“subsumed") into those likely to give higher risks. However, this 
can mean that the visibility of issues captured by the scenarios is reduced.
However, because scenario development is concerned with the future, and because it 
operates at a conceptual and descriptive level, is an opportunity to reflect stakeholder 
concerns about “what would happen if...”. Alternative evolutions can be considered by 
conducting sensitivity studies. For example, parameters within the models can be varied. 
These studies should indicate the model assumptions and data that the performance is 
most sensitive to. Additionally, alternative “what i f  scenarios can be explicitly considered. 
The early identification of the “what i f  studies to be undertaken could be used as a focus 
for debate and dialogue with stakeholders, and “what i f  studies explicitly addressing their 
own particular concerns could be considered.
2.3.8 Representing future biospheres
Whatever the scenario under which radionuclides return to the biosphere, the affect they 
may have on human health depends on the manner in which people are exposed to 
radiation. The manner in which people are exposed will depend on the nature of society 
and the standard of technology. There are huge ethical questions raised by thinking about 
future societies. For example:
• Are we worried about exposure to individuals or collectives? The manner in which risk 
is calculated and risk results are analysed varies significantly depending on this choice.
• Should we take into account the possibility of technical progression or technical 
regression? The scenarios that come into play for these two situations are entirely 
different.
•  How do we represent the response of societies to future environmental change -  either 
anthropogenic or natural? Predicting global change is a highly complex field in its own 
right. The assumptions about future societies vary significantly for different climate 
change scenarios.
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The performance assessments analysed here and describe in Appendix C tend to avoid 
these issues by making the assumption that we are concerned with collective risk, we 
cannot rely on a technologically based future for society and we need to consider risks 
under a range of different climates. Hence the assessments look at representative 
subsistence communities whose main risks of exposure arise from the mixing of 
groundwater with waters at the surface. Scenarios whereby humans intrude into the 
deeper environment potentially contaminated by radionuclide migration from the repository 
are also considered, as are scenarios whereby society is exposed because of the emission 
of gas from the repository. However, for the purposes of this thesis, we will focus on 
natural explore to radiological risk as a result of groundwater movement.
Contaminated groundwater will be diluted as it discharges into surface water. However, 
the risk is that humans could receive doses by drinking this water, and since animals could 
drink it also radionuclides could enter the food chain. Radionuclides will also be removed 
from solution and bound onto soils and sediments. Once in the soil, radionuclides may be 
transferred into plant matter, and from plants into the food chain. Particulate matter may be 
blown into the atmosphere and once there, respiration can lead to the inhalation of 
particulate matter. Evaporation of water and transpiration (‘breathing’) by plants can also 
lead to radionuclides entering the atmosphere.
The standards raise the issue of risk to human health. Therefore, various assumptions are 
made about how people may live in the future - diet, occupation and general lifestyle -  and 
how they might receive a radiological dose arising from the migration of contaminated 
groundwater. Due to the long timescales of consideration for a repository system, these 
will change from current behaviour and future trends are highly uncertain. Therefore, 
conservative assumptions that would tend to increase the received dose are adopted when 
calculating doses. For example, the following conservative assumptions are made 
concerning the individuals who define the potentially exposed group:
• they live in an area (known as the resource area) which includes the location of highest 
radionuclide concentration;
• they spend all their time in this resource area; and
•  they only eat foodstuffs gathered from the resource area.
The unpredictability of human behaviour, particularly over the long time scales appropriate 
to post-closure performance assessment, means that wide-ranging assumptions need to 
be adopted, for example on future land-use, farming practices and population distributions; 
these may be strongly influenced by climate change. The need to make such assumptions 
places a limit on the extent to which it is appropriate to make detailed predictions of the 
long-term evolution of the environment, as recognised in the advice received from the 
National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and the Government [EA, 1997],
These assumptions are translated into modelling methods using the concept of a biosphere 
factor - that converts the flux of radionuclide entering the biosphere into a radiological dose. 
This dose can then be converted to a radiological risk. The biosphere factor is very 
dependent on natural processes governing radionuclide transfer between different 
components of the environment. These components include:
• surface fresh waters (streams, rivers and lakes);
• surface-water catchments, including soils, sediments, plants and animals;
•  estuaries, including channel waters, unvegetated and vegetated sediments, and salt 
marshes;
• the marine environment, including foreshore, nearshore and offshore zones and their 
underlying sediments;
• the atmosphere.
Clearly there are a range of possible climatic conditions which could prevail over the 
timescales of concern when dealing with radioactive wastes. Therefore a range of broad
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climate states are used to describe the range of possible future climatic conditions in Britain 
[Meadows, 1992], These are: Mediterranean (e.g. Spain) or greenhouse-gas warmed; 
Temperate (e.g. UK); Boreal (e.g. Scandinavia); Tundra (e.g. Alaska); Glacial (e.g. 
Greenland). Different conditions characterise these different states. For example, Boreal 
conditions correspond to a climate similar to that of Southeast Iceland. The biosphere 
associated with this climate state can be described qualitatively in terms of an extended 
coastal plain, crossed by a number of small to medium size rivers. The climate is regarded 
as sufficiently mild for a range of arable crops to be grown in addition to the predominant 
pasture use. However, primary productivity is reduced relative to that of the current 
Temperate climatic conditions in the United Kingdom. Under this climate state, a global sea- 
level fall is predicted and much of the sea-bed is expected to be uncovered. Therefore 
most of the radionuclide release is expected initially to be to the terrestrial environment, 
rather than to the sea, irrespective of the repository’s location. This Boreal climate state is 
expected to exist at the time when the risks in the biosphere are nominally at a peak and 
hence it is appropriate to adopt in illustrations of the performance of a repository under 
future climatic conditions.
C2.4 What are the risks?
Earlier sections outline the standards that need to be met. These standards have a 
controlling influence over the way the performance assessment is undertaken. This is 
because, fundamentally, the output of the performance assessment needs to be in a form 
that can be compared to the standards. Past approaches to performance assessment 
have tended to focus on providing output that can be compared with the quantitative risk 
target set out in the regulatory guidance. Hence performance assessment process 
calculates an average, or expected, risk value.
The expectation value of risk is generally calculated by specific models that sit at the top of 
the hierarchy of models discussed earlier. These top level models (risk models) use as 
input, the factors calculated by lower level models. In essence, the risk models have 
components to represent what goes into the repository in the first place (the source term), 
the near field, the geosphere and the biosphere. Obviously, the risk models need to 
address the many sources of uncertainty that could affect the safety of the repository 
system. A number of techniques are used in the Nirex performance assessments.
As discussed above, Nirex has typically adopted a probabilistic approach to the treatment 
of uncertainty whereby the range of possible values is used as model input and the model 
is run many times using randomly selected values from within the range in order to derive 
the “average” output. To ensure that a large enough range of combinations is computed in 
order to have confidence in the average value, it may be necessary to run the models 
many hundreds of times. This would not be practicable for detailed, highly computer­
intensive models. Hence a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model cannot contain the 
same level of detail as the underlying models and the individual components are highly 
simplified representations of the complexity of features, events and processes that may 
combine in actuality. It is therefore inappropriate to consider the risk models in isolation 
from the underlying models and understanding on which they are based.
This means that risk models often need to make a number of simplifying assumptions, 
either because insufficient data are available or the modelling capability cannot represent 
some feature of the repository system in full detail. The aim is to address issues as 
realistically as possible, whilst erring on the side of caution. Therefore, many 
simplifications involve taking a conservative view, i.e. the assumption is made such that 
radiological dose will be over- rather than under-estimated. Conservative assumptions are 
often the best way of addressing issues without introducing unnecessary complexity into 
the models, which could by itself increase the modelling uncertainty.
Another technique that is used to address uncertainty within the risk models is to undertake 
“what i f  calculations. In this situation, the parameter values going in to the model are
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fixed to represent a certain set of conditions so that the model will calculate a risk result for 
a particular scenario, Such "deterministic" calculations are useful guides for considering 
worst Gase situations, but tend to be used to supplement the probabilistic calculations since 
they assume a certain future and hence ignore uncertainty about the future.
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Appendix D
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENTS
Around the world most disposal agencies, and in many cases also their regulatory bodies, 
have conducted performance assessments as part of their repository development 
programmes. In each case the approach adopted will depend on the context of the PA and 
any national preferences or requirements, for example those set out in regulatory guidelines. 
This appendix summarises reviews of a number of important international PAs, focussing on 
their context, the general approach and key elements of the methodology and any particular 
issues raised. The following performance assessments are considered:
1. Japan, H-12
2. Belgium, SAFIR 2
3. Sweden, SR 97
4. Sweden, SITE-94 -  A Regulatory PA
5. Switzerland, Kristallin-I
6. Finland, TILA-99
7. US, Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment
8. US, WIPP compliance certification Assessment
9. Canada, AECL 1994 Post-closure assessment of a reference system
10. UK, Nirex assessments
D1 JAPAN, H-12 
D1.1 Context
H-12 [i] is described as being a progress report on research and development to establish 
the concept of geological disposal in Japan in a generic context, that is prior to any site 
selection and decisions on other key factors such as safety criteria. It documents progress 
since an earlier report, H-3 [ii] and aims to confirm the basic technical feasibility of disposal 
of vitrified HLW in Japan. H-12 consists of five volumes, including an Overview report. One 
of these volumes is devoted to performance assessment and this also forms a major 
component of the Overview report.
The Japanese disposal concept aims to find a deep geological environment where volcanic 
activity, earthquakes, fault activity and influences of uplift, subsidence, climatic and sea-level 
change would cause no perturbation to a repository. However, because of the geologic 
tectonic instability of much of Japan, the disposal concept also incorporates a highly 
engineered near-field barrier. The vitrified waste would be encapsulated in a thick steel 
overpack and surrounded with a mixture of highly compacted bentonite and quartz sand. 
Various waste emplacement configurations are being considered, based on either horizontal 
or vertical disposal tunnels. All waste would be placed at least 100 m from any major water- 
conducting features and would be sufficiently spaced to ensure the temperature in the
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bentonite-sand buffer would not exceed 100°C. The Japanese aim to dispose of 40,000 
packages of vitrified waste by the year 2015.
As well as providing a technical basis for promoting understanding of the disposal concept, 
the purpose of the H-12 assessment is to provide an input to the repository siting 
programme and to assist in establishing a regulatory infrastructure.
There are as yet no formalised regulations for HLW  disposal in Japan. However, the 
Japanese regulator, the Atomic Energy Commission, has set some guidelines (included as 
an appendix in the H-12 Overview report) which have acted as the specification for the H-12 
assessment. These guidelines specify radiological dose as the primary safety indicator and 
refer to internationally accepted dose limits and the need to follow regulatory guidelines used 
in other countries. The groundwater pathway is identified as the main ‘scenario’, but there is 
also a recommendation to follow a systematic scenario development methodology to identify 
other scenarios. There is a recommendation to distinguish between sudden and gradual 
phenomena and that low probability scenarios need be assessed only semi-quantitatively in 
terms of their perturbation on existing models or model parameters.
There are no specific guidelines regarding a time cut-off for the assessment, other than that 
the assessment should be undertaken to identify when the effect on humans reaches it 
maximum and to determine how long this period lasts. There is also a requirement to 
confirm that a repository would not cause any significant increase in background radiation 
long-term. The assessment is also required to consider natural analogues and be presented 
in a form which “is widely understood and accepted by the public”.
D1.2 Approach
The H-12 assessment focuses on the performance of the engineered barriers. Relatively 
realistic models are used for the near-field, where the system is considered to be well- 
characterised, whereas the geosphere modelling is simplified and more conservative (solute 
transport using a one-dimensional model).
The calculations are all deterministic, with the exception of the use of PDFs to represent 
heterogeneity in the transmissivity of the host rock. Uncertainties in key parameters are 
assessed by considering a range of alternative calculation cases. The rationale for this 
largely deterministic approach is to give a transparent assessment of the uncertainties.
The assessment is presented as a systematic approach to scenario development. The first 
step is the preparation of a FEP list, developed from international FEP lists from which 
irrelevant FEPs are screened. The remaining FEPs are grouped into sets of ‘groundwater 
scenarios’ and ‘isolation failure scenarios’.
The ‘groundwater scenarios’ include a base scenario -  in which the geological environment 
is assumed to remain stable and present day geological conditions persist indefinitely; and a 
number of perturbation scenarios -  which take account of natural phenomena, future human 
activities and any initial defects in the engineered barriers.
The base scenario includes a ‘reference case’ and a number of alternative cases, which 
address alternative geological environments and repository designs, as well as uncertainties 
in the models and data. The main assumptions of the reference case are that:
•  the waste package overpack fails at 1000 years post-closure;
•  solute transport occurs through channels within a network of fractures in the rock 
mass; and
• linear reversible sorption occurs within the rock matrix, but not on the fracture 
surfaces.
D2
The base scenario alternative cases examine the impacts of the following identified 
uncertainties in the data and models:
•  the value of the glass dissolution rate;
•  the groundwater flow around the engineered barriers (controlled by the 
transmissivity distribution and hydraulic gradient);
•  sorption properties and geosphere transport times (represented by host rock 
distribution coefficients); and
•  the contribution of colloids to radionuclide transport.
The perturbation scenarios arise from natural phenomena and human activities. These 
scenarios are selected using influence diagrams to examine the potential impacts of external 
FEPs on the safety functions operating in the base scenario. The perturbation scenarios 
include;
• uplift and erosion -  leading to a decreased depth of the repository;
•  climate and sea-level change -  including intrusion of saline waters;
•  incomplete overpack sealing (e.g. due to welding errors) -  causing early water 
ingress and radionuclide release;
•  poor backfilling of the repository tunnels and plug defects -  causing fast
radionuclide transport along the tunnels and increased groundwater flux around 
the repository, leading to the direct release of the contents of one disposal tunnel 
(i.e. 200 waste packages);
• drilling of a well and water abstraction near the repository.
The main H-12 assessment only addresses the ‘groundwater scenarios’, that is the base 
scenario and the perturbation scenarios. Additionally, a number of ‘what if?’ calculations 
have been performed. These are referred to as ‘isolation failure scenarios’ and are treated 
qualitatively, they include:
•  direct human intrusion into the repository;
•  uplift/erosion such that the repository approaches the ground surface;
•  seismicity/fault movement in the repository vicinity -  this scenario was assessed 
to give rise to doses that exceed overseas safety standards but are not 
significantly greater than natural radiation levels in Japan; and
•  volcanic activity.
Overall, H-12 is very much a preliminary, generic assessment that is aiming to build the case 
for deep geological disposal in Japan. It is, however, a very detailed assessment in terms of 
the scenarios considered and is written in a convincing style. The disposal concept focuses 
on the engineered barriers and the need to find a stable geological environment, although 
the potential impacts of geologic instability are considered in ‘what if?’ calculations. The 
H-12 assessment draws heavily upon other international assessments, particularly those 
from Sweden and Switzerland, for its approach and for appropriate assessment standards.
D2 BELGIUM, SAFIR 2 
D2.1 Context
SAFIR 2 [iii] is a safety and feasibility interim report conducted by ONDRAF/NIRAS, the 
Belgian agency responsible for the management of radioactive waste and enriched fissile 
materials. It follows the SAFIR report , published in 1989, which concluded the first phase of
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research into the long-term management of radioactive wastes in Belgium. SAFIR 2 
synthesises all the technical and scientific knowledge available from the second phase of the 
Belgian programme of methodological research and development. The research is 
described as ‘methodological’ because it is not part of any licensing application, but aims to 
inform relevant Government ministers and safety authorities of the progress made regarding 
the technical feasibility of radioactive waste disposal in a deep repository and the 
assessment of long-term radiological safety. The stated three objectives of SAFIR 2 are to:
•  provide the authorities and other interested parties with a structured synthesis of 
the available technical and scientific information to enable them to assess 
progress made in terms of technical feasibility and long-term safety;
• promote interaction with the Belgian nuclear safety authority, AFCN/FANC, so as 
to reach closer agreement on outstanding research and principles of safety 
assessment; and
• provide one of the technical and scientific bases for broad dialogue on radioactive 
waste management.
SAFIR 2 discusses the disposal of long-lived and heat-emitting wastes (Belgian waste 
categories B and C) in poorly-indurated clay formations with an overlying aquifer. The 
majority of the waste under consideration is vitrified HLW. This waste would be placed in a 
primary stainless steel package (0.5 cm thick) with a 3 cm thick stainless steel overpack.
This in turn would be placed within a 1 cm thick stainless steel disposal tube in a concrete- 
lined disposal gallery. The galleries would be backfilled with a hydrated mixture of bentonite 
clay, sand and graphite. Spent fuel would be disposed in a similar manner to vitrified waste, 
with some design changes to accommodate longer package sizes. The third waste category 
considered in SAFIR 2 is hulls and endpieces, for which a simpler concept, omitting the 
overpack and concrete lining, is considered.
A network of disposal galleries is envisaged, 240 metres underground in a clay host rock. 
The galleries would be accessed by two shafts, with a connecting tunnel between them. A 
co-disposal repository is planned, with HLW and spent fuel disposed in galleries on one side 
of the connecting tunnel and the other wastes (hulls and endpieces) on the other side.
SAFIR 2 focuses on a reference host rock, the Boom clay in the Mol-Dessel nuclear zone, 
using data from an underground research laboratory at Mol (the site of ONDRAF/NIRAS’s 
main technical contractor, SCK-CEN). An alternative host formation, the Ypresian clay in the 
Doel nuclear zone, is also considered, but in less detail. Although the basic choice of a clay 
host formation is not in question for a disposal option, the report is very clear that it is not a 
licensing application and is not, at this stage, part of any decision-making process between 
options, as it does not, for example, include societal aspects of deep disposal. 
ONDRAF/NIRAS plan to produce a strategic environmental impact assessment by 2010 that 
would address these wider issues and contribute to a national decision-making process.
The Belgian regulatory criteria are based on the following three fundamental principles, 
derived from the IAEA and ICRP:
•  The principle of justification of practices -  requiring a cost benefit analysis.
•  The principle of optimisation of protection -  requiring that impacts are as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA).
•  The principle of limitation of individual doses -  requiring that doses must be within 
prescribed limits.
The dose constraint for a Belgian radioactive waste repository is 0.3 mSv/yr, which is an 
order of magnitude below the doses from background radiation in Belgium of 3.6 mSv/yr. 
Other factors specified in the regulatory guidance include the need to demonstrate flexibility
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to new wastes or conditioning practices, and the ability for the wastes to be retrievable over 
a limited period of time without compromising the long-term safety.
D2.2 Approach
The disposal system is based on the multi-barrier concept and aims to have partial 
redundancy between the barriers. The main barriers are identified as the engineered 
barriers, the geological (clay) barrier and the aquifer. The system offers four main safety 
functions: physical containment; delaying and spreading radionuclide releases; dilution and 
dispersion; and limitation of access.
The assessment approach is based on a systematic scenario development process, 
established in 1999-2000. The first stage of the scenario development is the identification of 
relevant FEPs. This was carried out by reference to the NEA FEP list. Screening out those 
FEPs not relevant to the Belgian concept, left 60 FEPs (excluding biosphere FEPs, which 
are addressed within the dose conversion factors). The aim is to identify a ‘normal evolution 
scenario’ and a number of alternative evolution scenarios, each scenario being described in 
terms of its evolution over time and the main processes by which radionuclides migrate from 
the repository to the biosphere.
The scenarios were identified by assuming that each of the three main components of the 
repository system (the engineered barriers, the geological clay barrier and the aquifers) is 
either intact and operating as planned or ‘short-circuited’ in some way. Taking all possible 
combinations, this leads to eight main system states, of which the state with all three 
components intact is the normal evolution scenario.
The assessment of the scenarios has four steps:
1. Conceptual modelling
2. Mathematical and numerical modelling
3. Impact calculations, including uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
4. Interpretation of results and confidence building, including qualitative arguments.
The SAFIR 2 assessment focuses primarily on the normal evolution scenario and the 
reference Boom day host rock, with only partial assessment of the alternative evolution 
scenarios and the alternative, Ypresian clay, host rock. SAFIR 2 also includes preliminary 
assessments of criticality and the impacts of toxic chemicals present in the wastes.
The normal evolution scenario describes the expected sequence of events in the evolution of 
the repository system and includes all those FEPs which are judged to be certain, or almost 
certain, to occur. However, for the purposes of modelling, it is assumed that the current 
characteristics of the disposal system remain constant over time. A range of assessment 
codes were used to simulate the release or migration of radionuclides in different 
components or groups of components of the system. The end-point of the calculations are 
dose estimates to individuals of the reference group, but intermediate results give a number 
of other safety indicators, including radionudide flux densities, total radionuclide flux and 
radionuclide concentrations in the aquifers and different parts of the biosphere. The 
calculations are primarily deterministic, using best estimate parameter values, but are 
supplemented by stochastic calculations to take account of parameter uncertainty for 
sensitivity analyses. Doses are calculated in three steps:
1. Simulation of the radionuclide migration in the near field and the Boom clay to
calculate the radionuclide flux at the interface between the clay and overlying aquifer. 
These calculations used different source-term models for each of the three waste 
classes, namely, vitrified waste, spent fuel and hulls and endpieces.
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2. Simulation of radionuclide migration in the aquifer to calculate the concentrations of 
radionuclides in water assumed to be pumped from a well just above the disposal 
facility, and the radionuclide fluxes entering rivers.
3. Modelling of transfers of radionuclides in the biosphere to calculate exposures to 
radiation and doses received.
To reduce the number of calculations required, migration calculations are only performed for 
those radionuclides with long enough half-lives and/or sufficient mobility to reach the 
overlying aquifer, namely:- carbon-14, chlorine-36, nickel-59, selenium-79, zirconium-93, 
niobium-94, technetium-99, palladium-107, tin-126, iodine-128, caesium-135 and 
samarium-147; and the curium-248, neptunium-237, plutonium-242 and uranium-235 decay 
chains. Several safety indicators are identified whose calculation is virtually independent of 
the evolution of the disposal system. These include:
• Decayed fractions and containment factors -  comparison of the total cumulative 
radioactivity in the overlying aquifer over 100 million years with the initial disposal 
inventory to give a ratio of disposed activity to cumulative released activity in the 
aquifer.
•  Total activity flux at the interface between the Boom clay and overlying aquifer.
•  Total uranium inventory -  comparison with natural levels present in the Boom 
clay.
The altered evolution scenarios address possible FEPs that are unlikely to occur and yet, if 
they did occur, would be capable of significantly altering the disposal system in terms of 
leading to poor performance or failure of one or more safety barriers. From consideration of 
FEPs with the potential to lead to barrier failure, the following eight altered evolution 
scenarios are identified:
1. Exploitation drilling (aquifer bypassed)
2. Greenhouse effect (aquifer bypassed)
3. Fault activation scenario (geological barrier bypassed or geological and engineered 
barriers bypassed)
4. Severe glaciation (all barriers bypassed, or geological and aquifer bypassed)
5. Poor sealing scenario (geological barrier bypassed)
6. Premature failing of engineered barrier (engineered barriers bypassed)
7. Transport by gases (geological (and engineered) barrier(s) bypassed)
8. Exploratory drilling (all barriers bypassed).
On the basis of an initial, primarily qualitative assessment, the above scenarios are shown 
not to lead to a significant increase in the overall expected radiological impact of the disposal 
facility.
The full SAFIR 2 report is available on CD-ROM with a single volume technical overview of 
some 270 pages. This overview report includes, as an appendix, the complete final opinion 
of the ‘Scientific Consultative Reading Committee’, a panel of thirteen independent Belgian 
experts who were commissioned to review SAFIR 2. Their 87 recommendations are listed, 
some of which ONDRAF/NIRAS had the opportunity to address prior to publishing SAFIR 2 
in its final form. Overall, this review committee confirmed that deep disposal within poorly- 
indurated clay was a viable option, but recognised that there is a need to reduce a number of 
uncertainties before actual implementation of disposal could be envisaged.
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In addition to the technical overview, a brochure summarising the key messages for the 
wider public and a short document putting SAFIR 2 into the context of sustainable 
development have also been published.
Overall, SAFIR 2 focuses on explaining the disposal concept and presenting the scenario 
development methodology. There are also substantial details on the ONDRAF/NIRAS 
planned forward programme to address outstanding issues. The report is written in a clear, 
common sense way, without giving the impression that it is strongly pushing the deep 
disposal option. Although it has some very helpful side panel definitions, the technical 
overview has relatively few illustrations, and is clearly aimed at a relatively expert audience.
D3 SWEDEN, SR 97 
D3.1 Context
SR 97 [iv] is a performance assessment conducted by SKB, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and 
Waste Management Company. It is an assessment of the Swedish ‘KBS-3’ disposal 
concept for spent nuclear fuel. In this concept spent fuel would be sealed in copper 
canisters with a high-strength cast iron insert. The canisters would then be placed in 
individual deposition holes drilled from tunnels excavated in granitic bedrock at a depth of 
about 500 metres. Within the deposition holes, the canisters would be surrounded by 
bentonite and the tunnels above the deposition holes would be backfilled with a mixture of 
bentonite and crushed rock (the exact proportions being dependent on the groundwater 
salinity at the chosen site). The layout of the deposition holes within the repository, in 
particular the distances between adjacent holes, would be chosen to ensure that the surface 
temperature of all the canisters remained below 90°C. The primary purpose of the KBS-3 
concept is to isolate the waste by keeping it within the copper canisters. If this isolation fails, 
the secondary purpose of the concept is to retard the release of radionuclides back to the 
environment. SKB are looking to dispose of about 8,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel, which 
would require approximately 4,000 canisters.
The KBS-3 concept was designed to satisfy the following safety principles, as laid out by the 
Swedish regulatory authorities:
• long-term safety should not be dependent on monitoring or maintenance;
• the repository should be designed so as to permit possible future retrieval of the 
waste or future repository modifications, if required;
•  the repository should use multiple engineered and natural barriers which 
contribute to the overall safety of the repository via different functions; and
• the repository should use natural materials for the engineered barriers, to enable 
comparisons with analogues and to minimise the disturbance of the natural 
conditions in the rocks, in particular limiting the chemical impact of the repository.
Swedish regulatory criteria also specify a risk limit of 10'6, or a one in a million chance of 
serious harm from a repository affecting an individual person. This has led to SKB adopting 
a risk-based approach to PA, in which the probabilities and consequences of different 
courses of events are aggregated to calculate the overall risk from a repository. Swedish 
regulations also require that future harmful effects are not given less weight than those 
today. Whilst recognising that the first 1,000 years is the most important period in terms of 
the wastes being at their most harmful, there is a requirement to evaluate safety beyond this 
period, up to 1 million years. There is also a requirement to consider the biological effects of 
radiation on natural habitats and ecosystems; and to consider the potential effects of
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disruption to the repository (for example by a human intrusion incident) in terms of ongoing 
protection of the environment from radiation.
The SR 97 assessment was conducted against these regulatory criteria, in preparation for 
forthcoming repository site investigations in Sweden. It has the following aims, defined by 
the Swedish Government and regulatory authorities:
• to demonstrate that the KBS-3 concept has good prospects of being able to meet
the specified safety and radiation protection requirements;
•  to demonstrate a methodology for safety assessment;
• to demonstrate the feasibility of finding a site which would meet the requirements;
•  to specify factors relevant for site selection and to determine important parameters 
and requirements for the site investigation programme; and
• to derive preliminary safety functional requirements on the canisters and other 
barriers.
The SR 97 assessment uses geological data from three different sites in Sweden, in order to 
show that the PA approach can reflect geological variations and to address the requirement 
to identify factors relevant for site selection. These three sites are named in the report, 
however it is made clear that none is being considered as a potential repository location. 
Thus SR 97 is relevant to the conceptual stage of a specific option, the KBS-3 disposal 
option, as a precursor to the site evaluation stage.
D3.2 Approach
The approach in SR 97 is to consider the state of the repository system at closure and then 
to analyse how it changes over time as a result of both internal processes and external 
forces. The internal processes define a ‘base scenario’ and the external forces are used to 
derive alternative scenarios for the repository evolution.
For assessment purposes the repository system is divided into four subsystems:- the fuel, 
canister, buffer/backfill and geosphere, each described by a set of time-dependent variables. 
The evolution of these subsystems is considered in terms of thermal, hydraulic, mechanical 
and chemical processes. These processes and their couplings are illustrated in a graphical 
representation developed by SKB, known as a ‘THMC diagram’. A separate diagram is 
developed for each of the four repository subsystems to show the couplings between the 
relevant variables for the subsystem (for example, temperature, water content, gas content) 
and the THMC processes (for example, heat transport, water transport, buffer swelling, 
advection). As an example, Figure D1 shows the THMC diagram developed for the 
geosphere.
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Figure D1 THMC Diagram for the Geosphere (from SR 97 Report [iv])
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The assessment approach in SR 97 then follows the following five steps:
•  System description -  includes defining the boundary between the repository system 
and its surroundings, with a description based on the THMC structure.
•  Description of the initial state of the repository and its surroundings at closure.
•  Choice of scenarios -  a range of scenarios is selected, on the basis of identified 
external forces, to give a reasonable coverage of different repository evolutions.
•  Analysis of chosen scenarios -  using different tools and methods, ranging from 
reasoning and simple approximations to detailed modelling based on site-specific 
data. (This modelling follows the premise that the base scenario is engineered to be 
robust, so variations are not expected to cause dramatic changes.)
•  Evaluation -  this is the overall assessment of repository safety, with different 
scenarios weighted together into a total risk picture, including a discussion of the 
level of confidence in the results.
In conducting the analysis, for each input parameter two values are assigned:- a reasonable 
value and a pessimistic value. Calculations are then performed with different combinations 
of reasonable and pessimistic parameter values to investigate sensitivities to parameter 
uncertainties. The reasonable and pessimistic values are each assigned probabilities such 
that the risk will be over-estimated (generally assuming a 90% probability for the reasonable 
value and 10% for the pessimistic value). Hence, SR 97 adopts a conservative, probabilistic 
approach to PA whilst avoiding the need to elicit probability distributions for ranges of 
parameter values. The only exception to this is for those parameters for which statistical 
parameter distributions are available, for example data with spatial variability. In other 
words, statistical distributions are only used for parameters where there is some kind of 
statistical data on which to base a distribution.
Based on expert judgement, with reference to previous safety assessments by SKB and 
other organisations, but with no guarantee of completeness, the following five scenarios 
were chosen for analysis:
•  Base Scenario -  in which present day conditions, including climate, persist. The 
evolution of the repository system is described in terms of the THMC processes to 
identify implications for safety, with a particular focus on considering what could 
lead to corrosion or failure of the copper canisters. It is concluded that under the 
base scenario conditions, the groundwater would remain oxygen-free and that the 
canisters would withstand corrosion throughout the 1 million year assessment 
period. Research evidence is presented to support the understanding of relevant 
processes but no radionuclide transport or risk calculations are performed as no 
radionuclides are released in the base scenario.
• Canister Defect Scenario -  in which it is assumed that one canister in 4,000 has a 
1 mm2 hole which is not detected in the inspection procedures. In the pessimistic 
case it is assumed that 5 canisters have such defects. All other conditions are the 
same as for the base scenario. A timeline is developed for the scenario, 
describing the processes in key timeframes. The THMC process analysis 
considers water ingress to the canister, leading to corrosion of the iron insert, 
which in turn leads to gas production and the corrosion products generated 
blocking the hole. As corrosion and gas production continue this builds up 
mechanical stresses in the canister, eventually enlarging the defect and releasing 
gas to the bentonite buffer. It is considered that by about 700,000 years the iron 
insert will have almost fully corroded and the fuel itself will have corroded and 
dissolved, the buffer will be deformed locally, but the rock will have been
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subjected mainly to compressive stresses and hence should not be damaged. 
Radionuclide transport calculations for each of the three geological environments, 
using a finite difference model for a stochastic simulation of groundwater flow, aim 
to give a simplified, but pessimistic understanding of the system evolution. These 
calculations predicted doses would be more than three orders of magnitude below 
the regulatory limit. Other variants, in which for example it was assumed that 
there was no geosphere retention, or no diffusion resistance in the buffer or no 
solubility limitation for the fuel also did not give rise to unacceptable doses.
• Climate Scenario -  based on conceivable sequences of climate events, including 
severe glaciation, postulated for each of the three sites. These climate sequences 
were used to analyse the THMC evolution of the repository in comparison to the 
base scenario. It was considered that a glacial climate may allow oxygen-rich 
water to infiltrate down to the bedrock as the oxygen would not be consumed in an 
organic soil layer, the soil having been eroded of organic material. However this 
was not considered to be a sufficient effect to lead to corrosion of the copper 
canisters. Likewise, the canisters are also calculated to be able to withstand the 
pressure increases that would occur due to glaciation. By describing the climate 
scenario in terms of the impact on the evolution of the repository, it is explained 
why the canister integrity is not threatened and hence no radionuclide transport 
calculations are required.
•  Earthquake Scenario -  simulates three site-specific earthquakes by analysing 
fracture data at the three sites, with the assessment focusing on whether an 
earthquake could breach canister integrity. 100 realisations of a stochastic 
fracture network model for each site were generated, with earthquakes 
represented by fracture displacements randomly distributed within a 100 km 
radius of the repository. The models were used to calculate the percentage of 
repository deposition holes which would be subjected to fracture movements 
greater than 0.1 m in 100,000 years and hence to show that earthquakes are not 
expected to lead to any damage to the canisters.
•  Intrusion Scenario -  analyses conceivable societal evolutions and future human 
actions that could affect the repository. It was calculated that it would require 
25,000 boreholes to be drilled per year to a depth of 500 m in order to reach the 
10"6 risk limit, assuming the probability of each drilling through a canister is 10'7 
(that is a one in 10 million chance).
SR 97 is presented in two volumes with a summary report. The assessment documentation 
is supported by three further reports: a Repository System report (discussing the wastes, 
repository design and the three sites), a Process report (explaining the processes affecting 
the repository evolution in greater detail) and a Data report (explaining the derivation of the 
data used and data uncertainties). SR 97 is described as being written mainly for experts, 
but with parts expected to be of interest to non-specialists. Although very text-filled, with 
relatively few diagrams, the report has an easy to follow layout, with helpful summaries of 
each section.
Overall, SR 97 focuses on building confidence in the KBS-3 disposal concept through an 
understanding and analysis of the processes which could affect the isolation and 
containment of the wastes. The thorough analysis of processes with relatively little 
emphasis on quantitative calculations reflects the fact that no radionuclides are expected to 
be released from the canisters in the base scenario.
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D4 SWEDEN, SITE-94 -  A REGULATORY PA
D4.1 Context
S IT E -9 4  [v] is a  p erfo rm ance a ss essm en t con ducted by the  S w edish  regulator, S K I. Like 
S R  97 , it is based  on the  K B S -3  d isposa l con cept for spent nuc lear fuel. S K I had th ree  a im s  
for undertak ing  S IT E -9 4 :
•  to develop  their p erfo rm an ce ass e s s m e n t m ethodology;
•  to d em o n stra te  how  real data  could be ass im ilated  into a  PA; and
•  to deve lop  a  process for the  sys tem atic  tre a tm en t o f uncertainties.
T h e s e  a im s reflect the  fact th at a t the  tim e  o f S IT E -9 4  S w ed en  w as preparing  fo r a  site  
selection s tage , h en ce  the focus on the  link betw een  site d a ta  and  PA , w hich w as a lso  a  
fea ture  o f the  S R  97  ass essm en t. T h e  geo log ical d a ta  for S IT E -9 4  w ere  taken  from  the  
Aspo hard rock laboratory. For the  purposes of the  a s s essm en t it w a s  ass u m ed  that a  
repository w ould be constructed ben eath  the  island o f Aspo, although it is m a d e  c lear that 
this is entire ly hypothetical, indeed A spo  is form ally  exc luded  from  consideration  as  a  
potential repository location.
G iven that S IT E -9 4  is a  P A  conducted by a regulator, its con text and  focus h av e  so m e  
im portant d ifferences com pared  to PA s perform ed by disposal ag e n cie s . In particular, there  
is no requ irem ent in S IT E -9 4  to conduct a quantitative  eva luation  o f the safe ty  o f e ith er the  
K B S -3  disposal con cept o r the  A spo  site. R a ther, th e  focus is entire ly on develop ing the  
exp erien c e  and capability for P A  m ethodology, in o rd er for S K I to be in a  strong position to 
eva lu a te  fu tu re ass essm en ts  subm itted by the  Sw ed ish  disposal agency , S K B .
D4.2 Approach
T h e  P A  app ro ach , and  in particu lar the  ana lysis  o f uncertain ty, is cen tral to the  a im s  of  
S IT E -9 4 . A  very m ethodical app ro ach  is ad o p ted , based on the identification o f features , 
events  and processes (F E P s ) and the  following four steps, referred  to as ‘ana lysis  leve ls ’:
1. S ystem  identification and  defin ition. It is considered to be im portan t to define  a  c lear  
system  boundary, in o rder to d e te rm in e  w hich F E P s  a re  internal to the  sys tem  and  w hich  
a re  external. For S IT E -9 4 , the  sys tem  boundary is set a t the  g eo sp h ere /b io sp h e re  
in terface , to avoid the  need fo r b iosph ere  m odelling.
2 . S cenario  identification. A  re fe ren ce  c as e  scenario  w as  estab lished based  on th e  system  
description and design basis assum ptions, to ad d ress  th e  ‘in tern al’ evo lution o f the  
system .
3. M odelling the repository evolution.
4. C o n seq u en ce  analysis.
Tw o  graph ical tools hav e  been  d ev e lo p ed  as  part o f the  PA  app ro ach  for S IT E -9 4 . T h e  first 
is a ‘process influence d ia g ra m ’ (P ID ) w hich contains all F E P s  re levant to the  system  
definition, i.e. all the  internal F E P s . In fluen ces b etw een  F E P s  a re  indicated by lines linking  
the F E P s  and  the  re lative  im p ortan ce  o f th e s e  in fluences is indicated by a  classification from  
1 to 10. T h e  P ID  thus contains m uch inform ation, but can a p p e a r quite daunting b ec a u s e  of 
the  num ber and com plexity o f the  ‘in fluence lines ’. An exa m p le  o f a  section o f th e  P ID  is 
shown in Figure D 2.
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Figure D2 A section of the PID showing FEPs and influences (from SITE-94 Report
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T h e  second graph ical tool is te rm e d  an  ‘as s essm en t m odel flo w ch art’ (A M F ). It is a  
relational d a ta b a s e  containing inform ation on d a ta  sou rces and  m odels  and  identifying a  
n u m b e r o f ‘clearing hou ses'. A  clearing  hou se is a  group o f individuals respo nsib le  for 
specific  a re a s  o f m odelling, for e x a m p le  th ere  a re  clearing  hou ses  for geo chem is try  and  
g ro u n d w a ter flow. All F E P s  and  in fluen ces on the  P ID  a re  m ap p ed  onto the  A M F , so that 
th e  A M F  indicates the  inform ation flow s th at ta k e  p lace  during m odelling w ork  and  identifies  
in teractions b etw een  d ifferent d isciplines and  m odelling groups. A n e x a m p le  o f part o f the  
A M F , show ing c learing hou ses, m odels  and  inform ation transfer links is show n in F igure  D 3 .
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Figure D3 A section of the AMF (from SITE-94 Report [v])
All internal, or system , F E P s  a re  included within the ‘R e fe re n c e  C a s e  Scenario '. F E P s  
w hich a re  externa l to th e  system  definition a re  te rm e d  ‘E F E P s ’ an d  a re  used to define  
alte rn ative  scenarios . In total, 81 E F E P s  w e re  originally identified, but th ese  w e re  reduced  
to a  m ore m a n ag eab le  num ber fo r ass essm en t purposes by rem oving those  w hich re lated  to  
deviations from  the repository des ign basis and those w hich w e re  irre levan t to  th e  A spo site  
or the ass essm en t basis (fo r e xa m p le  all b iosph ere F E P s  w e re  scree n ed  as  outside the  
ass essm en t basis). All E F E P s  dea ling  w ith c lim ate  ch a n g e  w e re  con sidered within a  
‘C entra l S c e n a rio ’ and the rem aining E F E P s  w e re  linked in various com binations to define  
eight ‘sup p lem en tary  scenarios ’. In this w ay , th e  C en tra l S cenario  an d  sup p lem en tary  
scenarios a re  each  develop ed  from  the R e fe re n c e  C a s e  Scenario .
E F E P s  a re  considered as m odifying th e  process boundary conditions. T h e re fo re , each  
scenario  could be ana lysed  by tracing th e  im pacts o f th e  E F E P s  on th e  system  P ID . T h e  
im pact o f an  E F E P  w ould be reflected as  ch an g es to th e  im p ortan ce  levels  o f the F E P  
in fluences on th e  P ID , thus leading to a  new  P ID , and sub sequen tly  a  n ew  A M F  to reflect the  
changed  m odelling requirem ents. T h is  ass essm en t process w a s  d eve lo p ed  not for 
m athem atica l com pleteness  but to produce an  aud itab le  system  that w ould allow  
interrogation by experts . T h e  S IT E -9 4  ass essm en t follow s the ap p ro ach  to a n a lyse  the  
C en tra l S cenario  only.
T h e  C entra l S c en ario  provides a  determ in istic  description o f th e  likely c lim ate  s tate  a t A spo  
o ver the next 1 3 0 ,0 0 0  yea rs  in th e  form  o f a  c lim ate seq u en ce  tim e  line. It includes a  
description o f the likely nature o f the su rface en v ironm ent a t eac h  s tag e  o f th e  c lim ate  
seq u en ce  and quantitative inform ation on how  th ese  ch a n g es  m ight a ffect th e  disposal 
system .
C o n seq u en ce  calculations focus on th e  R e fe ren ce  C a s e  an d  C en tra l S cen ario , th e  aim  
being to dem on stra te  use o f real geo log ical and hydrogeological da ta  in PA , ra th er than  
produce a  full tre a tm en t o f a  com preh ensive  se t o f scenarios . T h e  re fe ren ce  c a s e  design  
basis ass u m es  that a  single can ister has an  und etected  m anufacturing  de fec t o f a  5  m m 2
D15
hole through the copper (note this is five times the size of the hole assumed in SR 97, 
showing the Regulator taking a more conservative approach), which leads to galvanic 
corrosion of the intact steel inner container, limited by the supply of reducible species at the 
copper surface. Modelling approaches and calculations include:
• radionuclide releases from the canister and near-field region;
• geochemical and rock mechanical models;
•  detailed site-scale hydrogeological modelling using both a discrete fracture 
network model and a stochastic continuum model;
• one-dimensional flow evaluation using simple assumptions for the flow-field and 
boundary conditions, to identify critical factors for determining groundwater flow 
and transport parameters;
•  modelling the effects of redox state on near-field transport, including time 
evolution of the redox state and its effect on the solubility and sorption properties 
of each radionuclide;
•  time-independent modelling to explore variations in radionuclide release during 
the different climate states of the Central Scenario.
In addition to the quantitative modelling for the Reference Case and Central Scenario, the 
following supplementary scenarios were described in qualitative terms as illustrations:
• an alternative warm, wet climate evolution;
• technically induced seismicity;
•  effect of a large mine or water well in the vicinity of the repository;
•  inadequate shaft sealing;
• liquid waste injection into a fracture zone near the repository;
• liquid waste injection into a poorly sealed shaft, combined with local well/mine
pumping;
•  human impacts on the surface and on groundwater recharge; and
• mining impacts on the surface and on groundwater recharge.
SITE-94 is presented in two volumes, with an 85-page summary and a number of separate 
supporting documents. The documentation follows the ‘analysis levels’ of system 
description, scenario identification, modelling and consequence analysis. Numerical results 
are presented as fluxes of radionuclides from the near-field and far-field, but it is stressed 
that they are not predictions of actual impacts, just simple performance measures to put the 
releases from different cases into perspective. This is consistent with the stated focus of 
SITE-94 as a means of developing a PA methodology, rather than an assessment of the 
AspO site.
Having said that, the assessment is quite detailed, giving the impression of rigour and 
complexity, above clarity. For example, the PID diagrams are very difficult to follow, but 
contain a lot of information and are presented as being comprehensive and systematic. 
There is a strong emphasis on information management, supported by the development of 
the AMF concept, which is seen as being an important tool for structuring the review of 
future SKB assessments.
Perhaps appropriately for a regulatory PA, there is rather more focus on analysing 
uncertainty and the use of conservative assumptions, than building confidence. Stakeholder 
confidence in a Regulator is likely to depend much more on scientific credibility, and in
D16
contrast to an implementor’s PA, stakeholders may even derive confidence from the 
complexity of the approach, even if it lacks some clarity.
D5 SWITZERLAND, KRISTALLIN-I 
D5.1 Context
Kristallin-I [vi] was conducted by Nagra, the Swiss National Cooperative for the Disposal of 
Radioactive Waste, which is responsible for research and development work associated with 
the final disposal of radioactive waste. Kristallin-I is an assessment of the final disposal of 
vitrified HLW in the crystalline basement rocks of Northern Switzerland.
Kristallin-I builds on the earlier Nagra project GewShr [vii], which demonstrated the 
engineering feasibility and safety of a repository, but was not based on real site data. 
Kristallin-I is based on a geological dataset derived from the synthesis of regional deep 
borehole and seismic survey investigations. Two regions with different geologies, known as 
‘Area West’ and ‘Area East’ are discussed. The project is an important milestone in the 
Swiss HLW disposal planning programme as it formally completes the regional 
investigations of potential siting areas in the crystalline basement. Since the publication of 
Kristallin-I, Nagra have continued their research role and investigated Opalinus clay as a 
potential alternative, sedimentary, host rock.
The stated aims of Kristallin-I are to:
• re-evaluate the crystalline basement using both moderately conservative and 
robust arguments;
• improve understanding of the roles of the engineered and geological barriers 
through quantitative analysis and sensitivity studies;
• identify key geological characteristics and desirable parameter ranges, to provide 
guidance for additional field work and site identification and to provide a basis for 
comparisons between crystalline and sedimentary host rock options; and
• develop and test a more complete safety assessment methodology, including a 
scenario development methodology.
Kristallin-I assesses the disposal of 2693 stainless steel flasks each containing 150 litres of 
vitrified HLW. Each flask would be placed inside a massive steel canister, surrounded by 
compacted bentonite clay and placed in tunnels excavated at around 1,000 metres depth in 
low permeability crystalline basement rock. The steel canister is expected to remain intact 
for at least 1,000 years and its prime role is to prevent water reaching the wastes whilst they 
are still generating heat. The wasteform itself is an important barrier as the glass will 
corrode very slowly over 150,000 years following contact by water. The role of the bentonite 
is to provide long-term stability, both mechanically and as a chemical buffer providing a 
stable chemical environment. As bentonite saturates it swells to prevent fissures for water 
ingress and its fine pore structure also prevents colloid movement, meaning that aqueous 
diffusion is the only significant radionuclide transport mechanism through the bentonite. It is 
these engineered barriers that provide the principal constraints on radionuclide release and 
migration in the Swiss concept. The main role of the geosphere is to provide mechanical 
protection to the engineered barriers, favourable geochemical conditions and sufficiently low 
groundwater flow. Therefore in the Kristallin-I assessment the geosphere is represented by 
conservative assumptions.
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The Swiss regulatory criteria and principles are issued jointly by the Swiss Federal Nuclear 
Safety Inspectorate (HSK) and the Federal Commission for the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (KSA). Three protection objectives are specified:
•  Releases depending upon processes and events that are reasonably expected to 
happen shall at no time give rise to individual doses exceeding 0.1 mSv/yr.
•  The individual radiological risk of fatality arising from unlikely processes and 
events, not taken into consideration in the above objective, shall at no time 
exceed one in a million per year.
•  After the repository has been sealed no further measures should be necessary to 
ensure safety. The repository must be designed in such a way that it can be 
sealed within a few years.
The regulations do not specify any time-cut off for post-closure assessments, but state that 
assessments must be carried out at least until the maximum potential consequences have 
occurred. However, distant dose calculations are to be interpreted only as indicators and 
should be based on the use of reference biospheres and a population group with realistic 
living habits based on those observed today. There is a requirement to derive potential 
evolution scenarios but processes and events with extremely low probability or with 
considerably more serious non-radiological consequences, as well as intentional intrusion 
into the repository, are not required to be considered in the safety analysis.
D5.2 Approach
The performance assessment approach in Kristallin-I is entirely deterministic as there was 
judged to be insufficient data to justify parameter distributions. Nagra believe that there is 
greater uncertainty associated with the selection and representation of relevant processes 
than with scenario and conceptual model uncertainty. Therefore the use of deterministic 
calculations, by avoiding unrealistic sampled parameter combinations, is considered more 
instructive for the Kristallin-I context as it provides a more transparent illustration of system 
performance and sensitivity. With the use of conservative assumptions in Kristallin-I, the 
deterministic calculations tend towards upper bound estimates of the performance for the 
stated assumptions of a particular scenario. It is recognised that with more site-specific data 
and the requirement to optimise repository design, it will become desirable to reduce the 
conservatisms and introduce explicit representations of uncertainty and variability through 
PSA techniques.
Kristallin-I follows a FEP-based approach, in which scenario development is used both to 
identify FEPs and as an active tool for managing information and handling uncertainty.
Three types of uncertainty are recognised in Kristallin-I:
•  uncertainty in the selection and combination of relevant FEPs (this is explored 
through a ‘Reference Scenario’ and alternative scenarios);
•  uncertainty in the way FEPs are modelled (explored by alternative model 
assumptions within the Reference scenario); and
•  uncertainty in the rate and extent of important FEPs (explored by variations in the 
values assigned to model parameters).
A five-staged approach to building the assessment is followed:
1. The disposal system is defined, system understanding documented and the basic 
characteristics for long-term safety identified (i.e. FEP elicitation, starting from those 
aspects of the system intended to provide safety)
D18
2. A catalogue of all potentially relevant FEPs is developed and audited against 
international experience.
3. The ‘System Concept’ is developed. This is a description of the behaviour of the 
repository and its environment, incorporating understanding and interaction of all 
relevant FEPs.
4. The ‘Safety Assessment Concept’ is developed. This is a conceptual model of all 
those FEPs to be considered in the calculations. The Safety Assessment Concept is 
compared with available models to identify any important FEPs outside the existing 
modelling capability. The Safety Assessment Concept is then used to define the 
Reference Scenario and the alternative scenarios for consideration.
5. A ‘Robust Safety Assessment Concept’ is developed. This includes all potential 
detrimental FEPs, but only those safety-enhancing FEPs that can be relied upon. It 
defines the calculations required for a ‘Robust Scenario’.
The above process naturally leads to a hierarchy of scenarios, starting with the Reference 
Scenario, moving down through the alternative scenarios to the Robust Scenario.
The Reference Scenario encompasses a set of reference model assumptions and reference 
parameter values, but also includes parameter variations and alternative model assumptions 
in the form of sensitivity analyses. Together these form the ‘Reference Case’. The 
Reference Scenario assumes degradation of the engineered barriers according to 
conservative design performance; constant geology and hydrogeology based on 
understanding of present day conditions; a constant surface environment; and a temperate 
climate with subsistence agricultural practices. Where alternative possible models are 
identified, the one leading to the highest consequence is adopted for the reference model 
assumptions. For uncertain parameters generally two values are defined, one that is 
realistic but conservative and one that is pessimistic whilst still being possible -  i.e. the 
second value is one that can confidently be believed to yield an upper bound on the 
consequence. The realistic-conservative values are used as the reference parameter values 
and the pessimistic values are used in sensitivity analyses.
The alternative scenarios considered in Kristallin-I include those that are considered to be 
realistic and expected as well as unlikely scenarios. The expected alternative scenarios 
include a range of possible future geological conditions and alternative future climate states 
that would affect surface environmental conditions (for example, glacial-interglacial cycling 
and a continuous warm climate). The unlikely alternative scenarios include unexpected 
engineered barrier performance (for example, ineffective tunnel/shaft seals), unexpected 
geoclimatic events and conditions and the drilling of a deep water well into the crystalline 
basement in the vicinity of the repository.
In the Robust Scenario, uncertainty is replaced by conservatism. It is still assumed that the 
engineered barriers evolve and perform according to their design function, but the most 
pessimistic representation of the geological barriers is used in that it is assumed that any 
radionuclides reaching the bentonite-host rock interface are transported immediately to the 
biosphere.
Not all radionuclides are included in the Kristallin-I assessment. Radionuclides were 
selected for inclusion based on the drinking water dose that would be received from a simple 
analysis using the canister design lifetime, glass corrosion rate and dilution in a near-surface 
aquifer (i.e. neglecting any retention in the engineered and geological barriers). Those 
radionuclides giving rise to a dose greater than KT4 mSv/yr were included in the Kristallin-I 
safety assessment. Additionally, no gas release scenarios are included in Kristallin-I.
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Overall Kristallin-I provides a sound safety assessment, with a good description of the 
important processes and the sensitivity of the repository performance to important FEPs.
The assessment is transparent and systematic, exploring alternative possible assumptions. 
Presentation of a Robust Scenario that is still well within the regulatory performance 
requirements and the fact that no reliance on geosphere transport time is required to make a 
safety case provide considerable confidence.
Kristallin-I is presented in a single volume of some 400 pages. It is well written and 
technically detailed, with few illustrations. It is therefore aimed primarily at expert audiences. 
The conclusions are also published separately in a less technical report aimed at a more 
general readership, including the local population.
D6 FINLAND, TILA-99 
D6.1 Context
TILA-99 [viii] is a performance assessment conducted by the Finnish disposal agency, 
Posiva. It investigates four alternative sites for a potential repository for spent fuel. The 
disposal concept is based on the KBS-3 design developed by the Swedes (see Section 
Oabove) in which the spent fuel would be sealed in copper canisters with an iron insert and 
placed in vertical holes in the floors of horizontal deposition tunnels, some 500 metres 
underground in crystalline bedrock. The space surrounding the canisters would be filled with 
bentonite and the tunnels and shafts would be backfilled with a mixture of crushed rock and 
bentonite or natural smectitic clay. The distance between the deposition holes would be 
calculated on the basis of thermal analysis so as to limit the peak temperature at the rock 
interface. The repository design is such that the spent fuel canisters could be retrieved if 
necessary. Posiva state that they looked at other repository designs and chose the KBS-3 
design because it is robust, flexible, technically uncomplicated and offers good post-closure 
safety.
TILA-99 is an update of an earlier assessment, TILA-96 [ix] and has been followed by an 
environmental impact assessment [x] and a ‘decision in principle’ to construct an 
underground rock characterisation facility for further investigation at the preferred site. The 
aim of TILA-99 was to inform this decision on which of four sites should be selected for 
underground investigation into its suitability for a spent fuel repository. As such, TILA-99 
forms part of the site investigation process, linking information from the site characterisation, 
engineering design and research programmes.
Finnish regulatory criteria [xi] require calculation of the potential dose rate resulting from any 
releases from a repository to the human environment for a period that is ‘adequately 
predictable’, extending to ‘at least several thousand years’ following the closure of the 
repository. Posiva has taken this assessment period to be about 10,000 years. For times 
beyond this, the emphasis is on constraints on the release rate of radioactivity into the 
biosphere. The release rate constraint varies for different groups of radionuclides, 
depending on their radiotoxicity, for example, a maximum 0.1 GBq/yr is permitted for long- 
lived alpha emitters, 1 GB/yr for chlorine-36, iodine-129 and caesium-135 and a limit of 
10 GBq/yr for carbon-14 and technetium-99. The regulations allow the calculated release 
rates from the repository to be averaged over a period of 10,000 years for the purposes of 
comparison with these constraints. However, there is an additional requirement that on a 
large scale the radiation impacts from a repository should remain insignificantly low and 
should not exceed the level of impacts from natural radioactive substances. This focus on 
release rate means no benefit can be taken for dilution in the biosphere.
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During the period when dose rates are calculated, the regulatory criteria specify that the 
most exposed individual, assumed to be a member of a self-sustaining community in the 
vicinity of the repository, should not receive an annual dose greater than 0.1 mSv, whereas 
the doses to larger groups of the public must be insignificantly low. There are regulatory 
requirements to consider qualitatively the importance of unlikely disruptive events and 
wherever practicable to make comparisons of the consequences and expectancies of the 
potential radiation impacts from such events with the release constraints. There is also a 
stated requirement to discuss the potential impacts on flora and fauna.
D6.2 Approach
TILA-99 focuses on the normal evolution of a repository, with a number of sensitivity 
nalyses. There is an over-riding aim that the assessment should be transparent, robust, 
traceable and reproducible from the data provided in the single PA report. The emphasis is 
on simple, conservative models and deterministic calculations. The models used are 
primarily compartment models in which components of the repository system are 
represented by defined compartments and the movement of radionuclides between 
compartments is represented by transfer coefficients. All calculations are steady state, there 
is no transient or time variant modelling.
A scenario approach is followed in which the base case is the ‘normal evolution scenario’ in 
which the spent fuel canisters are assumed to remain intact for one million years and 
present-day repository conditions persist, unaffected by human activity. In this scenario 
there is no release of radioactivity. The normal evolution of the repository system, in terms 
of the climatic and geological conditions, is described for five timeframes: 1) the first 100 
years; 2) 100 to 10,000 years; 3) 10,000 to 100,000 years; 4) 100,000 to 1,000,000 years; 
and 5) beyond 1 million years. Differences in the expected evolution of the four potential 
repository locations are discussed.
Additionally, a set of reference scenarios which consider the effects of canister defects, 
namely a small hole (5 mm2), a large hole (1 cm2) and a totally defective or ‘disappearing’ 
canister have been assessed.
Sensitivity analyses are applied to each of the reference scenarios. These sensitivity 
analyses consider the following parameter changes;
•  alternative source term models -  using realistic instant release fractions and 
release from the fuel matrix at a steady rate over 10,000 yrs
•  very high solubility estimates for the reducing conditions in the near field -  taking 
all conservatisms into account
• oxidising conditions throughout the near field
•  transport along the tunnel -  e.g. placing a deposition hole at a fracture zone
intersection
•  reduced penetration depth of matrix diffusion -  limiting the distance over which 
rock matrix diffusion operates, thereby reducing radionuclide retardation
•  dispersion in the far field
•  alternative dose conversion factors
•  realistic data -  using realistic retardation data, release fractions and diffusion 
coefficients, with other data as in the reference scenarios.
Further, a number of ‘what if?’ scenarios are included, based on issues frequently discussed 
in Finland and in response to regulatory review comments. These scenarios consider the 
effects of:
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•  a combination of very high flow of non-saline groundwater and saline groundwater 
chemistry
•  very poor bentonite performance -  i.e. assuming the canister is surrounded by a 
backfill mixture of crushed rock and bentonite, instead of compacted bentonite
•  displacement of contaminated water out of the canister due to gas generation
•  glacial meltwater -  modelled by assuming very high flow and oxidising conditions 
in the geosphere and in the buffer and backfill
•  postglacial faulting -  which is assumed to break the canister at 30,000 years, 
displace the bentonite, enhance flow and transport and cause oxidising conditions 
throughout the near-field and geosphere.
The final ‘postglacial faulting scenario’ gives the highest releases of all the scenarios 
considered above, but is still almost order of magnitude below the regulatory limit. An 
additional ‘multi what if?’ scenario was constructed in which there is assumed to be no 
canister, instant fuel dissolution, oxidising conditions throughout the near field, very high flow 
of fresh groundwater combined with saline water chemistry, matrix diffusion limited to 1 cm 
penetration and strong dispersion. This scenario gave a maximum dose rate from a single 
failed canister of 0.8 mSv/yr. This is above the regulatory dose limit of 0.1 mSv/yr, but is 
presented as being purely hypothetical and therefore no cause for concern.
All the above calculations only consider failure to a single canister. Multiple canister failures 
were considered by calculating the maximum number of canister failures which could occur 
in each scenario before breaching the regulatory limits.
Overall, the approach to PA in TILA-99 is clear and easy to understand, with confidence 
resting on the basis of the conservative modelling approach and the range of sensitivity 
studies, rather than the detail and complexity of the models. There is very strong reliance on 
the engineered barriers, particularly the confidence in the integrity of the copper canisters. 
This means there is less emphasis on the natural components of the system, which makes 
handling uncertainty much easier. There is no emphasis on modelling the biosphere (dose 
conversion factors from the BIOMASS reference well-drinking scenario are used to convert 
release rates to doses) and virtually none on modelling the geosphere (transport through the 
geosphere is based on a migration pathway streamtube concept, with rock matrix diffusion).
D7 US, YUCCA MOUNTAIN VIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
D7.1 Context
Yucca Mountain is about 100 miles north-west of Las Vegas, USA, on unpopulated land 
owned by the US Federal Government. It is adjacent to the Nevada Test Site where more 
than 900 nuclear weapons tests have been conducted. This is a desert environment where 
the average rainfall is only 7 inches per year (95% of which runs off or evaporates). Yucca 
Mountain is being investigated by the US Department of Energy (USDoE) as a potential 
location for the disposal of 70,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel, including highly enriched fuel 
from the US Navy’s nuclear-powered ships and submarines and high level radioactive waste 
from commercial and military purposes.
The purpose of the Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment [xii] was to provide the US 
Congress, President and public with information on the progress of the Yucca Mountain site 
characterisation project and to identify any critical issues that would need to be addressed 
before a decision could be made by the US Secretary of Energy on whether to recommend 
the site for a repository. (This recommendation was subsequently made in February 2002,
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on the basis of a final environmental impact statement, and approved by the US Senate in 
July 2002. This paves the way for the USDoE to submit a licence application for repository 
construction authorisation.)
The Viability Assessment includes the preliminary design concept for the repository, a total 
system performance assessment, the project plan and cost estimate for remaining work to 
complete the studies and submit a licence application and an estimate of the costs to 
construct and operate a repository in accordance with the design concept.
The repository would be constructed in the mountain, approximately 300 metres below the 
ground surface and 300 metres above the water table, in the unsaturated rock zone. The 
waste would be placed in long-lived packages. These packages would be double canisters, 
having an outer layer of a carbon steel, about 10 cm thick to provide structural strength, and 
an inner layer of corrosion-resistant high-nickel alloy, about 2 cm thick. These packages 
would be placed on steel and concrete supports in tunnels excavated in the mountain, with 
concrete floors. Approximately 100 miles of tunnels would be excavated, including access 
and ventilation tunnels. This disposal concept uses multiple barriers to isolate and contain 
the waste. The barriers are the chemical and physical forms of the waste itself (including 
Zircalloy fuel cladding), the waste packages, the rock and the semiarid climate. The Yucca 
Mountain concept is designed to limit water contacting the waste packages and hence 
provide a long waste package lifetime. Any release of radionuclides from the packages 
would therefore be slow and radionuclide concentrations would further be significantly 
reduced during transport from the waste packages to the accessible environment.
Other design features to increase safety are also being considered. These include, drip 
shields to prevent water dripping onto the waste packages, a ceramic package coating to 
further prevent corrosion and the use of a crushed rock backfill around the packages to raise 
the package temperature and protect them from rock fall or tunnel collapse.
The Yucca Mountain area is geologically stable and has changed little over the last million 
years. The geology is compacted volcanic ash, known as Tuff. The site is also fairly unique 
in that the local groundwater is isolated in a closed regional basin and does not flow into any 
rivers that reach the ocean. These favourable siting factors would also contribute to the 
containment of radionuclides.
The regulatory criteria for the Yucca Mountain Project are established as follows: The 
National Academy of Sciences was directed to provide recommendations on the general 
standards for radioactive waste management. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is developing standards specifically for Yucca Mountain, consistent with these 
recommendations, for the protection of the environment from radiation. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) will then use these standards to establish technical criteria 
for the construction, operation and closure of the repository. One such regulatory 
requirement is the ability to retrieve the wastes, if required, up to 50 years from the start of 
waste emplacement. During this period remote sensors would be used to monitor the 
packages, tunnels and surrounding rock.
However, other aspects of the regulatory guidance have yet to be finalised. In the absence 
of final guidance, the appropriate measure of repository system performance for Yucca 
Mountain has been taken to be the radiation exposure rate for average members of a critical 
population, with present-day lifestyles, living 20 km downstream from the repository. This 
corresponds to the closest existing well to the site. Repository performance is formally 
evaluated for a period of 10,000 years, with analyses extended to 100,000 and one million 
years to determine the time of occurrence for the peak dose.
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D7.2 Approach
The Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment is described as a “total system performance 
assessment’, with the following five steps:
1. Develop and screen scenarios, using event trees to link FEPs that could lead to the 
release of radionuclides.
2. Develop models.
3. Estimate parameter ranges and uncertainties.
4. Perform calculations.
5. Interpret results, including further development or screening of scenarios, providing 
guidance to further work and compliance with regulatory requirements.
The stated aim is to determine the ‘probable’ behaviour of the system and therefore a 
probabilistic approach is adopted, with Monte Carlo sampling the primary method of 
uncertainty analysis. Uncertain parameters are sampled from PDFs, with results presented 
as cumulative distribution functions, giving the probability that the peak dose will be greater 
than a given value. For processes that are so uncertain there is insufficient data to justify a 
continuous PDF over a postulated range of behaviour, a high degree of sampling is not 
considered to be justified, and instead a few deterministic cases are considered, with the aim 
of bounding the likely behaviour.
Two approaches to Monte Carlo sampling have been followed:- ‘lumping’, in which all 
uncertainty is included in a single, comprehensive Monte Carlo simulation; and ‘splitting’, in 
which separate Monte Carlo simulations are performed for discrete models. The latter 
approach reflects the fact that the base case model represents a limited range of 
uncertainties (as it represents likely behaviour) in which some possibilities are treated 
separately in alternative models. This approach also recognises that simpler models may be 
more appropriate than overly complex models which may over-represent the actual state of 
knowledge.
The base case focuses on six radionuclides:- technetium-99, iodine-129, neptunium-237, 
uranium-234, plutonium-239 and plutonium-242. These radionuclides were selected 
because they are present in the wastes in significant quantities, they are long-lived, soluble, 
mobile and radiotoxic. The base case model considers how these radionuclides could be 
released from breached packages, dissolve in groundwater dripping through the repository, 
be carried down 300 metres to the water table and then be transported 20 km downstream 
to a well.
The assessment results are the calculated peak dose rates to the critical group using this 
well. These are presented either as probability distributions during a certain time, or as time 
histories over 10,000,100,000 and one million years for specific samplings of input 
parameters. Presenting results as probability distributions does not hide the fact that the 
mean values of the Monte Carlo simulations tend to be dominated by a few low-probability, 
high-dose realisations. Most simulations used 100 realisations. The results were shown to 
be similar to those from a 1,000 realisation simulation, and hence it was concluded that 100 
realisations was a ‘good compromise between cost and precision’.
Regression analysis was used to study the importance of uncertain variables. The Viability 
Assessment shows scatter plots of peak dose against these variables, to illustrate 
correlations. The uncertainty associated with some key parameters may swamp the effects 
of others, therefore sensitivity studies were conducted in which the first set of key 
parameters were given fixed (mean) values to enable the sensitivity of other parameters to 
be identified in a second round of regression analysis.
D24
The key processes for the safety of the Yucca Mountain repository concept were found to be 
water movement through the unsaturated zone above and below the repository, the effect of 
heat from the wastes on moisture in the rock around the tunnels and the movement of 
groundwater beneath the repository.
The sensitivity studies explored parameter ranges excluded from the base case. In addition, 
the following scenarios were considered to explore events outside the base case:
•  Volcanism. This is judged to be unlikely, as large-scale volcanism in the area 
ceased 7.5 million years ago, the last small eruption was 75,000 years ago.
• Earthquakes. Yucca Mountain is in a seismically active area (a 5.6 magnitude 
earthquake was recorded 12 miles away in 1992), hence the repository concept 
has been designed to withstand earthquakes.
• Accidental human intrusion. This is an unattractive location for exploration. 
However, the regulations define a scenario in which a waste package is 
penetrated by drilling. This would lead to increased dose rates if waste was 
carried down the drill-hole to the water table. In this scenario, only the 
consequences, not the probabilities, of human intrusion are considered.
• Criticality. Design specifications would prevent a criticality inside a package. It is 
considered very unlikely that sufficient accumulation of fissile material for a 
criticality could occur outside a package, but even if it did happen, it would only 
have a minor effect on the repository performance. An explosive criticality event is 
not judged to be credible.
The Yucca Mountain Viability Assessment is published in the form of a 40-page summary 
report with a CD-ROM insert containing the following five volumes:
1. Introduction and site characteristics (171 pages)
2. Preliminary design concept for the repository and waste package (325 pages)
3. Total system performance assessment (523 pages)
4. License application plan and costs (233 pages)
5. Costs to construct and operate the repository (145 pages)
The summary report is written in simple language with pictures on every page. The main 
volumes use more technical language, but each contains a glossary and starts with an 
overview of that volume. Diagrams and icons are used throughout. There is a strong focus 
on the practical aspects of the repository, with good descriptions of its proposed design and 
operation. In describing repository performance, the focus is on safety and zero releases, 
with an emphasis on continual seeking of improvements, summarised by the comment, ‘the 
release of any radionuclides is reason for concern and motivation for seeking improvements 
in the repository design’. However, alongside this there is recognition that uncertainties can 
be reduced but never totally eliminated. Overall, the Viability Assessment is presented as 
confident, with a clear message concerning the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, whilst 
acknowledging that there will always be some uncertainties.
D8 US, WIPP COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION ASSESSMENT 
D8.1 Context
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep radioactive waste repository excavated 
about 655 metres underground in a bedded rock salt formation near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
D25
The rock salt is around 600 metres thick and 225 million years old with no significant 
groundwater flow. WIPP has the capacity to contain over 175,000 m3 of transuranic (‘TRU’) 
wastes. These are wastes containing alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides with half-lives 
greater than 20 years, broadly similar to ILW.
Most of the waste is packaged in mild steel drums or standard waste boxes (thick-walled 
steel canisters are used for the 4% of wastes requiring radiation shielding and remote 
handling). The waste containers are stacked in disposal rooms and surrounded with bags of 
crushed magnesium oxide (MgO). This MgO acts as a chemical barrier by consuming any 
carbon dioxide produced, consuming significant quantities of water that may seep into the 
repository in the form of brine, and maintaining the C 0 2 partial pressure and the brine pH 
within ranges that lead to lower actinide solubilities.
The disposal rooms are grouped in ‘panels’. Two panels have already been excavated and 
a further six are planned. Each panel of disposal rooms will be closed with a rigid concrete 
barrier and a concrete isolation wall (creating an isolation zone between them). This panel 
closure system protects workers during repository operations and also limits liquid and gas 
migration post-closure.
The four shafts that connect the repository with the surface facilities at the WIPP site will be 
sealed, upon completion of disposal operations, using 13 discrete components, including a 
170 m long compacted salt column. These seals are designed to limit water from the 
repository reaching the accessible environment, restrict water flow through the seal, protect 
against component structural failure, limit subsidence and prevent accidental entry into the 
repository.
After closure of the repository, the natural process of creep in the salt host rock will gradually 
crush the waste containers and bags of MgO so that the wastes become entombed within a 
period of 500 years. Therefore, the waste containers themselves are not an important long­
term safety barrier and neither are the panel closure walls. These physical barriers are not 
credited in the performance assessment calculations.
The licensing process for the operation of the repository required the preparation of a 
Compliance Certification Application (CCA). This is an assessment of all aspects of the 
repository against specified regulatory criteria. The W IPP CCA [xiii] was submitted in 
October 1996, certification was achieved in May 1998 and the repository started to receive 
waste in March 1999. It is planned that the repository will be operated for 35 years, with re­
certification being required every 5 years.
The regulations for WIPP are based on health and environmental objectives. They specify 
containment requirements, individual protection requirements, groundwater protection 
requirements and assurances concerning active and passive institutional controls, multiple 
barriers, monitoring, resource extraction disincentives and the feasibility of waste removal. 
The standards and criteria for limiting radiation releases are set by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which is also responsible for ensuring that the criteria are met.
The regulatory annual dose limit for an undisturbed repository is 0.15 mSv, which compares 
to the annual average exposure to radiation for all US citizens of 3.6 mSv. In addition, the 
regulations require inadvertent intrusion into the repository to be considered and define the 
drilling frequency to be used for such calculations, based on local historical records. The 
disposal system is required to provide a reasonable expectation, based on performance 
assessments, that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment 
for 10,000 years after disposal, from all significant processes and events that may affect the 
disposal system shall:
•  have a likelihood of less than one chance in ten of exceeding the specified release 
limits and
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•  a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times the quantities 
calculated.
This requirement necessitates a quantitative, probabilistic assessment in order to construct a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) for comparison with the above 
regulatory constraints on probabilistic releases. In this respect, the regulatory criteria 
effectively define the performance assessment approach.
D8.2 Approach
The approach adopted in the WIPP CCA [xiii] aims to provide a reasonable estimate of the 
expected performance of a real repository. Unlike many assessments of repository 
concepts, the approach is not intended to be biased towards a conservative outcome. The 
approach is highly probabilistic, as defined by regulations, and aims to take account of the 
various uncertainties in a reasonable manner. However, where realistic approaches to 
incorporating uncertainty are unavailable or impractical and where the impact of the 
uncertainty on performance is small, reasonable conservative assumptions have been 
adopted to simplify the analysis.
A structured process was followed, starting with a FEP list compiled from international 
studies. A FEP screening process eliminated those FEPs irrelevant to the WIPP repository, 
those excluded by regulations (for example those not expected to occur within the regulatory 
assessment period of 10,000 years), FEPs with very low probability and FEPs with very 
small consequence. FEPs arising from operational, construction or decommissioning errors 
were screened on the basis of the quality control procedures in place at WIPP. FEPs 
associated with changes in land use, demographics, and anthropogenic climate change 
were also eliminated as the regulations specify present day assumptions for assessment 
calculations. This left 83 FEPs which were grouped into three major categories: natural, 
waste- or repository-induced, and human-initiated. The FEPs were used to define a normal 
evolution scenario (containing only natural FEPs) and variant scenarios for which 
conceptual, mathematical and then numerical models were developed. Due to the complex, 
non-linear nature of many of the processes being represented, the numerical models were 
often iterative, approximate solutions to the mathematical models (equations).
A range of computer codes was used for modelling different system components. Within a 
simulation, parameter values and disposal system conditions were passed between relevant 
codes several times, providing a loose coupling, rather than feeding results from component 
sub-models into a single overall system model. This approach allows time-dependent 
coupling, for example, permeability and porosity values are coupled to changes in pressure 
as the salt creeps. The evolution of the chemical environment is modelled, including 
microbial degradation of cellulosic materials, plastics and rubbers and the corrosion of steel. 
Transport models consider the potential for brine flow down the shaft, gas flow up from the 
repository to the compacted salt column and upward brine flow through the shaft seal 
system.
Together, the computer codes consider more than 1,800 parameters. However, on the basis 
of sensitivity analyses, only 57 of these were varied in the assessment calculations, using 
Latin Hypercube Sampling. The sensitivity analyses indicate the relative importance of each 
sampled parameter in terms of its contribution to uncertainty in the estimate of the repository 
system performance. For example, one of these parameters was the potential recharge, 
which determines the rate at which water is added to the water table in the groundwater 
model. This parameter acts as a ‘climate index’ by representing all the climate-related 
factors that might affect groundwater flow. Values for this climate index parameter were 
calculated on the basis of 17 transient and 54 steady-state regional 3-dimensional
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groundwater flow simulations, in which different recharge rates and assumptions concerning 
regional rock properties were applied to determine the effect on potential recharge.
In the normal evolution scenario, for an undisturbed repository, gas generation from 
corrosion and microbial degradation is expected to occur and will elevate the pressure within 
the repository, but not significantly above lithostatic pressure as fracturing within the 
surrounding rock will provide pathways for the gas to escape. Brine flowing out of the 
repository may transport actinides (both as dissolved species and colloids) but calculations 
indicate no significant releases to the biosphere are expected within the 10,000 years 
assessment period.
No potentially disruptive natural FEPs (such as large earthquakes) are likely to occur during 
the regulatory timeframe, therefore human intrusion provides the only potential mechanism 
for significant releases. The human intrusion events considered are mining and drilling. If a 
borehole was drilled into the repository, it has been estimated that there would be an 8% 
chance of the borehole also penetrating an underlying pressurised brine reservoir, thus 
providing an additional source of brine into the repository. This would not be a significant 
issue if the brine immediately flowed to the surface as it would not have had time to mix 
significantly with the waste. However, such a scenario could increase the volume of 
contaminated brine released in any subsequent drilling event. Therefore, five types of 
human intrusion scenario were identified:
•  Mining (M)
• Drilling -  penetrating a pressurised brine reservoir (E1)
•  Drilling -  brine reservoir not penetrated (E2)
•  Drilling -  an E2 event occurring after an E1 event (E1E2)
•  Drilling and mining (ME).
These scenarios form a core set of idealised futures for which assessment calculations were 
performed. Of course, in reality, one or more of these scenarios could occur. Potential 
sequences of future events were generated by randomly sampling six parameters 
associated with the above five scenarios, namely:
•  the time interval between drilling intrusions;
• the location of the drilling intrusion;
•  the activity of waste penetrated by each intrusion;
•  the standard to which an intrusion borehole is sealed when abandoned
(regulations require plugging and abandonment of boreholes to be consistent with 
current practices which require protection of groundwater and other natural 
resources);
•  whether a brine reservoir is penetrated; and
•  the occurrence of mining.
This random sampling was used to generate 10,000 equally likely independent futures for 
assessment. In other words, potential future evolutions of the repository system were 
created by direct probabilistic sampling of possible events leading to uncertain futures, rather 
than using an a priori definition of possible futures. A scenario can be regarded as a subset 
of futures having similar occurrences.
In these human intrusion scenarios, five routes were identified by which radioactivity could 
be released:
•  cuttings -  including material intersected by the drill rotary bit;
•  cavings -  material eroded from the borehole wall during drilling;
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•  spallings -  solid material carried into the borehole during rapid depressurisation of 
the region
•  direct brine releases -  contaminated brine flowing to the surface during drilling; 
and
• long-term brine releases -  occurring after the borehole is abandoned.
The assessment results in the WIPP CCA are presented as CCDFs of repository releases.
In line with regulatory requirements, these plots indicate the probabilities of the maximum 
radiation releases for each scenario. They do not show at what time the maximum release 
is expected to occur or how releases would vary over the assessment period.
The CCDF output results are obtained by combining the results of numerical simulations 
performed for a given set of sampled model parameters with the probabilistic futures 
determined by the random sampling of the human intrusion event parameters. A separate 
CCDF is constructed for each set of sampled model parameters. Building a CCDF 
necessitates calculating the consequences of each probabilistic future by scaling and 
interpolating the results from the core set of idealised deterministic futures (the M, E1, E2, 
E1E2 and ME scenarios). Each of the 10,000 randomly generated futures is assumed 
equally likely to occur and hence this calculation provides a mechanism for factoring 
scenario probability into the CCDF. Calculations were performed for 100 different sets of 
sampled model parameters, leading to 100 CCDFs, which were shown to be converged, 
thus enabling the mean CCDF to be calculated.
The WIPP CCA is a regulatory application for repository operation. It is therefore technically 
very detailed and mathematical with the emphasis on systematically demonstrating how 
each of the regulatory criteria is satisfied. It is aimed at the regulatory bodies and technical 
peer reviewers. A ‘citizen’s guide’ summary of the CCA has been produced for wider public 
audiences, which also explains ways in which members of the public can become involved in 
the WIPP decision-making process.
The CCA contains nine main chapters which discuss the background to the WIPP CCA, site 
characterisation, descriptions of the waste and the facility, demonstrations of compliance 
(which includes performance assessment modelling), quality assurance aspects and the 
results of peer reviews. These chapters are supported by 55 appendices and in hardcopy 
the complete CCA contains over 70,000 pages and occupies almost two metres of bookshelf 
space. However, the WIPP CCA was prepared to be primarily presented in CD-ROM 
format, with hyperlinked text, explanatory pop-up windows and extensive search facilities. 
Overall, the approach and presentation of the WIPP CCA are both largely defined by the 
regulatory criteria that the assessment is addressing. In particular, the comprehensive 
scenario analysis, in which very large numbers of possible future repository system 
evolutions are assessed, is possible because of the extensive FEP screening on the basis of 
regulatory definitions.
D9 CANADA, AECL 1994 POST-CLOSURE ASSESSMENT OF A REFERENCE 
SYSTEM
The AECL EIS [xiv] was judged to show a repository was acceptable from a technical point 
of view but not from a social standpoint as it had not been demonstrated that there was 
sufficient support from the public.
Deterministic calculations using median values of PDFs of input parameters, to illustrate 
radiological system behaviour. Probabilistic calculations were used to calculate risk for 
comparison with the regulatory target.
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D10 UK, NIREX ASSESSMENTS
Nirex has gone full circle’ in terms of the stages in a repository development programme. 
During the late 1980s and 1990s Nirex was investigating potential sites for a deep geological 
repository, and conducted increasingly detailed PAs, culminating in the Nirex 95 [xv] and 
Nirex 97 [xvi] assessments of the preferred site at Sellafield. Following the failure of the 
RCF public inquiry and the consequent loss of the Sellafield site, Nirex has been taking 
stock and seeking to learn from its own history and from others regarding the repository 
development process. One aspect of this learning process has been a reconsideration of 
the Nirex disposal concept, which now allows for a delay in the decision to backfill the 
repository with cement, seal and close it -  referred to as the Nirex phased disposal concept. 
Nirex has undertaken generic assessments in support of the development of this concept. 
For example, Reference [xvii] describes the chemical, physical and hydrogeological 
processes affecting the long-term performance of a repository and provides illustrative 
calculations of the performance of the disposal concept in six generic geological settings. 
Nirex has also developed a generic performance assessment (GPA) in which the properties 
of the geological setting are chosen to ensure that the repository performance is consistent 
with the radiological risk target set by the Regulator [xviii].
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F1 INTRODUCTION 
F1.1 The review
W e were invited to review the outputs to date of the visual language project. These 
comprised:
• The Visual Framework
• Options Diagrams
•  Argumentation Maps for rock matrix diffusion and solubility
These were accompanied by a draft document entitled The application of Visual Language 
to communicating the scientific basis of deep disposal’, which was provided to give 
background to the VL project within Nirex, but not included for review. A further 
argumentation map on sorption was provided at the workshop (see below). The review 
comments in this report refer primarily to the material provided for review; however, as will 
be seen, respondents emphatically contextualised this material within a wider framework of 
Nirex’s activities and the problems of radioactive waste management.
F1.2 Objectives for review
The review was asked to consider the following:
•  Does the visual language work help make science more accessible to the non­
scientist?
• Does the visual language work help clarify where there are areas of uncertainty?
•  would visual language contribute to the debate about radioactive waste management, 
and if so, how would it best be used?
• Are there any biases (obvious or hidden) within the material?
•  Is the structure of the material sensible?
•  Any comments about the presentational form of the material?
The review is not, however, restricted to these questions, but also reports on other issues 
that arose in responses to the material.
F1.3 Review participants
To contribute to the review process, a workshop was convened in the Institute of 
Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy (IEPPP)1 at Lancaster University, on 15th 
February, 2002. The workshop was attended by nine members of the University, largely 
from social science and humanities faculties, and by Anna Littleboy and Rachel Western 
from Nirex. It was led by Jane Hunt. AL and RW  were primarily observers rather than 
discussant, and were briefed not to participate in discussions unless asked a direct question. 
After discussing the material, each UL participant produced a note of their responses, which 
are used as a major contribution to this report.
Three further colleagues also reviewed the material and provided comments.
1 CSEC is part of IEPPP.
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The reviewers were primarily versed in social science and humanities traditions of thought, 
and it is this perspective which is primarily represented in this review. Some reviewers, 
however, have training in the natural sciences and mathematics, and the synthesis of this 
with a social science perspective is particularly useful. As well as the variety of intellectual 
perspectives represented, some reviewers have also worked professional in particularly 
pertinent fields, including design, provision of public information, and teaching and learning, 
and provided comments from these perspectives
F2 REVIEW
Responses and commentary to the VL material are grouped below under a number of 
headings which reflect the considerations identified by Nirex and the areas discussed by 
reviewers. The analysis is conducted partly in terms of considering the ‘messages’ implicit in 
particular choices about ways in which to represent the world: that is, that material is ‘read’ 
not just in terms of content, but also in terms of the way in which it is presented (as well, of 
course, in terms of who is presenting the material).
Notes:
- double quotation mark indicate words or phrases used by workshop participants and other 
reviewers.
- the term ‘reader’ refers to users of the material, be they literally reading it, looking at it, or 
other.
- individual slides are referred to in the form vl8 (8th slide in the visual language sequence), 
sol2 (2nd slide in the solubility sequence), etc. Slides are numbered, for clarification, on the 
accompanying A3 reproduction.
F2.1 Enthusiasm for the VL Project
There is considerable enthusiasm for the fact that Nirex are undertaking the VL Project. The 
project demonstrates Nirex’s commitment to exploring ways of making the science of deep 
storage/disposal more easily understandable by the lay person, and this was welcomed.
The value of the VL project is not solely, or even necessarily primarily, in the product, i.e. in 
the production of materials which contribute to scientific accessability. There is a very 
significant value in the process of producing those materials -  that is, in grappling with the 
problems inherent in such a project in the particular context of Nirex’s development within 
the broader radioactive waste arena.
Enthusiasm for the product to date has to carry the caveat that the product is not complete 
and there is obviously further development work necessary.
The approach -  using visual language -  is also welcome: clearly there are advantages to be 
gained from the combination and versatility of language and visual images. The ways in 
which issues can be mapped, both through a combination of slides and on individual slides, 
is also very useful, although this potential has limited use in the materials produced so far.
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The potential for use of the material to encourage and enable dialogue and two-way 
communication is also welcome, with the caveat that in its present form, the reader is 
positioned as a passive recipient of authorised knowledge.
F2.2 Scope of material
The VL project has scoped the scientific map of radioactive waste management, and 
selected particular topics for detailed working up. The context of these topics is presented 
as being the overall scientific requirements of deep geological disposal (or phased 
underground disposal).
The social, ethical, political and economic context is entirely invisible, either as a 
consideration in relation to the way science is produced, or a consideration in relation to the 
other dimensions of radioactive waste management. It is clear from the responses of 
reviewers2, and to work with the general public, that these other dimensions are of significant 
importance to them, and to make them invisible (which is a de facto result of not including 
them), carries its own message -  that these dimensions are not important to Nirex. These 
dimensions are, however, generally seen as significant and necessary components of 
discussion and deliberation.
The slide entitled ‘key questions’3 makes this very clear. In response to the question 
‘radioactive waste -  what is the problem?’ we are given a number of responses -  all in terms 
of rock, water movement through rock, etc. Not only does this presume deep geological 
disposal on the Nirex model, but it makes no reference whatsoever to any non-scientific 
issues. The question should be ‘radioactive waste -  what are the scientific issues in relation 
to deep geological disposal’, not claim the entire territory of radioactive waste problems and 
then define them so narrowly. As the second slide in the series, this slide is in a key position 
in relation to the subsequent material, defining the scope and the importance of what is to be 
considered. Slides v l3 ,4 and 5 compound this error, and add in the idea that these scientific 
questions are framed within a requirement to protect humans -  not the environment -  from 
radioactivity (see discussion below). This narrow framing is off-putting, offensive, and 
inappropriate. A much wider ‘funnel’ at the beginning of the material is required, which at 
least acknowledges the breadth of the issues, and then goes on to focus on specific sub- 
areas.
It appears possible that the VL approach is also suitable for including the non-scientific 
dimensions -  and even for relating these to scientific dimensions. Ethical issues, such as 
the distribution of impacts across populations, across space, and across time, and social 
issues, such as institutional arrangements and responsibilities, and the process of decision 
making, would be a valuable addition. Economic issues -  from the comparative cost of 
different disposal options to the complexities and argumentation regarding discounting 
practices, would also be a worthwhile inclusion.
However, it is not essential that all conceivable parts of the issue are fully worked up before 
the material can be used. So long as there are indications of awareness of the other 
dimensions signalled in the material presented (in the overall ‘funnel’ and cross-
2 Both at Nirex and at IEPPP
3 1 call this vl2a; it appears to be missing from the A3 sheets, but in the A4 sheets is the second slide 
in the visual framework series.
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referenced/linked to existing material), this demonstrates that Nirex are aware of these 
dimensions4.
The selection of detailed topics for working up into argumentation maps is a sensible 
exploration of the method, and to set this within the overall map of Nirex’s scientific method 
is useful, both to communicate this to others and for the value of discussion within Nirex 
which articulates different understanding of the nature of the parts of Nirex and their 
relationship to each other.
F2.3 Messages in representation choices
The way in which something is represented carries its own message. Design and stylistic 
choices themselves communicate particular messages, including messages about how the 
authors of the material wish to present themselves. No design choice is neutral.
2.3.1 Design
The particular points regarding design can be summarised in one comment “this is crying out 
for a professional designer -  and it’s a plum job for someone”5. This captures the 
enthusiasm and potential of the project -  and the recognition that the development of VL in 
Nirex is in its early stages.
The inconsistency of styles and use of common clip art, in particular, contribute to a 
message of amateurishness, which contradicts the storyline that the science of radioactive 
waste management is under professional control.
The use of clip art in relation to more social/philosophical issues, and of graphs in relation to 
‘hard science’ (which most readers found difficult to grasp), trivialised philosophical 
questions and issues of uncertainty, and emphasised ‘important, serious, but too 
complicated for you to understand’, scientific issues.
The relatively straightforward poster of the different options was generally thought to be very 
good as it stands. There was enough information to absorb relatively easily; the pictures 
gave straightforward visual clues to what was being talked about (these pictures could be 
used as ‘logos’ for further discussion of different options -  cf discussion of structure and 
style) and it was appreciated that this poster was only intending to provide an initial 
identification of the different options which have been raised as possibilities. That it was 
clearly stated that options were not considered further in this presentation is also positive, 
although it begs the question of ‘why not? why the focus on deep disposal?’.
Nirex’s motivation in producing this material is, and is likely to remain, suspect for at least 
some users. If Nirex’s intentions are honourable, this needs to be more clearly and 
consistently indicated in the material: acknowledging uncertainty and ignorance is one 
means of doing this, and many other comments are also relevant to the (sub-textual) 
communication of intent.
4 There could still be the criticism that Nirex has chosen to focus on the narrowly scientific issues, or 
that they have prioritised working up these issues: there needs to be a clear statement of where Nirex 
sees itself in relation to the broader issues vis a vis inclusion in the VL material.
This comment was made by a PhD student working on the philosophy of aesthetics, who was a 
professional designer in a previous life.
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2.3.2 The feel of the material
“it makes me think of sex education -  it’s sterile”
The analogy here was extended: we know that the complexity and multi-dimensionality of 
sex is not represented in standard sex education materials. The emotional content -  whilst 
often referred to -  is not invoked in the forms of representation selected. Similarly, this 
material makes no reference to the human dimensions, either seperately or in relation to the 
scientific material. This is compounded because there are no photographs or ‘real’ images, 
which would humanise and contextualise the material, making it translatable into the real 
world rather than an abstract exercise (when sites are identified, making material 
translatable in the real site will be a necessity). Translation is especially necessary as the 
subject matter is largely invisible. Making it visible -  e.g. through photographs of real rocks, 
perhaps magnified in insets to show rock structure -  is part of making it real.
2.3.3 Tone and intent
The referents in some images were seen as patronising by some respondents (the cup of 
tea was particularly problematic). The simplicity of the representation of the science (which 
is stylistic rather than structural) leads to an interpretation that the intent of the material is to 
be believable -  not to be understandable, which includes the ability to be critical -  as the 
user presumes that the science must be more complicated than is being represented.
Thus, simplicity is in tension with accessibility, although this can probably be dealt with by 
being more explicit about the different levels of simplicity/complexity represented by the 
material.
2.3.4 Different messages to different audiences
As one reviewer pointed out, he (as a “binary speaker”) would not take the material seriously 
unless it included graphs and other forms of ‘mathematical language’. Whilst it is inevitable 
that different readers will derive different messages from both the design and content of the 
material, this does not mean that design choices should overlook the impacts on a variety of 
readers. The use of mathematical language provides a form of scientific credibility even for 
the non-scientific reader -  but, as discussed below, it can also give rise to the suspicion that 
uncertainty and other assumptions are hidden within the scientific representation. This can 
be addressed as a question of intent -  for example, is the intention to provide an insight into 
the scientific understanding, or to convince readers of the credibility of the scientific 
understanding? In the first case, mathematical representations are probably necessary, but 
need more explanation for the non-scientist. In the second, ‘blinding with science’ will 
disempower some readers, and alienate others, but may nonetheless assist credibility.
2.3.5 Two way communication
There is no sense in the material that questions are allowed -  no clues or invitations that 
questions by the user are possible. Where questions are used, they are within the flow of 
the material, used as indicators that a logical step is being taken -  and the questions are 
answered, rather than being left open for the reader to consider. The reader is essentially 
passive.
This is a major criticism. The construction of a passive reader essentially reflects the ‘deficit 
model’ approach, whereby an ignorant public is seen as in need of ‘correct’ information. Of 
itself, this approach communicates a separation between experts and lay readers, and 
suggests that the authors are claiming the correctness, and unchallengeability, of their 
statements. A more dialogic approach, by contrast, suggests of itself that the authors are 
open to discussion and re-consideration of their claims.
F6
Appendices
2.3.6 Mapping
The ability to map the shape of an issue, and of sub-areas of an issue, is only partially 
developed within the material so far, yet the visual language approach has considerable 
potential as a means of representing the ‘landscape’ of radioactive waste management. The 
sode vl12 was generally received as a useful contribution in giving a sense of the larger 
landscape of the science. The comments made regarding the invisibility of social, ethical 
and other dimensions suggest that the attempt to produce the ‘big map’, and to clarify the 
position of scientific and technical endeavour within this larger multi-dimensional map, would 
be worthwhile in terms of:
• Enabling readers to locate and make sense of the larger landscape (and, if suitably 
linked to further information resources, to pursue interests and questions in these 
areas)
• Communicating that Nirex is very conscious of the larger landscape
•  Through the process of production of such a map, assisting Nirex in its 
understanding of the larger landscape.
F2.4 Structure and Style
2.4.1 Inconsistency
The structure of the material is not clearly reflected in the style of representation, and this 
adds to the readers’ difficultly in navigating a pathway through the material. Using different 
images, fonts, colours etc consistently to indicate different sections and to signpost, as 
discussed below, are necessary. These stylistic choices can be used very effectively to 
assist clearer visibility of the structure of the material; as yet, this does not seem to have 
been incorporated adequately.
The green, blue and yellow boxes used in Fig 2 of the accompanying note are not used 
consistently even within the note (on the following page, argumentation map topics are pink) 
and are not reflected in the VL materials (e.g. v!10,11,12,13), yet could be applied as a 
structuring framework (e.g. all argumentation map main heading boxes backgrounded in 
yellow). These boxes change again in the third slide of the solubility AM (not included on 
the A3) where a theory, obvservation/investigation, and modelling matrix is presented but 
then, apparently, abandoned, or at least not clearly visible in the structure of the subsequent 
material The visual clues to the structure and interpretation of the material must be made 
consistent.
The structuring of the argumentation maps into ‘general theory’ ‘support from general 
observation’ and ‘hypothesis’ looks fine in theory, but has not been well used on the page. 
The slides following the title ‘general theory’ do not seem to provide a clear statement of the 
‘theory’ (which theory -  e.g. solubility: that things dissolve, that things dissolving is important 
for the repository because of x, y and z, that the wastes will dissolve -  it’s not clear what the 
theory is, although the heading on sol3 of ‘water will get to the wastes’ suggests that this is 
the theory), ‘support from general observation’ gives us the cup of tea analogy in sol6, and a 
complicated graph relying on two unfamiliar concepts in rmd6 -  very different interpretations 
of what general observation is, and giving very different messages, neither of which, to my 
mind, provide an indication of what sort of support there actually is (which would include: lots 
of data, lots of experiments, everybody agrees this is the case, and/or it being a commonly 
observed phenomena e.g. in tea). In both maps, the hypothesis is phrased as a question - 1
6 This slide also indudes the problematic phrase "What isn’t known?’ as if this can be 
comprehensively identified -  see comments on uncertainty.
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was taught, as were my colleagues, that a hypothesis is a statement. There is thus 
inconsistency with the interpretation of the headings, and inconsistency with common 
understandings of terms, which does not aid understanding what the material is about or 
what it is trying to do and how. If the terms theory, evidence and hypothesis are to be used, 
they need explanation and consistent application.
2.4.2 Logic
The logic of the structure is scientific. There is, however, a visual logic to be considered -  as 
one designer put it “I wouldn’t start from here, I’d start from the village hall”. That is, thinking 
about issues such as display space, the way people move around material, and the way the 
eye moves through material, are important considerations in relation to the scientific logic 
and communicative intent.
2.4.3 Glossary
Even at this stage of development, the materials would benefit from a glossary: the 
presentation of so many new words makes this essential for the reader. For electronic 
versions, this should be hyperlinked. A glossary provides a useful ‘check’ for users, and 
reminds them of the meaning of terms they may have forgotten, or which are explained in 
another section. Glossary definitions should avoid the use of specialised language, and 
where this is essential, that term should itself be included in a glossary.
An electronic glossary can also be linked back to the text -  either to all uses of the word in 
question (thus doubling as index) or at least enabling that term to be highlighted on the 
page. Certainly the glossary definitions should be linked back to the text (both electronically 
and by reference in printed versions) where a fuller explanation may be found.
A glossary also serves the purpose of making it unneccessary to define every term every 
time it is first used in a particular section or argumentation map. However, it is important 
that the glossary does not become a justification for not explaining key concepts more 
thoroughly within the text.
2.4.4 Argumentation
There is very little argumentation in the argumentation maps’ -  probably because, during 
the process of producing the maps, agreement was reached through dialogue between AL 
and RW. The result is a presentation of their agreed conclusions about the shape of the 
science and where uncertainty lies. Argumentation implies that the stages of this dialogue 
need to be captured -  what are the arguments, critiques, alternative viewpoints? Are the 
conclusions (as derived by AL and RW) really what Nirex wish to present, or is it the points 
of divergence, or the identification of uncertainty?
To map out the argumentation, a different process of production is required, whereby a wider 
range of stakeholders with views on the topic are invited to present those views, preferably 
within a dialogue so points made and responses to those points can be identified. An “if this, 
then that” approach might be helpful to identify premises and follow lines of reasoning.
It appears that argumentation became secondary to identifying uncertainty in the production 
of the argumentation maps. Deciding more clearly which of these objectives are to be 
pursued (and they are not mutually exclusive) seems necessary before developing further 
argumentation maps.
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F2.5 Accessible Science
In general, the material was considered successful in providing an introductory 
understanding of solubility, rock matrix diffusion and sorption. However, quite what this 
understanding was is another question. The issue of whether people understood what was 
being presented in terms of the content presented -  whether they could then answer a test 
‘correctly’, for example - was not a focus of this review; some informal discussion indicates 
that understanding in this sense was not comprehensive. Rock matrix diffusion, for 
example, clearly got across (or resonated with pre-existing ideas and understandings) the 
idea that radioactivity is carried through rock by water. That some of the radioactivity stuck 
to the rock along the way, and that the pattern and extent of ‘blind alleys’ in relation to the 
water movement and how much radioactivity stuck to how much rock for how long might be 
significant in how much radioactivity eventually reached the biosphere was not so well 
understood7.
The accessibility of the science in the sense of providing introductory and/or framework 
understandings was considered to be patchy. The solubility argumentation map is clearer 
and more understandable than the rock matrix diffusion, and it is worth considering why this 
is the case. Firstly, solubility is a more familiar concept than the immediately 
incomprehensible terminology of ‘rock matrix diffusion’. Secondly, the solubility AM lays out 
a clearer sequence of concepts and steps, whilst the rock matrix diffusion AM is more 
difficult to follow in terms of its internal logic, and is more sloppily produced in terms of 
explaining unfamiliar terms, providing an accessible sequence of ideas, and making its 
points clear. This provides some clues as to what makes science more accessible: 
familiarity is one dimension, but clarity of presentation is highly important.
2.5.1 Content: Need to know
“Too much too soon” -  there are several places where a clutch of concepts are introduced 
simultaneously, e.g. vl20&21. Many of these common concepts (like radioactive decay) 
should be included in a glossary, and explained seperately in a ‘primer’ -  i.e. a series of 
maps of key concepts. It is good practice when ‘teaching’ to introduce one concept at a 
time, and use or apply or give example to that concept before moving on to the next.
A reviewer pointed out that in her experience, people often confused or did not distinguish 
between things ‘dissolving’ and things ‘melting’. It is important not to assume that terms in 
common usage are understood, or used, in the same way as they are understood 
scientifically. For everyday purposes, the distinction between whether things dissolve or 
melt is largely irrelevant (‘melts in the mouth’). It doesn’t matter when the sugar melts or 
dissolves -  it gets incorporated in the tea, and that is what does matter. It is well worth 
considering the lay understanding of a term that is being used in a scientific sense, and 
identifying and clarifying possible confusions (for example by stating that the usual use of a 
word is x, but that you are using it in this particular scientific sense). It is also worth 
considering, as I do in the next paragraph, whether the more specific concept is necessary 
to the scientific understanding, or whether the analogous lay understanding is itself sufficient 
or useful.
We could represent lay understanding, for example, that some things (usually hard things, or 
‘solids’) can become liquid, and that you can mix hard things and liquid things and get a
7 this is my own interpretation of the material in conjunction with conversations on the subject. I make
no claim to its ‘correctness’.
F9
Appendices
liquid thing. The simplicity of this representation is deliberate: it intends to indicate that it is 
possible to translate specialist understanding into common language, and it raises the 
question of whether it is actually necessary to have a more specialised understanding of the 
concept.
The answer is to be found in relation to the other concepts and processes being explained. 
For example, the key factors being communicated in relation to solubility are (as understood 
by me) that:
•  Solid things, which include radioactive bits, can become fluid
•  The amount that becomes fluid varies with environmental conditions such as heat 
and acidity (e.g. if its hot then more will melt/dissolve/become fluid).
•  If radioactivity (or radioactive bits) in the repository become fluid they could move 
through the rock and reach the biosphere.
• How much radioactivity gets to the biosphere therefore depends, in part, on how 
much is dissolved, which in turn depends on environmental conditions.
To me, at least, this captures as much as I need to know at this stage -  and I do NOT need 
to distinguish between something dissolving and melting to achieve this understanding 
because the point is about radioactivity become fluid and therefore being able to move 
through the rock, and the relevance of environmental conditions to how much becomes fluid 
is not dependent on an understanding of whether becoming fluid consists of something 
dissolving or melting (melting is also, of course, dependent on environmental conditions) or 
distinguishing between these two concepts.
The point of this is to demonstrate that it is not necessarily necessary to have a scientific 
interpretation of all concepts in order to follow a line reasoning, that the building blocks of 
comprehension can be made quite simple and accessible, and to argue that, given the 
volume and necessary complexities of the material, considering what is required on a ‘need 
to know’ basis to gain a grasp of the phenomena under discussion is a viable strategy.
Another example of this is sorption, which I understand as the ‘sticky’ tendency of 
radioactive things. That is, radioactivity tends to stick to things. A more complex 
understanding of sorption is not necessary to grasp what is going on in rock matrix diffusion.
It is necessary, though, to begin to understand the uncertainties as defined within this 
material.
It is, of course, also important to recognise when a more specialised or particular 
understanding of a building block is necessary. The conflation of dissolving and melting is 
shown above not to matter in this particular instance; it would no doubt be confusing to 
maintain that conflation when considering the topic in more detail, or in specific areas.
Thus, there is a conscious choice to be made in when it is necessary, and in what way, to 
present a concept or building block, and an argument that it is always worth seeing what can 
be excluded for the time being in order to simplify and clarify the key points being made.
2.5.2 Content: levels of explanation
This relates to the rock matrix diffusion argumentation map in particular, and the VL 
approach in general. The RMD AG appears to lose its thread -  what is the key storyline? 
What is the point that is being made? What is the reader supposed to come away from it 
with? There is a common saw in teaching that good teaching requires explanation at several
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levels -  a simple, accessible storyline running through, that everyone should be able to 
grasp, with more complexity, sophistication and detail surrounding that storyline for those 
that are learning more comprehensively. That storyline for RMD is not clear.
It is likely to be difficult for those trained in science and familiar with the content to identify 
this storyline: for the trained scientist there are both too many familiar assumptions and 
presumptions about concepts and their relationships, and a taken-for-granted way of thinking 
about a topic (that is, the loose tenets of scientific method) to be able to identify the basic 
storyline as it might be most understandable to a public who are not, in general, scientifically 
literate and have a different way of thinking. Certainly, when preparing the briefing materials 
for the P&T Citizens’ Panel, we found it useful to have one (scientifically illiterate) member of 
the team continually asking questions, suggesting simpler phrasing, asking why it was 
necessary to know things, and trying to tease out this basic storyline. And for some 
members of that panel, talking about bits of atoms that fly off and hit other atoms was the 
accessible way of explaining what was going on -  an explanation which trained scientists 
found unfamiliar. This is not to say that trained scientists cannot conduct this task, but that it 
might be helpful to use non-scientists too, in order to translate scientific understanding into a 
form where it is accessible by lay people, and where the storyline is clear at several levels.
2.5.3 Inherent interest
The material is inherently interesting for many. Particularly, many reviewers mentioned the 
diagrams of rock structure and water movement through rock: it seems that some contents 
of science are more interesting than others. Where concepts can be more easily related to 
the real world, and where that real world is itself more interesting (e.g. rocks are more 
interesting than fish; trees are more interesting than meteorites8, radioactivity is neither 
interesting nor understandable), seem to be associated with inherent interest. Identifying the 
characteristics of what is deemed ‘interesting’ and why might provide clues to where inherent 
interest lies and can be capitalised on.
2.5.4 Teaching and Learning
Teaching and learning models are useful resources for what appears to be being attempted 
here. If the intention is to provide users of the material (who are presumed to have varying 
levels of knowledge of the subject matter and of science more generally) with an 
understanding of topic (an understanding ranging from grasping the basic storyline to a more 
sophisticated scientific understanding), and an understanding of where scientists generally 
feel confident of their knowledge of what is happening, and where uncertainties lie, then that 
intention is, essentially, one of teaching people about the content of the material.
There are, as in all fields, different understandings of how the teaching and learning process 
works. Some are based on psychological understandings of memory and so on; some are 
focussed on the practice and content of material, and some stress the individual learner.
One potentially useful idea is that of learning styles, whereby different people have different 
ways of learning. Whilst this complexifies the production of material to some extent, it also 
makes it more accessible to a larger number of people if, similarly to the idea of providing 
simple and more complex storylines, if different learning styles are recognised9.
8 These are examples, not claims.
Neuro-linguistic programming offers one way of understanding and approaching this, e.g. see 
Garratt. T (1997) The effective Delivery of Training using NLP: a handbook of tools and practical 
experience (Kogan Page).
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There are also ‘basics’ which teachers are taught to use which are helpful. Firstly, there is 
the question of what the teacher wants the learner to have learnt by the end of any particular 
teaching event, and a course in total. Identifying this helps clarify the focus of the teaching. 
A pertinent second question is then how the teacher will find out if the learner has learnt this, 
or is misunderstanding, or is ready to take on material at a higher level. In teaching, this is 
done through discussion and through assessment exercises. The VL project needs to 
consider how it will identify and explore how users are understanding the material (the partial 
understanding of RMD as water movement through rock and the potential for radioactivity to 
reach the biosphere demonstrates that the material is open to an almost reverse 
interpretation -  i.e. that RMD is a bad thing in that it allows the radioactivity to reach the 
surface, rather than a good thing which means that less radioactivity will reach the surface -  
thus fundamentally reversing the significance of the argument about the certainty and 
significance of RMD). This again points to the need for work with ordinary members of the 
public to examine their understanding of the content of the material (rather than their 
responses to the general layout and idea of visual language). Such work could also usefully 
identify what is remembered a week or so after exposure to the material -  i.e. what are the 
ideas that have stuck (that it is all under control? That sugar dissolves in tea so radioactivity 
is like sugar?).
Summary and repetition are also common teaching tools. There will be repetition, or at least 
the use of common concepts, across argumentation maps. However, summaries at the end 
of each AM, (and also within the AM to emphasise and indicate key points) would be useful, 
both to clarify ‘these are the key things about this’ and to indicate and ‘close’ a particular line 
of reasoning.
F2.6 Clarification of Uncertainty
A key initial ambition of the VL project was to use this medium to identify and make explicit 
‘uncertainty’ in the science. There is a question to be asked, however, as to how 
‘uncertainty’ is being defined and represented within the VL project, and whether this is, 
indeed, how you wish to define and represent uncertainty.
Wynne10 discusses four different definitions:
•  risk: the dimensions (of what is not known/uncertainty) are known and can be quantified
• uncertainty: where the dimensions are recognised, but cannot be quantified
• ignorance: where the dimensions are not recognised (i.e. that which we don’t know that 
we don’t know)
• indeterminacy: things that cannot be known (e.g. because of recognition of the 
influence of forms of knowledge on what is known, or because of feedbacks within a 
system whose influence cannot be predicted, or because knowledge claims are 
conditional on a range of contingent factors)
Any or all of these forms of uncertainty become manifested when scientists disagree; that 
they do not become manifested says more about the social conditions of the production and 
application of knowledge than the certainty of the science11. Absolute certainty is, within 
most philosophies of science, unachievable.
10 W ynne, B (1992) Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventative paradigm. Global Environmental Change, June, 111-127
11 see Hunt, J (1994) Science and Policy in North Sea Pollution (unpublished PhD Thesis, Lancaster)
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It was clear that the construction of the VL material focussed on the first and second of 
these, particularly in relation to contested science or science where different interpretations 
were available. There is some allusion to indeterminacy in the final two slides of AM on 
solubility. The term ‘uncertainty' is used generally within the text to refer to the difficulty or 
impossibility of getting sufficiently robust data and models'! 2.
However, ignorance is commonly recognised by lay audiences (as well as by the 
reviewers). That is, people acknowledge that there are always unforeseen elements which 
come into play, that it is not possible to identify these unforeseen elements, and that, from 
life experience, things go wrong (i.e. Murphy’s Law). It is important for overall credibility to 
acknowledge ignorance as an inevitable condition; scientific claims are contingent on all 
relevant factors having been identified and the possibility that some factors are not 
identified needs to be explicit.
Indeterminacy, too, is commonly recognised and need to be made explicit. Areas of non­
knowledge are significant, and provide science with a humility which has generally been 
lacking.
It is perhaps clearer to provide examples from social science (assumptions about the 
‘strength’ of knowledge claims are more embedded and less visible in natural sciences) -  
the claim to have identified all possible social conditions over the life time of the repository 
is easier to accept as nonsensical.
Particular representations of uncertainty/non-knowledge carry their own message -  that is, 
to represent uncertainty as bounded and amenable to control is to implicitly make the claim 
that science can provide absolute predictions which are somehow beyond contingency and 
the unforeseen, and have some absolute relationship with ‘reality’ which is beyond the 
conditions of production of knowledge. Overstating ‘certainty’, and the possibility of 
achieving ‘certainty’, has been identified as a key factor in contested science and the public 
acceptability of scientific claims. Particularly, where certainty (often represented in terms of 
‘safety’, e.g. the claim that ‘it is safe to live downwind of a nuclear power station/eat beef/fly 
to the US’) is then demonstrated to be less than absolute, trust and confidence suffer.
In terms of identifying uncertainty within the way the term is interpreted in the material, a 
range of uncertainties to do with incomplete data, prediction, and relationships are 
identified and communicated. It might well be worthwhile to identify the forms of 
uncertainty that exist and which are these are amenable to becoming more certain if 
appropriate studies are undertaken (e.g. collection of more data). It is also, I think, worth 
being explicit about the other types of non-knowledge which we know exist.
there is a key distinction here: difficulty in gaining adequate data/models presumes that it is 
possible to aquire these if sufficient resources are applied; impossibility includes the possibility that it 
is not possible to acquire certainty, as the epistemological premises of a knowledge form are  
themselves constructed and conditional.
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F2.7 Contexts of use and delivery media
2.7.1 Media
Three media were considered in relation to the material -  A4 sheets or similar, as 
posters/boards, and the internet.
A4
Presentation as a series of A4 sheets obviously has serious drawbacks, most notably that 
the structure of the material is largely invisible, and that the sort of visual clues discussed 
above are largely missing. Reviewers identified difficulty in knowing when one section has 
ended and another begun, and in the relation of parts of the material.
Posters
Posters were only presented at the workshop, and detailed responses to them thereby 
limited. Apart from the obvious limitations to reproduction, transportability and display 
caused by the size of the posters, they did provide a much clearer sense of the structure of 
the material. However, there was a very large amount of information on each poster, making 
them unsuitable for general display.
Internet/CD
As an internet/CD presentation, the material obviously has great potential. A map of the 
structure is still required, but hyperlinking both through the material, to the glossary, and to 
external sources, gives more versatility (and the potential for more confusion if the structure 
is not clearly visible). The user can define their own pathway through the material in relation 
to their interest and existing knowledge. Electronic communication also offers the possibility 
of using animations (groundwater flow is an obvious candidate for animation) and sound, 
including voice-overs. It would also be possible to include interactive dimensions. Modelling 
could be demonstrated in simple terms by setting up a model with a number of parameters 
whereby the user could change e.g. temperature, pressure and see what happened. 
However, if the material is to be seriously developed for electronic communication, expertise 
in this medium will be essential, both to contribute to design, and to carry out the work.
2.7.2 Context
Interacting with the medium of presentation is the context of use. Reviewers reflected on the 
use of the posters in a ‘village hall’, i.e. set out on display boards for people to walk around 
and look at. There is a presumption here that people have an interest in the material. There 
is a large amount of material being presented, and more segmentation (chunking) is 
probably needed, as well as backup, printed material that people can take away. Selection 
of material, rather than presenting everything, will probably be necessary both due to space 
constraints and the sheer volume of material if argumentation maps are developed for all the 
scientific topics. Here again, maps of the larger range of issues will be necessary, perhaps 
accompanied by leaflet versions of individual argumentation maps. The question of how 
much information people actually want is again pertinent. Attention needs to be given to the 
direction of flow, i.e. where it is necessary to read one area of the poster in order for a 
subsequent section to make sense. Attention also needs to be given to the way in which 
people (including people with restricted mobility) will physically move around the material, 
and to the social context and implications of the event -  e.g. people are likely to talk to each 
other. The posters, at present, are also too large -  the distance from the top to the bottom is 
more than is easily readable by most people if standing. If the material is to be used on 
display boards or equivalent, some professional advice on the use of this medium would be 
worthwhile.
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As electronic communication, use is likely to be individual. Setting up a number of terminals 
in a common space is also possible, and might well be worthwhile particularly once sites are 
identified, in order to provide, and to demonstrate a commitment to providing, accessible 
information. The material also has potential linkages to the schools’ website being used in 
RISCOM. Use, however, is still primarily individual and this needs to be taken into account 
within the design.
A decision needs to be made regarding the medium in which the material is to be presented, 
and professional advice sought regarding the potential and limitations of these media.
2.7.3 Dialogue
The material clearly has uses in relation to dialogue and consultation, both as information 
provision and as a prompt to discussion. Here again, decisions need to be taken in terms of 
the potential use in dialogue. If the material is basically envisaged as information provision, 
laying out the ‘facts of the matter1 or ‘current scientific knowledge’, there are different 
implications for design. The material currently reads as if this is the intention. If, however, 
the intention is to generate discussion, then questions about the purpose of that discussion 
need to be answered, or at least considered. Inserting questions (of the type ‘what do you 
think’) into the material is one way of prompting discussion. However, the design in relation 
to dialogue uses is not the most important consideration: developing the material as 
information provision will not preclude its use within dialogue. That the material provides 
access points to discussion is itself valuable.
The material has obvious potential for use in conjunction with web-based dialogue, and at 
the least, some form of interactive response needs to be built in: at the simplest, this could 
be an email box where users could ‘write-in’ with questions. A discussion space is also 
relatively simple to set up. Decisions would need to be taken in relation to the use of queries 
and comments posted in this way: providing a communication channel is a valid purpose in 
its own right, but added value could be gained if, for example, queries and comments were 
analysed to find common areas of understanding/misunderstanding, where information is 
challenged, etc, in order e.g. to revise and improve the material and/or to identify areas of 
particular concern.
Some thought should be given to the potential uses of the material for dialogue and 
consultation, and decisions taken as to whether design is to be tailored to particular uses.
2.7.4 Users
It is not at all clear who the intended audience or readership is. If a ‘general’ readership is 
assumed then the comments on providing a ‘simple story line’ as well as more detailed and 
complex storylines is extremely pertinent, as are comments on the need for a clear map of 
the structure of the information. A much simpler and more straightforward lop layer1 needs 
to be produced -  similar in tone and detail to the options descriptions poster -  where users 
can gain an overview of the material and decide which areas to pursue.
It is worth considering who the different users might be. They are likely to include:
• stakeholders of various types, including industry and ENGOs, both of which groups are 
likely to be critical in stance (all criticisms should be taken seriously and discussed)
F15
Appendices
• members of the public with very different levels of interest, scientific literacy, and 
familiarity with the topics (the VL approach does lend itself to presenting different levels 
of complexity, although this is not fully utilised in the material prepared so far)
• school classes (where the material is likely to be used in a classroom setting and could 
benefit from the incorporation of tasks/questions for use as a teaching aid)
• local groups and individuals interested particularly in relation to the possibility of local 
siting of a repository (where some interpretation of the material in terms of the local site 
will be required)
The material thus needs to be considered in relation to a wider range of potential users and 
in relation to particular sites. The range of users is not yet properly incorporated in terms of 
both the ‘layering’ of the material (i.e. the provision of simple overviews with more detailed 
continuation/understoreys) or its range (i.e. the level of detail in relation to particular topics, 
and the number of topics).
2.7.5 Intent
The comments above point up the need for clarity in the choices that are being made, 
explicitly and implicitly,
The lack of clarity of intent/purpose is reflected in the visual component of the work -  its 
inconsistency and ad hoc-ness, as well as in the lack of clear structure and style.
Decisions need to be taken before the material is developed much further in relation to 
purposes and intentions. If decisions are not taken, the material will (as it appears to be 
starting to do now) develop an intention of its own -  that is, the design logic will drive further 
development, rather than being a tool to enable meeting the intentions of that development.
Some of these decisions are described above, but these are not intended to be exclusive, 
although some decisions imply a choice between different paths. A workshop within Nirex -  
possibly including external stakeholders -  would be a useful starting point to identify and 
discuss the range of intentions, but this will need to lead to decisions and choices rather than 
generated ever-increasing areas of discussion (although there is of course a choice to made 
as to when sufficient discussion has taken place to be able to reach a decision).
F2 .8  Bias
2.8.1 Rhetoric
Communicative activities carry their own particular rhetorics. Three particular rhetorical 
frameworks are visible:
1. That science is capable of establishing sufficient knowledge on which to base decisions, 
even over the very long timescales involved -  and, by implication, that ‘everything is 
under control’
2. That the nature of the problem is one that can be addressed and resolved by science
3. That uncertainty is bounded and resolvable.
All of these implicit claims are potentially ‘offensive’, either explicitly (for those who can 
articulate concerns in this area) or as a less well defined ‘suspicion’ of the claims that are 
being made. The rhetoric being adopted needs to be a conscious choice, rather than a 
product of the assumptions of the authors, in order to be aligned with decisions about the 
intent and purpose of the material.
F16
Appendices
These rhetorics give rise, inevitably13, to bias in several ways:
1. Whilst the material does a reasonable job of identifying uncertainty (as discussed above) 
it does not prompt, or particularly enable, the user to make their own judgements about 
the science. Inevitably the material tells its own story, but this could be opened up more, 
for example by using 'what do you think' type questions, thereby encouraging, and giving 
permission, for the user to have their own views. However, most lay users are still likely 
to feel they do not have the expertise or authority to make scientific judgements, and the 
material is not sufficiently comprehensive to provide a solid basis for such judgements. 
There is therefore a bias towards positioning the user to accept the material -  and the 
claims and statements it makes -  rather than challenging it.
2. There is a bias towards a narrow definition of uncertainty, as discussed above.
3. The focus on uncertainty is itself a form of bias -  why is uncertainty important, why is it 
problematic, and for whom? (an argumentation map on uncertainty, exploring these 
questions, would be a good example of including one of the 'other dimensions’ which so 
many reviewers saw as lacking).
4. Who is the *we' in the text? This seems to presume a common position which not 
everyone might wish to adopt. Even worse is the passive voice -  ‘it is known that’ -  who 
knows? The passive voice presumes an absolute, beyond human, uncontestable claim, 
which is not the case.
5. The focus on containment in relation to humans and the human environment contains an 
ethical presumption that these are the areas of concern. The exclusion of consideration 
of effects on the natural environment represents a bias in favour of humans14.
6. The presentation of medical and industry waste production (vl3) implies that production 
of wastes is a given: the use of the term 'come from’ implies the continuation of 
production as unquestioned. This locates Nirex not as neutral, but as supporting the 
continued production of wastes. This is an important question, and whilst Nirex may 
need to not adopt a position, this needs to be stated, and some pointer provided towards 
the fact that there is debate on continued production.
7. What is included and excluded from the scope of the material gives a message in itself: 
currently the bias is towards a narrow technical and scientific scope.
8. The conservative, standardised form of presentation gives a message of an intention to 
reassure, to make the user feel this is verifiable and understandable: this is a normative 
stance, which excludes several notions of uncertainty, and goes beyond Popperian15 
notions of science in its implicit claim for certainty and knowability. The nature of science 
is taken as a given -  yet this could well be a fundamentally important area to open for 
explicit consideration and deliberation (it would also assist in the understandability of the 
material if the structure, premises and terminology of science were introduced).
13 unbiased, or neutral, information, is impossible to produce -  one m erely provides a  rhetoric of 
neutrality, which is not the sam e thing. Bias is inevitable, but one can m ake bias m ore explicit, or 
explain the reasons for the direction of bias.
14 In various discussions, a large num ber of people have raised the point that effects on the natural 
environment are important in their own right, not just because of knock on effects on humans: fish  
have rights’. Ignoring this is likely to alienate m any users of the material.
13 Karl Popper understood science to m ake verifiable knowledge claims, which would stand until 
evidence to the contrary w as produced. Thus, the claim ‘there are no black swans’ is unscientific,
because it cannot be verified unless all swans are identified and none of them prove to be black -  and 
w e cannot know w e have identified all the swans, and that none are hiding. The claim th e re  are  
black swans’ is verifiable by the evidence being produced -  i.e. a black swan being found (I do not 
know if this evidence is overturned if som eone eats the black swan).
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9. The particular view of science being presented is another form of bias, making science 
separate from society and giving it a special, prioritised claim on what can be known. It 
can be disempowering to present the issues as scientific, in this sense, excluding the 
non-scientific and extra-scientific questions and concerns.
10. The simplification of complexity, and the use of everyday images, makes complexity 
simple and the risks everyday -  a  very contestable rhetoric.
11. The material is presented in terms of safety, both in content and style. The omission of 
‘unsafety’ communicates either a patronising stance, or a lack of ability to see problems 
which others identify. Where, for example, are the leukemia and thyroid cancer victims, 
that many of us know about? Their exclusion is a form of bias.
F3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
WORK
It is quite clear that the VL project has enormous potential, both as a form of communication 
with respect to the intention of ‘making science accessible’ to a wide range of audiences, 
and as a vehicle for dialogue both with and outside Nirex.
To date, the VL project has obviously had considerable benefit in developing Nirex’s 
understanding of the complexity of ‘making science accessible'. It would be valuable to take 
a little time to document this learning to avoid future wheel reinvention.
The materials developed to date provide a basis for continuation of the project. However, 
the purpose(s) of the material need to be more thoroughly considered and defined, now that 
a better understanding of the potential of the VL approach has been gained. Style also 
needs to be defined in relation to this purpose, and the project and products would benefit 
from working with an appropriate16 professional designer. The scope of the material also 
needs reconsidering. The overall structure needs tighter definition, the top layer needs 
working out in relation to this structure, and the ‘simple’ story lines need to be developed.
There are biases in the style of representation adopted which may prove problematic with 
wider, more general audiences. Particularly, the implicit safety and controllability rhetorics, 
and the narrow representation of uncertainty, need reconsideration.
The positioning of the reader as a passive recipient of information needs serious attention, 
especially in conjunction with possible uses of the material in relation to dialogue and 
consultation.
As a communication and information form, the VL material could well be developed as the 
central ‘stem’ of communication products (I am excluding consideration of dialogic uses for 
the moment, and focussing on the general requirement for Nirex to provide information in 
some form -  traditionally as leaflets, brochures and a website). It is easy to see how the 
material, and parts of the material can be utilised in different media (a booklet introducing the 
hydrogeological aspects of a deep repository, for example).
16 It would be essential to work with a designer who w as sensitive to the intentions of the project and 
who w as skilled in working with clients (i.e. Nirex) to identify the design choices and factors 
influencing these choices. Unfortunately, not all professional designers m eet this specification.
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It might also be viable to consider developing part or all of the material, in a consistent style, 
in conjunction with other agencies also involved in producing information on similar topics 
(e.g. NRPB, DEFRA, EA, Friends of the Earth). This would assist resourcing; more 
importantly, it would bring together a wider range of stakeholders to engage in the very 
important process of production (to gain benefit from this it would be necessary to be explicit 
about the value of the process, and the resist being overly driven by a requirement for 
products). It would, of course, be essential to include critical voices (who are likely to need 
resourcing) in such a group. The disadvantage of such a collective approach is that it could 
lead to a set of ‘master’ information which was more difficult to challenge, and was thus 
exclusionary. However, if the problem of ‘agreeing’ (i.e. losing the argumentation from the 
argumentation maps) can be resolved, a very useful knowledge map could be produced17.
The VL project is emblematic of Nirex’s developing awareness of its relationship with others. 
As such, it warrants a higher profile within Nirex, to encourage this awareness. The VL 
project embodies a positive approach to a complex and difficult situation. The creative 
space it occupies, however, is related to the period of (potentially) creative chaos which 
radioactive waste management in general, and Nirex in particular, are currently 
experiencing, and this should be acknowledged. There is no immediate need for closure of 
this period, and the creative opportunities it provides are beneficial in relation to the VL 
project.
17 Such a map -  and the process of collectively producing such a map - would also form a valuable
contribution to the review of science being contemplated by DEFRA.
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Appendix: specific comments on Visual Language
Presentation
1. All non standard images (i.e. specialist/not immediately accessible to a general 
audience, e.g. graphs) need to be appropriately titled or labelled.
2. The labelling of axes on graphs is problematic: to make these more understandable by 
the non-specialist who is already finding it difficult to work out what a graph means, non­
specialist language for labelling axes is clearly preferable. E.g. the use of the word 
‘concentration’, which is not understood (in terms of the scientific understanding) in lay 
usage.
3. The predominant font used is Times New Roman or similar, which gives a formal 
appearance. Different fonts can be used to communicate that ‘this is a scientific bit’, this 
is a  sum m ary , this is an  introduction, and font selection (and colour and size) is a useful 
tool for identifying to the reader where they are and what they are supposed to be doing. 
Again, using too many different ‘codes’ is confusing.
4. Using too many fonts is confusing.
5. Any hyperlinks need to be clearly identified as such, using a consistent motif such as text 
which is underlined. This motif should not then be used for anything else.
Images
1. Images should be used consistently: if an image is used as a representation or symbol 
for one thing, it should not then be used as a symbol for another (e.g. the image of the 
people sitting around a table appears to be used as a image for people in general, and 
for the research community in particular).
2. Images should add something in terms of explanation, rather than being purely 
decorative.
3. The image of people sitting round a table appears to include only Caucasians, with 
women in subservient positions (presenting the image in e.g. black on green bypasses 
racial stereotypes to some extent). Not taking account ‘political correctness’ of itself 
gives a clear message to readers that Nirex are not concerned about racial and gender 
issues.
4. Is crystal ball gazing really supposed to be a representation of scientific uncertainty?
5. The images of rock structure were widely liked.
6. The contested cup of tea slide sol6 presumably intends to demonstrate that (the rate of? 
The occurrence of?) solubility varies with temperature, but this is not spelt out, and the 
slide appears to be demonstrating (in relation to the preceding heading) only that things 
dissolve in everyday life.
7. The use of clip art was felt to be flippant, and used to present a message that these 
weren’t important issues, and weren’t anything to worry about. This message, in turn, 
was read as intentionally trying to trivialise the issue, and direct attention away from it.
8. The options poster was generally liked, although there were some comments related to 
simplicity -  the rocket, especially, generated a response in several people that they 
wanted to see what happened next (rocket travels to sun? rocket crashes?).
9. Graphs were generally felt to be more difficult to understand.
10. Diagrams were generally felt to be very helpful.
11. Clip art was described as ‘eye candy18’ used to break up the text -  there was a view that 
it added interest, although most felt that these common, and somewhat cartoon like 
images should be replaced with something more specific and more serious.
18 There is more attractive eye candy available, if this is the intention.
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Colour
1. a large number of men are colour blind, so the use of red and green should be avoided; 
different shades of green in combination will be illegible.
2. Dark colours on dark colours eg as used on header slides for in VM e.g. vm2, 8, 9 etc, 
are hard to read and illegible at a distance.
3. There are certain common cultural expectations in the use of colours in representations 
-  water is blue, for example; complying with these expectations aids communication (e.g. 
where particles are blue and water is sandy coloured)
4. There are particular cultural associations for colours -  red, or yellow/black, for warning, 
for example.
5. The expectations and associations of colours do vary across cultures: purple is the 
colour of royalty for some, and of goths19 for others. White is the colour of purity in the 
west, and of mourning in the east. Colours should be used with an awareness of the 
readership.
Space
1. ‘blank spaces are thinking spaces’: leaving spaces should be done deliberately, to 
indicate to the reader where to pause and reflect on what they have just read.
2. Some slides have far too much on them: others too little. If (and this is not clear to me, 
as reader) the slides are supposed to represent steps in a line of reasoning, this will be 
unworkable in relation to the space available, as some steps are bigger than others. 
Steps and lines would be better indicated visually by some other means (e.g. colour, 
format).
House style
1. Adopting a house style is important because it enables the reader to leam how a 
presentation is constructed and where to look for various things (e.g. the footnotes are at 
the bottom of the page; the introductory bit will be in red arial 12 point). Use of a 
consistent style throughout will aid accessability. The current style is not consistent, and 
not used in any clear sense in relation to the structure.
2. It is essential that grammar, punctuation and spelling are correct (this is not always the 
case in this version) -  otherwise a message of sloppiness comes over, and that does not 
inspire confidence in Nirex as a radioactive waste management organisation.
Direction
1. English is read from top to bottom, left to right, and clockwise (e.g. where speech 
bubbles are used). Meaning should move in these directions.
Definition/terminology/word use
1. all specialist terms should be explained when first used (this is not always the case in 
this version of the material), and should then be used consistently with this explanation, 
e.g. see rmd15 where several new terms are suddenly introduced (advection, rock face) 
along with a graph.
2. Not more than one term should be introduced at once.
3. the terms ‘research’ and ‘modelling’ need clarification and distinguishing very early on.
19 Goths are a sub-group of alternative youth culture distinguished by their adoption of black and 
purple clothing, with a preference for velvets and lace.
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4. ‘diffusive flux’ explanation goes straight in at a relatively complex level, and its relevance 
to rock matrix diffusion isn’t clear -  the heading ‘general theory...’ on rmd2 leads the 
reader to expect an explanation of rmd, not of diffusion.
5. Diffusion flux might be more understandable as rate of flow x number of particles x time 
over distance; this term certainly needs an explanation in lay language such as the rate 
at which particles move through rock. It could then go on to look at the factors 
influencing this -  i.e. concentration (which is a term which is not explained, and should 
be).
6. Rmd 8 (concentration gradient) is a good simple explanation, but does not take account 
of other factors affecting the rate of diffusion, e.g. ph, temperature. This could be 
approached in the same way as solubility (i.e. solubility is the amount that dissolves, and 
the rate at which things dissolve is influenced by....)
7. Rmd8 is a good example of a bad graph -  it is not clear whether the arrow points to the 
curve or the red line, what the red line means is unknowable to someone not familiar with 
curves on graphs, there are two arrows on the slide, one used as an indicator (this is a 
....) and one used to indicate movement, and the term concentration is used to label an 
axis but is not explained (see comment below). And the bunch of flowers can be read 
as ‘so its just like flowers, i.e. pleasant, safe, - if they are trying to tell me radioactivity is 
like that, they are lying....’. I do not think it is actually necessary to understand the 
concept of a concentration gradient to understand rock matrix diffusion (simple version) 
and this slide, here, with this complicated concept, is offputting.
8. Conflation of terms that have both lay and specialist meanings -  such as concentration -  
should be avoided. Like dissolve and melt, the lay understanding of concentration is 
different from its specialist meaning, focussing (I think) on how much ‘stufF there is in 
one place (concentrated) rather than as a relationship between different concentrations. 
This relationship needs spelling out.
9. Examples should be identified as examples, using the sentence structure -  stating ‘for 
example....’.
10. Common symbols are useful, but their meaning can be ambiguous and changes with 
context (e.g. the use of the ‘no entry’ symbol on slide » ) .  If there is an emotive 
heading, for example, a symbol is likely to be interpreted differently than if there is a 
technical heading.
11. Large numbers should be written as words: lots of zeros are not comprehensible to many 
people.
12. Words need to be used very carefully, both individually and in relation to each other.
E.g. The use of ‘unique’ (s lide»> ) suggested unpredictability where the intention was to 
suggest predictability.
13. Whenever ‘it’ is used, the thing being referred to should be clear -  sometimes it is 
ambiguous which of two possible referents are intended.
14. Verb tenses can be confusing. ‘There is a problem of rock matrix diffusion’ suggests that 
there is currently a problem in the physical world rather than the scientific research 
world. That there ‘will be’ or ‘may be’ a problem is more appropriate in relation to a 
future repository. There is’ also gives the impression that the reader should already 
know what rock matrix diffusion is.
15. Acronyms should always be defined on first use; it may be necessary to alter text to 
encompass this with disruption. Acronyms should also be linked to a glossary.
16. The difference between storage and disposal needs to be explained.
17. The term ‘concept’ is used in relation to the Nirex concept, without explanation -  and it is 
confusing to use this word for ‘the Nirex concept’ and the idea of a concept.
18. Notwithstanding the difficulties this audience had with unfamiliar graphs, simple, clearly 
labelled graphs are recognised as a valuable means of communication -  and the
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expectation that ‘everyone should speak English’ (rather than speaking maths) is clearly 
arguable. It is reasonable to make some demands, and place some expectations, on 
users, rather than trying to reduce everything to the lowest common denominator.
Structure
1. In the linear form (printed on A4 sheets) it is very difficult to see where different sections 
are, and to read in order, and to see the overall structure, and impossible to grasp where 
there are choices to follow the information along one line or another. If this form is to be 
used, reordering and ‘links’ will have to be incorporated.
2. The material is largely ‘chunked’, although this is not particularly clear in the layout and 
style. There is a valid emphasis on the flow of ideas, but this appears to have been 
emphasised at the expense of the individual ‘chunks’ -  where the chunks are in relation 
to each other, and where the beginning and end of each chunk is, needs to be clear. A 
summary slide at the end of each chunk would achieve this, as well as providing a useful 
(simple) summary of that bit.
3. The beginnings and end of individual ideas and larger ideas need to be clearly marked, 
even (especially) when the end of one idea is the beginning of another (again, this can 
be done through style/visual indicators of ‘this is the end of this bit and the beginning of 
the next bit’ as well as through the text. Rmf 16, for example, suddenly introduces the 
idea of a model, and that the use of model involves assumptions, which is key to the 
whole argumentation map, but just appears half way through a section on what is as isn’t 
known. Yes, it flows from the previous slide, but needs a clear visual and structural clue 
that this is important.
4. Headings sometimes seem to have little to do with the subsequent slides -  eg rmd 7&8
5. All slides should be numbered (discretely) -  or provided with some form of identification, 
so that they can be referred to directly in discussion/communication.
Content
1. Where claims contradict ‘common knowledge’ this needs to be explicit -  otherwise it is 
confusing and can appear to be dishonest. E.g. it is common (ish) knowledge that the 
ice sheets are melting, i.e. unstable, so presenting them as stable in the options poster is 
problematic.
2. Time and distance are in play at many points, and it needs to be clearer when either or 
both are important.
3. Huge timescales are notoriously difficult to comprehend in a culture where we largely do 
not think beyond a generation or two. It is usually more accessible to think about long 
periods of time projecting backwards rather than forwards (‘if the Romans had produced 
radioactive waste, we would still be looking after it now’). One suggestion was for an 
image of ‘security guards’ through the ages, ‘caring for1 the waste across a historical 
vista and providing a visual prompt.
4. Statements such as ‘since we’ve lived in caves’ are offensive to e.g. contemporary 
Spanish cave dwellers.
5. The final slides in the RMF AM are confusing, particularly rmd 22 -  are the Swedes and 
Nirex using different data? Why was different significance attached to rmd? Are ‘the 
Swedes’ and ‘Nirex’ equivalent entities?
6. An argumentation map on the dangers of radioactivity is essential.
7. The assumed level of knowledge of the reader is very variable -  we are supposed to 
know what concentration is, but need solubility explaining; we can understand graphs but 
need picture of cups of tea. Increasing complexity as we proceed through the slides
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doesn’t work -  it means people give up before they get to the end of the story. Rather, 
there should be concurrent simple and complex narratives.
8. The presumption that waste needs to be kept remote from humans needs explanation -  
why is it dangerous, and why is it difficult?
9. The ideas that a) radioactivity decays and b) protection is considered in terms of 
exposure to radioactivity, rather than ‘locking it away’ could usefully be explicated.
10. The lack of reference to decay chains and daughter isotopes, and how these complicate 
assessments, undermines confidence in the comprehensiveness of the stories beina 
told.
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